JUDGMENT A.S. NAIDU, J. : The appellants, as plaintiff, filed O.S. No.77 of 1987 in the Court of the then Addl. Munsif, Bhadrak, inter alia, praying for a declaration that being the sons and legal heirs of Late Mutuwalli Rasul Bux are the sole Mutuwalli of the Wakf properties more fully described under suit schedule ‘A’ and for a further declaration that the order of Wakf Board recog¬nizing defendant Nos.4 and 5 to be the sons and legal heirs of Late Mutuwalli Sk. Wahabulla and granting sanction to the aliena¬tion made by them on 18.8.1985 in favour of defendant Nos.1 to 3 are illegal and void and for further declaration that defendant Nos.4 and 5 or defendant Nos.8 and 9 are not the sons of Sk. Wahabulla and for permanent injunction against defendant Nos. 1 to 7 restraining them from entering upon the suit property or creating any sort of disturbances thereon as well as for other ancillary reliefs. 2. The trial Court by judgment and decree dated 30th January, 1993 and 31st January, 1993 respectively decreed the suit against defendant Nos.1, 2, 3, 8 and 9 and in part against defendant No.7 as well as defendant Nos.4, 5, and 6. The plain¬tiffs were declared to be the sole Mutuwallis of the Wakf proper¬ties more fully described in Schedule ‘A’ of the plaint. It was further declared that the order of the Wakf Board recognizing the defendant Nos.4 and 5 as sons and legal heirs of Late Mutuwalli Sk. Wahabulla and giving sanction to the sale made by them on 18.8.1986 in favour of defendant Nos.1 to 3 are illegal and void. It was also declared that the defendant Nos.4 and 5 or defendant Nos.7 and 8 are not the sons of Sk. Wahabulla. The trial Court further permanently restrained defendant Nos.1 to 6 from entering upon the suit property or from creating any sort of disturbances thereof and/or in the management of Juma Masjid and Wakf proper¬ties. The suit decreed was assailed by the plaintiffs in Title Appeal No.25 of 1993 and was heard by learned Addl. District Judge Bhadrak. By judgment dated 2.8.1997, appeal was allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court was set aside. The said reversing judgment is assailed in this Second Appeal by the plaintiffs. 3. The suit decreed was assailed by the plaintiffs in Title Appeal No.25 of 1993 and was heard by learned Addl. District Judge Bhadrak. By judgment dated 2.8.1997, appeal was allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court was set aside. The said reversing judgment is assailed in this Second Appeal by the plaintiffs. 3. The facts of the case have been discussed in extenso by both the trial Court as well as lower appellate Court. Therefore to avoid repetition they are not reiterated again, but then only those facts, which are necessary for effectual adjudication are stated herein-below in brief. According to the plaintiffs, Sk. Wahabulla, the grand father was the Mutuwallis in respect of Schedule ‘A’ properties recorded in the name of Juma Masjid. Sk. Rasul Bux being his only son became the sole Mutuwalli after the death of Sk. Wahabulla. The lands being part of Bahel estate vested with the State Government in the year 1974. On the basis of an application filed by Sk. Rasul Bux, the lands were settled in his favour in R.F. Case No.14/76. Defendants 1 to 3, who had no semblance of right, title and interest claiming to be the sons of Sk. Wahabulla through his 2nd wife Sahejadi Bibi filed a petition for settlement of the land in their favour. Defendant Nos.8 and 9 also supported their case. The said petition was registered as R.F. Case No.306 of 1977. The Tahasildar, it is alleged, without serving any notice on the plaintiffs settled a portion of the suit property in favour of defendant Nos.4 and 5 by order dated 30.12.1977. There¬after, defendant No.4 filed an application before the Tahasilar to review the said order. The order of settlement, it appears from the pleadings, was assailed before different authorities and even before this Court in OJC No.90 of 1983. This Court held that the Tahasildar had no power to review is own order. While the matter stood thus, defendant Nos.4 and 5 executed a sale deed on 22.2.1978 and alienated some of the properties in favour of defendant Nos. 1 to 3. The said sale deed was executed without obtaining prior permission from the Wakf Board. It appears the Wakf Board while granting permission also held that defendant Nos.4 and 5 were the legal heirs of the last Mutuwalli. 1 to 3. The said sale deed was executed without obtaining prior permission from the Wakf Board. It appears the Wakf Board while granting permission also held that defendant Nos.4 and 5 were the legal heirs of the last Mutuwalli. The said order, it is alleged, was assailed before this Court in OJC No.971 of 1979. This Court disposed of the writ application on the ground that the order passed in the review having been set aside, it is not necessary to determine the validity of post facto sanction granted by the Wakf Board. In short, according to the plaintiff, defendant Nos.8 and 9 are strangers to the family, they were not the Mutuwallis of Juma Masjid, but taking advantage of the illegal order of the Tahasildar passed in R.F. Case No.306 of 1977 and subsequent review order dated 20.2.1978, they had illegally alienated the property in favour of defendant Nos.1 to 3. On the basis of such pleadings, the plaintiffs filed the suit. 4. After receiving notice, defendant Nos. 1 to 3 and defendant Nos.7, 8 and 9 filed three sets of written statements. Defendant Nos.8 and 9 mainly contested the suit. They admitted that Sk. Wahabulla was the Mutuwalli of Juma Masjid. During his life time, he had married twice. Maina Bibi was the first wife and through her Sk. Rasul Bux was born. After the death of Maina Bibi, he married to Sahejadi Bibi and through her defendant Nos.8, 9 and 6 were born. After the death of Sk. Wahabulla, defendant Nos.8 and 9 along with the plaintiffs (sons of Sk. Rasul Bux) became the Mutuwallis. On 20.8.1961, defendant Nos.8 and 9 along with Sk. Rasul Bux applied recognize them as Mutuwal¬lis and the Board of Wakf, defendant No.7 resisted them as such. The plaintiffs at a later stage disputed the status of defendant Nos.8 and 9 before the Wakf Board and claimed that they are not the Mutuwallis. Defendant No.7 caused an enquiry, took evidence and came to the occlusion that defendant Nos.8 and 9 were the legal heirs of Sk. Wahabulla through his 2nd wife. On 22.5.1980 after obtaining due permission defendant Nos.8 and 9 sold Ac.0.31 dec. of land to defendant Nos. 1 to 3. Again on 18.8.1986 they executed a registered sale deed in favour of defendant Nos.1 to 3 and delivered possession of the lands to them. Wahabulla through his 2nd wife. On 22.5.1980 after obtaining due permission defendant Nos.8 and 9 sold Ac.0.31 dec. of land to defendant Nos. 1 to 3. Again on 18.8.1986 they executed a registered sale deed in favour of defendant Nos.1 to 3 and delivered possession of the lands to them. In short, accord¬ing to the contesting defendant Nos.8 and 9, they being the Mutuwallis had right to alienate the properties after obtaining due permission from the Wakf Board and the suit filed by the plaintiffs is thus a misconception one. Defendant Nos. 1 to 3 in their written statement disputed the averments made in the plaint and supported the case of defendant Nos.8 and 9. 5. Defendant No.7, the Wakf Board in its written statement averred that the sub-committee constituted after taking evidence came to the conclusion that defendant Nos.8 and 9 were legitimate sons of Sk. Wahabulla through his 2nd wife. The right of defend¬ant Nos.8 and 9 over the suit properties was recognized by de¬fendant No.7. 6. On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings, the trial Court framed as many as thirteen issues and held that the defend¬ants 8 and 9 were the sons Sahejadi Bibi through her husband Fakir Khan. They are not the sons of Sk. Wahabulla and can never be appointed as mutawallis. 7. Defendants 1 to 3 neither got valid title under Ext.E-1, and the same was executed without any consideration, nor defendants 1 to 3 and defendants 8 and 9 acquired any right, title and interest over the suit land. 8. The plaintiffs are the only mutawallis of Juma Masjid and they are the Marfadars of the Mosque and the order for fixa¬tion of rent in favour of Juma Masjid in R.P. Case No.14/1976 is valid. The suit is neither hit by the principles of resjudicata or estoppels nor it is hit by Section 55 and 56 of the Wakf Act. 9. On the basis of such conclusions, the suit was decreed on contest and it was held that the plaintiffs are entitled to get the reliefs claimed except the relief of permanent injunction claimed against the defendant No.7. 10. The judgment and decree passed by the trial Court was assailed in T.A. No.25 of 1992. The lower appellate Court dis¬cussed the evidence both oral and documentary in extenso and arrived at the following conclusions. 10. The judgment and decree passed by the trial Court was assailed in T.A. No.25 of 1992. The lower appellate Court dis¬cussed the evidence both oral and documentary in extenso and arrived at the following conclusions. (a) The findings of the Court that the register indicating the marriage of Sk. Wahabulla with Sahejadi Bibi was fabricated one for the purpose of the suit, cannot be sustained. (b) Sufficient evidence is not available to establish that defendant Nos.8 and 9 were the sons of Fakir Khan and not the sons of Sk. Wahabulla. (c) Defendant Nos.8 and 9 by cogent evidence could establish that they are the sons of Sk. Wahabulla through Sahejadi Bibi and not the son of Fakir. (d) This Court in OJC No.971 of 1979 (Ext.12) held that the sale deed dated 18.8.1986 vide Ext.F is a valid one and had conferred title upon defendant Nos.1, 2 and 3 and as such, the dispute cannot be agitated once again. Defendant Nos.8 and 9 are the Mutuwallis of Juma Masjid being the sons of Sk. Wahabulla. They have got a valid right, title and interest over the suit proper¬ties and they have rightly executed the registered sale deed dated 18.8.1986 in favour of defendant Nos. 1 to 3 after obtain¬ing permission from the Wakf Board. 11. On the basis of such conclusions, the appeal was al¬lowed. 12. While admitting the appeal, in consonance with Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the following substan¬tial question of law was framed. “As to whether there was misconstruction of documents marked Exts.A, P and E” 13. Though it was further observed that the appellants are allowed to urge any other substantial question of law at the time of hearing of the appeal, notice of any other substantial ques¬tion of law has not been served on learned counsel for the re¬spondents. 14. Mr. S.P. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellant, strenuously took this Court through the evidence and contended that while deciding a Second Appeal, this Court can also interfere with the findings of fact in certain circumstances. In support of such contention, Mr. Mishra, relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the cases of Mst. 14. Mr. S.P. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellant, strenuously took this Court through the evidence and contended that while deciding a Second Appeal, this Court can also interfere with the findings of fact in certain circumstances. In support of such contention, Mr. Mishra, relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the cases of Mst. Sugani v. Rameshwar Das and another, AIR 2006 S.C. 2172 , Hero Vinoth (minor) v. Seshammal, reported in AIR 2006 SC 2234 , Naray¬an Chandra Ghosh and others v. Kanailal Ghosh and others AIR 2006 SC 562 and Ramlal and another v. Phagua and others AIR 2006 SC 623 . 15. Before entering into the arena of controversy, it would be just and proper to once again recapitulate the law with regard to the restrictions imposed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, the “Code”) Section 100 of the Code reads as follows : “Section 100. (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte. (3) In an appeal under this Section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be al¬lowed to argue that the case does not involve such question.” 16. Perusal of said Section gives an impression that jurisdiction of this Court in a Second Appeal is confined to substantial question of law only and it is not open to this Court to re-appreciate or reassess the evidence, however gross the error may seem to be. In other words, the finding of fact is not open to be challenged even if appreciation of the evidence by the Courts below is apparently wrong. In other words, the finding of fact is not open to be challenged even if appreciation of the evidence by the Courts below is apparently wrong. The paramount duty to consider the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence to support a finding of fact is a matter of decision of the Courts below and it cannot be assailed in a Second Appeal. But then, there is some exception to the aforesaid settled principles of law inasmuch as finding of fact may be interfered with in a Second Appeal if the following contingencies arise. (i) where there is no evidence at all upon which the finding of fact can be based; (ii) where the findings of fact have been recorded by ignoring important and relevant evidence having considerable bearing on the issue or by taking into consideration extraneous facts; (iii) where point of determination is one of mixed questions of fact and law; (iv) where construction of document of title or document which is the foundation of the rights of the parties is ignored; and (v) where ultimate finding of fact by the First Appellate Court is a result of wrong placement of onus. However, in the case where two views are possible to be taken from the available evidence, it is not open to the Second Appellate Court to set aside the findings because a contrary view appears to be more appealing (see : AIR 1998 Ori 131 : Gopabandhu Das and others v. Maheswar Mundian and others). 17. In the case of Panchugopal Barua and others v. Umesh Chandra Goswami and others, AIR 1997 SC 1041 , the Supreme Court observed that while entertaining a Second Appeal, the Court should not over-look the change brought about by the Amendment Act of 1976 restricting the scope of second appeal drastically and confining the same only to appeals involving substantial question of law, specifically set out in the memorandum of appeals and formulated by the High Court. Of course the High Court has the jurisdiction to entertain a Second Appeal even on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if the Court is satisfied that the case involves such a question, but then before that a fresh notice has to be issued to the opposite party. 18. In the case of Ram Prasad Rajak v. Nan Kumar and Bros. 18. In the case of Ram Prasad Rajak v. Nan Kumar and Bros. and another, AIR 1998 SC 2730 , it was observed that existence of substantial question of law is a sine-qua-non for the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code. Similar view has also been taken in catena of decisions of Supreme Court, this Court a well as other High Courts. The proper test for determination whether a question of law arises in the case is substantial or not was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Sir Chuni¬lal V. Mehta and sons Ltd. v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. reported in AIR 1962 Supreme Court 1314. In the said case it was observed as follows : “The proper test for determining whether a question of law arises in the case is substantial, would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so, whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest Court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law.” 19. In the case of Gian Dass versus Gram Panchayat, Village Sunner Kalan and others, (2006) 6 SCC 271 and also in the case of C.A. Sulaiman and others v. State Bank of Travancore and others, AIR 2006 SC 2848 , the Supreme Court held that Clause-5 of Section 100 applies only when substantial question of law has already been framed and if the Court forms the opinion that some other substantial question of law exists, the Court may frame the said issue after recording the reasons for the same and after issuing notice to the respondents. 20. In the case at hand, as stated earlier the only sub¬stantial question which has been framed by the Court while admit¬ting the Second Appeal is “as to whether there was mis-construction of documents marked as Exts.A, P and E”. 20. In the case at hand, as stated earlier the only sub¬stantial question which has been framed by the Court while admit¬ting the Second Appeal is “as to whether there was mis-construction of documents marked as Exts.A, P and E”. Of course this Court further observed that the appellants are allowed to urge any other substantial question of law at the time of hearing of this appeal, but then no petition was filed for framing any other substantial question of law nor notice thereof was issued to the respondents. 21. Before proceeding further it would be prudent to take note of the fact that a compromise petition was filed by the appellants and L.Rs. of respondent No.5 and the said petition was registered as Misc. Case No.334/2007. Respondents 1 to 4 however raised objections to the said petition for compromise on the ground that such a compromise is not maintainable. After hearing parties, this Court observed that as all the parties to the appeal are not parties to the compromise petition, no order can be passed on the petition. 22. Learned counsel for the respondents, supported the judgment passed by the lower appellate Court and submitted that as none of the ingredients necessary for interfering with the order passed by the lower appellate Court, which is based on factual finding and as no substantial question of law is in¬volved, it is a fit case where the appeal should be dismissed. 23. To appreciate the submissions made, this Court once again went through the judgment and the relevant annexures. Ext.A is the registered sale deed dated 11.6.1976 executed by Fakir Khan wherein defendant Nos.8 and 9 have been described as his sons. Ext.P is the certified copy of the birth register dated 30.10.1939 which indicates that a male child was born to Sk. Wahabulla in the year 1939 and a female child was born to him in the year 1945. Ext.E is the order of the Wakf Board granting post-facto sanction. The lower appellate Court has vividly dis¬cussed the evidentiary value of the aforesaid documents and has come to the conclusion that Ext.P being the birth register pre¬pared in due course of business 30 years back and being a public document in consonance with Section 90 of the Evidence Act was admissible in evidence. That apart, Ext.P was a document prepared by Government agency and prepared in due course of business. That apart, Ext.P was a document prepared by Government agency and prepared in due course of business. Ext.E happens to be the marriage register of Sk. Wahabulla, which is of the year 1937. The appellate Court has taken pain to go through Ext.A which is a binding book and used as a marriage register. Every page of the said book is numbered and is main¬tained in due course of business. The said document is also reveal that Sahejadi Bibi was aged about 27 years, in the year 1937 when her marriage took place with Sk. Wahabulla. Relying upon the said documents coupled with the birth register Ext.P series, the oral evidence of D.W.6 and the voters list (Ext.3) the appellate Court came to the conclusion that the defendants 8 and 9 were the sons of Sk. Wahabulla. The said conclusion also fortified by the report of the committee constituted by the Wakf Board, vide Exts. C and D as well s the evidence of D.W.2. After going through the conclusions arrived at by the lower appellate Court, this Court finds that the said Court has not committed any error in appreciation of Exts. A, P and E. He has taken pain to go through the documents, discussed the same and considering the evidentiary value thereof vis-a-vis other evidence on record and has rightly come to the conclusion that defendants 8 and 9 were the sons of Sk. Wahabulla, the ex-marfatdar. Ext.12 is the judg¬ment passed by this Court in OJC No.971 of 1979. In the said application, the validity of the post facto sanction accorded by the Wakf Board to the registered sale deed executed by defendants 8 and 9 in favour of defendant Nos.1, 2 and 3 was assailed. This Court by order dated 1.10.1986 held that the sale deed executed on 18.8.1986 was valid and so also the permission accorded by the Wakf Board. This Court further held that as the ale deed dated 18.8.1986 is in pursuance of the sanction of the Board, the same confers valid title upon defendant Nos.1, 2 and 3. The finding vide Ext.12 arrived at by this Court is also binding upon the Courts below and cannot be bypassed or set at rest in a suit. After going through the documents Exts. The finding vide Ext.12 arrived at by this Court is also binding upon the Courts below and cannot be bypassed or set at rest in a suit. After going through the documents Exts. A, P and E as well as the judgment of the lower appellate Court, this Court is satisfied that the same have been interpreted correctly and there was no apparent error in such interpretation. The question framed is accordingly answered in favour of the respondents. 24. In view of the discussions made above, this Court finds no reason to interfere with the finding of facts arrived at by the lower appellate Court and refuse to interfere with the same. The Second Appeal is accordingly dismissed. Parties to bear their own cost through out. Appeal allowed.