Judgment Prashant Kumar,J : A common question of law arose in these appeals, therefore, both the appeals are heard together and disposed of by this judgment. 2. The appellants have challenged the order dated 30.8.2006 in Case No. 33 of 2006 (JET) and Case No. 32 of 2006(JET) whereby and whereunder the Jharkhand Education Tribunal has dismissed the aforesaid cases as the said cases have been filed beyond the period of limitation. 3. It appears that the appellant of A.C.(S.B.) No. 19 of 2006 was employed in Adarsh Vidya Mandir, Bokaro on the post of teacher. However her services has been terminated on some charges. Thereafter she filed a suit in the court of Munsif, Bokaro vide Title Suit No. 31 of 2001 on 04.06.2001 challenging the order of termination. It further appears that during pendency of aforesaid suit, Jharkhand Education Tribunal Act, 2005( hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') has been enacted and Jharkhand Education Tribunal established. Accordingly, an application was filed before the Tribunal, which was instituted as Case No. 33 of 2006 (JET). 4. The case of appellant of A.C.(S.B.) No. 20 of 2006 is that he was working on the post of Principal, Adarsh Vidya Mandir, Chas, Bokaro. His services has been terminated in most arbitrary and mala fide manner. It is further stated that against the order of termination, he has filed a suit in the court of Munsif, Bokaro vide Title Suit No. 29 of 2001. However, after establishment of Jharkhand Education Tribunal, he filed an application in the Tribunal which was instituted as Case No. 32 of 2006 (JET). 5. It appears that both the aforesaid cases I.e. Case No. 33 of 2006(JET) and Case No. 32 of 2006(JET) have been rejected by the Tribunal vide order dated 30.8.2006 on the ground that the same have been filed beyond the period of limitation, as prescribed under section 10(i)(a) of the Act. Against the aforesaid orders, these appeals filed. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that section 8 of the Act provides that the Tribunal have all the jurisdiction, power and authority, vested in all other courts, for adjudication of dispute relating to all the matters concerning the service condition of the employee of the Educational Institutions. Against the aforesaid orders, these appeals filed. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that section 8 of the Act provides that the Tribunal have all the jurisdiction, power and authority, vested in all other courts, for adjudication of dispute relating to all the matters concerning the service condition of the employee of the Educational Institutions. It is then submitted that the appellants' services have been terminated by the Management of the Institute and they have filed Title Suit in the court of Munsif, Bokaro, challenging the order of termination. During the pendency of the aforesaid suit, Jharkhand Education Tribunal Act, 2005 came into force, therefore from the date of enforcement of the said Act, the civil court, Bokaro has no power to entertain the aforesaid suit. Accordingly, the appellants filed the present case in the Jharkhand Education Tribunal for redressal of their grievances. It is submitted that since the civil court have no power to entertain the suit, therefore, the present applications are maintainable in the Tribunal. Thus, the order of Tribunal is against the provisions of section 8 of the Act. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents submits that as per section 10(i)(a), the Tribunal can admit only such applications for hearing in which impugned order was issued during the period of three years preceding the date of establishment of Jharkhand Education Tribunal. It is submitted that the Act has come into force in the year 2005 and the order of termination of the appellants was issued sometime in the year 2001 i.e. prior to three years from the date of constitution of Tribunal. Accordingly, as per the provision contained under section 10(i)(a) of the Act, both the cases filed by the appellants in the Tribunal are time barred, therefore the Tribunal has rightly rejected both the cases. 8. In the present appeals only question arose for consideration is " whether the cases filed by the appellants were time barred as provided under Section 10(i)(a) of the Act ?" For better appreciation of the aforesaid points it is appropriate to quote section 8 and 10(i)(a) of the Act, which are as follows: 8. Jurisdiction, power and authority of the Jharkhand Education Tribunal. Jurisdiction, power and authority of the Jharkhand Education Tribunal. (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Jharkhand Education Tribunal shall exercise on and from the appointed day, all the jurisdiction, power and authority exercisable immediately before that day by all Courts (Except the Jharkhand High Court and Supreme Court of India) regarding: (a) Matters concerning recruitment to any post in connection with the affairs of the educational institution; (b) All matters concerning the service conditions of employees of the educational institutions; (c) Grievances of the employees against the management of the educational institutions; (d) Grievances of the guardians and parents of students against the management of the educational institutions regarding teaching standards, fee structure infrastructural facilities development works and allied matters related thereto; (e) Such matters relating to educational institutions as may be referred to the tribunal by the State Government by notification from time to time. 10 Limitation: (I) A Tribunal shall not admit an application, unless (a) The grievance in respect of which an application is made had arisen by reason of any order made at any time during the period of three years immediately preceding the date of the establishment of this Tribunal; 9. Section 8 of the Act, only confers jurisdiction upon the Tribunal to adjudicate dispute relating to service condition of employee of educational institution. From the perusal of entire Act, I find that there is no provision in it which bars the jurisdiction of civil court from entertaining suit with respect to the matters/disputes triable by the Tribunal. There is also no provision in the Act which provides that any suit pending in the civil court, will be transferred automatically to the Tribunal after its constitution. Under the said circumstance, the contention of learned counsel for the appellants that after constitution of Tribunal, their cases can only be adjudicated by Tribunal and no other court has jurisdiction to try the same, is misconceived, thus cannot be sustained. 10. Section 10(i)(a) puts an embargo on the power of tribunal from entertaining any case in which the impugned order has been issued prior to three years from the date of the establishment of Tribunal. It is an admitted position that Act came into force in the year 2005. It is also an admitted position that the services of appellants terminated in the year 2001. It is an admitted position that Act came into force in the year 2005. It is also an admitted position that the services of appellants terminated in the year 2001. Under the said circumstances, it is manifestly clear that impugned orders, of both the cases, were issued prior to three years from the date of the establishment of the Tribunal. Thus the cases filed by the appellants before the Tribunal comes within the mischief of section 10(i)(a) of the Act. Accordingly, I conclude that the Tribunal rightly, rejected the said cases taking recourse of section 10(i)(a) of the Act. 11. In view of the discussions made above, I find that there is no illegality and/or irregularities in the impugned orders of Tribunal which require any interference by this Court. 12. In the result, both the appeals are dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the cases, I order that parties shall bear their own costs.