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2010 DIGILAW 4037 (MAD)

Lakshmi Vilas Bank Limited rep. By its Managing Director K. S. R. Anjaneyalu v. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Chennai Bench D

2010-09-06

CHITRA VENKATARAMAN

body2010
Judgment :- 1. These writ petitions are against the order of the Appellate Tribunal relating to MP.Nos.150/Mds/2006 and 151/Mds/2006 dated 5th March 2010, rejecting the prayer of the writ petitioner for rectification of the appeal order relating to the Assessment Year 1992-93 (ITA 766/Mds/00) and 1995-96 (ITA-681/Mds/03) on the ground that no legal ground was taken on the validity of the reopening of the assessment. The Tribunal further pointed out that no additional grounds stated to have been filed was available in the files. The Tribunal, however, rectified its orders on other aspects and granted the relief. The writ petitioner is challenging that portion of the order relating to the claim on the additional grounds raised on the validity of the reopening of assessment. 2. It is seen from the order of the Tribunal that it rectified the order as regards the broken period interest. Being a mistake apparent from the record, the Tribunal recalled its order dated 10.3.2006 in I.T.A.No.766/ Mds/ 2000 relating to 1992-93 for the limited purpose of deciding this issue. Similarly as regards the proportionate expenses for tax free interest receipt and proportionate expenses for earning dividend, the Tribunal pointed out that it had omitted to mention the same in the said order. The Tribunal further rectified its order in respect of Assessment Year 1992-93 and 1995-96 in I.T.A.Nos. 766/Mds/2000 and 681/ Mds/ 2003 as regards the issue of fees for enhancement of capital involved, thereby rectified its order. In respect of Assessment Year 1995-96 in ITA 1406/MDS/99, the Tribunal accepted the plea of the petitioner for rectification on the issue of deposit mobilisation expenses. So too, the appeal relating to I.T.A.No.631/MDS/06 relating to Assessment Year 1996-97 as regards the fees paid to SEBI. However, as far as M.P.Nos.150 and 151 of 2006 were concerned, the Tribunal pointed out that the issue of reopening the assessment was not raised by the assessee in its appeals in I.T.A.Nos.766/Mds/2000 and 681/Mds/2003 relating to the Assessment Years 1992-93 and 1995-96. The Tribunal pointed out that the original grounds contained no such legal ground nor any mention about the additional grounds filed in the files. Accordingly, the Tribunal rejected the plea of the petitioner to allow the rectification petition as regards the issue raised on reopening of the assessment relating to Assessment Years 1992-93 and 1995-96. Aggrieved by this portion of the order, the present writ petitions are filed. 3. Accordingly, the Tribunal rejected the plea of the petitioner to allow the rectification petition as regards the issue raised on reopening of the assessment relating to Assessment Years 1992-93 and 1995-96. Aggrieved by this portion of the order, the present writ petitions are filed. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decision reported in [2010] 324 ITR 87 – CIT v. Malladi Project Management P. Limited), wherein it is held that failure by Tribunal to consider a ground would not be a reason for filing an appeal. The reported decision relates to an issue raised by the revenue that a particular ground raised was not considered by the Tribunal. To this, this Court held that it is for the revenue to bring the same to the notice of the Tribunal and get it rectified by a procedure known to law. The failure of the Tribunal to consider the issue raised, by itself, cannot be a reason for filing an appeal and even if an appeal is filed, the same has to be remitted back to the Tribunal once again for re-consideration of the issue. As far as the present case is concerned, the petitioner took the plea that the Tribunal had not considered the issue on reopening of the assessment. Apart from this, there were several other aspects which were also raised in the rectification petition. While the Tribunal rectified its order on some of the issues raised, it however rejected the prayer as regards the validity of reopening of the assessment that no ground was raised challenging the same. 4. On the language of Section 260-A of the Income Tax Act, the proper remedy for the petitioner as against an order passed on merits in the rectification petition would be to file an appeal alone and not by way of a writ petition. Section 260-A of the Income Tax Act providing for appeal to the High Court states: "An appeal shall lie to the High Court from every order passed in appeal by the Appellate Tribunal, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law." The phrase, "every order" came up for consideration in the decision reported in (1967) 1 SCR 310 (Central Bank of India Ltd. Vs. Golak Chand). The said decision relates to a case arising under the Delhi Rent Control Act. Golak Chand). The said decision relates to a case arising under the Delhi Rent Control Act. Section 38(1) of the Act gives the right of appeal to a party aggrieved by an order of the controller affecting his rights or liability. The Apex Court pointed out "in a pending proceedings, the controller may pass interlocutory orders in a pending proceeding. Under Section 36, he may pass orders for the summoning of witnesses, the issue of commissions for examination of witnesses discovery, production and inspection of documents and inspection of premises. ... Under Section 38 an appeal shall lie from every order of the Controller made under this Act to the Rent Control Tribunal. As against the orders of the Appellate Tribunal under Section 39 an appeal lies to the High Court. " 5. Referring to Section 38(1), the Apex Court pointed out "the object of Section 38(1) is to give a right of appeal to a party aggrieved by some order which affects his right or liability. In the context of Section 38(1), the words "every order of the Controller made under this Act", though very wide, do not include interlocutory orders, which are merely procedural and do not affect the rights or liabilities of the parties. In a pending proceeding, the Controller may pass many interlocutory orders under Sections 36 and 37, such as orders regarding the summoning of witnesses, discovery, production and inspection of documents, issue of a commission for examination of witnesses, inspection of premises, fixing a date of hearing and the admissibility of a document or the relevance of a question. All these interlocutory orders are steps taken towards the final adjudication and for assisting the parties in the prosecution of their case in the pending proceeding; they regulate the procedure only and do not affect any right or liability of the parties. The legislature could not have intended that the parties would be harassed with endless expenses and delay by appeals from such procedural orders. It is open to any party to set forth the error, defect or irregularity, if any, in such an order as a ground of objection in his appeal from the final order in the main proceeding. Subject to the aforesaid limitation, an appeal lies to the Rent Control Tribunal from every order passed by the Controller under the Act. It is open to any party to set forth the error, defect or irregularity, if any, in such an order as a ground of objection in his appeal from the final order in the main proceeding. Subject to the aforesaid limitation, an appeal lies to the Rent Control Tribunal from every order passed by the Controller under the Act. Even an interlocutory order passed under Section 37(2) is an order passed under the Act and is subject to appeal under Section 38(1) provided it affects some right or liability of any party. Thus, an order of the Rent Controller refusing to set aside an ex parte order is subject to appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal. " 6. Going by the above understanding of the phrase "every order" and the rejection of the rectification petition was on merits and not as to the maintainability of the same, the proper course for the assessee would be to file an appeal under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act. The Section provides for an appeal remedy as against every order passed in appeal by the Tribunal. Applying the decision of the Apex Court to the provisions under Section 260-A of the Income Tax Act, that the order passed being one on the appeal order, writ will not lie as against an order passed by the Tribunal in the rectification proceedings on merits. 7. In view of the above, the above writ petitions are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected MPs are also dismissed.