JUDGMENT 1. By way of this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India the petitioners, who are facing the proceedings under the provisions of the Gujarat Provision For Disqualification Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) which is pending before the competent authority being Appeal No. 44/2009, have prayed for an appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 05/08/2010 rejecting the application submitted by the petitioners raising preliminary objection in Appeal No. 44/2009. 2. The petitioners are the elected members of the Vapi Municipality who have been elected as the official candidates of Bhartiya Janta Party. Respondent no. 2 had initiated the proceedings, being Appeal No. 44/2009, before respondent no. 1 designated officer interalia praying for disqualifying the petitioners for the alleged breach of mandate issued to the petitioners for casting their votes in favour of one Shri Paresh Desai for election of President of the Vapi Municipality. In the said application/proceedings, the petitioners submitted an application raising preliminary objections to dismiss Appeal No. 44/2009 contenting interalia that as the whip by the appropriate authority was not intimated within a period of 15 days it is to be presumed that there is no whip at all, and, therefore, for breach of such a whip, no proceedings could be initiated against the petitioners. That the petitioners relied upon Sub Rule (6) of Rule 3 of the Gujarat Provisions For Disqualification Rules, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules”). It was submitted on behalf of the petitioners that in one application/complaint all the petitioners are joined as respondents and such a joint petition/appeal was not maintainable, as against each member there is a separate cause of action, and, therefore, separate petitions/applications are required to be filed against each member. The designated officer by impugned order overruled the objections raised by the petitioners. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the impugned order overruling the preliminary objections raised by the petitioners, the petitioners have preferred the present Special Civil Application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 3. Shri Mangukiya, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners has as such reiterated what was submitted before respondent no. 1 designated officer while raising preliminary objections. 3. Shri Mangukiya, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners has as such reiterated what was submitted before respondent no. 1 designated officer while raising preliminary objections. It is submitted that there is non-compliance of Sub Rule (6) of Rule 3 of the Rules, inasmuch as the appropriate authority had not intimated the designated authority with respect to the whip within a period of 15 days and, therefore, for the alleged breach of such a whip, no petition is maintainable as there was no valid whip at all. It is further submitted by Shri Mangukiya, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners that the designated authority has not properly appreciated the preliminary objections raised by the petitioners and has passed the impugned order. It is submitted that it was not the case on behalf of the petitioners that the application/complaint was required to be filed within a period of 15 days. It is also further submitted by Shri Mangukiya, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners, that considering the provisions of the Act and the Rules such a joint petition/complaint was not maintainable at all. It is further submitted that against each member there is a separate cause of action, and, therefore, considering Section 3 of the Act, which speaks about the singular Councillor or a Member, such a joint petition/complaint is not maintainable. Shri Mangukiya, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners has relied upon the decision of the Privy Council in the case of PENINSULAR AND ORENTAL STEAM NAVIGATION COMPANY Vs. TSUNE KIJIMA AND OTHERS reported in (1895) 1 A.C. 661 as well as the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of FRANKENBURG Vs. GREAT HORSELESS CARRIAGE COMPANY reported in (1900) 1 Q.B. 504. By making the above submissions and relying upon the above decisions, it is requested to admit/allow the present petition. 4. Heard Shri Mangukiya, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners at length. Considering the preliminary objections raised by the petitioners with respect maintainability of the proceedings before the designated authority, being Appeal No. 44/2009, the preliminary objections raised by the petitioners are twofold. One is with respect to non-intimation of the whip by the appropriate authority to the designated authority within a period of 15 days/one month and the second is with respect to filing joint petitions. 4.1. One is with respect to non-intimation of the whip by the appropriate authority to the designated authority within a period of 15 days/one month and the second is with respect to filing joint petitions. 4.1. Now with respect to the first preliminary objection, Shri Mangukiya, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners has relied upon Sub Rule (6) of Rule 3, which reads as under;“6.Where a member belonging to any political party votes or abstains from voting in any meeting of a municipal corporation panchayat or municipality contrary to any direction issued by such political party or by any person or authority authorised by it in this behalf, without obtaining in either case, the prior permission of such political party, person or authority, the leader of the municipal party or panchayat party concerned or where such member is the leader, or as the case may be, the sole member of such municipal party, or panchayat party, such member, shall as soon as may be after the expiry of fifteen days from the date of such voting or abstention, and in any case within thirty days from the date of such voting or abstention inform the designated offer in Form II whether such voting or abstention has or has not been condoned by such political party, person or authority.”Now on fair reading of Sub Rule (6) of Rule 3, it does not talk about intimation of the whip by the appropriate authority, who has issued the whip to the designated authority and that to within 15 days as sought to be contented on behalf of the petitioners. Sub Rule (6) of Rule 3 speaks with respect to condonation of such voting or abstention, which is alleged to be contrary to the whip. Sub Rule (6) of Rule 3 speaks with respect to condonation of such voting or abstention, which is alleged to be contrary to the whip. As per Sub Rule (6) of Rule 3 where a member belonging to any political party votes or abstains from voting in any meeting of a municipal corporation, panchayat or municipality contrary to any direction issued by such political party or by any person or authority authorised by it in that behalf, without obtaining in either case, the prior permission of such political party, person or authority, the leader of the municipal party or panchayat party concerned or where such member is a leader, or as the case may be, the sole member of such municipal party, or panchayat party, such member, shall as soon as may be after the expiry of 15 days from the date of such voting or abstention, and in any case within thirty days from the date of such voting or abstention inform the designated officer in Form II whether such voting or abstention has or has not been condoned by such political party, person or authority. Therefore, the aforesaid limitation is prescribed with respect to intimation by such person with respect to condonation of such vote or abstention by such a political party, person or authority, and it does not speak/talk about the intimation of the whip by such political party, person or authority to the designated authority as sought to be contended. Under the circumstances, the preliminary objection raised by the petitioners that as the whip has not been intimated by the political party, person or authority after 15 days but within 30 days, as there is no valid whip at all, for the alleged breach of whip, the application/complaint before the designated officer under the Act is not maintainable, has no substance and cannot be accepted. 4.2. Now so far as the second preliminary objection raised by the petitioners with respect to non-maintainability of such a joint petition against the petitioners jointly is concerned, the same also has no substance. The learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners has heavily relied upon the singular word Councillor and Member mentioned in Section 3 of the Act. However, from the aforesaid, it cannot be said that there is a bar on filing such a joint petition. The learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners has heavily relied upon the singular word Councillor and Member mentioned in Section 3 of the Act. However, from the aforesaid, it cannot be said that there is a bar on filing such a joint petition. At the most the respective Member against whom the allegations are made with respect to the breach of mandate/whip are required to be issued the notice separately and they are required to be given an opportunity of being heard independently. However, to say that such a joint petition is not maintainable, cannot be accepted and has no substance at all. There is no provision by which such a joint petition is barred. Considering the above, the decisions of the Privy Council and the Court of Appeal relied upon by the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners would not be of any assistance to the petitioners considering the facts of the case. In the case of PENINSULAR AND ORENTAL STEAM NAVIGATION COMPANY (supra) in a suit under Lord Campbell's Act numerous plaintiffs sought to recover separate damages as due to each plaintiff or group of plaintiff for injuries resulting from a maritime collision alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the appellants and to that it was held that there was no authority expressed in or to be implied from the Rules of Court to warrant the joinder in one suit of different and distant causes of action not being causes of action by and against the same parties. Similarly, in the case of FRANKENBURG (supra) separate reliefs were sought against separate defendants in one petition and it was held to be not maintainable, and, therefore, the aforesaid decisions would not be of any assistance to the petitioners. In the facts and circumstances of the case, where the allegations against the petitioners are with respect to breach of mandate/whip, it cannot be said to be for different and distinct cause of action. 5. In view of the above and for the reasons stated hereinabove, there is no substance in the present petition, which deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.