JUDGMENT A.S. NAIDU, J. : The judgment and decree dated 13.2.2004 passed by the learned Addl.District Judge, FTC No.2, Bhubaneswar in R.F.A. No.42/02/12/03 confirming the judgment and decree dated 31.10.2003 passed by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Bhubaneswar in Title Suit No.293 of 2003 is assailed in the Second Appeal. 2. At the time of admission of the appeal, the following substantial questions of law have been formulated by this Court. (i) When the defendant was admittedly a tenant under the plain¬tiff and was paying monthly rent and was a monthly tenant for all practical purposes, whether in the absence of any notice of termination of tenancy, the suit for eviction is maintainable ? (ii) Whether by referring to Ext.9, the agreement of tenancy between the parties which specified that the tenancy was for period of three years after starting from 21.3.1977 and thereaf¬ter no further agreement has been executed but the defendant was allowed to continue with the consent of the landlord on payment of monthly rent till filing of the suit and even thereafter, the learned Courts below are justified to hold that the tenancy had been terminated by afflux of time and no notice U/s.106 of the T.P. Act is required ? (iii) When the specific plea of the plaintiff that the de¬fendant was a defaulter in payment of rent and paid the rent at a time @ Rs.500 p.m. for 24 months and was duly accepted by the plaintiff, which itself shows that the relationship between the parties as landlord and tenant subsisted till the filing of the suit, whether the learned Courts below were correct in saying that there was no tenancy subsisting in order to terminate the same ? (iv) When the plaintiff had filed Money Suit No.220/93 for reali¬zation of arrear rent for the period after the filing of the suit that itself establishes the fact that the plaintiff accept the defendant as a monthly tenant and therefore in the absence of termination of tenancy, the suit for eviction could not have been held maintainable by the Courts below ? 3. The facts of the case have been elaborately dealt with by both the Courts below and as such, this Court refrains from reiterating the entire facts, and confines only to those facts, which would be necessary for effectual adjudication of this Second Appeal. 4. 3. The facts of the case have been elaborately dealt with by both the Courts below and as such, this Court refrains from reiterating the entire facts, and confines only to those facts, which would be necessary for effectual adjudication of this Second Appeal. 4. Respondent is admittedly, the owner of the suit rooms situated on the ground floor of the double storied building constructed by her over Plot No.83/A at Bapuji Nagar, Bhubanes¬war. She is a doctor and it is averred that the shop rooms were constructed with a view to open a Nursing Home after her retire¬ment. In 1974 she had rent out the same to one Khemaraj Koheli for a period of three years and the latter opened an Automobile shop in the name and style of “Navin Automobiles”. It is alleged that the said tenant did not pay the house rent and huge arrears accumulated. Consequently, a suit was filed by the respondent, as plaintiff, in the Court of learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bhubaneswar for recovery of arrear rent. The said suit was regis¬tered as T.S. No.220 of 1993. It is further alleged that as the tenant did not vacate the shop room in spite of several requests and in spite of issuance of statutory notice, the respondent, as plaintiff, was constrained to file another suit for eviction out of which this Second Appeal arises. 5. The defendant in his written statement admitted owner¬ship of the plaintiff over the suit room. According to the de¬fendant, out of the four rooms situated on the ground floor, he had taken on rent only one room. There was neither any agreement executed nor there was any understanding for vacation of the suit room after the retirement of the plaintiff. It is further averred that the plaintiff intended to enhance the rent and as the defendant did not agree to the same, the suit was filed. The plea of bonafide requirement of opening a Nursing Home was stout¬ly denied. 6. On the basis of the pleadings, the trial Court framed as many as eight issues. The plaintiff got examined three wit¬nesses and exhibited several documents. On behalf of the defend¬ant, only one witness was examined and seven documents were exhibited. The plea of bonafide requirement of opening a Nursing Home was stout¬ly denied. 6. On the basis of the pleadings, the trial Court framed as many as eight issues. The plaintiff got examined three wit¬nesses and exhibited several documents. On behalf of the defend¬ant, only one witness was examined and seven documents were exhibited. The trial Court after discussing the evidence in extenso and after analyzing the pleadings came to the conclusion that the suit room was bonafidely required by the plaintiff for opening of her Nursing Home (clinic). Under issue no. (iv) the trial Court held that the defendant was chronic defaulter making payment of the house rent to the plaintiff. Under issue no. (v) the trial Court held that the plaintiff was the owner of the shop room and that the defendant admitted to be in possession of the same as a tenant. In view of the fact that the plaintiff bona¬fidely required the house for opening a Nursing Home, the defend¬ant is liable to be evicted therefrom. Under issue nos. (i) and (ii), the trial Court held that the suit was maintainable since the defendant did not vacate the suit room belonging to the plaintiff in spite of several request and has also refused to accept the notice sent by the plaintiff and as such, the plain¬tiff had cause of action to file the suit. Consequently, the suit was decreed. 7. The judgment and decree of the trial Court was assailed by the defendant before the learned District Judge, Bhubaneswar and was heard by Adhoc Addl. District Judge (FTC No.II), Bhuba¬neswar, mainly on the following grounds : (i) The suit should have been held as premature as the observa¬tions made by the Supreme Court were not complied with. (ii) The Court below should have held that the suit is hit under the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2, C.P.C. as another suit for recovery of rent was pending adjudication before the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division). (iii) The Court below committed error by holding that the suit room is necessary for bona fide requirement. (iv) The finding that the defendant is a defaulter was incorrect. (v) The Court below should have held that the suit is not main¬tainable for want of notice under Section 106 of the T.P. Act. 8. (iii) The Court below committed error by holding that the suit room is necessary for bona fide requirement. (iv) The finding that the defendant is a defaulter was incorrect. (v) The Court below should have held that the suit is not main¬tainable for want of notice under Section 106 of the T.P. Act. 8. The appellate Court by a well discussed judgment held that no notice under Section 106 of the T.P. Act was required to be served prior to the filing of the suit for eviction as the plea of want of notice under Section 106 of the T.P. Act had not been taken by the appellant-defendant in his written statement. The lower appellate Court further held that the earlier suit, i.e., Money Suit No.220 of 1993 being one for realization of the arrear rent, the second suit for eviction cannot be held to be hit under Order 2 Rule 2 of C.P.C. 9. So far as the non-compliance of the observations made by the Supreme Court is concerned, it is held that the Special Leave Petition was dismissed with the observation that some time should be granted to the petitioner to vacate the shop room. It is stated that as the defendant is not agreeing to vacate the shop room, it cannot be held that filing of suit for eviction was premature. The contention of the appellant that till the Nursing Home is constructed, it cannot be said that the plaintiff bona¬fidely requires the shop room, was negatived. It was held that the plaintiff is a retired doctor and she bonafidely requires the shop room. On the basis of the aforesaid analysis, all the find¬ings arrived at by the trial Court were confirmed and the appeal was dismissed. The said order, as stated earlier, is assailed in this Second Appeal. 10. Mr. S.P. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the appellant strenuously took this Court through the evidence and other materials and submitted that the suit as laid down is not maintainable and that both the Courts below have not properly appreciated the facts and law and as such, the decree may be set aside and the suit for eviction be dismissed in limine. He also submitted that the suit is hit by Order 2, Rule 2, C.P.C. and on that ground alone, it should be dismissed. The third contention of Mr. He also submitted that the suit is hit by Order 2, Rule 2, C.P.C. and on that ground alone, it should be dismissed. The third contention of Mr. Mishra is that the notice under Section 106 of the T.P. Act having not been served, the suit for eviction should have been dismissed in limine. 11. Mr. D.S. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that the earlier suit was one only for realization of arrear rent. On the date of filing of the said suit, cause of action for eviction of the defendant did not arise as the plaintiff did not require the shop room for her own use. But later on the plaintiff retired from service and required the shop room for setting up her Nursing Home. Therefore, the present suit was filed for eviction. Mr. Mishra, further submitted that as the notice under Section 106 of the T.P. Act was in fact sent by registered post with A.D., the same was tendered to the appellant by postman, but he refused to accept the notice and the same returned back with the endorsement “refused” as would be evident from Exts.4, 4/a, 5 and 5/a. Thus, no illegality has been committed. 12. Heard learned counsel for the parties. Perused the documents meticulously. In the case of Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami and others, AIR 1997 SC 1041 , the Supreme Court observed that while entertaining a Second Appeal, the Court should not over-look the change brought about by the Amendment Act, 1976 restricting the scope of Second Appeal drastically, and at present it applies only to appeals involving substantial questions of law, specifically set-out in the memorandum of appeals and formulated by the High Court. Thus, the existence of substantial question of law is sine qua non for exercise of jurisdiction under the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 13. In the case of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitri Bai Sopan Gujar and others, AIR 1999 SC 2213 , the Supreme Court held that the High Court has no power to enlarge the scope of grounds mentioned and formulated and the Second Appeal cannot be decided merely on equitable grounds as its lies only on substantial questions of law, which is something distinct from substantial question of fact. The Court cannot entertain a Second Appeal unless substantial question of law is involved. In the case of Sashi Bai v. Parvati Bai, reported in (1995)6 SCC 213 , the Supreme Court observed that the High Court cannot ignore the statutory provision of Section 100 of the Code and re-appreciate the evidence and interfere with the findings of fact unless substantial questions of law or questions of law duly formulated. In other words, it is held that the Second Appeal does not lie on the ground of erroneous findings of fact based on appreciation of relevant evidence. 14. In the case of Mahindra and Mahindra v. Union of India and another, AIR 1979 SC 798 the Supreme Court observed as fol¬lows : “...... It is not every question of law that could be per¬mitted to be raised in the second appeal. The parameters within which a new legal plea could be permitted to be raised, are specifically stated in Sub-section (5) of Section 100. Under the proviso, the Court should be ‘satisfied’ that the case involves a substantial question of law and not a mere question of law. The reason for permitting the substantial question of law to be raised, should be recorded by the Court. It is implicit therefrom that on compliance of the above, the opposite party should be afforded a fair or proper opportunity to meet the same. It is not any legal plea that would be alleged at a stage of second appeal. It should be a substantial question of law. The reasons for permitting the plea to be raised should also be recorded.” 15. The Supreme Court once again in the case of P. Chandra¬sekharan and others v. S. Kanakrajan and others, (2007) 5 SCC 699 reiterated the principle that interference is second appeal is permissible only when the findings are based on misreading of evidence or are so perverse that no person of ordinary prudence could take the said view. The Court, therefore, must be conscious that intervention is only permissible provided the case involves substantial question of law. 16. The Court, therefore, must be conscious that intervention is only permissible provided the case involves substantial question of law. 16. Now examining the arguments advanced in the light of the decisions of referred to supra and the principles laid down for entertaining a second appeal, this Court finds that monthly tenancy was created on the basis of an agreement between the parties specifying the period of tenancy and therefore, no notice under Section 106 of the T.P. Act is required to be served prior to filing of the suit for eviction. 17. In the case of A. Rajeswari v. Brundaban Mohapatra, 94 (2002) CLT 212, this Court being confronted with a similar ques¬tion came to the conclusion that before filing a suit for evic¬tion of tenanted premises on termination of agreement/contract specifying the period of tenancy and for restoration of posses¬sion and recovery of damages, service of notice under Section 106 of T.P. Act is not necessary. 18. Even otherwise, Section 111 of the T.P. Act prescribes that the lease of immovable property can be determined by efflux of time limited by an agreement. By virtue of Section 111, a tenancy automatically gets terminated by efflux of time and thus, there is no requirement of service of notice on a tenant under Section 106 of T.P. Act. Even otherwise, it appears that notice under Section 106 of the T.P. Act was issued to the defendant by registered post. The said notice returned back with an endorse¬ment that the party refused to accept the same as would be evi¬dent from Exts.4, 4/a, 5 and 5/a. In view of the aforesaid facts and the point of law, the Courts below have not committed any error and the substantial question Nos.(i) and (ii) framed get answered. 19. So far as substantial question No.(iii) is concerned, it is suffice to say that receipt of rent even after expiry of the period of tenancy will not stand as a bar for filing a suit for eviction. 20. That apart, as would be evident, the plaintiff filed money suit in the year 1993 for realization of arrear rent. It is stated that on the date of filing of the said suit, cause of action for eviction of the tenant did not arise as the plaintiff had no bona fide requirement at that specific time. 20. That apart, as would be evident, the plaintiff filed money suit in the year 1993 for realization of arrear rent. It is stated that on the date of filing of the said suit, cause of action for eviction of the tenant did not arise as the plaintiff had no bona fide requirement at that specific time. But then, later on after she retired from service, she required the shop room for her personal use and the suit for eviction was filed. In the aforesaid scenario, it cannot be safely concluded that the suit was not hit by Order 2, Rule 2, C.P.C. 21. In course of hearing a feeble attempt is made by Mr. S.P. Mishra, to the effect that the land has been vested with the State Government and as the same has not been settled with the plaintiff, the suit was not maintainable. But then, the said plea was never taken before the Court below nor any issue was framed to that extent. Even otherwise, the defendant agreed that he was a tenant under the plaintiff. Law is well settled that a tenant cannot assail or challenge the title of his landlord. Thus, the plea taken before this Court for the first time has no legs to stand. 23. After considering all the facts and circumstances, this Court finds that both the Courts below have properly appreciated the evidence and the judgment and decree suffers from no infirmi¬ty or illegality so as to call for any interference by this Court in this Second Appeal. Consequent, the Second Appeal fails and the same is dismissed with cost of Rs.1000. Appeal dismissed.