Judgment A. K. SHRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1. ) Challenging the order dated 17/9/2009 passed in Writ Petition No. 4706/05 by the learned Writ Court dismissing the writ petition of the appellant this writ appeal has been filed under Section 2(i) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaya Peeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005. ( 2. ) By filing writ petition under Article 226/ 227 of the Constitution of India, the writ petitioner/appellant sought the following reliefs : (i) "Quashing the demand raised by the respondents for depositing the amount of Rs. 61,045.00 pursuant to the audit note of the year 1999-2000 and issuing a writ of certiorari or any other suitable writ or order or direction which this Honble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. (ii) Costs of the petition may also be awarded to the petitioner." ( 3. ) In brief, case of the writ petitioner/appellant is that he is a consumer of M. P. State Electricity Board, Gwalior (hereinafter, referred to as the "Board"), having a commercial electric connection at Service No. (old) 22-15-90-0-3447066 and (New) 39425401- 90-0-3447066 and is having a business of expeller machine having sanctioned load of 10 HP since December, 1997. Petitioner is depositing the monthly bills issued to him by the Board from time to time. All of a sudden for the first time in the month of May, 2003 a demand was raised for Rs.61,045/- showing the same to be recoverable as per the audit report made in the year 1999-2000. Copy of the bills of the month of May, 2003 onwards showing the demand have been enclosed collectively as Annexure P/2. ( 4. ) In pursuance to some audit objection of the year 1999-2000, prior to the demand having been raised since May, 2003, no demand was ever been made from the writ petitioner; no check report or demand note was ever served on the petitioner and outright without affording any opportunity or particulars and information related to demand, a demand has been raised and this fact is evident from the monthly bills which are issued to the petitioner. Copy of the collective bills are Annexure P/3. ( 5. ) The petitioner against the demand also submitted a representation to the Executive Engineer of the Board explaining that the demand raised is highly unjustified. Copy of the collective bills are Annexure P/3. ( 5. ) The petitioner against the demand also submitted a representation to the Executive Engineer of the Board explaining that the demand raised is highly unjustified. The petitioner is also regularly depositing his bills and no demand was ever been made from the petitioner earlier. It has also been submitted in the representation that the petitioner is regularly depositing the amount demanded in the bills and the impugned demand of Rs. 61,045/- is not justified. The petitioner is also depositing the electricity charges regularly. Copy of the bills of the month of September, 2005 and the representation were filed as Annexures P/4 and P/5 in the Writ Court. ( 6. ) It is the further case of the writ petitioner that subsequent to the representation the demand was stopped and now again in the bill for the month of April, 2005 the demand is being made with respect to same audit objection of the year 1999-2000 after a period of almost more than five years. According to the writ petitioner, this action of the respondents is highly arbitrary and in complete derogation to the rules." ( 7. ) By highlighting Rule 10.19 of the M. P. Electricity Supply Code, 2004 (in short the Code of 2004) it has been pleaded in the Writ Petition that no recovery can be made for the amount due after a period of two years from the date on which such sum became due. According to the writ petitioner, the alleged due amount is of the year 1999-2000 and for the first time the demand was raised in the month of May, 2003 and thereafter when petitioner submitted his objection by way of representation, the authorities of respondents got satisfied and stopped making the demand, but now again the demand is being made in the year 2005 which is in complete derogation to the Code of 2004. Hence, a writ petition was filed by the writ petitioners praying to grant the relief which we have quoted hereinabove. ( 8. ) In the return, the respondents have pleaded that the impugned demand which was raised against the petitioner relates to the period July, 1998 to January, 1999. The petitioner is having 10 HP industrial connection for the purpose of oil-mill installed in his premises. ( 8. ) In the return, the respondents have pleaded that the impugned demand which was raised against the petitioner relates to the period July, 1998 to January, 1999. The petitioner is having 10 HP industrial connection for the purpose of oil-mill installed in his premises. On 26-6-1998 at the time of taking the reading the employee of the Board found that the meter was tampered. Consequently, for the month of June, 1998 billing of 1667 units was assessed. The meter was not replaced. But in July, 1998 assessment of 1279 units was made. From August, 1998 to January, 1999 the meter was shown to be stopped, but some reading was shown in the meter. Thereafter, in February, 1999 it was shown as faulty and in March, 1999 it was shown as stopped and from April to July, 1999 it was shown that the seals are tampered. The billing was raised during this period and the audit party raised objection that the billing is not proper and it should be revised. Copy of the audit objection was placed on record in the Writ Court as Annexure R/1. ( 9. ) The audit party after raising the objection, also proposed the billing and, therefore, the period July, 1998 to the date when the meter was replaced, the billing was made on the assessment basis at the rate of 1667 units per month which was the undisputed assessment made for the month of June, 1998 i.e. the month immediately preceding to the month from when the meter became disputed. Henceforth a total assessment was made for 28339 units, from which already billed units i.e. 8847 units were deducted and billing was raised on net 19492 units and in this manner the total bill of Rs. 61,045/- has been rightly raised. ( 10. ) The position of law has also been explained in para 5.6 of the return that the Code of 2004 has been framed under the Electricity Act, 2003 (in short the Act of 2003) and these provisions were taken into consideration by the learned single Bench of this Court in Gendlal Agrawal v. State of M. P. and others, 2007 (1) MPHT 528 in which it has been specifically held that the provisions of the Act of 2003 and that of the Code of 2004 would be applicable from the date of its enforcement and not earlier to it. Since admittedly the billing is prior to the date of enforcement of the abovesaid laws, the said demand cannot be said to be arbitrary or de hors to the law. Hence, it has been prayed that the Writ Petition be dismissed. ( 11. ) The learned Writ Court after discussing the case of the parties, in para 4 of its order has held that if the petitioner is having any grievance in respect to the calculation of consumed units, he can raise such grievance to the respondents, but certainly it is not a matter of adjudication under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It would be apt to quote paras 4 and 5 of the order of learned Writ Court which reads thus :- "4. From the facts of the case, it is clear that on 26-6-1998 when reading of the meter was taken it was found that the meter was tampered. Consequently, for the month of June 1998 a total consumption of electricity of petitioners industrial unit was assessed 1667 units. At that time meter was not re placed and the meter was shown stopped from August 1998 to January 1999 and from April to July 1999 the meter was shown as seals tampered. In this view of the matter on the audit objection the department has rightly assessed the consumption of the petitioners industrial unit at the rate of 1667 units per month from July 1998 up to the date when the meter was replaced. Because, at that time there was irregularity and for certain period the meter was also stopped, hence there is no illegality or irregularity in recovery of an amount of Rs. 61045/- from the petitioner. Respondents have done a detailed calculation to this effect. If there is any grievance to the petitioner, it can raise the grievance with the respondents with regard to calculation of units. However, that cannot be agitated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in writ petition. 5. With the aforesaid observation, this writ petition is disposed of." ( 12. Respondents have done a detailed calculation to this effect. If there is any grievance to the petitioner, it can raise the grievance with the respondents with regard to calculation of units. However, that cannot be agitated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in writ petition. 5. With the aforesaid observation, this writ petition is disposed of." ( 12. ) Shri Brijesh Sharma and Shri Nitin Agrawal, learned counsel for the appellant/ writ petitioner, by inviting our attention to rule 10.19 have vehemently contended that the Board is not entitled to recover any sum of amount due from the consumer after the period of two years from the date on which such sum became first due unless such claim has been shown continuously recoverable as arrear of charges for electricity supplied. The contention of learned counsel is that a sum . of Rs. 61,045.00 for the year 1999-2000 was demanded on 7/5/2003 (Annexure P/2) on some audit objection and in this context learned counsel has put emphasis on Annexure R/3 filed on behalf of the respondent in the return and, hence, submitted that the same is ex facie time barred and cannot be claimed in view of the aforesaid provision. Learned counsel further submitted that vide Annexure P/5 dated 18-8-2003 writ petitioner/appellant submitted the representation and thereafter the alleged demand of Rs. 61,045/- was stopped and all of a sudden again it was demanded on 18-4-2005 when the bill Annexure P/1 was sent in which the demand of the said amount was also made and it has been submitted that as per the provisions of the Code of 2004, no such demand can be made and, it has been prayed that this appeal be allowed. ( 13. ) On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents by putting emphasis to Section 56(2) of the Act of 2003 as well as to rule 10.19 of the Code of 2004 has contended that the Act of 2003 came into force w.e.f. 10-6-2003 and the Code of 2004 which has been framed inter alia in pursuance to Section 50 of the principal Act came into force w.e.f. 10/6/2004 and, therefore, these provisions would be applicable from the date of the enforcement of the Code and not earlier to it. The contention of learned counsel is that since the amount due is earlier to 10-6-2004 which is the date on which the Code came into force, therefore, the said provision would not be applicable and the provision of Electricity Act, 1910 would be applicable in which there was no limitation. By placing reliance on the single Bench decision of this Court Gendlal (supra) learned counsel for the respondents submitted that this point has already been put to rest and, hence, it has been prayed that this appeal be dismissed. ( 14. ) Having heard learned counsel for the parties we are of the considered view that this appeal deserves to be dismissed. ( 15. ) In order to understand the controversy in the matter, it would be apposite to quote Rule 10.19 of the Code of 2004 which reads thus :- "10.19 No sum due from any consumer shall be recoverable after the period of two years from the date when such sum became first due unless such sum has been shown continuously as recoverable as arrear of charges for electricity supplied and the licensee shall not cut the supply of the electricity." The provisions of the Code of 2004 became effective from 10-6-2004 (see Rule 1.2 of the Code of 2004). We find sufficient substance and merit in the contention of learned counsel for the respondent that since the Code of 2004 came into force w.e.f. 10-6- 2004, therefore, the aforesaid provision of Rule 10.19 would be applicable from the date of the enforcement of this statute viz. Code of 2004 and not earlier to it, because, it is the cardinal and well settled principle of construction of law that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. But the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair existing obligations. Unless there are words in the statute sufficient to show the intention of the Legislature to affect existing rights, it is deemed to be prospective only (see Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G. P. Singh, 10th Edition 2006, 474). Unless there are words in the statute sufficient to show the intention of the Legislature to affect existing rights, it is deemed to be prospective only (see Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G. P. Singh, 10th Edition 2006, 474). In this context, we may also place reliance on the legal maxim "nova constitutio futuris forman imponere debet non praeteritis", which would mean, "a new law ought to regulate what is to follow, not the past". In the words of Lord Blanesburg, "provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment" (see Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income-tax Commissioner, Delhi and another, AIR 1927 PC 242). In this context, we may also place reliance on Zile Singh v. State of Haryana and others, (2004) 8 SCC 1 : ( AIR 2004 SC 5100 ). ( 16. ) Oh literal reading of the various provisions of the Code of 2004 and particularly Rule 10.19, we find that for no stretch of imagination this statute can be given retrospective operation. The restriction of two years imposed due after the expiry of two years has been enacted only on the enforcement of the Act of 2003 and the Code of 2004 and earlier to it these provisions were not there in the Electricity Act of 1910. Needless to say that the Code of 2004 has been enacted w.e.f. 10-6-2004 in exercise of powers conferred by Sections 43(1) read with Section 181(t), Section 44, Section 46 read with Section 181(1), Section 47 (1) read with Section 181(v), Section 47(4) read with Section 181(w), Section 47(2), (3) and (5), Section 48(b), Section 50 read with Section 181(2-x) and Section 56 of the Electricity Act, 2003 (No. 36 of 2003) and Section 9(j) of Madhya Pradesh Vidyut Sudhar Adhiniyam, 2000 (No. 4 of 2001), since it is clear from the notification No. 861-MPERC- 04 dated 27/3/2004 published in the M. P. Rajpatra Part-IV(Ga), dated 16/4/2004. ( 17. ) Since the burden has been imposed on the Board not to realize the amount which became due after two years, according to us, unless and until specifically or by necessary implication it is made retrospective in operation, for no stretch of imagination it can be held that the Code of 2004 is made effective retrospectively. ( 17. ) Since the burden has been imposed on the Board not to realize the amount which became due after two years, according to us, unless and until specifically or by necessary implication it is made retrospective in operation, for no stretch of imagination it can be held that the Code of 2004 is made effective retrospectively. We have no scintilla of doubt that this statute is prospective in nature and because in the earlier statute there was no limitation to make demand, therefore, the impugned demand of Rs. 61,045/- cannot be said to be time barred. Hence, according to us, the contention of learned counsel for the appellant/writ petitioner that the said demand has become time barred cannot be accepted. ( 18. ) The learned Writ Court has already directed while disposing of the writ petition that the petitioner may raise his grievance in respect to the calculation of the actual consumed units with the department and since it is having nexus with the facts, rightly learned Writ Court declined to resolve this disputed question of fact. Hence, we hereby affirm the order passed by learned Writ Court. ( 19. ) With the aforesaid observation, this writ appeal is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.