JUDGEMENT Dipak Misra, J. 1. Being grieved and dissatisfied with the order dated 4.5.2009 passed by the learned Single Judge in CWJC No. 5689 of 1996, the appellants have preferred the present appeal invoking the jurisdiction under Clause- X of the Letters Patent. 2. The necessitous facts, bereft of unnecessary details, are the appellants-petitioners (hereinafter referred to as the appellants) invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issue of a writ of certiorari for quashment of Memo No. 2392 dated 18.11.1995, contained in Annexure-1 to the writ petition, issued by the Regional Deputy Director of Education, Patna Division, Patna, whereby the interveners were included in the Divisional Cadre of Basic Government School. It is worth noting that the aforesaid memorandum came to be issued on the basis of the order passed in CWJC No. 4199 of 1989 and other analogous cases and that of the order passed by the Apex Court, which affirmed the order of this Court. As is evident vide the memorandum contained in Annexure-1, 26 persons have been adjusted in basic schools of Patna Division. 3. The case of the appellants before the Writ Court was that in pursuance of an advertisement for appointment of teachers in Government Basic Schools, they had applied for the said posts and eventually were selected by the Divisional Level Establishment Committee in the year 1991 and posted in various Government Basic Schools by the Regional Deputy Director of Education in the pay scale of Rs. 1200- 1800/-. On 18.11.1995 by the impugned order, the said authority had adjusted the Assistant Teachers, who were at that time posted in different Basic Schools in Divisional Cadre. The said action, was taken by the respondents, on the basis of the order passed in CWJC No. 4199/1989. 4. It was pleaded in the writ petition that in the State of Bihar, school education has two branches, namely, Primary Education and Secondary Education with separate Directorate. Under Primary Education, there are two categories of schools, namely, Government Basic Schools and Non-Government Elementary Schools. On 11.11.1975, vide Notification No. 2749 the State Government in exercise of the power conferred on it under Article 309 of the Constitution of India framed the State Basic Schools (Classification, Appointment, Promotion and Transfer of Assistant Teachers) Rules, 1975, (hereinafter referred to as the 1975 Rules). On 11.11.1975, vide Notification No. 2749 the State Government in exercise of the power conferred on it under Article 309 of the Constitution of India framed the State Basic Schools (Classification, Appointment, Promotion and Transfer of Assistant Teachers) Rules, 1975, (hereinafter referred to as the 1975 Rules). According to the 1975 Rules, the cadre of the Assistant Teachers of Basic Schools is of Divisional Level under the Regional Deputy Director of Education (for short, R.D.D.E.), who was the appointment authority. According to Rule 3 of the 1975 Rules, the cadre of the teachers of the Government Basic Schools would be of Divisional Level and, according to Rule 4 of the aforesaid Rules, the cadre controlling authority of the teachers of the Government Basic Schools would be the concerned Regional Deputy Director of Education. According to Rule 5, the competent authority would make appointment on the basis of the recommendations of the Divisional Committee constituted under the said Rules. Referring to the said Rules, it was contended that the posts of Assistant Teacher of Government Basic Schools belonging to Divisional Cadre, the concerned Regional Deputy Director of Education would make appointment upon the recommendations of the aforesaid Divisional Committee. The initial appointment was to be made on the posts of Matric Trained Scale and thereafter promotion would be made on the basis of seniority to the posts of higher scale. Thereafter, all appointments on the posts of Assistant Teacher of Government Basic Schools in Divisional Cadre were being made by the concerned R.D.D.E. according to the 1975 Rules. 5. For better organization and development of elementary education, the State Government brought the legislation, namely, Bihar Non-Government Elementary Schools (Taking Over and Control) Act, 1976, (for brevity, the 1976 Act). It was put forth that the service conditions of the Primary School Teachers are governed by the 1976 Act whereas the service conditions of the Basic School Teachers are governed by the 1975 Rules. When the matter stood thus, the State Government took recourse to Section 8 of the 1976 Act and also in exercise of the power under Article 309 of the Constitution of India framed Rules under Memo No. 2412 dated 5.11.1981 pertaining to appointment of Assistant Teachers in Elementary/Primary and Basic Schools. When the matter stood thus, the State Government took recourse to Section 8 of the 1976 Act and also in exercise of the power under Article 309 of the Constitution of India framed Rules under Memo No. 2412 dated 5.11.1981 pertaining to appointment of Assistant Teachers in Elementary/Primary and Basic Schools. According to the 1981 Rules, new appointments in Matric Trained Scale in Government Basic Schools would be made by the District Superintendent of Education from the panel prepared by the District Education Establishment Committee and such teachers posted thereto would belong to the District Cadre of Nationalized Elementary Schools. 6. Placing reliance on the 1981 Rules, it was contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the persons appointed/promoted according to the said Rules would belong to District Cadre of Teachers of Nationalized Elementary Schools. It was put forth that the said Rules did not make any provision that the teachers appointed according to the said Rules in the Basic Schools by the District Superintendent of Education would belong to Divisional Cadre of Teachers of the Government Basic Schools but, on the contrary, Rule 1 of the 1981 Rules made it quite clear that such posts and the teachers posted against those posts would belong to District Cadre of the Nationalized Elementary Schools. 7. It was put forth before the Writ Court that Rule 2 of the 1981 Rules is self-evident that for the purpose of promotion upon the units/posts allotted/sanctioned in I.A. and B.A. trained scales in the Government Basic Schools which are equivalent to Grades-V & III of the Nationalized Elementary Schools, the provisions made under the 1975 Rules would remain intact. It was also urged that if for the purpose of promotion on the newly sanctioned posts in I.A. and B.A. trained, if teachers working in the Government Basic Schools are not available in sufficient number then on those vacant posts, according to Notification No. 2060 dated 15.9.1981 issued for appointment and promotion of the teachers of Nationalized Elementary Schools, appointment/promotion would be made from the District Cadre of District Elementary Schools and such teachers would belong to District Cadre of Elementary Schools. 8. 8. A reference was made to Notification dated 5.11.1981 to highlight that the teachers either appointed by the District Superintendent of Education in the Government Basic Schools or promoted to higher scales, after such appointment, were to remain in District Cadre of the teachers of Nationalized Elementary Schools and were not to be included in Divisional Cadre of teachers of the Government Basic Schools. It was contended that in the year 1982-1983, in Tirhut Division the then R.D.D.E. made large number of appointmerits on the posts of Assistant Teachers of the Government Basic Schools and the services of the said appointees were terminated as they were irregular. They approached this Court but there was no interference and, eventually, the matter travelled to the Apex Court and the Apex Court by order dated 2.5.1986 passed in several Special Leave Petitions holding that the R.D.D.E. was the authority competent to make appointments in the Government Basic Schools. In view of the order passed by the Apex Court that for appointment on the posts of Assistant Teacher in Government Basic Schools, the concerned R.D.D.E. remained the only appointing authority, who would make appointment upon the recommendations of the Divisional Committee constituted under the 1975 Rules and the 1975 Rules remained intact. Elaborating the same it was further asserted that the appointments made by the District Superintendent of Education according to the 1981 Rules belong to District Cadre of teachers of Nationalized Elementary Schools. The District Superintendent of Education, placing reliance upon the 1981 Rules, made several appointments in Government Basic Schoob. Though appointments were made by the District Superintendent of Education under the 1981 Rules, yet they really belonged to District Cadre of teachers of Nationalized Elementary Schools. It was urged that the said appointments made by the District Superintendent of Education were contrary to the mandate of the Apex Court and, therefore, they could not have claimed to have been appointed in Divisional Cadre of the teachers of Government Basic Schools as they were not appointed by the R.D.D.E. according to the provisions of the 1975 Rules and further as there were no recommendations of the Divisional Establishment Committee. That apart, District Superintendent of Education is an Officer/authority of the District Level whereas the R.D.D.E. is an authority of the Divisional Level and, therefore, there could not have been appointment for the Divisional Level. 9. That apart, District Superintendent of Education is an Officer/authority of the District Level whereas the R.D.D.E. is an authority of the Divisional Level and, therefore, there could not have been appointment for the Divisional Level. 9. A reference was made to the Notification No. 1067 dated 17.8.1988 whereby the State Government amended the Notification dated 5.11.1981 and vested the power of appointment of teachers in the Government Basic Schools in the Regional Deputy Director of Education. Thereafter, the teachers appointed by the District Superintendent of Education in Government Basic Schools were directed to go back to the District Cadre as the Assistant Teachers in Nationalized Elementary Schools. The said action was challenged before this Court in CWJC No. 8949 of 1991. A Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 3.12.1993 dismissed the writ petition treating the working of such teachers in Government Basic Schools as on deputation and, therefore, the direction to go back to the Divisional Cadre did not suffer from any illegality. 10. In the year 2003, when the R.D.D.E., Patna Division, Patna had asked the District Superintendent of Education to furnish a list of such teachers, who were appointed by the District Superintendent of Education but were continuing in the Government Basic Schools, one teacher, who was also appointed by the District Superintendent of Education and was continuing in the Government Basic School for last 16 years, filed CWJC No. 5770 of 2003. The learned Single Judge by order dated 15.12.2003 disposed of the writ petition directing the Director (Primary Education), Bihar to make an enquiry into the circumstances in which the said writ petitioner continued in the Basic School for 16 years and further to take such administrative action as may be warranted against the concerned persons. L.P.A. No. 85/04 preferred against the said writ petition was also dismissed on 30.1.2004. 11. The aforesaid aspects were highlighted to bring on record that the teachers, who were appointed by the District Superintendent of Education from the panel prepared by the District Education Establishment Committee and were posted in the Basic Schools, belong to District Cadre of the teachers in Nationalized Elementary Schools and they have no right to continue in the Basic Schools. 12. 12. It is relevant to mention here that the Regional Deputy Director of Education, Patna Division, Patna vide Memo No. 2392 dated 18.11.1995, Annexure-1 to the writ petition, had adjusted the Assistant Teachers, who were at that time posted at different Basic Schools, in Divisional Cadre as they had made such a prayer pursuant to the order of this Court in CWJC No. 4199/89. 13. The said order was challenged in CWJC No. 5689 of 1996 on the ground that those teachers were appointed pursuant to the advertisement made for Assistant Teachers in Primary Schools in District Cadre and, hence, could not have brought in the Divisional Cadre. The learned Single Judge, placing reliance on the order passed in CWJC No. 4199/89, had held that the order passed in Annexure-1 to the writ petition would not mean that the persons mentioned in the said order would be treated to be teachers of the Basic Schools from the date of issuance of Annexure-1, i.e., 18.11.1995, rather they would have the right to be treated as teachers of Basic Schools fiom the date on which they were so appointed/posted in terms of the judgment passed in the case of Sri Jagat Narayan Singh and Ors. V/s. The State of Bihar (CWJC No. 325 of 1991 and other connected matters). Being of this view, the learned single Judge declined to interfere. 14. We have heard Mr. Chittaranjan Sinha, learned Senior Counsel alongwith Mr. Ajay for the appellants, Mrs. Nivedita Nirvikar, learned Government Counsel-XVI for the State and Mr. Pratap Sharma, learned counsel for the respondents no. 6 to 33. 15. The gravamen of the controversy is whether the respondents 6 to 33, who were the petitioners in CWJC No. 4199 of 1989, can be treated to be in the Divisional Cadre in the light of the decision rendered in CWJC No. 4199 of 1989 and other analogous cases and the order passed in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 15838-15844/94. By issue of Annexure-1 dated 18.11.1995, 26 persons mentioned therein have been adjusted in the Basic Schools of Patna Division. By issue of Annexure-1 dated 18.11.1995, 26 persons mentioned therein have been adjusted in the Basic Schools of Patna Division. As it is manifest it was contended before the learned Single Judge that the persons mentioned in Annexure-1 ought to have been treated as teachers of the Basic Schools from the date on which Annexure-1 had been issued and not to be treated as teachers of the Basic Schools from the date on which they were so appointed. 16. In this regard it is essential to appreciate what has been held in the case of Sri Jagat Narayan Singh & Ors. V/s. The State of Bihar & Ors., (CWJC No. 325 of 1991) and Ramanuj Singh and Others V/s. The State of Bihar & Ors., (CWJC No. 4199 of 1989) which were disposed of by the Division Bench of this Court alongwith other writ petitions by a common order dated 3.2.1994. In the said batch of writ petitions, the petitioners therein had prayed for quashment of orders dated 21.9.1988, 13.10.1988, 22.5.1993, 17.1.1990 and 29.12.1990 passed by the 3rd respondent therein whereby all the District Superintendent of Educations had been directed to remove the Assistant Teachers from the Basic Schools in order to make such posts available to the respondent no. 3. The Division Bench adverted to the factual matrix of the case and referred to the order passed in CWJC No. 4199/1989, whereby there was stay of operation of the impugned orders, and referred to notification dated 11.11.1975, Rule 7 of the 1975 Rules, the stand and stance put forth by the State Government, the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners therein and came to hold that the petitioners therein were entitled to continue in the basic schools. 17. Be it noted, the said order was assailed in Special Leave to Appeals (Civil) No. 15838-15844/94, which were dismissed by the Apex Court. 18. If the aforesaid decision is appreciated in proper perspective, three aspects, namely, that the Division Bench had accepted the fact that the petitioners therein were teachers in basic schools in terms of 1975 Rules; that the petitioners in CWJC No. 4199/1989 derived the legal right to continue in the said schools; and that the terms and conditions of their service are distinct from the service conditions of the teachers of the elementary schools and are unalterable without their consent are clearly revealed. In this regard it is also seemly to refer to the order dated 12.3.1993 passed in CWJC No. 8949/1992, wherein the Division Bench has held thus: "The petitioner is aggrieved by the order, as contained in Annexure-7 dated 10th of July, 92 pursuant to which he has been directed to return to a district cadre as an Assistant Teacher in nationalised elementary school. Admittedly the petitioner was appointed Assistant Teacher in the district cadre elementary school by the District Education Establishment Committee as is evident from memo no. 13055 dated 29.12.1987 (Annexure-1). It seems that subsequently he was made to work in basic school for same which can at best be treated as on deputation in the cadre of basic school teachers. In this view of the matter, the direction, contained in the impugned order for reverting the petitioner to his parent cadre does not suffer from any illegality." The facts, as have been stated in the said order, make it quite clear that the petitioner therein was an Assistant Teacher in a Nationalised Elementary School and, therefore, he was repatriated despite the fact that he was asked to work in a basic school. Thus, the reference to said order is totally inconsequential. 19. It is submitted by Mr. Sinha, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that the learned Single Judge has fallen into grave error by coming to hold that the order passed vide Annexure-1 is a sequitur to the order passed in CWJC No. 4199/ 1989 and even the same is assumed to be correct, the order passed in the earlier writ petition cannot become the foundation for issue of Annexure-1 as the order passed in the earlier writ petition is per incuriam as it has not adverted at all to the 1981 Rules which really governed the field and proceeded to decide the controversy on the basis of the 1975 Rules. It is his further submission that when a decision is rendered, being totally oblivious of a statutory Rule, it is per incuriam and thereby is a nullity and cannot be pressed into service at any point of time. Alternatively it is argued by him that even if the benefit is conferred it can be conferred from the date of issue of the order, contained in Annexure-1, and cannot be relegated to the date of appointment. 20. Mrs. Alternatively it is argued by him that even if the benefit is conferred it can be conferred from the date of issue of the order, contained in Annexure-1, and cannot be relegated to the date of appointment. 20. Mrs. Nivedita Nirvikar, learned Government Counsel-XVI for the State and Mr. Pratap Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the respondents no. 6 to 33, supporting the order of the learned Single Judge have proponed that the respondents are covered by the earlier decision as they had been appointed under the 1975 Rules and the Division Bench after scanning the anatomy by the 1975 Rules had given a categorical finding with regard to their status. It is urged by them that once their status has been determined it is obligatory on the part of the State to respect the order and give effect to it as that is the primary objective in a State governed by Rule of Law. It is canvassed by them once consequential steps are taken in pursuance of an order, no fault can be found with the State Government. That apart, it is also propounded by them that the 1981 Rules have no role to play in the case of the petitioners in the earlier writ petition and, therefore, the concept of per incuriam does not even remotely get attracted. 21. Before we dwell upon the factual scenario, whether, as a matter of fact, the principle of per incuriam would be applicable, we may notice a few citations in the field. 22. In Mamleshwar Prasad and Another V/s. Kanhaiya Lal (Dead) through L.Rs., (1975)2 SCC 232 , a three-Judges Bench has held thus: "7. Certainty of law, consistency of rulings and comity of courtsall flowering from the same principleconverge to the conclusion that a decision once rendered must later bind like cases. We do not intend to detract from the rule that, in exceptional instances, whereby obvious inadvertence or oversight a judgment fails to notice a plain statutory provision or obligatory authority running counter to the reasoning and result reached, it may not have the sway of binding precedents. It should be a glaring case, an obtrusive omission.........." 23. In Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh V/s. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh and Others, (1990)3 SCC 682 , it has been held thus: ".........The Latin expression per incuriam means through inadvertence. It should be a glaring case, an obtrusive omission.........." 23. In Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh V/s. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh and Others, (1990)3 SCC 682 , it has been held thus: ".........The Latin expression per incuriam means through inadvertence. A decision can be said generally to be given per incuriam when this Court has acted in ignorance of a previous decision of its own or when a High Court has acted in ignorance of a decision of this Court........." 24. In A.R. Antulay, Appellant V/s. R.S. Nayak and Another, Respondents, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1531, it has been held thus: "It could not be said that the directions given by the Supreme Court in the instant case were not per incuriam. It was manifest to the bench that exclusive jurisdiction created under Section 7(1) of the 1952 Act read with Section 6 of the said Act, when brought to the notice of the Supreme Court, precluded the exercise of the power under Section 407 of Criminal P.C. There was no argument, no submission and decision on this aspect at all. There was no prayer in the appeal which was pending before the Supreme Court for such directions. Furthermore, in giving such directions the Supreme Court did not advert to or consider the effect of earlier case (i.e. AIR 1952 SC 75 ) which was a binding precedent." 25. In Government of Andhra Pradesh and another V/s. B. Satyanarayana Rao (Dead) by L. Rs., (2000)4 SCC 262 , it has been held as follows: "Rule of per incuriam can be applied where a Court omits to consider a binding precedent of the same Court or the superior Court rendered on the same issue or where a Court omits to consider any statute while deciding that issue." 26. In Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. V/s. Shivaraj V. Patil, (2001)6 SCC 356 , it has been held thus: "A prior decision of the Supreme Court on identical facts and law binds the Court on the same points of law in a latter case. In exceptional instances, where obvious inadvertence or oversight a judgment fails to notice a plain statutory provision or obligatory authority running counter to the reasoning and result reached, the principle of per incuriam may apply. Unless it is a glaring case of obtrusive omission, it is not desirable to depend on the principle of judgment "per incuriam". In exceptional instances, where obvious inadvertence or oversight a judgment fails to notice a plain statutory provision or obligatory authority running counter to the reasoning and result reached, the principle of per incuriam may apply. Unless it is a glaring case of obtrusive omission, it is not desirable to depend on the principle of judgment "per incuriam". It has to be shown that some part of the decision was based on a reasoning which was demonstrably wrong, for applying the principle of per incuriam." 27. In State of Bihar, Appellant V/s. Kalika Kuer @ Kalika Singh and Others, Respondents, A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 2443 : 2003(3) PLJR (SC)76], it has been held hus: "At this juncture we may examine as to in what circumstances a decision can be considered to have been rendered per incuriam. In Halsburys Laws of England (Fourth Edition) Vol. 26: Judgment and Orders Judicial Decisions as Authorities (pages 297-298, Para 578) we find it observed about per incuriam as follows: "A decision is given per incuriam when the court has acted in ignorance of a previous decision of its own or of a court of coordinate jurisdiction while covered the case before it, in which case it must decide which case to follow or when it has acted in ignorance of a House of Lords decision, in which case it must follow that decision; or when the decision is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or rule having statutory force. A decision should not be treated as given per incuriam, however, simply because of a deficiency of parties, or because the Court had not the benefit of the best argument and, as a general rule, the only cases in which decisions should be held to be given per incuriam are those given in ignorance of some inconsistent statute or binding authority. Even if a decision of the Court of Appeal has misinterpreted a previous decision of the House of Lords, the Court of Appeal must follow its previous decision and leave the House of Lords to rectify the mistake." 28. In N. Bhargavan Pillai (dead) by L.Rs. and Another, Appellants V/s. State of Kerala, Respondent, AIR 2004 S.C. 2317 , while dealing with the concept of per incuriam and the plea put forth on that platform, the Apex Court has held thus: "14. In N. Bhargavan Pillai (dead) by L.Rs. and Another, Appellants V/s. State of Kerala, Respondent, AIR 2004 S.C. 2317 , while dealing with the concept of per incuriam and the plea put forth on that platform, the Apex Court has held thus: "14. Coming to the plea relating to benefits under the Probation Act, it is to be noted that Section 18 of the said Act clearly rules out application of the Probation Act to a case covered under Section 5(2) of the Act. Therefore, there is no substance in the accused-appellants plea relating to grant of benefit under the Probation Act. The decision in Bore Gowdas case (supra) does not even indicate that Section 18 of the Probation Act was taken note of. In view of the specific statutory bar the view, if any, expressed without analysing the statutory provision cannot in our view be treated as a binding precedent and at the most is to be considered as having been rendered per incuriam......." 29. In Nirmal Jeet Kaur V/s. State of M.P. and Another, (2004)7 SCC 558 , the Apex Court while dealing with the principle of per incuriam has ruled thus: "21. "Incuria" literally means "carelessness". In practice per incuriam is taken to mean per ignoratium. English courts have developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. The "quotable in law", as held in Young V/s. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd., (1944)2 AII.ER 293:1944 KB 718 is avoided and ignored if it is rendered "in ignoratium of a statute or other binding authority". Same has been accepted, approved and adopted by this court while interpreting Article 141 of the Constitution of India (in short "the Constitution") which embodies the doctrine of precedents as a matter of law. The above position was highlighted in State of U.P. V/s. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd., (1991)4 SCC 139 . To perpetuate an error is no heroism. To rectify it is the compulsion of the judicial conscience." 30. The above position was highlighted in State of U.P. V/s. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd., (1991)4 SCC 139 . To perpetuate an error is no heroism. To rectify it is the compulsion of the judicial conscience." 30. In Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community and Another, Petitioners V/s. State of Maharashtra and Another, Respondents, AIR 2005 S.C. 752 , the Constitution Bench has held as follows: ".........Per incuriam means of decision rendered by ignorance of a previous binding decision such as a decision of its own or of a Court of coordinate or higher jurisdiction or in ignorance of the terms of a statute or of a rule having the force of law. A ruling making a specific reference to an earlier binding precedent may or may not be correct but cannot be said to be per incuriam.........." 31. Presently to the factual matrix; in Sri Jagat Narayan Singh & Ors. (supra), the case of the petitioners therein was for quashment of the orders passed by the respondents whereby all the District Superintendents of Education had been directed to remove the Assistant Teachers of the Government Basic Schools in order to make such posts available to the third respondent therein. The Bench took note of the fact that an advertisement was issued in March, 1985 by the State Government inviting applications for appointment on the posts of Assistant Teachers and the last date to receive such applications was 10.4.1985. In the said advertisement it was provided that the minimum qualification for the post of Assistant Teacher was Matric trained. The petitioners in terms of the said advertisement applied to the respective Employment exchange and they were called for interview by the Committee constituted for that purpose. They were appointed in different years from 1986 to 1988. Vide Notifications dated 21.9.1988 and 13.10.1988, as contained in Anriexures-1 & 2 to the said writ petitions, the power of the District Superintendent of Education as appointing authority of Assistant Teachers of Basic Schools was withdrawn and the petitioners were transferred to the Elementary Schools. The said order was stayed in CWJC No. 4199/1989. 32. Before the Division Bench a contention was advanced that vide Notification dated 11.11.1975, the State had framed the 1975 Rules in exercise of power conferred on under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. The said order was stayed in CWJC No. 4199/1989. 32. Before the Division Bench a contention was advanced that vide Notification dated 11.11.1975, the State had framed the 1975 Rules in exercise of power conferred on under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. It was accepted in the counter affidavit that in terms of the provisions of the 1975 Rules, the District Superintendent of Education was the appointing authority. In terms of Rule 5 of the 1975 Rules, a cadre of the directly recruited Assistant Teachers in the State Basic Schools was created. The said teachers of the aforementioned cadre would be recruited in the posts of Matric Trained Teachers. Rule 7 of the 1975 Rules clearly stipulated that the transfer of the said teachers would be within their cadre. The State had filed the counter affidavit therein admitting that so far as the case of the Assistant Teachers of the Basic Schools are concerned they were at least in the Divisional Cadre whereas the Assistant Teachers of the Elementary Schools belonged to the District Level Cadre. The State had contended that in view of the Notification dated 17.8.1988, the Regional Deputy Director of Education was delegated with the power of the appointing authority. It was contended by the petitioners therein that the Notification dated 17.8.1988 would not be applicable to them and, even if it is applicable, it would be prospective in nature and cannot have retrospective effect. In this background the Bench proceeded to hold as follows: "10. As indicated hereinbefore, the State itself in its counter affidavit categorically admitted that the petitioners are borne in District Level Cadre. The respondents in their counter affidavit have further admitted that the teachers posted in Basic School having requisite qualification in the lower subordinate service got the aforementioned benefit but the teachers of elementary schools who are appointed in the district cadre did not get such benefit. It has, however, been contended that in view of the aforementioned notification dated 17.8.1988, the impugned orders as contained in Annexures-1 and 2 have been issued. 11. It has been submitted that the petitioners are being only adjusted in their own regional cadre for which they applied /or appointment. 12. It has, however, been contended that in view of the aforementioned notification dated 17.8.1988, the impugned orders as contained in Annexures-1 and 2 have been issued. 11. It has been submitted that the petitioners are being only adjusted in their own regional cadre for which they applied /or appointment. 12. In view of the fact that the petitioners were in the basic schools, in terms of the statutory Rules, in our opinion, they have derived a legal right to continue in the said schools, as admittedly, they are borne in a different cadre and the terms and condition of their service are also distinct and different from those appointed in elementary schools and thus there cannot be any doubt that the petitioners could not have been transferred from their own cadre to another cadre without their consent nor could they be directed to be adjusted in a different cadre which amount to a fresh appointment by way of transfer. Even if the validity or legality of the notification dated 17.8.1988 as contained in Annexure-6 to the writ application be not gone into, as it is not necessary to do so in the instant case, the said notification must operate prospectively. By reason of the aforementioned notification dated 17.8.1988 the rules validly framed by the State of Bihar in exercise of its power under the proviso appended to Article 309 of the Constitution of India could not have been amended nor altered with retrospective effect. In any event, the phraseology used in the aforementioned notification dated 17.8.1988 states no such retrospective operation therefor nor in our considered view, the legal right vested in the petitioners cannot be taken away thereby. 13. For the reasons aforementioned, these applications are allowed and the aforementioned orders dated 21.9.1988, 13.10.1988, 22.5.1993, 17.1.1990 and 29.12.1990 respectively are quashed so far as they relate to the petitioners, of all these writ applications. There shall, however, be no order as to costs." 33. It is worth noting, the said order was assailed in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) Nos. 15838-15844/94 which, as has been indicated hereinabove, were dismissed by the Apex Court. 34. To have a complete picture of the controversy it is apposite to refer to the counter affidavit of the writ petition (CWJC No. 5689/1996) from which the present appeal arises. It is worth noting, the said order was assailed in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) Nos. 15838-15844/94 which, as has been indicated hereinabove, were dismissed by the Apex Court. 34. To have a complete picture of the controversy it is apposite to refer to the counter affidavit of the writ petition (CWJC No. 5689/1996) from which the present appeal arises. In the return file by the State Government in paragraphs 2, 4 and 9 it has been pleaded as follows: "2. That before giving parawise reply to the writ application it is relevant to mention here that the order and di- rection passed in C.W.J.C. No. 4199 of 1989 by Division Bench of this Honble Court as well as in accordance with the order dated 1.12.1994 passed in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) Nos. 15838- 15844/94, the Divisional Cadre has been given to the teacher appointed by District Superintendent of Education. The State Government has revised or, amended the Rules regarding appointments of Assistant Teachers of Basic School vide memo no. 2412 dated 5.11.1981 but the same was withdrawn vide memo no. 1067 dated 17.8.1988. Thereafter only on the basis of judgment and order passed in C.W.J.C. No. 4199/89 the Divisional Cadre was given to those teachers. 4. That with regard to the statements made in paragraph 13 of the writ application, it is stated that Supreme Court after examining both Rules i.e. Rules i.e. Rules of 1975 and Rules dated 5.11.1981 vide its order dated 2.5.1986 (Annexure-7 of the writ petition) held that Rule 2 of the earlier Rule 1975 shall remain intact and the Regional Deputy Director of Education is competent authority to make appointment in Basic Schools since large number of posts in Basic School were lying vacant and as per direction of Honble Supreme Court the posts of Assistant Teachers of Basic Schools were advertised. In the meantime the State Government vide notification dated 17.8.1988, in the light of the judgment of Supreme Court also delegated the power to respondent no. 3 to make appointment of teachers in Basic Schools and accordingly the teachers were appointed in Basic Schools. 5. That with regard to the statements made in paragraph-27 of the writ application, it is stated that the writ petitioner of C.W.J.C. No. 4199/89 were never appointed in terms of notification no. 4557 dated 15.12.1996, 1938 dated 21.8.1981 and 2060 dated 15.9.1981." 35. 5. That with regard to the statements made in paragraph-27 of the writ application, it is stated that the writ petitioner of C.W.J.C. No. 4199/89 were never appointed in terms of notification no. 4557 dated 15.12.1996, 1938 dated 21.8.1981 and 2060 dated 15.9.1981." 35. Before the learned Single Judge it was contended that the decision rendered in Sri Jagat Narayan Singh & Ors. (supra) did not discuss the provisions of 1981 Rules and, in fact, did not interpret he Rules and, therefore, the Court should nterpret the Rules in favour of the petiioners. The learned Single Judge in the order impugned has held thus: "....It appears that all these matters have already been settled by this Court by the judgments delivered in the case of Sri Jagat Narayan Singh and Ors., C.W.J.C. No. 325 of 1991 and analogous cases, S.L.P. Nos. 15838- 15844 of 1994, C.W.J.C. No. 10616 of 1995, Kumari Sashikala and Ors. V/s. The State of Bihar and C.W.J.C. N ,. 1296 of 1996 passed in Kumar Prasad Rajak and Ors. V/s. The State of Bihar. Therefore, I hold that the order passed in Annexure-1 cannot mean that the persons mentioned in the said Annexure-1 would be treated to be teachers of basic school from the date of issuance of Annexure-1 i.e. 18.11.1995 rather they would have the right to be treated as teachers of basic schools from the date on which they were so appointed/posted in terms with the judgment passed in the case of Sri Jagat Narayan Singh and Ors. vs. The State of Bihar......" 36. As is evincible, on an earlier occasion, the respondents had placed reliance on the 1975 Rules. This Court on scrutiny of the Rules had rendered the decision. This Court had categorically held that the petitioners therein were appointed under the 1975 Rules and such a finding was recorded on the analysis of the factual matrix in entirety. Be it noted, the stand of the State therein was that it had issued a notification in 1988. The Division Bench has expressed the view that the said notification was not applicable to the said case. The 1981 Rules is not applicable as the deviation only came in existence in the year 1988, which was pressed into service by the State. Prior to that the petitioners therein, who are respondents in the present appeal, had already been appointed. The Division Bench has expressed the view that the said notification was not applicable to the said case. The 1981 Rules is not applicable as the deviation only came in existence in the year 1988, which was pressed into service by the State. Prior to that the petitioners therein, who are respondents in the present appeal, had already been appointed. Once there had been adjudication of the present nature, we really fail to fathom how the principle of per incuriam would get attracted. When a set of Rules, as we are inclined to think, is not applicable and this Court had correctly applied the 1975 Rules, therefore, the submission advanced by Mr. Sinha, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants does not deserve acceptation. 37. It is submitted by Mrs. Nivedita Nirvikar, learned Government Counsel-XVI that the order passed on earlier occasion would operate as res judicata as the decision was rendered between the petitioners therein on one hand and the State on the other side. 38. Per contra, Mr. Sinha, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants submitted that when the Court had not taken the provision into consideration and the appellants were not parties, the decision would not operate as res judicata. In this context we may refer to the decision rendered in Mathura Prasad Sarjoo Jaiswal & Ors. V/s. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy, AIR 1971 SC 2355 , wherein it has been held as follows: "9. A question of jurisdiction of the Court, or of procedure, or a pure question of law unrelated to the right of the parties to a previous suit, is not res judicata in the subsequent suit. Rankin, C.J., observed in Tarini Charan Bhattacharjees case, ILR 56 Cal. 723= (AIR 1928 Cal. 777). "The object of the doctrine of res judicata is not to fasten upon parties special principles of law as applicable to them inter se, but to ascertain their rights and the facts upon which these rights directly and substantially depend; and to prevent this ascertainment from becoming nugatory by precluding the parties from reopening or recontesting that which has been finally decided." A question relating to the jurisdiction of a Court cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous decision of the court. If by an erroneous interpretation of the statute the Court holds that it has no jurisdiction, the question would not, in our judgment, operate as res judicata. If by an erroneous interpretation of the statute the Court holds that it has no jurisdiction, the question would not, in our judgment, operate as res judicata. Similarly by an erroneous decision if the Court assumes jurisdiction which it does not possess under the statute the question cannot operate as res judicata between the same parties, whether the cause of action in the subsequent litigation is the same or otherwise. 10. It is true that in determining the application of the rule of res judicata the Court is not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the earlier judgment. The matter in issue, if it is one purely of fact, decided in the earlier proceeding by a competent court must in a subsequent litigation between the same parties be regarded as finally decided and cannot be reopened. A mixed question of law and fact determined in the earlier, proceeding between the same parties may not, for the same reason, be questioned in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties. But, where the decision is on a question law, i.e. the interpretation of a statute, it will be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties where the cause of action is the same, for the expression "the matter in issue" in S. 11, Code of Civil Procedure, means the right litigated between the parties i.e. the facts on which the right is claimed or denied and the law applicable to the determination of that issue. Where, however, the question is one purely of law and it relates to the jurisdiction of the Court or a decision of the Court sanctioning something which is illegal, by resort to the rule of res judicata a party affected by the decision will not be precluded from challenging the validity of the order under the rule of res judicata, for a rule of procedure cannot supersede the law of the land. 11. In the present case the decision of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Borivli, that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for determination of standard rent, is, in view of the judgment of this Court, plainly erroneous, See (1962)3 SCR 928 =( AIR 1966 SC 1939 ). 11. In the present case the decision of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Borivli, that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for determination of standard rent, is, in view of the judgment of this Court, plainly erroneous, See (1962)3 SCR 928 =( AIR 1966 SC 1939 ). If the decision in the previous proceeding be regarded as conclusive it will assume the status of a special rule of law applicable to the parties relating to the jurisdiction of the Court in derogation of the rule declared by the Legislature." 39. In Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. V/s. L.V.A. Dixitulu & Ors., (1979)2 SCC 34 , the Apex Court while adverting to the issue of pure question of law or a decision rendered by a court without jurisdiction has expressed thus: "Moreover, this is a pure question of law depending upon the interpretation of Article 371-D. If the argument holds good, it will make the decision of the Tribunal as having been given by an authority suffering from inherent lack of jurisdiction. Such a decision cannot be sustained merely by the doctrine of res judicata or estoppel as urged in this case." While dwelling upon the concept of res judicata, their Lordships have opined thus: "It is true that the appellant did not challenge the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The learned Judge in support of his judgment relied upon an earlier decision of the High Court in Rajesh Garg V/s. Management of Punjab State Tube-well Corporation Limited & Anr. [1984(3) SLR 397] but failed to consider the question having regard to the pronouncements of this Court including H.R. Adyanthaya (supra), Rajesh Garg (supra) was rendered following S.K. Verma (supra), which being not a good law could not have been the basis therefor. The principle of res judicata belongs, to the domain of procedure. When the decision relates to the jurisdiction of a court to try an earlier proceedings, the principle of res judicata would not come into play. [See: Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal (supra)]. An identical question came up for consideration before this Court in Ashok Leyland Ltd. V/s. State of Tamil Nadu and Another [ (2004)3 SCC 1 ] wherein it was observed: "The principle of res judicata is a procedural provision. A jurisdictional question if wrongly decided would not attract the principle of res judicata. [See: Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal (supra)]. An identical question came up for consideration before this Court in Ashok Leyland Ltd. V/s. State of Tamil Nadu and Another [ (2004)3 SCC 1 ] wherein it was observed: "The principle of res judicata is a procedural provision. A jurisdictional question if wrongly decided would not attract the principle of res judicata. When an order is passed without jurisdiction, the same becomes a nullity. When an order is nullity, it cannot be supported by invoking the procedural principles like, estoppel, waiver of res judicata..." It would, therefore, be not correct to contend that the decision of the learned Single Judge attained finality and, thus, the principle of res judicata shall be attracted in the instant case." 40 From the aforesaid enunciation of law it is clear as crystal that when a Court delivers a judgment without jurisdiction or is contrary to the existing law, the earlier judgment cannot be held to be res judicata in the subsequent case but, a significant one, in the case at hand the earlier decision was rendered by this Court which had jurisdiction, dealing with the case and had not delivered the decision contrary to the law. True it is, the appellants were not the parties to the earlier decision but they could not have been as they were not borne in the cadre and the lis pertained to the petitioners therein and the State. 41. In view of the aforesaid the State is bound by the said order and cannot be held to have acted illegally by following the said decision. The present appellants, we are disposed to think, cannot question the legal propriety of the said decision, more so, when the same has been given the stamp of approval by the Supreme Court inasmuch as their Lordships have declined to interfere in the Special Leave Petition. Be it noted, we have dealt with this facet in the present manner as a plea of res judicata was raised by the State and on behalf of the appellants the plea of nullity was canvassed. 42. In view of the aforesaid premised reasons, the appeal, being sans substratum, stands dismissed. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.