Judgment :- 1. These Second Appeals are filed at the instance of the Plaintiffs in O.S. No.70/1999 and have been entertained on the following substantial questions of law: 1.1. Whether the Civil Court is precluded from deciding the question of title on the ground that the Sale Deed-Ex. A2 has been executed in favour of the Plaintiffs’ contrary to the condition imposed in the grant Ex.A10? 1.2. Whether the lower Appellate Court was right in invoking Section 14 of the Land Encroachment Act in the absence of pleading and proof? 2. The above said Suit was instituted by the Appellants herein/Plaintiffs for declaration, declaring that the Plaintiffs are the absolute owners of the vacant site in the suit property and for permanent injunction restraining the Defendants from interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the suit property by the Plaintiffs and for costs. 3. The cape of the Plaintiffs as set out in the Plaint is as follows: a. A terraced building, which is marked as ‘BCDB’ in the plain plan, measuring 20’ in east west on the north, 19’ east west of the south, 13.74’ in north south on both sides originally belonged to one U.S. Natarajan of Uthandipalayam, who obtained a grant from the 1st Defendant for the portion to an extent of 0.02 acres. The said grant was issued by the Joint Collector of Coimbatore on 14.5.1963 in Old S.F-No.218, which is a poramboke land. A portion of the property covered under the grant situated on the north of ‘BCDB’ is the suit property in the present Suit which is marked as ‘ABEF’ in the plaint plan. b. About 50 feet, away on the north of the suit property, there exist east west Karur to Erode tar road. The suit property along with the property in ‘BCDE’ portion was enjoyed by the said U.S. Natarajan and there existed a tiled building and presently, it is covered with asbestos roofing. On the east and west of the suit property, there are buildings and the said grant is in force till this date. The suit property along with the property in ‘BCDE’ portion was enjoyed by the said U.S. Natarajan and there existed a tiled building and presently, it is covered with asbestos roofing. On the east and west of the suit property, there are buildings and the said grant is in force till this date. The said U.S. Natarajan sold ‘EDGE’ portion along with the suit property to one Muthusamy Gounder, son of Chinnappa Gounder of Nanjappa Goundanpudur under a registered Sale Deed dated 24.7.1970 and the said Muthusamy Gounder sold the aforesaid property in favour of the Plaintiffs under a registered Sale Deed dated 23.1.1983 and since then, the Plaintiffs have been in possession and enjoyment of the same, by running a hardwae business under the name and style of Sri Ganesh Hardwares from 1977 i.e. even before the Plaintiffs purchased the said property and the Plaintiffs have been paying house tax and the electricity connection was obtained in the name of the Plaintiffs and the Plaintiffs and their predecessors in title are in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the suit property continuously, openly and uninterruptedly for more than 35 years. c. The Defendants never enjoyed the suit property and the Defendants have not right to interfere with the right of the Plaintiffs of enjoyment of the suit property. While so, the Defendants and their officials under the guise of removing the encroachment in poramboke land on 23.1.1999 made an attempt to demolish the building in the suit property and dispossess the Plaintiffs. Which was thwarted by the Plaintiffs. There is no necessity to remove the building in the suit property and the actual road is situated about 50 feet away on the north from the suit property and it is not an encroachment on the road Again on 9.2.1999, the Defendants attempted to dispossess the Plaintiff and the said attempt was stopped by the intervention of the neighbours. Hence, the Suit has been filed. 4. In the Written Statement filed by the 3rd Defendant, it is averred as follows: a. It is true that one U.S. Natarajan got a grant for two cents in poramboke land as alleged by the Plaintiffs. But, it is false to state that the suit property forms a protion of the property obtained under the grant. The plan and the measurements given by the Plaintiffs are not correct. But, it is false to state that the suit property forms a protion of the property obtained under the grant. The plan and the measurements given by the Plaintiffs are not correct. The suit property was never enjoyed by U.S. Natarajan. The property covered by the grant and the suit property formed one unit and the suit property was a vacant site belonged to the 3rd Defendant, which was encroached by the Plaintiffs, after they got an invalid sale by one Muthusamy Gounder from the vendee of U.S. Natarajan and the said Muthusamy Gounder also did not enjoy the suit property and the Plaintiffs encroached upon the suit property and put up the building thereon without any right. The documents filed by the Plaintiffs cannot bind the 3rd Defendant in so far as the Suit property is concerned. b. The property under the grant mentioned in the plaint and given to U.s. Natarajan never included the portion of the property and it belonged to the department of the 3rd Defendant. Taking advantage of the order of grant, the Plaintiffs unlawfully encroached upon the portion of the property belonged to the 3rd Defendant. It is also false to state that the Defendants and their officials attempted to dispossess the Plaintiffs from the suit property on various dates. Hence, the Suit is liable to be dismissed. 5. Before the Trial Court, on the side of the Plantiffs, Ex.A1 to A10 were marked and the Plaintiffs examined the 1st Plaintiff as PW.1 and one O.S. Natarajan, Kolandavel and Velusamy as PWs.2 to 4. On behalf of the Defendants. Ex.B1 to B3, Ex.C1 to C3 were marked and one Swaminathan and Manokaran were examined as DW.1 and DW.2 6. On consideration of the oral as well as the documentary evidence, the Trial Court dismissed the Suit in so far as the prayer for declaration is concerned, but however, granted a decree for permanent injunction restraining the Defendants from interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the suit, property by the Plaintiffs and further directed the Defendants not to dispossess the Plaintiffs from the suit property without following the due process of law. As against the said judgment and decree of the Trial Court, both the Plaintiffs and the Defendants filed Appeals. As against the said judgment and decree of the Trial Court, both the Plaintiffs and the Defendants filed Appeals. The First Appellate Court negatived both the reliefs on the ground that the Suit is not maintainable in view of Section 14 of the Tamil Nadu Encroachment Act and the alienation made by the grantee is contravention of the conditions stipulated in Ex.A10 is not valid. As against he same, these Second Appeals have been filed by the Plaintiffs. 7. This Court heard the submissions of the learned Counsel on either side and also perused the judgments of the Court below and the materials on record. 8. The suit property originally belonged to one U.s. Natarajan having got the same on a grant on 14.5.1963 in Ex.A10 from the 1st Respondent for an extent of 0.02 acres and sold the suit property to one Muthusamy Gounder by a registered Sale Deed dated 24.7.1970 under Ex.A1, who in turn sold the same to the Appellants on 28.1.1983 by way of a registered Sale Deed Ex.A2. The predecessors of the Plaintiffs and the Plaintiffs are in possession and enjoyment of the suit property and the Plaintiffs are running a hardware business and paying house tax and electricity service connection stands in their name. Thus, the Plaintiffs are in possession and enjoyment for a period of more than 35 years. 9. According to the Appellants/Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs and their predecessors in title are in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the property openly, continuously and uninterruptedly for ore than 35 years, thus, perfecting their right over the suit property by way of adverse possession. The Respondents and their officials under the guise of removing the encroachment in the poramboke land attempted to demolish the building on 23.1.1999 and again on 9.2.1999, which was thwarted by the Appellants. The Karur-Erode road is 50 to 60 feet away on the north from the suit property and the Plaintiffs have neither obstructed the road nor encroached on the road. 10. The Respondents contended that the suit property never formed part of the grant given to the grantee U.S. Natarajan and the Appellants have unlawfully encroached upon a portion of the property belonging to the Highways Department taking advantage of the grant. 10. The Respondents contended that the suit property never formed part of the grant given to the grantee U.S. Natarajan and the Appellants have unlawfully encroached upon a portion of the property belonging to the Highways Department taking advantage of the grant. The grantee has no right to transfer the rights in favour of any other person without the sanction of the Government as per the conditions of the grant, and further, in the event of the land in question being required for widening the road of for any other purpose in connection with the road, the grantee was required to vacate the property without any protest. 11. The Trial Court though granted a decree of injunction, but refused to grant a decree for declaration. The First Appellate Court negatived both the reliefs on the ground that the suit is not maintainable in view of Section 14 of the Tamil Nadu Encroachment Act and the alienation made by the grantee in contravention of the conditions stipulated in Ex.A10 is not valid and thus dismissed the Suit. Aggrieved against the said judgment and decree of the Lower Appellate Court, the present Second Appeals are filed 12. Mr. N. Manokaran, the learned counsel for the Appellants submitted that Section 14 of the Tamil Nadu Encroachment Act did not bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to adjudicate the title of the parties and the Appellants and their predecessors in title having been, in uninterrupted possession for more than 35 years, the Civil Court’s jurisdiction is not ousted in the case of Srinivasan and six others v. Sri. Madhyarjuneswaraswami, Pattaviathalai, Tiruchi District by its Executive Officer at Pettavaithalai Devasthanam and five others, 1998 (1) CTC 630 , wherein the Full Bench answered in the negative to the question referred to the Full Bench as to whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a Suit for declaration of title and injunction is barred by reason of the grant of patta under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act 30 of 1963. The Full Bench has held that the Civil Court;s jurisdiction to adjudicate the title of the parties is not barred by virtue of the provision of the Tamil Nadu Minor Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963 and observed that the jurisdiction of the Civil courts cannot be held to have been completely ousted or barred at any rate in respect of adjudication of claims of title and questions or issues which are not obliged or required to be adjudicated for the purpose of enforcement of these laws which has, as their object and aim, to implement Ryotwari Settlement in the areas governed by them. 13. A learned Single judge of this Court followed the dictum laid by the Full Bench cited supra in the case of Ramalingam and two others v. the Idol of Sri Thayamanasamy at Sri Thayamanasamy Devesthanam, Arasaloor, Musiri Taluk by its Executive Officer, 1998 (3) CTC 665 , and held that the Civil court’s Jurisdiction to adjudicate the title of the parties is not barred in the light of the nature of dispute raised being one related to adverse possession. It is relevant to extract the observation made by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of State of Tamil Nady v. Ramalinga Samigal Madam, AIR 1986 SC 794 , as below: “Thirdly, having regard to the principle stated by this Court while enunciating the first proposition in Dhulabha case, AIR 1969 SC 78 , it is clear that, even where the statute has given finality to the orders of the Special Tribunal, the Civil Court’s jurisdiction can be regarded as having been excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil court would normally do in a Suit. In other words, even where finality is accorded to the orders passed by the Special Tribunal one will have to see whether such Special Tribunal has powers to grant reliefs which Civil Court would normally grant in a Suit and if the answer is in the negative it would be difficult to imply or infer exclusion of Civil Court’s jurisdiction. In other words, even where finality is accorded to the orders passed by the Special Tribunal one will have to see whether such Special Tribunal has powers to grant reliefs which Civil Court would normally grant in a Suit and if the answer is in the negative it would be difficult to imply or infer exclusion of Civil Court’s jurisdiction. Now, take the case of an Applicant who has applied for a Ryotwari Patta under Section 11 staking his claim thereto on the basis of his long and uninterrupted possession of he ryoti land but the Settlement Officer on materials before him is not satisfied that the land in question is ryoti land; in that case he will refuse the Patta to the Applicant. But, can he, even after the refusal of the Patta, protect the Applicant’s long and uninterrupted possession against the Government interference? Obviously, he cannot, for it lies within his power and jurisdiction merely to grant or refuse to grant the Patta on the basis of materials placed before him. But, such a person even after the refusal of the Ryotwari Patta would be entitled to protect his possessory title and long enjoyment of the land and seek an injunction preventing Government’s interference otherwise than in due course of law and surely before granting such relief the Civil Court may have to adjudicate upon the real nature or character of the land if the same is put in issue. In other words since the settlement officer has not power to do what Civil Court would normally do in a Suit it is difficult to imply ouster of Civil Court’s jurisdiction simply because finality has been accorded to the Settlement Officer’s order under Section 64-C of the Act.” 14. In the present case, no notice has been issued to the Appellants either specifying the land so occupied by the Appellants as an encroachment or the Appellants being in possession unauthorisedly as trespasser in the property of the Government. There is no order passed directing them to vacate the land under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Land Encroachment Act, 1905. In the said facts and circumstances, there is no scope for invoking for the application of Section 14 of the Tamil Nadu Encroachments Act, 1905. There is no order passed directing them to vacate the land under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Land Encroachment Act, 1905. In the said facts and circumstances, there is no scope for invoking for the application of Section 14 of the Tamil Nadu Encroachments Act, 1905. The Civil Court’s jurisdiction is not barred to adjudicate the dispute raised by the Appellant as the reliefs sought for by the Plaintiffs is to protect his possession and long enjoyment of the land. Accordingly, the second substantial question of law is answered. 15. The suit property admeasuring an extent of 0.02 acres along with the other property was given to U.S. Natarajan as grant by the Joint Collector of Coimbatore on 14.5.1963 in Old S. No.218, the copy of which is marked as Ex.A10. She said U.S. Natarajan had sold the said property to one Muthusamy Gounder under Ex. A1 dated 24.6.1970, who in turn has sold it to the Appellants under Ex. A2, a registered Sale Deed dated 28.1.1983. the Plaintiffs and their predecessors in title are in exclusive possession and the Plaintiffs are running a hardware stores. The Karus-Erode road is 60 feet away from the suit property and in between the road and the suit property, there is a Vinayagar Temple, an old tree, a common well for the public and a bus shelter abutting the road. The Advocate Commissioner has mentioned all the above said features in his report Ex.C1 and Ex.C2. The officials from the Defendant’s department admitted in their evidence about the distance between the road and suit property and also the existence of the temple, the old tree and the public common well in between the suit property and the Karur-Erode Road. 16. Mr. N. Manokaran, the learned Counsel for the Appellants would submit that the Plaintiffs have proved to be in possession and as per the principles of possessory title, a person, who has been in long continuous possession, can protect the same by seeking an injunction against any person even as against the true owner. 16. Mr. N. Manokaran, the learned Counsel for the Appellants would submit that the Plaintiffs have proved to be in possession and as per the principles of possessory title, a person, who has been in long continuous possession, can protect the same by seeking an injunction against any person even as against the true owner. The learned Counsel would submit that the Appellants having purchased the suit property through a valid Sale Deed dated 28.1.1983 are in continuous possession and even assuming that there was a condition in the grant made by the Government, the same, not being cancelled, the Appellants had acquired possessory and prescriptive title over the suit property and the Appellants are entitled to resist or defend their possession. The learned Counsel would submit that in such a case, the possession of the Appellants cannot be interfered with except in due course of law, even assuming that the predecessor in title had sold the property in violation of the condition mentioned thereon in Ex.A10. 17. The learned Counsel for the Appellants would further contend that a person in juridical possession or settled possession cannot, be evicted without recourse to law and relied on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court rendered in the case of Anamallai Club v. Government of Tamil Nadu and others, 1997 (2) CTC 307, wherein the Honourable Supreme Court has reiterated the principle of law enunciated in the case of State of U.P. v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad singh, 1989 (2) SCC 505 . It held in paragraphs 8 and 9 as extracted below: 8. Law makes a distinction between persons in juridical possession and rank trespassers. Law respects possession even if there is no valid title to support it. Law does not permit any person to take law into his hands and to dispossess a person in actual possession without having recourse to a Court. The object thereby is to encourage compliance of the rule of law and to deprive the person who wanted a person in lawful possession removed from possession according to proper form and to prevent him from going with a high band and eject such person. The object thereby is to encourage compliance of the rule of law and to deprive the person who wanted a person in lawful possession removed from possession according to proper form and to prevent him from going with a high band and eject such person. Undoubtedly, the true owner is entitled to retain possession even though he had obtained it by force or by other unlawful means but that would not be a ground to permit the owner to take the law into his own hands and eject the person in juridical possession or settled possession without recourse to law. 9. Thus, it could be seen that even after determination of the licence under the Government Grants Act, the Government is entitle to resume possession but resumption of possession does not mean unilaterally taking possession without recourse of law. The Eviction Act contemplates such a procedure. ‘Premises’ defined under Section 2(d) of the Act means any land or any building or a part of a building or hut or any enclosure appurtenant thereto. Section 4 prescribes procedure of issuance of a notice of show cause before eviction giving an opportunity and thereafter taking action under section 5 of the Act., Unfortunately, on the facts of the case on hand, the Respondent has not adopted the procedure prescribed under Section 4 and 5 of the Eviction Act after determination of the licence granted under the Government Grants Act. The High Court, therefore was not right in its conclusion that the procedure prescribed under the PPE Act is not applicable to the grants made under the Government Grants Act since the Appellants remained in settled possession since a long time pursuant to the grant. After determination of the grant, though they have no right to remain in possession, the State cannot take unilateral possession without taking recourse to the procedure provided under the Act. It is, therefore, clear that it would have been open to the Respondent to have a notice issued to the Appellant and given time to vacate the premises within 10 days or 15 days and therefore, could leave resumed possession with minimal use of police force. We cannot give any direction in this case since possession was already resumed. We have directed not to create third party right in the property. We are not inclined to interfere with the order.” 18. We cannot give any direction in this case since possession was already resumed. We have directed not to create third party right in the property. We are not inclined to interfere with the order.” 18. The learned Counsel for the Appellants would contend that the Respondents having not cancelled the grant made in favour of the grantee, they are not entitled to resume possession unilaterally without recourse to law. In the present case, no notice has been given to the grantee canceling the grant for violation of the condition stipulated in Ex.A10. There is also no notice given to the Appellants as contemplated under the relevant provisions of the Tamil Nadu Encroachments Act, 1905. 19. It is held by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Malappa (D) by L.Rs. v. State of Karnataka and another, 2005 (10) SCC 1583, that in ease of alienation made by the grantee in violation of condition imposed in the grant of land, the Government had every right to take action to declare the sale as null and void and to resume the land, but it can be done only after following the necessary procedure as laid down under the Act. 20. In the instant case, it is no doubt true that there is a clause in Ex.A10 prohibiting the transfer of land without prior sanction of the Government. Clause 4 of Ex.A10 reads as follows: “The grantee shall not transfer to any other person the rights hereby conveyed to him, without the previous sanction of the Government.” In the same grant, Clause 21 reads as follows: “The grant hereby given may be revoked by the Collector, action on behalf of the Governor of Madras after giving (left bland) month’s notice in writing and by the Government or the Board of Revenue without notice in an emergency (the Government or the Board of Revenue being, the sole judge of the emergency) and shall be terminable by the grantee giving to the Collector (left blank) months’ notice in writing but without prejudice to any right of action or remedy of the Government in respect of any antecedent breach of any of the foregoing conditions. The grantee shall not, in case of such revocation or termination be entitled to any compensation in respect of any structure on the land or of any other improvements effected by the grantee to the land or for the loss caused by the interruption of his occupation, but he may before the revocation or termination of the grant takes effect, or if the grant is revoked without notice within such time as may be allowed by the Collector in that behalf, remove such structures.” The above said condition clearly stipulates issuance of prior notice in writing in case of any breach of any of the conditions imposed under the grant. Admittedly, no action had been taken by the Respondents for resumption of the land for violating the above said condition, though the first transfer had been made as early as in the year 1970. Indisputably, the predecessors in title of the Plaintiffs and the Plaintiffs after purchase by a valid Sale Deed are in possession and the Government has not taken any action to declare the sale as null and void and to resume the land. 21. The Honourable Supreme Court in its earliest decision reported in the case of Munshi Ram v. Delhi Administration. AIR 1968 SC 702 , clearly pointed out that even a trespasser, who is in settled possession of the land, is not entitled to be evicted except in due course of law and he is further entitled to resist or defend his possession even against the rightful owner who tries to dispossess him. The only condition laid by the Honourable Supreme Court also explained that the settled possession must be extended over a sufficiently long period and acquiesced by the true owner. 22. In the present case, there is a condition imposed in the grant Ex.A10 prohibiting the transfer of land given to the grantee to any other person without getting prior sanction of the Government. Such being the condition, the Appellants/Plaintiffs cannot claim title to the suit property based on the Sale Deed executed by the grantee. Nevertheless, the Appellants are found to be in settled possession of the property. The Respondents have not exercised their right over the suit property till date. The Appellants have made substantial improvements in the suit property by putting up construction. Nevertheless, the Appellants are found to be in settled possession of the property. The Respondents have not exercised their right over the suit property till date. The Appellants have made substantial improvements in the suit property by putting up construction. The concept, of settled possession and the right of the possessor to protect his possession against the owner has been settled by the Honourable Supreme Court in the decisions cited supra in Munshi Ram v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1968 SC 702 , and Rame Gowda (D) by Lrs v. M. Varadappa Naidu (D) by LRs and another, 2004 (1) SCC 769 :2004(3) LW 143. 23. As regards adverse possession, it was not disputed that the Appellants entered into possession over the suit properly under a Sale Deed executed by his vendor who in turn had purchased from the grantee in the year 1970. The grand was made in the year 1963 and the possession, thus, initially being permissive, the burden was heavily on the Appellants to establish that it became adverse. It is settled law that a possession of a co-owner or of a licensee or of an agent or a permissive possession to become adverse must be established by cogent and convincing evidence to show hostile animus end possession adverse to the knowledge of real owner. Mere possession for howsoever length of time does not result in converting the permissive possession into adverse possession. Both the Courts below have gone into this aspect and after considering the facts and circumstances of this case, found it as a fact that the possession of the Appellants was not adverse. I do not find any infirmity in the said findings and this Court cannot interfere with the same. 24. It is not disputed that, the Appellants claim title, to the suit property based on the Sale Deed executed by his vendor who acquires title through the grantee. The Courts below have rightly held that in view of the specific condition imposed in Ex.A10 grant the Appellants/Plaintiffs cannot claim title to the Suit land. The learned Counsel for the Appellants, despite strenuous argument, could not demolish the finding of the Courts below that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to a decree for declaration of title against the Respondents. The Courts below have rightly held that in view of the specific condition imposed in Ex.A10 grant the Appellants/Plaintiffs cannot claim title to the Suit land. The learned Counsel for the Appellants, despite strenuous argument, could not demolish the finding of the Courts below that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to a decree for declaration of title against the Respondents. However, the Appellants being in settled possession entitled to a decree for injunction from being dispossessed without following the necessary procedure as laid down by the law and the Civil Court is net precluded from granting such a decree. Accordingly, the first substantial question of law is answered. 25. In the light of the discussions made above, the conclusion arrived at by the Courts below that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to a decree for declaration of title is well reasoned and is in accordance with the legal principles and therefore, S.A. No.664/2001 is liable to be dismissed. But, however the findings of the Lower Appellate Court reversing the findings of the Trial Court in respect of the decree for permanent injunction is unsustainable and the same is liable to be set aside. 26. In the result, the S.A. No.664/2001 is dismissed and the judgment and decree of the courts below are confirmed. 27. The S.A. No.665/2001 is allowed and the judgment and decree of the First Appellant Court is set aside. The judgment and decree of the Trial Court is restored. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.