JUDGMENT KRISHNA MURARI, J.-Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri A.K. Sachan appearing for respondent No.3. 2. J.S.C.C. Suit was filed by the landlord-respondent No.3 seeking ejectment and arrears of rent against the petitioner-tenant. The matter was referred to Lok Adalat where the parties entered into a compromise and the dispute was decided on the basis of the compromise. According to the terms of the compromise, the rent was enhanced from Rs. 400 / - to Rs. 800/- per month and in case of default, the plaintiff-landlord was entitled to recover the same and eject the tenant-petitioner. When the petitioner failed to comply with the terms of the compromise and "did not make payment of the rent, landlord-respondent No.3 filed a execution case. An objection under section 47 of the Act was filed by the petitioner, which was rejected Aggrieved, the petitioner went up in revision, which was also dismissed. 3. It has been urged by learned Counsel for the petitioner that once the decree has been passed on the basis of the compromise as such the same could not have been put to execution and in case there is a default, it is open to the landlord-respondent to have given notice terminating the tenancy and filed a suit for ejectment. In support of the contention, reliance has been placed on a Apex Court decision in the case of Bibekananda Bhowal (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Satindra Mohan Deb Wead) by L.Rs.1 AIR 1996 SC 1985 . 4. In reply, learned Counsel for the landlord-respondent No.3 has tried to justify the impugned order. 5. I have considered the argument advanced by learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. Both the Courts below have held that the petitioner has defaulted in making payment of the rent as agreed in the compromise. The Court below has further held that in view of clause (3) of the compromise which gave a right to the respondent-landlord of recovery" of arrears of rent and ejectment, it literally means that in case of default of the terms of the agreement, the decree was liable to be executed. The Court below has further held that in view of clause (3) of the compromise which gave a right to the respondent-landlord of recovery" of arrears of rent and ejectment, it literally means that in case of default of the terms of the agreement, the decree was liable to be executed. The decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court relying upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is not applicable in the facts of the present case inasmuch as in the said case, the terms of the compromise decree provided that the defendant would liable to be evicted after expiry of 10 years by appropriate action in a Court of law and thus, the Hon'ble Apex Court interpreted that the compromise decree was not liable to be executed and the plaintiff could exercise right conferred under the compromise decree by bringing appropriate action in a Court of law. In the case in hand, the fact is entirely different. The petitioner-tenant has agreed in the compromise that he shall be liable to be ejected in case of default. The said decree was passed on 27.5.2007 and within a period of one year, he defaulted as such, the landlord-respondent No.3 had to move execution application in August, 2008. The petitioner having wilfully defaulted and in view of clause (3) of the agreement between the parties, the execution proceedings were rightly initiated by the respondent-landlord and the objection filed by the petitioner-tenant under section 47 of the Act has rightly been dismissed. " 6. In view of the aforesaid facts and discussion, the impugned order does not call for any interference by this Court. 7. The petition stands dismissed. Petition Dismissed.