Judgment :- A.P. Bhangale, J. 1. Heard. Rule. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respective respondents waive notice. By consent, rule is made returnable forthwith. 2. The petitioner-developer seeks to invoke writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for, to quash and set aside the order dated 18-7-2009 passed by High Power Committee of the Government of Maharashtra in Application No.824 of 2008. The petitioner had challenged the order dated 4-3-2008 passed by the Chief Executive Officer, Slum Rehabilitation Authority whereby the S.R.A. directed further implementation of the slum rehabilitation scheme by another developer M/s. Shree Siddhi Vinayak Construction Company (respondent No.4 herein). The High Power Committee has dismissed the appeal by the petitioner on the ground that no case was made out. 3. The facts which gave rise to this petition are mentioned as under:- A plot of land bearing CTS No.6 (Part); 7; 7/1 to 3; 9/1 to 4; 10(Part) admeasuring 7000 square meters at Mulund (West), Mumbai is claimed by the petitioner. According to the petitioner, the plot of land was encroached by slum-dwellers who proposed co-operative housing society (respondent No.3 herein). The S.R.A. Declared the said property as ‘slum’ under the S.R.D. Scheme. However, it is claimed by the petitioner that the proposed slum dwellers society resolved in March, 1996 to implement the S.R.D. Scheme through the petitioner. According to the petitioner, he had moved the S.R.A. to get the plot declared as ‘slum’ and promised the slum-dwellers to provide permanent alternate accommodation as per the scheme. In June, 1996 the plot was declared as a slum. The petitioner claims that he moved the S.R.A. for letter of intent, which came to be issued by the S.R.A. on 6-1-1998. The petitioner was granted commencement certificate to construct D-Wing upto plinth level being rehabilitation building. The petitioner to accommodate the slum-dwellers in transit camp temporarily constructed accommodation but the Chief Promoter of Shree Pandit Co-operative Society instigated some slum-dwellers of the society to refuse to hand over their respective hutments and to shift to the transit camp. The project was thus delayed according to the petitioner. The petitioner had agreed to allot a flat bearing Flat No.702, admeasuring 500 sq.feet to the Chief Promoter Mr. Putran in the proposed ‘Dharamveer Apartments’ to settle dispute with him. The project was thus delayed according to the petitioner. The petitioner had agreed to allot a flat bearing Flat No.702, admeasuring 500 sq.feet to the Chief Promoter Mr. Putran in the proposed ‘Dharamveer Apartments’ to settle dispute with him. According to the petitioner, they continued to complete development despite odds and hurdles but respondent No.3-Society’s committee members intended to remove the petitioner as builder/developer by bringing in respondent No. 4 as developer. 4. Respondent No.2 by letter dated 19-5-2000 directed the petitioner to pay C.C. validation fees. The petitioner had executed undertaking on stamp paper to deposit C.C. revalidation charges. Respondent No.2 by letter dated 6-6-2000 insisted to submit Annexure-III to show financial capacity to carry out construction. On 16-8-2000 the petitioner paid re-validation fees. Respondent No.2 granted further C.C. beyond D-Wing but obstructions were made by some members/hirelings of respondent No.3-Society. The S.R.A. by letter dated 28-7-2000 called the petitioner for joint meeting and resolved on 24-3-2000 to terminate agreement with the petitioner. Thus respondent No.4 was allowed further implementation of S.R.S.. The petitioner filed Suit No.2145 of 2005 in City Civil Court aggrieved by termination of agreement from S.R.A. 5. It appears main grievance of the petitioner that while the construction activity was in progress, members of respondent No.3 with support from respondent No.4, by their mala fide acts, created physical obstructions and hindrances and the petitioner had complained about their high-handed activities to respondent No.2-S.R.A., i.e., induction of non-eligible members in the premises, etc., and that S.R.A. (respondent no.2) had directed the Society (respondent No.3) to decide developer for S.R.S. and the S.R.A. decided to keep all approvals in abeyance till the society comply with directions as to declare names of elected members of the society and name of the developer and other relevant information of S.R.S.. The petitioner had challenged the action of S.R.A. by filing Writ Petition No. 2953 of 2004 by impleading the society and respondent No.4 (developer). The writ petition was disposed of by order dated 10-2-2005 by this Court as various legal issues were required to be heard and decided by S.R.A. according to law. On 10-3-2005 the S.R.A. (respondent No.2) passed order holding that the development agreement dated 3-3-1996 of the petitioner stood validly terminated and directed further implementation of the S.R.S. By M/s. Siddhi Vinayak Construction Company (respondent No.4). On 10-3-2005 the S.R.A. (respondent No.2) passed order holding that the development agreement dated 3-3-1996 of the petitioner stood validly terminated and directed further implementation of the S.R.S. By M/s. Siddhi Vinayak Construction Company (respondent No.4). The order dated 10-3-2005 passed by S.R.A. was challenged in S.C. Suit No.2145 of 2005 filed by the petitioner in Bombay City Civil Court, Mumbai in which interim order was passed on 9-1-2008. The petitioner preferred Appeal From Order No.71 of 2008 along with Contempt Petition No.36 of 2008. The matter was remitted to S.R.A. after this Court set aside the order dated 10-3-2005 passed by S.R.A. with direction to S.R.A. to pass reasoned order after hearing the parties. The S.R.A. by order dated 4-3-2008 held that M/s. Siddhi Vinayak Construction Company (respondent No.4) should be allowed to complete balance work of S.R.S.. In other words, the petitioner stood excluded from further participation in slum rehabilitation project. The order by S.R.A. was again challenged by Writ Petition No.3207 of 2008 which was decided on 29-8-2008 leaving the petitioner to take recourse to such remedy as may be available and permissible according to law. Thus the petitioner approached High Power Committee constituted by respondent No.1-State. The High Power Committee decided the representation/application by order dated 18-7-2009 which is sought to be impugned herein. 6. We have heard respective counsel at length with reference to documents and rulings relied upon and the orders sought to be challenged which were passed by S.R.A. and High Power Committee. 7. The Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred as ‘the Slum Act’) was enacted with a view to re-house, resettle slum-dwellers in housing colonies to ensure health, safety, convenience of slum-dwellers and to provide them with basic necessities like water, sanitation, light by speedy and effective machinery. The Competent Authority under the Slum Act has statutory powers in the matter of declaring the area as slum area and to carry out improvements by approving undertakings; requiring occupants to vacate by offering alternate site or to remove them by use of reasonable force if so necessary; to allow any agency to execute work; maintenance of repairs, collecting service charges, etc. In Tulsiwadi Navnirman Co-operative Housing Society and another Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2007 (6) Mah.L.J. 851 (FB). In Tulsiwadi Navnirman Co-operative Housing Society and another Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2007 (6) Mah.L.J. 851 (FB). It appears clear that in disputes involving factual aspects necessitating oral and documentary evidence to be led, remedy by way of a suit in competent Civil Court or arbitration may be resorted to resolve private or contractual disputes. Thus alternative remedy is required to be exhausted; as disputed facts can be decided on appreciation of evidence {see ruling in G. Srinivas Vs. Government of A.P. & others, reported in AIR 2005 SC 4455 }. Intervention by exercise of writ jurisdiction has to be minimum and exceptional; in a deserving case. 8. The petitioner has alleged mala fides on the part of the respondent-S.R.A. and the society in the matter of termination of agreement to develop slum area; and choice of another developer to implement the S.R.S.. Section 41 of the Slum Act protects the Competent Authority or any person acting under its authority from suits/legal proceedings if acts are done in good faith in accordance with the Slum Act and Rules made thereunder. It does by implication save suits; or legal proceedings instituted for mala fide acts. Under Section 42 of the Slum Act, the bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court is not absolute. As held in P.R. Murlidharan and others Vs. Swami Dharmananda Theertha Padar and others, reported in (2006) 4 SCC 501 , jurisdiction of Civil Court is wide and plenary and writ cannot be a substitute for civil suit to adjudicate civil rights. The scope of judicial review is limited in cases involving property rights. The disputes which are purely private or contractual will have to be resolved by suit or arbitration, as permissible according to law. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the High Power Committee ought to have dealt with all questions of law by a detailed and reasoned order. He placed reliance upon Steel Authority of India Limited Vs. Sales Tax Officer, Rourkela I Circle and others, reported in (2008) 9 SCC 407 . The learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance upon the ruling by this Court in M/s. Sigtia Constructions Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., in Original Side Writ Petition No.1036 of 2007 and connected writ petitions, delivered on 17-9-2009 whereby the matter was remitted back to S.R.A.. The learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance upon the ruling by this Court in M/s. Sigtia Constructions Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., in Original Side Writ Petition No.1036 of 2007 and connected writ petitions, delivered on 17-9-2009 whereby the matter was remitted back to S.R.A.. In the present case, the petitioner had already approached the S.R.A. as well as the High Power Committee constituted by the Government of Maharashtra and the case of the petitioner stood decided by reasoned orders. No useful purpose can be served by making the petitioner to approach same authorities again who have already passed reasoned orders. Therefore, to our mind, the rulings in Steel Authority of India Limited and M/s. Sigtia Constructions’ case (supra) are of no assistance to the petitioner. In our view, the jurisdiction of issuance of high prerogative writs can be exercised in limited and exceptionally deserving cases wherein the High Power Committee refused to issue direction for expeditious implementation of S.R.S.. In our opinion, suit against the Competent Authority or persons acting under the Authority doing acts in good faith is barred as the object of the Slum Act is to speedily implement the slum rehabilitation scheme and rehabilitate slum-dwellers in better alternative accommodation with basic amenities made available to them. No suit can be entertained which may stall/stultify the slum rehabilitation scheme or project. The provision in Section 42 of the Slum Act is not a blanket bar for institution of civil suits but prohibits Civil Court from entertaining such suits or granting injunction in suits in respect of action taken/to be taken in good faith in exercise of powers conferred under the Slum Act. It is to prevent any disgruntled, dissatisfied litigant who may, in order to harass the Authority i.e., Administrator, Competent Authority or Tribunal under the Act, resort to a long drawn out process of suit in Civil Court and stall the slum rehabilitation project; which has to be expeditiously implemented in larger interest of society or people. However, the remedy of civil suit is not barred to seek relief against mala fide commission or omission of acts which are not in good faith to resolve private or contractual disputes. However, the remedy of civil suit is not barred to seek relief against mala fide commission or omission of acts which are not in good faith to resolve private or contractual disputes. The High Power Committee constituted by the State Government has limited role as mentioned by the Full Bench of this Court in Tulsiwadi’s case (supra) to speedily issue directions to resolve disputes under the Slum Act in respect of implementation of slum rehabilitation schemes. 9. Considering the object and purpose of the ‘Slum Act’, the slum rehabilitation scheme cannot remain at standstill status as it is required to be expeditiously implemented bearing in mind the intended welfare measures. The Competent Authority under the Slum Act is required to take early decision and issue directions to ensure smooth implementation of S.R.S. by overcoming obstacles or hurdles. Disputed questions of facts, if involved, are at the best left to be resolved by alternative remedy i.e., for breach of contract monetary compensation, etc.. The High Power Committee constituted by the State Government, which was approached by the petitioner, observed thus: “3. During the course of argument, the advocate for the Applicant has not brought cogent argument before this Committee as to how the Order dated 4/3/2008 passed by the CEO, SRA is bad in law. Further the arguments advanced by the Advocate for the Applicant are already concluded by Order of the Hon’ble High Court, Bombay, vide their Order dated 29-2-2008 passed in Writ Petition No.3207/2008 and this Committee is not above the Order of Hon’ble High Court. 4. Considering the arguments advanced by the concerned parties it seems that there is private dispute between the two developers and therefore the applicant is at liberty to approach proper Court of Law.” Therefore, the petitioner is not left remediless. The petitioner can claim monetary compensation by approaching the competent Civil Court for the alleged breach of contract. 10. Bearing in mind the aforesaid settled principles in the facts and circumstances of the case, for the reasons stated above, we do not find any exceptional or substantial ground to intervene in exercise of writ jurisdiction with orders sought to be impugned herein. 11. In the result, the petition is dismissed. The rule is discharged.