ORDER Since the facts and issues involved in both these criminal petitions are one and the same, both these petitions are being disposed of by this common order. 2. The brief facts of the cases are as follows:- The petitioner is the Managing Director of M/s.Chandak Laboratories (Pvt.) Ltd., situated at premises No.7-61, Kondamadugu Village, Bibinagar Mandai, Nalgonda District. The factory was established in the year 1985 and started production of chemical products. The said factory has been covered under the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 ('the Factories Act', for brevity). A huge fire accident had occurred on 27.09.2007 in the factory. Soon after receiving information, the fire service authorities took steps and one fire tanker was brought from Bhongir and as it was not sufficient, second fire tanker from Choutuppal was also brought to the spot. Subsequently, some other vehicles joined in fire fighting operation. The fire service personnel of AP. Fire and Emergency Services Department, namely Sri M.Rameswara Rao, Lading Fireman, Sri G.N arsinga Rao, Fireman and Sri E. Vishnu Murthy, Fireman, sustained injuries while fire fighting operation and one R.Mahender Reddy, employee of the said factory also sustained injuries while fighting with fire. The victims were shifted to Kamineni Hospital, L.B.Nagar, Hyderabad, by means of 108 Ambulance. Though fire accident occurred on 27.09.2007, it appears that the injured were still being treated till the date of filing of complaint i.e. on 28.01.2008. In fact, the said fire fighting operation was supervised by senior officers of AP. Fire and Emergency Services which include the Director General of Fire Service, Regional Fire Officer and District Fire Officer. 3. The main allegation against the petitioner herein is that the fire personnel had sustained injuries mainly due to the negligence of the management (petitioner) to provide mandatory fire safety systems and personal protective equipments. Fire and Emergency Services which include the Director General of Fire Service, Regional Fire Officer and District Fire Officer. 3. The main allegation against the petitioner herein is that the fire personnel had sustained injuries mainly due to the negligence of the management (petitioner) to provide mandatory fire safety systems and personal protective equipments. It is also alleged that the petitioner, being Managing Director of the factory, failed to caution the victims about the hazardous nature / properties of the chemicals on fire and failed to provide required personal and protective equipments, and as such, violated the provisions of Sections 15, 16, 18, 19, Section 30 which deals with Penalties failure to take out license, Section 31 which deals with Penalties of the A.P. Fire Services Act, 1999 ('Fire Services Act', for brevity), Rule 29(6) of the A.P. Fire Service Operations and Levy of Fee Rules, 2006, which deals with Penalties for willful violation and Rule 29(7) which deals with Offences (Procedure to deal with offences by companies). It is also alleged that the petitioner failed to obtain renewal of license and thereby, violated Section 18 of the Fire Services Act, which was mandatory. In view of the willful contravention of the mandatory provisions and safety provisions, as required under Table 23 of the National Building Code of India, 2005, and other BIS safety standards, it is the case of the prosecution that the management is liable for penal action for the offences under the above mentioned sections. 4. The said complaint, which is registered as CCNo.218 of 2008 on the file of the Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Bhongir in Crime No.152 of2007 is the subject matter of quashing proceedings in Criminal Petition No.6815 of 2008. 5. Basing on the said report given by Assistant District Fire Officer about the fire accident and on the allegation that there were no preventive measures for any sort of fire accident, that the fire fighters sustained injuries, that there was danger of loss of life and property and even for the neighbourhood, that there was heavy financial loss, and that the management is liable for penal action, a criminal case under Crime No.152 of 2007 was registered for the offences punishable under Sections 337 and 338 IPC It also appears that the petitioner herein was arrested and subsequently released on bail. Challenging the initiation of criminal proceedings in Crime No.152 of 2007 for the offences punishable under Sections 337 and 338 IPC, Criminal Petition No.1933 of 2008 has been filed. 6. Heard the learned counsel on record. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the Inspector of Factories filed a complaint against the petitioner alleging that he failed to comply with certain provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 ('the Factories Act', for brevity) and thereby committed offence punishable under Section 92 of the Factories Act and that the petitioner pleaded guilty and was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- for the alleged offense under the Factories Act and in view of the same, the petitioner cannot be prosecuted for the same offence, though under a separate statutes. Her main submissions are that both the offences are not distinct offences as they arise out of the same set of facts and when there is a special enactment dealing with offence relating to the factories and when the petitioner is already convicted and sentenced under the Factories Act, continuation of other proceedings against the petitioner will amount to abuse of process of Court; that though some fire personnel have sustained injuries, those injuries were not as a result of any violation of safety measures to be provided by the petitioner company; that as far as the employee of the industry who sustained injuries is concerned, he has been already paid adequate compensation; that the petitioner is not responsible for the injuries sustained by the fire fighting personnel and the employee of the factory; that therefore, the FIR which is filed for the offences punishable under Section 337 and 338 IPC is not maintainable against the petitioner. It is also her submission that once petitioner has been convicted in SIC 73 of 2008 on the file of the Additional Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Bhongir, and was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.5,OOOj- under Section 92 of the Factories Act, present FIR for the same fire accident and with same ingredients amounts to 'Double Jeopardy' and proceedings cannot be permitted to be continued in view of Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India which stipulates that no person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offences more than once. It is her further submission that the ingredients of both the offences are one and the same and therefore 'Doctrine of Double Jeopardy' will apply. She has also relied upon section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and submitted that where an act or omission constitute an offence under two or more enactments, the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or anyone of those enactments and shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence. With reference to the allegations of not obtaining licenses under the Fire Services Act, it is her submission that if at all the petitioner has not obtained license, the fire authorities would not have permitted to carryon production in the factory and that the petitioner had obtained No Objection Certificate from time to time and therefore, no offence is made out as alleged by the prosecution. It is also her submission that the second petitioner in Criminal Petition No.6815 of 2008 is not in-charge of day-to-day management of the factory and therefore, he had been unnecessarily made as accused in criminal case. Ultimately, her submission is that the present complaint nothing but abuse of process of Court and is liable to be quashed. In support of her contentions, she relied upon the judgments reported in. In re. P. Bapanaiah (1) AIR 1970 AP 47 and Manipur Administration, Manipur, Appellant v. Thokchom Bira Singh, Respondent (2) AIR 1965 SC 87 . 8. Per contra, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor representing the respondents submits that the 'Doctrine of Double Jeopardy' will not apply to the present case. His submission is that 'Doctrine of Double Jeopardy' will be applicable only in case where the offence is one and the same and where the offences are not separate and distinct offences. His further submission is that not obtaining required license under the Fire Services Act and not complying with the provisions of the Factories Act are distinct and separate offences. It is also submitted that the act of negligence on the part of the petitioner in not providing the required safety measures to the workers working in the factory is also punishable under the penal provisions. He has also referred to Section 300 Cr.P.C. and also relied on the judgment reported in V.K.Agarwal, Appellant v. Vasantraj Bhagwanji Bhatia and others, Respondents (3) AIR 1988 SC 1106 . 9. He has also referred to Section 300 Cr.P.C. and also relied on the judgment reported in V.K.Agarwal, Appellant v. Vasantraj Bhagwanji Bhatia and others, Respondents (3) AIR 1988 SC 1106 . 9. The only point that arises for consideration is whether the alleged offences punishable under the enactments, i.e., under the Factories Act, under the Fire Services Act and under Indian Penal Code are distinct offences or one and the same; and whether 'Doctrine of Double Jeopardy' is applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 10. Sub-Sections 1 and 2 of Section 300 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, reads as under:- Sec.300. Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence:- (1) A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under sub-section (1) of Section 221, or for which he might have been convicted under sub-section (2) thereof. (2) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence may be afterwards tried, with the consent of the State Government, for any distinct offence for which a separate charge might have been made against him at the former trial under sub-section (1) of Section 220. 11. Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, reads as under:- 26. Provision as to offences punishable under two or more enactments:- Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence. 12. Article 20 (2) of the Constitution of India reads as under:- 20(2):- No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. 13. 12. Article 20 (2) of the Constitution of India reads as under:- 20(2):- No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. 13. The Calcutta High Court, in a case between Baidyal1ath Basak and etc., v. Union of India and others (4) 1983 Cri.L.J. 1542, held as follows:- The provisions of 5.26 of the General Clauses Act, on construction, resemblance those of Art.20(2) and not withstanding the fact that the section permits a second trial after a previous one and acquittal, the provisions are unconstitutional. But under the provisions of 5.26, the General Clauses Act and Art.20(2) of the Constitution, a double punishment is prohibited, so, an Act under which such double punishment would be permissible, would be void being repugnant to Art.20(2). It should, of course, be noted that the principle of issue estoppel, would be different from the principle of double jeopardy. In order to attract the principle of issue estoppel, there must have been distinctly raised and appropriately decided, the same issue in the earlier criminal trial between the same parties. 14. The allegation against the petitioner is that the grievous injuries that were caused to the fire fighting personnel were mainly due to the failure on the part of the management to provide mandatory fire safety systems and personnel protective equipments and to caution the victims about the hazardous nature and properties of the chemicals of fire and failure to provide personnel protective equipments. 15. The charge sheet allegations for the offence punishable under Section 338 IPC are as follows:- The Assistant District Fire Officer is the complainant. He alleges that a heavy fire accident took place at M/s.Chandak Laboratory Pvt., Ltd., Kondamadugumettu of Bibi Nagar MandaI the fire fighting personnel, namely, Sri M.Rameswara Rao, Lading Fireman, Sri G.Narsinga Rao, Fireman and Sri E. Vishnu Murthy, Fireman, sustained injuries while fire fighting operation and one R.Mahender Reddy, employee of the industry also sustained injuries in the accident. The scene of offence is the premises of M/s.Chandak Laboratories Pvt., Ltd., and it is located besides NH No.202 leading Hydeabad to Warangal towards northern side at a distance of about 100 yards at the outskirts of Kondamadugumettu. Compound wall is there around the factory having main gate and a wicket gate on the left corner of the western side. There are (50) tolling drums in front of the main block. Compound wall is there around the factory having main gate and a wicket gate on the left corner of the western side. There are (50) tolling drums in front of the main block. Hydrogen factory is located beside the main block to the eastern side at a distance of 50 feet and both rooms are connected with cable. Some Hydrogen full cylinders are also placed in front of the burnt main block to the northern side, while there is a cooling tower on its backside. In this accident, the following property is found to be burnt:- (1) SS 316 Reactors condenser having capacity of 3000 litres W/Rs.10,00,000/- (2) SS 316 Reactors condenser having capacity of 2500 litres W/Rs.8,00,000/- (3) SS 316 Reactors condenser having capacity of 2500 litres W/Rs.7,00,000/- (4) SS 316 Reactors condenser having capacity of 2500 litre" W/Rs.8,00,000/-, (5) 48" SS sentry fuse W/Rs.9,00,000/-, (6) SS Pump motor, W /Rs.10,00,000/-, (7) Electrification flame fuse W/Rs.10,00,000/-, (8) MS Structure building office rooms W/Rs.20 lakhs, (9) Chemical works in progress (1500) Kgs W /Rs.23,00,000/-, (10) Rejected chemicals (3000) Kgs W/Rs. 45,00,000/- and (11) Raw material solvencies W /Rs.18,00,000/-. The Deputy Chief Inspector of Factories, Nalgonda has visited the scene of offence i.e. Chandak Laboratories Pvt., Ltd., Kondamadugumettu, inspected the scene and furnished the detail report opining that "The management has failed to provide a vent condenser to recover solvent (Toluene), so as to prevent the escape of inflammable solvent vapors into the atmosphere. Further they have failed to take precautions to prevent initiation of ignition of the solvent vapor to prevent the occurrence of fire in the production of block and extended to other areas. Also they have not provided adequate fire fighting facilities such as fire hydrant system, suitable and sufficient number of fire extinguishers and also personal trained in firing methods to extinguish/control the spread of fire." The medical officer who treated the injured opined that the injuries sustained by the injured as "Grievous in nature". 16. In the light of the above referred specific allegations let us examine the case law on the subject. 17. In State of M.P. v. Veereshwar Rao Agnihotri (5) AIR 1957 SC 592 , it was held as follows: "A previous prosecution for an offence under Section 409, Penal Code, was no bar to a subsequent prosecution under Section 5(1)(c), Prevention of Corruption Act." 18. 17. In State of M.P. v. Veereshwar Rao Agnihotri (5) AIR 1957 SC 592 , it was held as follows: "A previous prosecution for an offence under Section 409, Penal Code, was no bar to a subsequent prosecution under Section 5(1)(c), Prevention of Corruption Act." 18. In Mohammad Safi v. State of W.B. (6) AIR 1966 SC 69 , it was held as follows:- "Proceedings will not amount to a trial unless they are held before a Court which is in fact competent to hold them and which is not of opinion that it has no jurisdiction to hold them." 19. In Maqbool Hussein v. State of Bombay (7) AIR 1953 SC 325 , it was held as follows:- The fundamental right guaranteed under Article 20(2) enunciates the principle of" autrefois convict" or' double jeopardy" which means that no person can be punished twice for the same cause and that once a person has been convicted of an offence by a competent Court, such conviction shall operate as a bar to a subsequent criminal proceeding for the same offence or on the same facts for any other offence. The test for the application of this principle is whether the former offence and the offence subsequently charged have the same ingredients, that is, whether the facts which constituted the first offence were sufficient to justify a conviction for the second offence. The test is not whether the State relies at the subsequent trial on the same facts on which it relied at the previous one. The word "offence in Article 20(2) has not been defined in the Constitution, but it has been defined in Section 3(38) of the General Clauses Act. Article 367 provides that the General Clauses Act applies for the interpretation of the Constitution. Therefore, the word "offence" in Article 20(2) must be taken to mean "any act or omission made punishable by any law" as defined in Section 3(38) of the General Clauses Act. The words "before a Court of law or a judicial tribunal" are not found in Article 20(2). But the various expressions used in Article 20 such as "convicted", "commission of offence", "penalty", "prosecuted and punished", etc., indicate that this Article contemplates that there was a judicial decision in the previous proceeding under which punishment was awarded for the commission of an offence. But the various expressions used in Article 20 such as "convicted", "commission of offence", "penalty", "prosecuted and punished", etc., indicate that this Article contemplates that there was a judicial decision in the previous proceeding under which punishment was awarded for the commission of an offence. Article 20(2) can, therefore, be invoked only when all the following conditions are satisfied:- 1. that there has been previous proceeding before a Court of law or a judicial tribunal; 2. that the previous proceeding was of a criminal nature and in respect of the commission of an "offence", that is, act or omission which is punishable under any law; 3. that there was a judicial decision in the previous proceeding; 4. that under the decision a "punishment" was awarded; and 5. that the offence of which the offender is now being tried is the same offence or has the same ingredients as the previous offence, or is based on the same facts which constituted the previous offence. In short, Article 20(2) can be invoked only when there has been a previous prosecution for an offence before a Court or judicial tribunal which has resulted in a punishment, and not otherwise. An order of confiscation and payment of duty at a higher rate made by Customs Authority acting under the Sea Customs Act, 1878, is not prosecution and punishment within the meaning of Article 20(2) and it cannot operate as a bar against a subsequent prosecution of the offender under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. In the present case, the accused was caught at an air port when he arrived from a foreign country with gold which he had not declared. The Customs Collector took proceedings against him under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, and ordered confiscation of the gold seized. Thereafter a complaint was filed in a Magistrate's Court under Section 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. The accused thereupon applied to the High Court invoking Article 20(2), and when he failed, he appealed to the Supreme Court. Held: (i) A Customs Authority was merely an administrative body with administrative powers and was not a judicial tribunal, and the proceeding before him was not in nature of judicial proceeding. (ii) The order of confiscation was only in the nature of a proceeding in rem, and not in the nature of a proceeding m personam. Held: (i) A Customs Authority was merely an administrative body with administrative powers and was not a judicial tribunal, and the proceeding before him was not in nature of judicial proceeding. (ii) The order of confiscation was only in the nature of a proceeding in rem, and not in the nature of a proceeding m personam. (iii) The proceedings taken by the Revenue Authorities not being a "prosecution for an offence" and the order of confiscation not being "punishment" of the offender, within the meaning of Article 20(2), they could not operate as a bar to subsequent prosecution of the offender for an offence under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. The Court observed that "prosecution in this context means an initiation of proceeding of a criminal nature before a Court of law or a judicial tribunal in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the statute which creates the offence and regulates the procedure." After examining the provisions of the Sea Customs Act, the Court came to the conclusion that a Customs Authority is not a "judicial tribunal" and that the imposition of confiscation or of increased rate of duty or of a penalty under the Act was not an order of a Court or judicial tribunal, and on these conclusions the Court rejected the plea of "double jeopardy" in that case. These findings apply with full force to the present case. The language employed in various provisions of the Sea Customs Act makes it clear that the Act does not envisage the Customs Authorities to function as a Court. Expressions like "offences" and "penalties" have been used in the Act in their generic sense, and not in their specific sense as acts .punishable under any penal law, and the power vested in Customs Authorities to order confiscation or to impose penalty in respect of an offending article, is distinct from a sentence of imprisonment or fine imposed by a Criminal Court. Whenever criminal prosecution and punishment of the offender in the sense of the penal law is contemplated in the Act, it makes a specific reference to a trial by a Magistrate, to a conviction by such a Magistrate, and to imprisonment or fine upon such conviction. 20. Whenever criminal prosecution and punishment of the offender in the sense of the penal law is contemplated in the Act, it makes a specific reference to a trial by a Magistrate, to a conviction by such a Magistrate, and to imprisonment or fine upon such conviction. 20. In State of Rajasthan, Appellant v. Hat Singh and others, Respondents (8) 2003 (1) ALT (Crl.) 378 (SC) = AIR 2003 SC 791 , it was held as follows: Art. 20(2) of the Constitution provides that no person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. To attract applicability of Art. 20 (2) there must be a second prosecution and punishment for the same offence for which the accused has been prosecuted and punished previously. A subsequent trial or a prosecution and punishment are not barred if the ingredients of the two offences are distinct. The rule against double jeopardy is stated in the maxim nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa. The manifestation of this rule is to be found contained in S. 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, S. 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and S. 71 of the Indian Penal Code. The offence under S. 5, under S. 6(1) r/w S. 6(3) and S. 6 (2) r/w S. 6 (3) are three distinct offences. They are not the same offences. This is clear from a bare reading of Ss. 5 and 6. While S. 5 makes the commission of an act an offence and punishes the same; the provisions of S. 6 are preventive in nature. The prohibition under S. 6 is against abetment of Sati or doing of any act, which would aid or facilitate the commission of Sati. In case of prosecution under S. 6(2) r/w S. 6(3) what would be punishable is such defiance or contravention of the order of the Collector and District Magistrate, as has the effect of the glorification in any manner of the commission of Sati. In distinction therewith, it is the actual doing of an act for the glorification of Sati which is made punishable u/S. 5. Thus the sense, import and content of the offence u/S. 5 are different from the one under S. 6(3). In distinction therewith, it is the actual doing of an act for the glorification of Sati which is made punishable u/S. 5. Thus the sense, import and content of the offence u/S. 5 are different from the one under S. 6(3). What is punished under S. 5 is the criminal intention for glorification of Sati; what is punishable under S. 6 is the criminal intention to violate or defy the prohibitory order issued by the lawful authority. It cannot therefore be said that the ingredients of the offences contemplated by S. 5 and S. 6(3) are the same or that they necessarily and in all cases overlap or that prosecution and punishment for the offences under Ss. 5 and 6 (3) both are violative of Art. 20 (2) of the Constitution or of the rule against double jeopardy. It is therefore incorrect to hold a view that once a prohibitory order under See. 6(1) or (2) has been issued, then a criminal act done after the promulgation of the prohibitory order can be punished only under S. 6 (3) and in spite of prosecution u/s. 6(3) failing, on the same set of facts the person proceeded against cannot be held punishable u/s 5 of the Act although the ingredients of S. 5 are fully made out. 21. In a case between Manipur Administration, Manipur, Appellant v. Thokchom Bira Singh, Respondent (9) AIR 1965 SC 87 , it was held as follows: "Both in the case of Art. 20(2) of the Constitution as well as S.26 of the General. Clauses Act to operate as a bar the second prosecution and the consequential punishment thereunder, must be for "the same offence" i.e. an offence whose ingredients are the same. The Vth amendment of the American Constitution which provides that no person shall be subject, for the same offence, to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, proceeds on the same principle. AIR 1961 SC 578 , Rel. on." This Court, in re. P.Bapanaiah (supra) observed as follows: Prosecution of a person, on whom, besides confiscation of contraband gold, penalty has been imposed, under S.135 of Customs Act, (1962) and Rule 126-P (2) does not offend Art.20(2) of the Constitution. Confiscation of the contraband gold does not amount to prosecution or punishment of the person. on." This Court, in re. P.Bapanaiah (supra) observed as follows: Prosecution of a person, on whom, besides confiscation of contraband gold, penalty has been imposed, under S.135 of Customs Act, (1962) and Rule 126-P (2) does not offend Art.20(2) of the Constitution. Confiscation of the contraband gold does not amount to prosecution or punishment of the person. Confiscation of the goods in order in rem dealing with goods and not a punishment imposed on the person. Imposition of penalty by Customs Authorities does not amount to prosecution contemplated by Art.20(2) of the Constitution. The term "prosecution" means a proceeding either by way of indictment or information in the criminal Courts in order to put an offender upon his trial. The Deputy Collector, Central Excise, can, by no stretch of imagination, be equated to a Court for the simple reason that he is vested with certain powers in the matter of effecting searches and seizures, compelling attendance of witnesses and the like by the Rules. The legislature was aware of the distinction between a proceeding before the Customs Authorities and the criminal proceeding before a Magistrate and therefore, in the absence of one of the three essential conditions laid down in clause (2) of Art.20 of the Constitution viz. prosecution, the prohibition against double jeopardy would not become operative. What is intended is prevention of punishment twice for the same act or omission which is an offence under more enactments than one and not prosecution also. 22. The provisions of Section 403(1) (sic: 300 (1)) of the Code of Criminal Procedure are based upon principles of autre fois acquit' recognized by English Courts. The principle on which right to plead an 'autre fois acquit' depends is that a man may not be put twice in jeopardy for the same offence. Article 20(2) applies only when a person has been prosecuted and punished for the same offence at previous trial. If the earlier proceedings are null and void by reason of want of competence, Article 20(2) cannot apply. 23. Article 20(2) applies only when a person has been prosecuted and punished for the same offence at previous trial. If the earlier proceedings are null and void by reason of want of competence, Article 20(2) cannot apply. 23. In a case between State of Bombay, appellant v. S.L. Apte and another, respondents (10) AIR 1961 SC 578 , it was held as follows: "where the offences are distinct and separate and their ingredients are different, the above provisions cannot be invoked and there is no bar against prosecution for one of such offence even after the accused has been tried and convicted of the other offence." 24. Thus, it is clear that for Article 20(2) of the Constitution to operate as a bar to the second prosecution and the punishment thereunder, the offence must be 'the same offence'. Distinct offences are distinguished from one another by (i) difference in time i.e. commission of offence on different occasions and (ii) nature of acts and cash date offences and different section. Thus, for example, the offence of misappropriation and cheating, and theft and receiving the stolen property are distinct offences and not one and the same, though may be arising out of the same crime. 25. In case between Corporation of Calcutta v. Mulchand Agarwalla (11) AIR 1956 SC 110 , it was held as follows: A previous conviction under Municipal Act for an unauthorized construction without permission will not bar a subsequent prosecution for a breach of Building Rules, because the defaults in question are not the same. Section 403(1) of the Code does not apply to such a case. In the present case, the owner of a house in Calcutta was prosecuted under Section 488 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, for making an unauthorized construction without obtaining permission, and was fined Rs.200/-. Thereafter the Municipality found that the construction had contravened its Building Rules, and filed another complaint against the owner under Section 363 of the Act for contravention of those Rules. The matter ultimately came before the Supreme Court and the question was whether the previous prosecution and sentence operated as a bar to the subsequent prosecution. Held:- (1) When the legislature provides that on the same facts proceedings could be taken under two different sections and the penalties provided in those sections are not the same, it is obviously intended to treat the two sections as distinct. Held:- (1) When the legislature provides that on the same facts proceedings could be taken under two different sections and the penalties provided in those sections are not the same, it is obviously intended to treat the two sections as distinct. There is no question in such a case of the application of Section 403 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and previous conviction under one section cannot operate as a bar to a subsequent prosecution under the other section. (2) When a previous conviction is on a charge for executing a building without permission and the subsequent prosecution is on a charge relating to breach of Building Rules, it could not be said that the accused is prosecuted twice over the same default. 26. In a case between V.K.Agarwal, Appellant v. Vasantraj Bhagwanji Bhatia (12) AIR 1988 SC 1106 , it was held as follows:- The facts constituting the offence under Customs Act are different and are not sufficient to justify the conviction under the Gold Control Act. It was relied that what is necessary is to analyse the ingredients of the two offences and not the allegations made in the two complaints. 27. Ina case between Mukhtiar Ahmed Ansari, Appellant v. State (N.C. T. of Delhi), Respondent (13) 2005 (4) SCJ 526 = 2005 (2) ALT (Crl.) 168 (SC) = 2005 (5) ALT 31.4 (DN SC) = AIR 2005 SC 2804 the Apex Court, while dealing with the provisions of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (28 of 1997) and the Arms Act, 1959 and where the accused was acquitted for the offence of kidnapping by the competent Court, it was held that "Doctrine of 'autrefois acquit' gets attracted. The Designated Court cannot reconsider matter by doubting decision or commenting upon it observing that acquittal was undeserved or unwarranted and accused had committed offence with which he was charged." However, a reading of the above judgment gives an impression that the facts of that case are entirely different from the facts of the case on hand. 28. In the light of the above referred decisions, now, we have to consider whether the petitioner herein is being tried for the same offence or for distinct offences. 29. It is not in dispute that the petitioner pleaded guilty when he was charged under the provisions of Factories Act. 30. Section 92 of the Factories Act reads as follows:- 92. In the light of the above referred decisions, now, we have to consider whether the petitioner herein is being tried for the same offence or for distinct offences. 29. It is not in dispute that the petitioner pleaded guilty when he was charged under the provisions of Factories Act. 30. Section 92 of the Factories Act reads as follows:- 92. General penalty for offences:- Save as is otherwise expressly provided in this Act and subject to the provisions of Section 93, if in, or in respect of, any factory there is any contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or of any rules made thereunder or of any order in writing given 'thereunder, the occupier and manager of the factory shall each be guilty of an offence and punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extent to (two years) or with fine which may extend to (one lakh rupees) or with both, and if the contravention is continued after conviction, with a further fine which may extend to (one thousand rupees) for each day on which the contravention is so continued. 31. The essential ingredients of Section 92 of the Factories Act are:- (i) that there should be any contravention of any of the provision of the said Act; (ii) If the contravention resulted in death, the fine shall be twenty five thousand rupees and in case of serious bodily injury, the fine shall be five thousand rupees 32. Section 36 of the Factories Act deals with providing of manhole of adequate size or other effective means of egress in any factory in which any gas, fume, vapour or dust is likely to be present. 33. Section 37 of the Factories Act deals with the measures to be taken to prevent any kind of explosion. It reads as under:- 37.Explosive or inflammable dust, gas, etc.,:- (1) Where in any factory any manufacturing process produces dust, gas, fume or vapour of such character and to such extent as to be likely to explode to ignition, all practicable measures shall be taken to prevent any such explosion by,- (a) effective enclosure of the plant or machinery used in the process; (b) removal or prevention of the accumulation of such dust, gas, fume or vapour; (c) exclusion or effective enclosure of all possible sources of ignition. 34. 34. Thus, it is clear that Section 92 of the Factories Act will come into play even before any person sustaining any type of injury or where the accident did not result in death of any person. But, Sections 337 and 338 IPC will apply where a negligent act result in causing injuries to any person. Mere noncompliance of the provisions of the Fire Services Act and the Factories Act are certainly punishable. 35. Section 38 of the Factories Act, reads as follows:- 38. Precautions in case of fire:- (1) in every factory, all practicable measures shall be taken to prevent outbreak of fire and its spread, both internally and externally, and to provide and maintain:- (a) Safe means to escape for all persons in the event of fire, and (b) the necessary equipment and facilities for extinguishing fire. . (2) Effective measures shall be taken to ensure that in every factory all the workers are familiar with the means of escape in case of fire and have been adequately trained in the routine to be followed in such cases. (3) The State Government, may make rules, in respect of any factory or class or description of factories, requiring the measures to be adopted to give effect to the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2). (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a) of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), if the Chief Inspector, having regard to the nature of the work carried on in any factory, the construction of such factory, special risk to life or safety, or any other circumstances, is of the opinion that the measures provided in the factory, whether as prescribed or not, for the purposes of clause (a) of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are inadequate, he may, by order in writing, require that such additional measures as he may consider reasonable and necessary, be provided in the factory before such date as is specified in the order. 36. Thus, it is clear that Section 38 of the Factories Act envisages that in every factory, all practicable measures shall be taken to prevent outbreak of fire and its spread, both internally and externally. 37. Section 87 of the Factories Act, 1948, reads as follows:- 87. 36. Thus, it is clear that Section 38 of the Factories Act envisages that in every factory, all practicable measures shall be taken to prevent outbreak of fire and its spread, both internally and externally. 37. Section 87 of the Factories Act, 1948, reads as follows:- 87. Dangerous operations:- Where the State Government is of opinion that any [manufacturing process or operation] carried on in a factory exposes any persons employed in it to a serious risk of bodily injury, poisoning or disease, it may make rules applicable to any factory or class or description of factories in which the [manufacturing process or operation] is carried on:- (a) Specifying the [manufacturing process or operation] and declaring it to be dangerous; (b) Prohibiting or restricting the employment of women, adolescents or children in the [manufacturing process or operation]; (c) Providing for the periodical medical examination or persons employed, or seeking to be employed, in the [manufacturing process or operation], and prohibiting the employment or persons not certified as fit for such employment [and requiring the payment by the occupier of the factory of fees of fees for such medical examination ]; (d) Providing for the protection of all persons employed in the [manufacturing process or operation] or in the vicinity of the places where it is carried on; (e) Prohibiting, restricting or controlling the use of any specified materials or processes in connection with the [manufacturing process or operation]; (f) Requiring the provision of additional welfare amenities and sanitary facilities and the supply of protective equipment and clothing, and laying down the standards thereof, having regard to the dangerous nature of the manufacturing process or operation. 38. Rule 61 of the A.P. Factories Rules, 1950, deals with the following fire protection measures for a factory. 61. Fire Protection:- (1) Process, equipment, plant etc., involving serious explosion and serious fire hazards; (2) Access for fire fighting; (3) Protection against lighting; (4) Precaution against Ignition; (5) Spontaneous Ignition (6) Cylinders containing compressed gas; (7) Storage of flammable liquids; (8) Accumulation of flammable dust, gas, fumes or vapour in airorflammable waste material on the floors: (9) Fire Exits; (10) First-aid arrangements; (11) Other fire fighting arrangements; (12) Personnel in charge of equipment and for fire fighting, fire drills etc., 39. The relevant provisions of Rule 95 of the A.P. Factories Rules, 1950, are given hereunder:- 95. The relevant provisions of Rule 95 of the A.P. Factories Rules, 1950, are given hereunder:- 95. Dangerous Operations:- (1) The following operations when carried on in any factory are declared to be dangerous operations under Section 87. (2) Manufacture of aerated water and processes incidental thereto. (3) Electrolytic planting or oxidation of metal articles by use of an electrolyte containing chromic acid or other chromium compounds. (4) Manufacture and treatment of lead and certain compounds of lead. (5) Generation of gas from the dangerous petroleum. (6) Certain lead process carried or in printing presses and type foundries. (7) Chemical Work. (8) Compression of oxygen and Hydrogen produced by the electrolysis of water. (9) Handling and manipulation of corrosive substances. (10) Carbon Disulphide plants. (11) Manufacture, handling and use of Benzene. (12) Manufacture or manipulation of manganese and its compounds. (13) Highly Flammable Liquids and Flammable Compressed Gases 40. Section 7 A of the Factories Act, 1948, reads as under:- 7 A. General duties of the occupier:(1) Every occupier shall ensure, so far as it reasonably practicable, the health, safety and welfare of all workers while they are at work in the factory. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (1), the matters to which such duty extends, shall include:- (a) the provision and maintenance of plant and systems of work in the factory that are safe and without risks to health; (b) the arrangements in the factory for ensuring safety and absence of risks to health in connection with the use, handling, storage and transport of articles and substances; (c) the provisions of such information, instruction, training and supervision as are necessary to ensure the health and safety of all workers at work; (d) the maintenance of all places of work in the factory in a condition that is safe and without risks to health and the provision and maintenance of such means of access to, and egress from, such places as are safe and without such risks; (e) the provision, maintenance or monitoring of such working environment in the factory for the workers that is safe, without risks to health and adequate as regards facilities and arrangements of their welfare at work. 41. The petitioner herein is alleged to have violated the provisions of Sections 15, 16, 18 and 19 of the Fire Services Act. 42. 41. The petitioner herein is alleged to have violated the provisions of Sections 15, 16, 18 and 19 of the Fire Services Act. 42. Sub-section 1 of Section 14 of the Fire Services Act empowers the Government to prescribe certain precautions to be taken by the owners or occupiers of the premises for the purpose which, in their opinion, are likely to cause risk of fire and the precautions to be taken have been separately notified. 43. Section 15 of the Fire Services Act is as follows:- 15. Purposes for which places may not be used without licence: Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Government may by notification declare that no place within any area, as may be specified shall be used for anyone or more of the purposes which in their opinion constitute a fire risk except in accordance with the terms and conditions of a licence to be issued by any officer of the service duly authorized in this behalf by the Government subject to the payment of such fee as may be prescribed. 44. Section 16 of the Fire Services Act reads as under:- 16. Application for grant of licence: The owner or occupier of any place using it for anyone or more of the purposes mentioned in the notification issued under Section 15, shall, within thirty days from the date of the notification make an application together with the prescribed fee, to the authorized Officer having jurisdiction over the area, in which such place is situated for a licence for the use of such place for such purpose. 45. Section 17 of the Fire Services Act, reads as under:- 17. Grant of licence:- (1) The authorized officer, after due verification shall within a period of sixty days from the date of application under Section 16, grant the licence with such conditions as he may think fit and necessary, or for reasons to be recorded in writing, reject the application for licence. If no order is passed under this sub-section within the time limit specified, the licence applied for shall be deemed to have been granted, subject to the application for licence being in conformity with the provisions of this Act. If no order is passed under this sub-section within the time limit specified, the licence applied for shall be deemed to have been granted, subject to the application for licence being in conformity with the provisions of this Act. (2) Against every order of the authorized officer refusing to grant a licence, an appeal shall lie to the Director General within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order. 46. Sections 18 and 19 of the Fire Services Act, are as follows:- 18. Duration of Licence:- Every licence granted under Section 17 shall be valid for a period of three years, or for such lesser period as may be specified in the licence and may be renewed from time to time for a similar or lesser period as may be specified in the renewed licence and may be cancelled for reasons to be recorded in writing. 19. Owner's or occupier's liability to provide for fire prevention of fire safety measures:- (1) The owner or occupier or both, of a building or part thereof shall provide fire safety measures in it and maintain them in good repair and efficient condition at all times, in accordance with the building byelaws :- Provided that, the owner, or occupier of the building or part thereof, the construction of which was completed on or before the date on which this Act comes into force or which was under construction on such date shall undertake and carry out such additional fire prevention and fire safety measures, required under the building bye-laws in force, as are specified in the notice served on him under Section 21. (2) No person shall tamper with, alter, remove or cause any injury or damage to any fire prevention and fire safety equipment installed in any building or part thereof or instigate any other person to do so. 47. The above provisions of the Fire Services Act make it clear that the owner of the occupier of any place using it for anyone or more purposes mentioned in the notification issued under Section 15 of the Fire Services Act shall make an application for licence for the use of such place for such purposes. 47. The above provisions of the Fire Services Act make it clear that the owner of the occupier of any place using it for anyone or more purposes mentioned in the notification issued under Section 15 of the Fire Services Act shall make an application for licence for the use of such place for such purposes. Section 15 of the Fore Services Act referred above envisages that no place within the area, as may be specified, shall be used for anyone or more purposes which, in their opinion, cause to a fire risk except in accordance with the terms and conditions of licence. Therefore, the ingredients of Section 15 of the Fire Services Act appears to be attracted where any place has been used for anyone or more purposes which, in their opinion, constitute a fire risk except in accordance with the terms and conditions of a licence to be issued by concerned authorities. Section 16 of the Fire Services Act will apply in case where the owner of occupier of any place uses it for anyone or more purposes mentioned in the notification issued under Section 16 of the Fire Services Act fail to apply, within thirty days from the date of notification to the authorized officer, for a licence. Section 17 of the Fire Services Act deals with the grant of licence and Section 18 of the Fire Services Act deals with the period of validity of the licence so issued. Section 19 of the Fire Services Act envisages that the owner or occupier or both of a building or part thereof, shall provide fire safety measures in it and maintain them in good repair and efficient condition at all times, in accordance with the building bye laws. 48. Therefore, all the sections of the Fire Services Act referred to above deals with preventive measures to be taken by the owner or occupier of a building or a place which is used, to prevent fire risk. Thus, it appears that irrespective of the fact whether any fire accident had taken place or not, the owner or the occupier of the building or the premises have to make an application for licence under Section 16 of the Fire Services Act and they shall not use such place for any other purpose except in accordance with the terms and conditions of the licence. Thus, it is clear that the very act of the petitioner in not applying for licence or not obtaining licence and using the place in violation of Sections referred above is punishable under Section 30 of the Act. 49. Section 31 of the Fire Services Act provides that whoever willfully contravenes any provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder or fails to comply with any requisition lawfully mad upon him under any provisions of this Act, shall, without prejudice to any other action taken against him under Section 22 be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months or with fine which may extend to twenty five thousand rupees or with both; and where the offence is a continuing one, with a further fine which may extend to three thousand rupees for every day during which such offence continues after the conviction for the first such offence. 50. Therefore, it is clear that where a person fails to obtain licence or fails to comply with the conditions of licence, he is punishable under Section 30 of the Fire Services Act which may extend to three months or, with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees or both. Hence, the ingredients of the above offence did not depend on occurring of the fire accident as referred above. Irrespective of any fire accident, it constitutes an offence from the date of not obtaining licence or from the date of violating the conditions of the licence and they are continuing offences till required licence is not obtained or till safety measures have been taken. 51. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner had obtained 'No Objection Certificate'. Section 13 of the Fire Services Act deals with 'No Objection Certificate'. It prescribes that for construction of a high-rise building or a building proposed to be used for any other purpose other than residential purposes, the applicant shall apply to the concerned authorities for issuance of 'No Objection Certificate'. Therefore, 'No Objection Certificate' appears to be applicable only at the stage of construction of the building and not at the stage of using the premises. 52. The very object of the Factories Act is to provide protection to the workers and for the improvement of the working conditions within the factory or the factories as per the provisions of the Factories Act. 52. The very object of the Factories Act is to provide protection to the workers and for the improvement of the working conditions within the factory or the factories as per the provisions of the Factories Act. The Act prescribes to maintain a system of work of the factory that are safe and without risk to the half of the workers working in it. The Act also prescribes to take necessary steps to ensure the health and safety of the workers at work, the precautions to be taken to prevent outbreak of fire etc. As in the case of Fire Services Act, the provisions of Section 38 of the Factories Act also deals with the preventive and precautionary measures. Therefore, to prevent occurrence of the fire accidents, the owner or the occupier of the factories are bound to take steps under the relevant provisions of the Factories Act. Thus, non-compliance of those provisions would attract Section 92 of the Factories Act which deals with the penalties and procedure. 53. In the instant case, it is most unfortunate that the concerned officers seems to have not verified whether the conditions prescribed under the provisions of the Factories Act or the Fire Services Act have been complied with in the premises of the petitioner i.e. M/s.Chandak Laboratories Pvt., Ltd., or not. Though certain provisions may overlap or certain conditions to be complied with may overlap, but since the Legislature, in their wisdom, have made separate laws and provisions under separate enactments and penalties have been prescribed for noncompliance of those provisions, it cannot be said that non-compliance of those provisions come within the meaning of the same offence. 54. As far as the offences under penal code are concerned, the petitioners are alleged to have committed offences punishable under Sections 337 and 338 IPC. 55. Sections 337 and 338 of Indian Penal Code, 1860, reads as under:- 337. Causing hurt by act endangering life or personal safety to others: Whoever causes hurt to any person by doing any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or the personal safety of others, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extent to five hundred rupees, or with both. 338. 338. Causing grievous hurt by act endangering life or personal safety to others:- Whoever causes grievous hurt to any person by doing any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or the personal safety of others, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term' which may extent to two years, or with fine which may extent to one thousand rupees, or with both. 56. The essential ingredients of Section 337 IPC are that whoever causes hurt to any person by doing any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or the personal safety of others, shall be punished. So, one of the essential ingredients of this Section must be that hurt must be caused to someone in doing an act and the person bearing to take reasonable care is said to be negligent of his act. Section 338 IPC is applicable when the other ingredients of Section 337 IPC are complied with and in addition to that, if a grievous hurt is caused to someone. 57. The only distinction between Section 337 and 338 IPC is that Section 338 IPC will apply if any grievous hurt is caused to some one. 58. The ingredients of Sections 337 and 338 IPC and the provisions of the Fire Services Act and the Factories Act cannot be said to be one and the same. They apply to different situations for different purposes and for different measures to be taken by the owner or occupier of the factories. Even the steps to be taken under both the enactments are different as discussed above, and even if no fire accident had taken place, the provisions of Factories Act and the Fire Services Act will apply. But when there is no accident, Sections 337 and 338 IPC do not apply. Sections 337 and 338 IPC are applicable where the owner or occupier, knowing very well that no preventive steps were taken and it will be dangerous for the workers to work in such a situation and without any due regard to the consequences which a man would think and for the safety to the workers, extract work from them and wherein from the circumstances it appears that such an act of extracting work from workers amount to acting in rash and negligent manner. Therefore, to attract Sections 337 and 338 IPC, something more i.e. careless and negligent act is required to be proved, even after proving of violation of provisions of Fire Services Act and the Factories Act. Thus, it is clear that Sections 337 and 338 IPC are applicable only in aggravated situations besides violation of the provisions of the Fire Services Act and the Factories Act. 59. Whether the petitioners have taken reasonable and proper care and a precaution to guard against injuries to the workers or to any fire fighting personnel or not has to be examined by the trial Court. In a case between Bhalchandra and another, Appellants v. The State of Maharashtra, Respondent (14) AIR 1968 SC 1319 , it was held that "The criminal negligence is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard against injury either to the public generally or to an individual in particular, which having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge has arisen, it was the imperative duty of the accused person to have adopted. 60. Not taking required licence and using the premises against the provisions of Fire Services Act or not taking required measures under the Factories Act are one thing and exposing such premises which is dangerous to the life of the workers which attracts rash and negligent act within the meaning of Sections 337 and 338 IPC appears to be distinct offences from the offence of noncompliance of provisions of Factories Act and Fire Services Act. The owner or the occupier of the premises may fail to obtain licences or may fail to comply with certain provisions of the Factories Act, but when the workers are exposed to such premises knowing very well that no safety measures have been taken and that the fire accident may occur at any time, certainly, in my view, are distinct offences from the penal provisions of the Fire Services Act and the Factories Act, and the ingredients of those sections are certainly not one and the same. They apply to different situations at least in terms of time, Admittedly, fire service personnel have sustained injuries. Admittedly, there was no safety system and no personal protective equipments, made available to them. They apply to different situations at least in terms of time, Admittedly, fire service personnel have sustained injuries. Admittedly, there was no safety system and no personal protective equipments, made available to them. Therefore, it has to be examined whether such acts constitute rash and negligent act under the provisions of Sections 337 and 338 IPC or not. of course, Section 92 of the Factories Act provides that if mere contravention of any of the provisions of Chapter IV or any rule made thereunder or Section 87 has resulted in the accident or death or serious bodily injury, the fine shall not be less than twenty five thousand rupees in case of accident causing death and five thousand rupees in case of accident causing serious bodily injury. Merely because penalty has been provided under Section 92, even in case of resulting in death or serious bodily injury, by that alone it cannot be said that the ingredients of Sections 337 and 338 IPC and Section 92 of the Factories Act are one and the same. 61. Since it appears that the offences with which the petitioner is charged with under different enactments are distinct offences and the same can be distinguished from one another at least in respect of difference of time and also the purpose for which those provisions have been made, I am of the considered view that those offences cannot be treated as same offence, and since they are distinct offences, both the criminal petitions are liable to be dismissed. 62. Accordingly, both the Criminal Petitions are dismissed.