Judgment : 1. This application has been filed under Section 92(1) of C.P.C. seeking leave of this Court to institute a suit. 2. The relief asked for in this plaint is to frame a Scheme for performance of management and administration of the affairs of the schedule mentioned suit properties vested with the committee of the first defendant Society by supersession of the Committee. 3. When this Application No. 2182 of 2010 came up for hearing on 15.4.2010, this Court ordered notice. Notice was served and the first respondent entered appearance through its counsel and filed a counter opposing the grant of leave. 4. The applicants in their affidavit filed in support of their leave application stated that first defendant is a Society started in the year 1946, but registered in 1954 in Registration No. 24 of 1954 under the . The main object of first defendant is to provide free education, books and school uniforms to the poor and needy and also for the improvement of the Nadar Community people who are presently residing in Chennai but hailed from Tenkasi and its surrounding areas. The first defendant is running three Educational Institutions, a temple and a Community Ritual Place. It is having four bank accounts in its name. The applicants are five in number and they are the members of first defendant Society for more than 25 years. They have sufficient interest in protecting the interest of the Society. 5. According to them, during the year 2004-2005, some of the members of the Society alleged that the Society was being mismanaged and made complaints to the Registrar of Societies, North Chennai. A competent authority was appointed under Section 36 of the Act, who conducted an enquiry and submitted his Report on 29.6.2007. On that basis, a further enquiry was conducted by the District Registrar and he submitted a report on 11.2.2008 to the I.G. Of Registration. The I.G. On 24.8.2008, recommended to the second defendant to appoint a Special Officer. But, no steps have been taken by the second defendant, eventhough an order has been passed by this Court in W.P. No. 15077 of 2009 on 30.7.2008. 6. According to the applicants, all their efforts to correct their irregularities have filed and therefore, the suit has been filed for the aforesaid relief. 7. But, no steps have been taken by the second defendant, eventhough an order has been passed by this Court in W.P. No. 15077 of 2009 on 30.7.2008. 6. According to the applicants, all their efforts to correct their irregularities have filed and therefore, the suit has been filed for the aforesaid relief. 7. In the counter, the first respondent objects to the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 92 C.P.C. as the Society is registered under Societies Registration Act. The Registrar is competent to go into the irregularities and enough provisions are there in the Act itself. It is pointed out in the counter that the applicants were the Executive Committee members during the period 2004 to 2006. As they acted against the interest of the Society, they were suspended on 2.8.2006. Against the order of suspension, the applicants 1 and 2 filed a suit and the same was dismissed on 3.2.2009. While admitting the fact that there was an enquiry and followed by a report, it was stated that the irregularities took place during 2004 to 2006 during which period the first, second and fifth applicants were Committee Members. It is pointed out that because of their failure the present management is finding it difficult to collect the account books and to complete the formalities. The counter narrates the number of legal proceedings initiated by the first, second and fifth applicants herein, which reads as follows: i. O.S. No. 1758 of 2007 filed before XIII Asst. City Civil Court by first and second applicants for a declaration, declaring the order of suspension dated 2.8.2006 is null and void and for permanent injunction restraining this respondent from operating the bank accounts. The said suit was dismissed on merits on 3.2.2009 and as against the dismissal of the suit the first and second applicants filed 1st appeal in A.S. No. 269 of 2009 pending before XI Additional City Civil Judge at Chennai. ii. O.S. No. 713 of 2008 filed by this respondent against the 1st and 2nd applicants before XIII Asst. City Civil Court, for production of account books pertaining to the year 2004-2006-pending. iii. C.M.A. No. 78 of 2008 on the file of the V Addl. ii. O.S. No. 713 of 2008 filed by this respondent against the 1st and 2nd applicants before XIII Asst. City Civil Court, for production of account books pertaining to the year 2004-2006-pending. iii. C.M.A. No. 78 of 2008 on the file of the V Addl. City Civil Judge at Chennai, filed by the first and the second applicants as against the order in I.A. No. 7131 of 2008 in O.S. No. 713 of 2008 wherein, the first and the second applicants were directed to furnish the account books for the year 20042006 into the Court for safe custody. iv. O.S. No. 3458 of 2008 filed by the fifth applicant herein for permanent injunction restraining this respondent from conveying the General Body Meeting on 25.5.2008. The suit was dismissed on 12.1.2009. Therefore, the first respondent sought for the dismissal of this application. 8. A reply affidavit has been filed by the applicants wherein they reiterate that notwithstanding the fact that the first respondent was registered under the Societies Act, still it is amenable to Section 92 C.P.C., as the first respondent is a Constructive Trust. Excepting this, the other allegations raised in the counter are not denied in the reply. 9. I have heard the learned counsel for the applicants and the learned counsel for the first respondent. I have also gone through the documents including the counter and the reply affidavit. 10. The only question that arises, for consideration is that whether leave could be granted to the applicants to institute the suit under Section 92 C.P.C. 11. Though a technical objection was raised by the first respondent stating that Section 92 will not apply, the same is not sustainable in view of the decision of this Court in M. Gomathinayagam Pillai and Others v. Sri Manthramurthi High School Committee, Tirunelveli and Others AIR 1963 Mad 387 : (1963) 2 MLJ 56 and the judgment dated 30.1.2004 in O.S.A. No. 251 of 2003 Chennai Vazh Duraiyur Nadar Uravin Murai Magamai Sangam and Others v. K.A. Gurusamy and Others (2004) 1 MLJ 731 . 12. 12. In the M. Gomathinayagam Pillai and Others v. Sri Manthramurthi High School Committee, Tirunelveli and Others (supra), a Division Bench of this Court held that the jurisdiction of a civil Court under Section 92 C.P.C. to try a suit for the due administration of the school, which is a Public Charitable Trust, is not ousted merely because the Managing Committee of the School is registered under the Companies Act. 13. In the Chennai Vazh Duraiyur Nadar Uravin Murai Magamai Sangam and Others v. K.A. Gurusamy and Others (supra), another Division Bench of this Court has held that Section 92 C.P.C. will get attracted eventhough the sangam is registered under the Trust or Societies Registration Act. 14. In the present case, also first respondent is Chennai Nadar Munnetra Elainzhar Kazhagam, which is running three schools and therefore, I have no hesitation in holding that a suit can be laid against the first respondent under Section 92 C.P.C. 15. It is settled law that no suit can be laid under Section 92 C.P.C. without the leave of this Court. The Court will not grant leave merely because the applicants have locus standi to maintain the application. What is to be considered is whether the suit is to be laid for vindication of public rights or for settling private or personal disputes. If it is for the former purpose, leave can be granted, in the case of the latter, the leave can be refused. This proposition of law is settled by the Hon ‘ ble Supreme Court in Vidyodaya Trust v. Mohan Prasad R and Others (2008) 4 SCC 115 : (2008) 3 MLJ 967. 16. In the above judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows at p. 975 of MLJ: “ 18. Prior to legislative change made by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 104 of 1976 the expression used was “ consent in writing of the Advocate-General ” . This expression has been substituted by the words “ leave of the Court ” . Sub-section (3) has also been inserted by the Amendment Act. The object of Section 92 C.P.C is to protect the public trust of a charitable and religious nature from being subjected to harassment by suits filed against them. Public trusts for charitable and religious purpose are run for the benefit of the public. No individual should take benefit from them. Sub-section (3) has also been inserted by the Amendment Act. The object of Section 92 C.P.C is to protect the public trust of a charitable and religious nature from being subjected to harassment by suits filed against them. Public trusts for charitable and religious purpose are run for the benefit of the public. No individual should take benefit from them. If the persons in management of the trusts are subjected to multiplicity of legal proceedings, funds which are to be used for charitable or religious purposes would be wasted on litigation. The harassment might dissuade respectable and honest people from becoming trustees of pubic trusts. Thus, there is need for scrutiny. 19. In the suit against public trusts, if on analysis of the averments contained in the plaint it transpires that the primary object behind the suit was the vindication of individual or personal rights of some persons an action under the provision does not lie. As noted in Swami Parmatmanand’s case a suit under Section 92 C.P.C is a suit of special nature, which pre-supposes the existence of a public trust of religious or charitable character. When the plaintiffs do not sue to vindicate the right of the public but seek a declaration of their individual or personal rights or the individual or personal rights of any other persons or persons in whom they are interested, Section 92 has no application. 20. In Swamy Parmatmanand’s case it was held that it is only the allegations in the plaint that should be looked into in the first instance to see whether the suit falls within the ambit of Section 92 . But if after evidence is taken it is found that the breach of trust alleged has not been made out and that the prayer for direction of the Court is vague and is not based on any solid foundation in fact or reason but is made only with a view to bringing the suit under the Section then suit purporting to be brought under Section 92 must be dismissed. 21. In Chettiar’s case it was held that normally notice should be given before deciding the question as to whether leave is to be granted. 22. If in a given case notice has not been given and leave has been granted, it is open to the Court to deal with an application for revocation and pass necessary orders. 23. 21. In Chettiar’s case it was held that normally notice should be given before deciding the question as to whether leave is to be granted. 22. If in a given case notice has not been given and leave has been granted, it is open to the Court to deal with an application for revocation and pass necessary orders. 23. One of the factual aspects which needs to be highlighted is that the allegations which have been made against respondents 2, 3 and 10 ape referable to a decision taken by the Board, though may be by majority. The fundamental question that arises is whether allegations against three of them would be, sufficient to taint the Board’s decision. As’was observed by this Court in Swamy Parmatmanand’s case, to gauge whether the suit was for vindicating public rights, the Court has to go beyond the relief and to focus on the purpose for which the suit is filed. To put it differently, it is the object or the purpose for filing the suit and not essentially the relief which is of paramount importance. There cannot be any hard and fast rule to find out whether the real purpose of the suit was vindicating public right or the object was vindication of some personal rights. For this purpose the focus has to be on personal grievances. 24. On a close reading of the plaint averments, it is clear that though the color of legitimacy was sought to be given by projecting as if the suit was for vindicating public rights the emphasis was on certain purely private and personal disputes. 25. In Sugra Bibi v. Hazi Kummu Mia it was held that the mere fact that the suit relates to public trust of religious or charitable nature and the reliefs claimed fall within some of the clauses of sub-section (1) of Section 92 would not by itself attract the operation of the Section, unless the suit is of a representative character instituted in the interest of the public and not merely for vindication or the individdal or personal rights of the plaintiffs. 26. To put it differently, it is not every suit claiming reliefs specified in Section 92 that can be brought under the Section; but only the suits which besides claiming any of the reliefs are brought by individuals as representatives of the public for vindication of public rights. 26. To put it differently, it is not every suit claiming reliefs specified in Section 92 that can be brought under the Section; but only the suits which besides claiming any of the reliefs are brought by individuals as representatives of the public for vindication of public rights. As a decisive factor, the Court has to go beyond the relief and have regard to the capacity in which the plaintiff has sued and the purpose for which the suit was brought. The Courts have to be careful to eliminate the possibility of a suit being laid against public trusts under Section 92 by persons whose activities were not for protection of the interests of the public trusts. In that view of the matter the High Court was certainly wrong in holding that the grant of leave was legal and proper. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The appeal is allowed but without any order as to costs. ” 17. In the light of the above settled legal principles, if the facts of the present case are considered, I do not find any vindication of public rights and their attempt is only ventilating their private grievance. 18. The plaint filed will show that the plaintiffs wanted to frame a scheme for the proper management of the affairs by supersession of the Committee. The allegation levelled in the plaint is irregularities and mismanagement that took place during the year 2004 to 2005 leading to an enquiry by the Deputy Registrar and the recommendation of the Inspector General to the second defendant. In the counter, it was clearly stated that during that period some of the applicants see in the Executive Committee and they were also suspended for their activities. Challenging the suspension a suit was filed by the applicants 1 and 2 and the same was also dismissed. It is further stated that due to the mismanagement of the previous committee, of which some of the applicants are members, irregularities have crept in and the present management is undoing the damages. The counter cites a number of litigations initiated between the Kazhagam and some of the applicants herein and seeks for dismissal of the application as it is yet another attempt on the part of the applicants to settle their personal scores. 19. The counter cites a number of litigations initiated between the Kazhagam and some of the applicants herein and seeks for dismissal of the application as it is yet another attempt on the part of the applicants to settle their personal scores. 19. In the reply, the applicants while stood by their stand that Section 92 C.P.C. will apply, they feigned ignorance about the other averments narrated in the counter. 20. In the light of the above facts, circumstances and law, I find no merits in the leave application as the applicants attempt is not in the public interest of first respondent but to settle their personal scores. The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Vidyodaya Trust v. Mohan Prasad R and Others (supra) will apply to the facts of this case and consequently, the application is dismissed. No costs.