Judgment :- 1. The common issue that arises for consideration in these Writ Petitions is whether the Joint Commission for determination of the Tariff was constituted as envisaged under Section 83 of the Electricity Act, 2003. 2. W.P. Nos.23070 and 23079 of 2009 have been filed for Writ of Declaration declaring that the Third Respondent’s composition not being in accordance with the provisions of Section 83 of the Electricity Act, 2003, it has no jurisdiction to entertain an application for determination of Tariff and therefore, the Third Respondent’s actions in entertaining and proceeding in respect of the Petition dated 5.10.2009 for “Aggregate Revenue Requirement and Determination and Revision of tariff for retain sale of power to various category of consumers in the Union territory of Puducherry for the year 2009-10” filed before it, by the Second Respondent are illegal, invalid, without authority of law, null and void. 3. W.P. Nos.23071 and 23074 of 2009 have been filed for Writ of Mandamus directing the Third Respondent to exercise the powers of a Regulatory Commission only upon appointment of all members in terms of Section 83 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and entertain an application for determination of Tariff only after duly framing appropriate Regulations under Section 61 of the Electricity Act, 2003. 4. Since common issue arises for consideration in all these Writ Petitions, they are disposed of by a common order. The averments made in the affidavit in support of the Writ Petition in W.P.No.23071 of 2009 alone, is therefore, in nutshell, are set our here under: (a) The Petitioners are High Tension (HT) electricity consumers of the Second Respondent. The Second Respondent is one of the Departments of Government of Puducherry and it has undertaken the distribution and retail supply of electricity in the Union territory of Puducherry. The Government of Puducherry, through the Second Respondent is deemed to be a licensee under the third Proviso to Section 14 of the Electricity Act, 2003. (b) The Second Respondent has filed its revised Petition dated 5.10.2009 for aggregate revenue requirement and determination of Revision of Tariff for retail sale of power to various category of consumers in the Union territory of Puducherry for the year 2009-10 before the Third Respondent. In the said Petition, the Second Respondent proposed 50% hike in demand charges and around 35% hike in energy charges for HT category consumers,. In the said Petition, the Second Respondent proposed 50% hike in demand charges and around 35% hike in energy charges for HT category consumers,. The petitioners discovered that the Third respondent is not duly constituted and therefore, neither the said Petition is maintainable nor the Third Respondent is empowered to hear and pass orders. However, the Third Respondent is proceeding with further and hence, the Petitioners have come forward to challenge the same bty raising the following points: (i) The Third Respondent is not yet properly constituted and therefore, it has no jurisdiction to proceed with the Tariff fixation exercise. (ii) The Third Respondent even assuming that it has jurisdiction, cannot proceed with a Tariff fixation exercise without first framing the Tariff Regulations which are mandatorily required to be framed under the Electricity Act, 2003. (iii) The Second Respondent’s Petition before the Third Respondent is defective and the Third Respondent is also proceeding with the matter further by ignoring the mandatory provisions of the Act. 5. The sum and substance of the issue raised by the Petitioners are that the Third Respondent has not been constituted properly as envisaged under Section 83 of the Electricity Act, 2003. Section 83(2) of the Electricity Act provides for formation of a Joint Commission consisting of one member from each of the participating States and Union territories and the Chairperson shall be appointed from among the members by consensus failing which by representation. However, the Third Respondent was constituted by two members only consisting of a Chairperson and one Member. The representation of all participating States and Union territories is an important statutory mandate. Hence, the Third Respondent has no jurisdiction to proceed with the hearing of the Petition for fixation of the Tariff. 6. Common Counter Affidavit has been filed on behalf of the First respondent Union of India, containing the following averments: (a) The Joint Commission can be constituted under Section 83 of the Electricity Act, and so did, it was constituted. Hence, the Third Respondent has no jurisdiction to proceed with the hearing of the Petition for fixation of the Tariff. 6. Common Counter Affidavit has been filed on behalf of the First respondent Union of India, containing the following averments: (a) The Joint Commission can be constituted under Section 83 of the Electricity Act, and so did, it was constituted. As per Section 83 of the Electricity Act, the Joint Commission can be constituted for two or more States or one or more States and one or more Union Territories or two or more Union Territories, if the constitution of a Joint Commission is for one or more States, the consent of the State Government will be necessary; if the constitution of a Joint Commission is for two or more Union territories only, without the involvement of any State, then there is no need for any consent since the Central Government exercises control over the administration of Union territories sub-section (5) of Section 83 of the Electricity Act is an overriding provision starting with a non-obstante clause, wherein the Central Government is given absolute power to appoint the Joint Commission as it considers appropriate. Therefore, the said provision empowers the Central Government to create a Joint Commission for Union Territories. (b) The First Respondent, thus, followed the necessary procedures in constituting the Third Respondent Commission in accordance with the Act and the Third Respondent shall be allowed to proceeded with its functioning. (c) The Central Government has constituted the Third Respondent Commission with one Chairperson or one members. This has been done by the First Respondent after due consultation with all the interested parties viz, the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, representing all Union Territories except Delhi and the State Government of Goa and due deliberation at the highest level keeping in mind the load of work and the cost of running of the Third Respondent Commission was taken note of. The Ministry of Home Affairs by its Memo dated 25.11.2004 had issued Notification regarding conferring powers under the Electricity Act on the Lt. Governor of Puducherry excluding the powers under Sections 82 and 83 of the Act. (d) The Act itself provides for an Appeal under Section 111 and any party aggrieved over an action constituting Joint Commission may approach the appellate Tribunal for Electricity. Governor of Puducherry excluding the powers under Sections 82 and 83 of the Act. (d) The Act itself provides for an Appeal under Section 111 and any party aggrieved over an action constituting Joint Commission may approach the appellate Tribunal for Electricity. The Petitioners are carrying on business activities in the Union Territory of Puducherry and the Union of Puducherry has not revised its Tariff for the past several years. The Petitioners who are enjoying the benefits of low Tariff for the electricity consumed by them, have come forward with the present Writ Petitions purely on selfish motive and to stall the functioning of the Third respondent Commission. Thus, the Counter Affidavit seeks for the dismissal of the Writ Petitions. 7. Counter Affidavits were filed on behalf of the Second respondent, wherein the following facts have been set out: .(a) The primary function of the Electricity Department, Government of Puducherry is the distribution of the electricity to all categories of consumers in the Union Territory of Puducherry. The power Tariff in the Union territory of Puducherry was last revised during the year 2002, prior to enactment if the Electricity Act, 2003. The powers for determination of Tariff is vested with the appropriate Commission. The powers to exercise the various provisions under the Electricity Act except Sections 82 and 83 were delegated to the Lieutenant Governor of Puducherry during January, 2005. Sections 82 and 83 of the Electricity Act contain the provisions for the constitution of the State Commission and Joint Commission. (b) The cost of the purchase of power is on the increase and on the other hand, the Electricity Department is supplying power to its consumers at a very low cost due to non-revision of Tariff which had resulted in huge financial loss to the Government. In view of the same, the Government of Puducherry is unable to implement the various welfare schemes. (c) After constantly pursuing the mater of Joint Electricity Regulatory Commission with the Government of India, such Commission was made functional during the month of October, 2008. The said joint Commission has to decide the Tariff for distribution and retail supply of electricity. The Electricity Department therefore filed a Petition before the Third Respondent for aggregate revenue requirement and Tariff determination. It was made available to all those who requires it,. The said joint Commission has to decide the Tariff for distribution and retail supply of electricity. The Electricity Department therefore filed a Petition before the Third Respondent for aggregate revenue requirement and Tariff determination. It was made available to all those who requires it,. It has been made known to the public and requested for any objections from any consumer by publishing the same in leading newspapers. Some of the Writ Petitioners have filed their Written Objections. All objections so received by the department have been furnished to the Third Respondent. The Third Respondent had scheduled to hold public hearings in Puducherry and Yanam to record the view of public before considering the proposal for Revision of Tariff. While so, by filing the present Writ Petitions, the Petitioners are stalling the Revision of Tariff. (d) Section 110 of the Act contemplates establishment of the Appellate tribunal. Any person aggrieved by the decision of the Appellate Tribunal may file an Appeal before the Hon’ble Apex Court. While, when the objections raised by the Petitioners are under the Consideration of the Third Respondent, the Petitioners have approached this Court by filing the present Writ Petitions. (e) According to Section 83(5) of the Act, if the State Government authorities the Central Government to constitute a Joint Commission on behalf of the State, the Central Government can constitute a Joint Commission for the State. In so far as the Union territories are concerned, the Central Government is the absolute authority to constitute the Joint Commission with such Member of Members as the Central Government considers appropriate. The Central Government can exercise powers and control in respect of the Union territories. Hence, there is no requirement for the Joint Commission to be constituted with Members representing each of the Union Territories. In view of the above stated position, the Third Respondent has been constituted properly as per Section 83(5) of the Act. Thus, the Counter Affidavit sought for the dismissal of the Writ Petitions. 8. Though Common Counter Affidavit was filed on behalf of the Third Respondent, it is not expressing any view on the merits of the Tariff Petition filed by the Second Respondent and such Tariff Petition shall be heard with opportunity to the concerned stakeholders such as the Petitioners in these Writ Petitions. 8. Though Common Counter Affidavit was filed on behalf of the Third Respondent, it is not expressing any view on the merits of the Tariff Petition filed by the Second Respondent and such Tariff Petition shall be heard with opportunity to the concerned stakeholders such as the Petitioners in these Writ Petitions. The Counter Affidavit has been filed for a limited purpose answering the preliminary issues raised by the petitioners on the constitution of the Third Respondent. Thus, the Counter Affidavit seeks for the dismissal of the Writ Petitions. 9. I have heard Mr. R. Muthukumaraswamy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners in all the Writ Petitions, Mr. Goolam E. Vahanvati, learned Attorney General of India and Mr. M..Ravindran, learned Additional Solicitor General of India, (for both) assisted by Mr. M. Devendran, learned Senior Panel Counsel for Central Government, for the First Respondent, Mr. D. Sreenivasan, learned Government Pleader, (Puducherry) for the Second Respondent and Mr. Karthik, learned Counsel for the Third Respondent. 10. At the time of filing the Writ Petitions, the two issues that were available to the Petitioners were- (i) As per Section 61 of the Electricity Act (herein after referred to as the Act). The appropriate Commission shall satisfy the terms and conditions before determination of the Tariff, but, however, the terms and conditions were not specified by the appropriate Commission and hence, the formation of the Joint Commission is bad. (ii) The Joint Commission shall be formed as per Section 83 of the Act, but, however, the same was not done. 11. Now that, Regulations have been framed after filing of the Writ Petitions and the only point that is available for the Petitioners is “whether the Joint Commission was framed as per Section 83 of the Act?” 12.1. The first and foremost submission that was made on behalf of the Petitioners in this regard is that the Third Respondent ought to have been constituted by an agreement to be entered into- (a) by two or more Government of States; or (b) by the Central Government in respect of one or more Union territories, and one or more Government of States as provided under Section 83 of the Act. However, Notification dated 6.5.2005 did not mention anything about such agreement. Hence, the First Respondent has no authority to constitute the Third Respondent in the manner in which it constituted the Third Respondent Commission. However, Notification dated 6.5.2005 did not mention anything about such agreement. Hence, the First Respondent has no authority to constitute the Third Respondent in the manner in which it constituted the Third Respondent Commission. Thus, the contention put forth on behalf of the Petitioners is that the notification did not mention about the agreement envisaged under Clause (1) of Section 83 of the Act. 12.2. The said contention has been countenanced on behalf of the First Respondent by the learned Attorney General of India that Clause (1) of Section 83 contemplates constitution of a Joint Commission by an agreement, but, however, Clause (5) of Section 83 contemplates constitution of a Joint Commission by the Central Government by the authorities of all participating States. He has further elaborated that foundation of Clause (1) of Section 83 is an agreement which leads to the constitution of a Joint Commission, whereas, foundation of Clause (5) of Section 83 is an authorization to the Central Government by the participating States to constitute the said Commission. 12.3. The contention of the learned Attorney General of Indian appears to be well-founded. A conjoint reading of Clause (1) and Clause (5) of Section 83 of the Act would make it clear that Joint Commission may be constituted by an agreement as envisaged under Clause (1) of Section 83 and by authorization of all the participating States as envisaged under Clause(5). 12.4. In view of the above position, I am unable to accept the contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioners that the Notification dated 6.5.2005 constituting a Joint Commission by the Central Government did not refer about any agreement and hence, the notification is bad. 12. The next contention that has been put forth on the side of the Petitioners viz., whether the Third Respondent has been properly constituted or not, is liable to be considered. 13. .1. The main grievance in this regard on behalf of the Petitioners is that while constituting the Joint Commission, representation has not been given to the Union Territory of Puducherry, Relying on Clause (2) of Section 83, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioners submitted that the Joint Commission shall consist of one or more Member from each of the participating States and Union Territories and the Chairperson shall be appointed amongst the Members by consensus, failing which by rotation. However, the Third Respondent was constituted by two Members only comprising of a Chairperson and one Member. The representation of all the participating States and Union Territories is an important statutory mandate, but a representation to Puducherry was not given. 13.2. On the other hand, it is contended on behalf of the First Respondent by the learned Attorney General of India that the constitution of the Joint Commission so made was made under Clause (5) of Section 83 and hence, representation of all participating States and Union Territories in the said Commission is not a must. 13.3. Before adverting to the said contention, it would be useful toe extract Section 83 of the Act in this regard, and the same is reproduced here under. “83. Joint Commission.- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in section 82, a Joint Commission may be constituted by an agreement to be entered into- (a) by two or more Government of States; or (b) by the Central Government in respect of one or more Union territories and one or more Government of States, and shall be in force for such period and shall be subject to renewal for each further period, if any, as may be stipulated in the agreement. Provided that the Joint Commission, constituted under Section 21-A of the Electricity Regulatory Commission Act, 1998 (14 of 1998) and functioning as such immediately before the appointed day, shall be the Joint Commission for the purposes of this Act and the Chairperson, Members, Secretary and other offices and employees thereof shall be deemed to have been appointed as such under this Act and they shall continue to hold office, on the same terms and conditions on which they were appointed under the Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act, 1998 (14 of 1998). (2) The Joint Commission shall consist of one Member from each of the participating Stats and Union territories and the Chairperson shall be appointed from amongst the Members by consensus, failing which by rotation. (2) The Joint Commission shall consist of one Member from each of the participating Stats and Union territories and the Chairperson shall be appointed from amongst the Members by consensus, failing which by rotation. (3) An agreement under sub-section (1) shall contain provisions as to the name of the Joint commission, the manner in which the participating States may be associated in the selection of the Chairperson and Member of the Joint Commission, manner of appointment of Member and appointment of Chairperson by rotation or consensus, places at which the Commission shall sit, apportionment among the participating States of the expenditure in connection with the Joint commission, manner in which the differences of opinion between the Joint Commission and the State Government concerned would be resolved and may also contain such other supplemental, incidental and consequential provisions not inconsistent with this Act as may be deemed necessary or expedient for giving effect to the agreement. (4) The Joint Commission shall determine Tariff in respect of the participating States or Union territories separately and independently. (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Section, the Central Government may, if so authorized by all the participating States, constitute a Joint Commission and may exercise the powers in respect of all or any of the matter specified under sub-section (3) and when no specifically authorized by the participating States.” 13.4. Learned Attorney General of India appearing for the First Respondent contended that Clause (5) of Section 83 begins with “notwithstanding anything that have been provided in the other Clauses”. This would only mean that even if Clause (2) of Section 83 envisages that the Joint Commission shall consist of one member from each of the participating States and Union territories, the same will arise only if the Joint Commission is constituted by an agreement to be entered into between two or more Government of States or by the Central Government in respect of one or more Union Territories or one or more Government of States. If it is constituted under Clause (5) of Section 83, such representation need not be given to all the participating States and Union Territories. If it is constituted under Clause (5) of Section 83, such representation need not be given to all the participating States and Union Territories. In other words, it has been submitted that formation of a Joint Commission consisting of one member from each of the participating States and Union Territories will arise only if the Joint Commission is constituted under an agreement as per Clause (1) of Section 83 of the Act. 13.5. Countenancing the said arguments, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioners submitted that the words “notwithstanding anything contained in this Section” do not mean excluding Clause (2) of Section 83. The non-obstante clause is to override inconsistent in the provision and if the provision is very clear, the non-obstante clause will have no application. Thus, according to the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioners, Clause (5) of Section 83 cannot override Clause (2) of Section 83. 13.6. This contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioners deserves to be rejected on the following reasons: If the intention of the legislature is not to exclude Claue (2) of Section 83, though Clause (5) of the said section opens with “notwithstanding anything contained in this Section”, the legislature could have explicitly stated in Clause (5) viz., “notwithstanding anything contained in this Section except Clause (2) of Section 83”. But, no such restriction finds place in Clause (5) of Section 83. Thus, the phrase used “notwithstanding anything contained in this Section” would only mean that “notwithstanding Clause (2) of Section 83, the Joint Commission could be constituted, if so authorized by all the participating States without one member from each of the participating States and Union territories as envisaged in that Clause”. Thus, when the Joint Commission is constituted by authorization of all the participating States, the question of constitution of such Commission consisting of one member from each of the participating States and Union Territories does not arise. When it is so explicitly clear, this Court exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot impute certain words in the provision, which is impermissible. Interpretation of a provision will arise only if there is any ambiguity in it. When it is so explicitly clear, this Court exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot impute certain words in the provision, which is impermissible. Interpretation of a provision will arise only if there is any ambiguity in it. Since I am of the considered view that thee is no ambiguity in Clause (5) of Section 83, there need be no necessity to interpret Clause (5) of Section 83 in the manner in which the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioners wants this Court to do. 13.7. The Courts are normally bound to give effect to the plaint meaning of the words used in the status, unless and otherwise such an interpretation leads to some abused or illogical consequence or is in variance with the intention of the legislature. In this connection, the judgment reported in Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai v. Anjum H. Ghaswala and others, 2002 (1) SCC 633 , more so para 29 of the said judgment is usefully extracted here under: “29. Nextly, the Commission has elaborately discussed the object of introduction of Chapter XIX-A in the Act, the history behind the introduction and schematic rationalization of the provisions of Chapter XIX-A brought about through the Finance Act, 1987 to hold that in exercising its power under Chapter XIX-A it has almost an unbridles power to arrive at a settlement. This exercise of purposive interpretation by looking into the object and scheme of the Act and legislative intendment would arise, in our opinion, if the language of the statute is either ambiguous or conflicting or gives a meaning leading to absurdity. We do no find any such problem in the provisions of the Act to which we have already referred to…” 14.1. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioners has relied on the decision reported in British India General Insurance CO. Ltd. v. Captain Itbar Singh, AIR 1959 SC 1331 . More emphasis has been made on paragraph 13 of the said judgment, which is extracted here under: “It also seems to us that even if sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) were confined only to defences based on the conditions of the policy that would not have led to the conclusion that the legislature thought that other defences not based on such conditions, would be open to an insurer. If that was what the legislature intended, then there was nothing to prevent it from expressing its intention. What the legislature has done is to enumerate in sub-section (2) the defences available to an insurer and to provide by sub-section (6) that he cannot avoid his liability excepting by means of such defences. In order that sub-section (2) may be interpreted in the way the learned Solicitor-General suggests we have to add words to it. The learned Solicitor-General concedes this and says that the only word that has to be added is the word “also” after the word “grounds”. But even this the rules of interpretation do not permit us to do unless the section as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful meaning, neither of which we think it is. The addition suggested will, in our view, make the language used unhappy and further effect a complete change in the meaning of the words used in the sub-section.” By placing reliance on paragraph 13 of the said judgment, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioners submitted that the Courts cannot add words to a Section unless the Section, as it stands, meaningless or has doubtful meaning. The said judgment, if fact, supports the case of the respondents. As discussed earlier, Section 83 as it stands does not require any interpretation by this Court since Clause (1) of Section 83 contemplates constitution of a Joint Commission by agreement and Clause (5) of Section 83 contemplates constitution of a Joint Commission by authorization. The constitution of a Joint Commission by an agreement shall only require that it consists of one member form each of the participating States and Union Territories. 14.2. The next judgment relied on by the learned Senior counsel appearing for the Petitioners is reported in R.S. Raghunath v. state of Karnataka and another, 1992 (1) SCC 335 . The non-obstante clause in a statute came in for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court Paragraph 13 which was emphasized by the learned Senior Counsel is extracted here under: “13. As already noted, there should be a clear inconsistency between the two enactments before giving an overriding effect to the non-obstante clause but when the scope of the provisions of an earlier enactment is clear the same cannot be cut down by resort to non-obstante clause. As already noted, there should be a clear inconsistency between the two enactments before giving an overriding effect to the non-obstante clause but when the scope of the provisions of an earlier enactment is clear the same cannot be cut down by resort to non-obstante clause. In the instant case we have noticed that even the General Rules of Which Rule 3(2) forms a part provide for promotion by selection. As a matter of fact Rules 3(2) forms a part provide for promotion by selection. As a matter of fact Rules 1(3)(a) and 3(1) and 4 also provide for the enforceability of the Special Rules. The very Rule 3 of the General Rules which provides for recruitment also provides for promotion by selection and further lays down that the methods of recruitment shall be as specified in the Special Rules, if any. In this background if we examine the General Rules it becomes clear that the object of these Rules only is to provide broadly for recruitment to services of all the departments and they are framed generally to cover situations that are not covered by the Special Rules of any particular department. In such a situation both the Rules including Rules 1(3)(a), 3(1) and 4 of General Rules should be read together, If so read it becomes plain that there is no inconsistency and that amendment by inserting Rule 3(2) is only an amendment to the General Rules and it cannot be interpreted as to supersede the Special Rules. The amendment also must be read as being subject to Rules 1(3)(a), 3(1) and 4(2) of the General Rules themselves. The amendment cannot be read as abrogating all the Special Rules in respect of all departments. In a given case where there are no Special Rules then naturally the General Rules would be applicable. Just because there is a non-obstante clause, in Rule 3(2) it cannot be interpreted that the said amendment to the General Rules though later in point of time would abrogate the special rule the scope of which is very clear and which co-exists particularly when no patent conflict or inconsistency can be spelt out. As already noted Rules 1(3)(a), 3(1) and 4 of the General Rules themselves provide for promotion by selection and for enforceability of the Special Rules in that regard. As already noted Rules 1(3)(a), 3(1) and 4 of the General Rules themselves provide for promotion by selection and for enforceability of the Special Rules in that regard. Therefore there is no patent conflict or inconsistency at all between the General and the Special Rules.” Thus, it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that there should be clear inconsistency between two enactments before giving an overriding effect to the non-obstante clause, but when the scope of the provision of an earlier enactment is clear, the same cannot be cut down by resort to non-obstante clause. In the given case on hand, as stated already, though there is no inconsistency between Clause (1) of Section 83 and Clause (5) of Section 83, Clause (1) of Section 83 contemplates constitution of a Joint Commission by agreement and Clause (5) of Section 83 contemplates constitution of a Joint Commission by the Central Government by authorisation of all the participating States. As discussed already, the Joint Commission constituted as per agreement requires one or more member each of the participating States, but whereas if it is constituted by the Central Government by authorization of all the participating States, it does no require a member from each participating States. The intention of the legislature while incorporating Clause (5) of Section 83 seems to be conscious of the fact that if a Joint Commission is constituted by an agreement by two or more Government of States or by Central Government in respect of one or more Union Territories and one or more Government of States, it shall consist of one member form each of the participating States and Union Territories and the Chairperson shall be appointed from amongst the ambers by consensus, failing which by rotation. In the case of constitution of the Joint Commission by the Central Government on authorisation by all the participating States such necessity to appoint one member from each participating Stats and Union Territories does not arise and hence, Clause (5) of Section 83 reads “Notwithstanding anything contained in this Section”. Thus, the legislatures in their wisdom thought that if the Central Government constitutes a Joint Commission by authorisation of all the participating States, it does not require one member from each of the participating States and Union Territories. 14.3. Thus, the legislatures in their wisdom thought that if the Central Government constitutes a Joint Commission by authorisation of all the participating States, it does not require one member from each of the participating States and Union Territories. 14.3. Yet another decision that was relied on by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioners is reported in A.G. Varadarajulu v. State of T.N., AIR 1998 SC 1388 Paragraph 16, which was more emphasized by the learned Senor Counsel is extracted here under: “16. It is well settled that while dealing with a non-obstante clause under which the legislature wants to give overriding effect to a Section, the court must try to find out the extent to which the legislature had intended to give one provision overriding effect over another provision. Such intention of the legislature in this behalf is to be gathered from the enacting part of the Section. In Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, patanjali Sastri, J. observed: “The enacting part of a statute must, where it is clear, be taken to control the non-obstante clause where both cannot be read harmoniously.” In Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India, (SCC at p.139) Hidayatullah, C.J. observed that the non-obstante clause is no doubt a very potent clause intended to exclude every consideration arising from the provisions of the same statute or other statue but “for that reason alone we must determine the cope” of that provision strictly,. When the Section containing the said clause does not refer to any particular provisions which it intends to override but refers in the provisions of the statute generally, it is not permissible to hold that it exclude the whole Act and stands all alone by itself. “A search has, therefore, to be made with a view to determining which provision answers the description and which does not.” As held by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court must try to find out the extent which the legislature is intended to give overriding effect in Clause (5) of Section 83 over Clauses (1) and (2) of Section 83. The non-obstante clause viz., Clause (5) of Section 83 was intended to override the other clause in Section 83 viz., Clauses (1) and (2) in that Section. 15.1. The non-obstante clause viz., Clause (5) of Section 83 was intended to override the other clause in Section 83 viz., Clauses (1) and (2) in that Section. 15.1. In this connection, it would be useful to rely on the judgment cited by the learned Attorney General of India viz., Union of India and another v. G.M. Kokil and others, 1984 (supp) SCC 196. Paragraph 11 of the said judgment is usefully extracted hereunder: “11. Section 70, so far as is relevant, says “the provisions of the factories Act shall, notwithstanding anything contained in that Act apply to all persons employed in and in connection with a factory”. It is well-known that a non-obstante clause is a legislative device which is usually employed to give overriding effect to certain provisions over some contrary provisions that may be found either in the same enactment or some other enactment, that is to say, to avoid the operation and effect of all contrary provisions. Thus the non-obstante clause in Section 70, namely, “notwithstanding anything contained in that Act” must mean notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in that Act and as such it must refer to the exempting provisions which would be contrary to the general applicability of the Act. In other words, as all the relevant provisions of the Act are made applicable to a factory notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in it, it must have the effect of excluding the operation of the exemption provisions. Just as because of the non obstante clause the Act is applicable even to employees in the factory who might not be ‘workers’ under Section 2(1), the same non-obstante clause will keep ;away the applicability of exemption provisions quo all those working in the factory. The Labour Court, in our view, was, therefore, right in taking the view that because of the non-obstante clause Section 64 read with Rule 100 itself would not apply to the respondents and they would be entitled to claim overtime wages under Section 59 of that Act read with Section 70 of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act. 1948.” 15.2. The decision reported in Parayankandiyal Eravath Kanapravan Kalliani Amma & Ors. 1948.” 15.2. The decision reported in Parayankandiyal Eravath Kanapravan Kalliani Amma & Ors. v.K.Devi & Ors., JT 1996 (4) SC 656 was relied on by the learned Attorney General for the proposition that there is always a presumption that an Act made by the Parliament or the State Legislature is valid so also there is a strong presumption in favour of the validity of legislative classification. It is for those who challenge the Act as unconstitutional to show and prove beyond all doubts that the legislature arbitrarily discriminated between different persons similarly circumstanced. The said presumption however, can be displaced by showing that the discrimination was so apparent and manifest that any proof was hardly required. In the case on hand, the Petitioners have not established any discrimination, which apparent and manifest. Though it is stated that without any member form Puducherry Union Territory, a Joint Commission may not be in a position to decide the issue pertaining to Puducherry. I am of the considered view that the Central Government which has constituted the Joint Commission will take care of all the Union Territories including the Puducherry Union Territory. 16. In view of the foregoing discussions made, I am of the considered view that the Central Government, if so authorized by all the participating States, may constitute a Commission consisting of the members of its choice and can decide the number of members in that Commission. 17. That apart, as rightly contended by the learned Attorney General of India, the Petitioners seem to have been aware that while constituting a Joint Commission, the Central Government has exercised its rights vested under Section 83(5) of the Act. Paragraph 6 of the Affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition in W.P.No.23070 of 2009 establishes the same, which is extracted hereunder: “6. The Third Respondent is a Joint Electricity Regulatory Commission for all Union Territories Except Delhi, constituted by the First Respondent, purportedly in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 83(5) of the Act, to be known as “Joint Electricity Regulatory Commission for Union Territories” vide Notification No.S.O.643 (E), under F.No.23/52/2003-R and R, dated 2nd May, 2005 and published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, dated 6th May, 2005. With the joining of the State of Goa, the Third Respondent came to be known as “Joint Electricity Regulatory Commission for the State of Goa and Union Territories” With effect from 31.3.2002…” The Petitioners, who were well aware that the Central Government exercised power vested under Clause (5) of Section 83 while constituting the Joint Commission, cannot now be heard to say that such constitution is bad without a member form the Union Territory of Puducherry in the said Commission. 18. In the Counter Affidavit of the First Respondent, in paragraph 8, it was clearly stated that the Third Respondent Commission has been constituted by the Central Government, the First Respondent herein, exercising the powers vested in it under Section 83(5) of the Act. In this connection, it would be useful to extract the Notification of the Ministry of Power dated 2.5.2005 and the amendment by Notification dated 30.5.2008, which are extracted here under: “MINSITRY OF POWER NOTIFICATION New Delhi, the 2nd May, 2005 S.O.643 (E)-In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (5) of Section 83 of the Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), the Central Government hereby constitutes a Joint Electricity Regulatory Commission for all Union territories except Delhi with effect from the date of publication of the notification. The Joint Commission shall be known as ‘Joint Electricity Regulatory Commission for Union Territories’ and its headquarters shall be at Delhi.” “MINSISTRY OF POWER NOTIFICATION New Delhi, the 30th May, 2008 “S.O.1271 (E)- In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (5) of Section 83 of the Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), the Central Government hereby makes the following amendments in the notification of the Government of India, in the Ministry of Power, number S.O.643 (E), dated the 2nd May, 2005, namely: In the said Notification for the words “Joint Electricity Regulatory Commission for”, the words “Joint Electricity Regu7latory Commission for the State of Goa and “Shall be substituted.” Thus, I am of the considered view that the Petitioners are well aware that the Joint Commission has been constituted by the Central Government exercising its power under Clause (5) of Section 83. 19. The next question that arises for consideration is “whether authorization by all the participating States” could only mean the State Government and Union territories. Clause (58) of Section 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 defines “State” which includes a Union Territory. 19. The next question that arises for consideration is “whether authorization by all the participating States” could only mean the State Government and Union territories. Clause (58) of Section 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 defines “State” which includes a Union Territory. The said clause is reproduced here under: “(58) “State”……. (a) as respects any period before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, shall mean a Part A State, a Part b State or a Part C State: and (b) as respects any period after such commencement, shall mean a State specified in the First Schedule to the Constitution and shall include a Union Territory.” In view of the above stated position, the contention raised on the side of the Petitioners by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioners that participating States found in Clause (5) of Section 83 shall not be understood to mean Union territory. Cannot be accepted. 20. Though the burden of proof is on the Petitioners that there was not authorization or consent by the Government of Puducherry, as rightly contended by the learned Attorney General of India, the First Respondent was able to establish by producing the minutes of the Ministry of Home Affairs that the Ministry of Home Affairs has deliberated the matter and later it was accepted by the Government of Puducherry: (A) The proceedings of the Government of India, Ministry of Power dated 2.9.2003, especially, paragraph 3, which is relevant, is usefully extracted hereunder: “3. The question of appointment of Electricity Regulatory Commissions for determination of Tariffs in Union Territories has now arisen. Under Section 2(5) of the Act, the expression “Appropriate Government” has been defined but the definition is silent with reference to Union Territories. It is understood that under the General Clauses Act, the Central Government has powers and the responsibilities of the State Government for Union Territories. This would imply that the Central Government is required to take action for appointment of Regulatory Commission(s) for the Union territories. We may request the Dept of Legal Affairs to examine the matter and give their advice. This would imply that the Central Government is required to take action for appointment of Regulatory Commission(s) for the Union territories. We may request the Dept of Legal Affairs to examine the matter and give their advice. (B) The proceedings of the Government of India, Ministry of Power dated 4.12.2003 are usefully extracted hereunder; “It has been decided to hold a meeting under the Chairmanship of Shri R.V.Shahi, Secretary, Ministry of Power on 11th December, 2003 at 4.00 p.m. in the Committee Room )No. 200 B) of Ministry of Power, Shram Shakti Bhawan, Rafi Marg, New Delhi110001 to discuss the issues relating to constitution of Electricity Regulatory Commission (ERC) in the Union Territories (UTs).” (c) In the minutes of the meeting held on 111.12.2003 by the Chief Secretary, NCT of Delhi, Additional Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs etc, it has deliberated the issue and paragraph 5 of that minutes is usefully extracted hereunder: “After discussions, it was agreed that a Joint Electricity Regulatory commission may be constituted by the Ministry of Power for all the Union Territories except the NCT Delhi. In respect of Pondicherry, the consent of the Government of Pondicherry may be awaited. This JERC may be Single member Commission with headquarters at Delhi and it would be required to have sittings in respective Union Territories for hearing the matters specific to that Union Territory. For selecting the Chairman of the proposed JERC, a Selection Committee as envisaged in the Electricity Act may be constituted by the Ministry of Power, Ministry of Power would take necessary steps for implementing this decision in consultation with the Ministry of Home Affairs.” (D) The proceedings of the Ministry of Home Affairs (U.T. Division) New Delhi, dated 28.1.2004 are extracted hereunder: “The Union Home Secretary will hold a meeting at 2.15 p.m. on Thursday, the 29th January, 2004 in the Conference Room, Jaiselmer House, New Delhi, to discuss the various issues involved in the constitution of Electricity Regulatory Commissions for Union territories under Section 83 of “The Electricity Act, 2003. 2. It is requested that you may kindly make it convenient to attend the meeting”. (E) In the meeting held by the Union Home Secretary on 29.1.2004, which included the Secretary in the Ministry of Power and the Chief Secretary, Delhi, the constitution of the Joint Electricity regulatory Commission for the Union Terrritories excluding National Capital Territory of Delhi was considered. It is requested that you may kindly make it convenient to attend the meeting”. (E) In the meeting held by the Union Home Secretary on 29.1.2004, which included the Secretary in the Ministry of Power and the Chief Secretary, Delhi, the constitution of the Joint Electricity regulatory Commission for the Union Terrritories excluding National Capital Territory of Delhi was considered. The Secretary (Power) gave a brief over view of the matter in which he essentially highlighted several aspects, which includes the following aspects: “……… (f) The Chief Secretary, Pondicherry, had in his subsequent communication indicated that the matter had again ;been placed before the Cabinet but the latter had reiterated its decision to constitute a separate Electricity Regulatory Commission for Pondicherry; and (g) It was the considered view of the Ministry of Power that the constitution of a separate Electricity Regulatory Commission for Pondicherry was not administrately and financially expedient in view of relatively very small volume of consumption of power in the Union Territory and that its requirement could be adequately met with by a Joint Commission. 3. The matter was deliberated at length and the unanimous view that emerged was that the scale of operations in the power section in Pondicherry did not functionally justify the establishment of a separate Commission. It was, though, recognized that Pondicherry, like Delhi, had with own Legislative Assembly empowered to make laws for the whole or any part of the Union Territory with respect to any maters enumerated in the State List or in the Concurrent List including the transmission and distribution of electricity, but keeping in view Pondicherry’s negative balance form current revenues, it was difficult to justify establishment of a separate Commission for Pondicherry when Joint Commission for the Union Territories (other than Delhi) could adequately take care of its requirements. 4. It was accordingly decided to recommend to the Government constitution of an Joint Electricity Regulatory Commission for all the Union Territories excluding Delhi subject to the provision that in case it was decided to permit Pondicherry to set up its own Commission, the jurisdiction of the proposed Joint Commission be limited to the five Union Territories without Legislature.” Thus, a deliberation has been made in this regard by various departments of the Central Government of finally, the Central Government which represents the Union territory constituted a Joint Commission. 21. 21. Hence, in view of the proceedings stated above, In am of the considered view that much deliberation was made by the Ministry of Home Affairs about the participation of the Union territory of Puducherry and finally, a Joint Commission has been constituted. Though the Government of Puducherry wanted to go alone, later, the Government of Puducherry accepted for the constitution of the Joint Commission by the Central Government. 22. One more aspect that requires to be considered is that the Petitioners have not challenged the Joint Commission constituted so by the Central Government. As rightly contended by the learned Attorney General of India, without challenging the Joint Commission constituted, the Petitioners cannot argue that the constitution of the Joint Commission is bad as per Section 83 of the Act. 23. That apart, a single Union Territory seems to have been made a complaint about the constitution of the Joint Commission without as participation. As stated already, the Union Territory of Puducherry, after due deliberation, has accepted the constitution of the Joint Commission. The learned Government Pleader, Puducherry has also accepted the said submission. Not only that, the Ministry of Home Affairs has not taken unilateral decision in this regard but, however, it was, after due deliberation, which was set out earlier. 24. Thus, summing up the entire discussions made above, I am of the considered view that- (i) Clause (1) of Section 83 of the Act envisages the constitution of a Joint Commission by an agreement entered into by two or more Governments of States or by the Central Government in respect of one or more Union territories and one or more Governments of States. (ii) Clause (5) of Section 83 of the Act contemplates constitution of a Joint Commission by the Central Government on authorization by all the participating States. (iv) If the Joint Commission is constituted by an agreement as envisaged under Clause (1) of Section 83, then only it shall consist of one member from each of the participating States and the Union Territories as envisaged under Clause (2) of Section 83. (v) If the Joint Commission is constituted as per Clause (5) of Section 83, the same need not consist of one member from each of the participating States or Union territories. (v) If the Joint Commission is constituted as per Clause (5) of Section 83, the same need not consist of one member from each of the participating States or Union territories. (vi) The phrase “notwithstanding anything contained in this Section” as found in Clause (5) of Section 83 could only mean and include Clauses (1) to (4) of the said Section and nothing more. (vii) If the language of the statute is either ambiguous or conflicting or gives a meaning leading to absurdity, the interpretation of the statute by the Court would be necessitated. (viii) The Courts are normally bound to give effect tot eh plaint meaning of the words used in the statute, unless such interpretation leads to absurd or illogical consequence ir is in variance with the intention of the legislature. (ix) Since the Petitioners were aware that the Central Government exercised its rights vested under Clause (5) of Section 83 is constituting the Joint Commission, they cannot now be heard to say that such constitution is bad without a member from the Union Territory of Puducherry. (x) The phrase “participating States” as found in Clause (5) of Section 83 would mean only the State Government and the Union Territories. (xi) The Ministry of Home Affairs had deliberated the matter at length about the participation of the Government of Puducherry and finally the Government of Puducherry has accepted the constitution of the Joint Commission. 25. For the foregoing conclusions arrived at by me. I am of the considered view that the claim made by the Petitioners is liable to be rejected and accordingly, rejected. 26. In fine, all the Writ Petitions stand dismissed. However, there is no order as to costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.