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2010 DIGILAW 427 (GAU)

State of Tripura v. Haradhan Majumder

2010-06-14

A.C.UPADHYAY, UTPALENDU BIKAS SAHA

body2010
JUDGMENT U.B. Saha, J. 1. This appeal under Section 378, Code of Criminal Procedure is filed by the State Appellant against the judgment and order of acquittal dated 23.9.2004 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala in ST 178(WT/S)/1994 whereby and whereunder the Respondents herein, husband and mother in law of the victim respectively, were acquitted from the charges leveled against them under Sections 302/498A/201/34, IPC. 2. Heard Mr. A. Ghosh, learned Addl. P.P. appearing for the State Appellant and Mr. A.L. Saha as well as Mr. J. Paul, learned Counsel for the Respondents. 3. The background of the prosecution case, in a nutshell, is as follows: On 13.2.1991, one Dhirendra Majumder lodged an FIR before the Officer-in-charge, Jatrapur P.S alleging that his daughter Putul Majumder was married to Haradhan Majumder, the Respondent No. 1 herein, as per Hindu rites and custom. But after 2/3 months of the marriage, the accused husband and her mother in law, started assaulting his daughter and inflicting torture and even they did not provide proper food to her daughter. It is also alleged that the day on which he lodged information to the Officer in-charge of the said police station, he got information at about 6.30 a.m. from P.W. 5 Laxmi Majumder, the brother of the accused Haradhan, who was accompanied by another person, that his daughter had become unconscious and was not in a position to speak. Upon hearing such news, he hired a tempo and went to the house of the accused and he found that his daughter Putul was dead. On seeing his daughter, he assumed that the death of his daughter had not occurred due to any disease and he suspected that the accused persons, Respondents herein, killed his daughter. 4. On receipt of the said information, a case under Section 157, Code of Criminal Procedure. was taken up vide G.D. Entry No. 334 dated 13.2.1991 and after completion of investigation, S.I. Debashish Debbarma (P.W. 16) lodged a complaint on 1.4.1991 and accordingly Jatrapur P.S Case No. 1(4)/91 under Sections 302/201/498A of IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Act was registered and charge sheet was filed against Haradhan Majumder and Smt. Jaya Rani Majumder, the husband and mother in law respectively of the deceased Putul, under Section 302/34, IPC and Section201/34, IPC and also under Section 498A, IPC. 5. 5. During trial, the prosecution examined as many as sixteen witnesses including the official witnesses and also exhibited some documents in support of its case. But the defence examined none and advanced a case of total denial and claimed to be tried. 6. Out of sixteen witnesses, the important witnesses who supported the prosecution case are P.W.7 Dr. Subodh Kr. Shil, P.W 8, Smt. Gouri Pal, P.W. 9, Smt. Archana Pal and P.W. 10 Smt. Usha Rani Majumder. It is admitted position that the informant, father of the deceased, though lodged FIR, regarding the death of his daughter and on the basis of whose information, G.D. entry was recorded and investigation under Section 157, Code of Criminal Procedure was initiated, was not examined, as before trial he died. After recording the evidences of the prosecution witnesses, the accused Respondents were examined by the learned trial court under Section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure wherein they pleaded innocence and specially stated that all the allegations made against them are false and they did never commit such a crime as alleged by the complainant. Thereafter, the trial court heard the learned Counsel for the parties and ultimately considering the evidences of prosecution as recorded acquitted the accused Respondents from the charges levelled against them. 7. Mr. Ghosh, learned Addl. P.P while placing the case of the State Appellant and urging for conviction of the accused Respondents contended that the learned trial court failed to appreciate the evidences on record, particularly, the evidences of P. Ws. 7, 8, 9 and 10. He also contended that from the evidence of P.W. 7 Dr. Shubodh Kr. Shil, it would be evident that the death of the deceased Putul was caused due to strangulation and the nature of the death is homicidal one. He further contended that the learned trial Court did not state any reason for non-believing the evidence of P.W. 8 Smt. Gouri Pal, a neighbor of the deceased Putul, P.W.9 Smt. Archana Pal, a friend of deceased Putul, and P.W 10 Smt. Usha Rani Majumder, the mother of the deceased. He finally urges that the learned trial court ought to have discussed regarding the medical evidence wherein it is specifically stated that the cause of death of the deceased Putul is not of any disease, but for strangulation and homicidal in nature. He finally urges that the learned trial court ought to have discussed regarding the medical evidence wherein it is specifically stated that the cause of death of the deceased Putul is not of any disease, but for strangulation and homicidal in nature. He also contended that the death of Putul occurred in the house of the accused Respondent. Therefore, the accused Respondent cannot be treated as innocent. 8. On the other hand, Mr. A.L. Saha, the learned Counsel for the accused Respondents while supporting the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court would contend that the prosecution failed to adduce any evidence to prove its case, inter alia, that the accused Respondents are involved with the alleged offence. He again contended that even if the evidence of the doctor is considered in toto, ' then also the prosecution failed to establish who caused the strangulation. Not only that he further urges that none of the neighbours of the accused persons were produced before the court to support the case of the prosecution and to say that the accused persons actually subjected to Putul with cruelty and unless a case of cruelty is made out, the court cannot convict an accused person under Section 498A. Therefore, the learned trial court rightly acquitted the accused Respondents. He further contended that by this time, it is settled that when two inferences are possible in a case, then court should accept one which favours the accused. Not only that, the court should be more cautious and should keep in mind the cardinal rule as prescribed/namely, (a) that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused which has been strengthened by the acquittal of the accused by the trial court, (b) if two views are possible, a view favourable to the accused should be taken, (c) that the, trial Judge had the advantage of looking at the demeanour of the witnesses and (d) the accused is entitled to a reasonable benefit of doubt, a doubt which a thinking man will reasonably, honestly and consciously entertain. In support of his aforesaid contention, he referred to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of State v. Vazir Hakki (2005) Cri. LJ 2719. 9. In support of his aforesaid contention, he referred to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of State v. Vazir Hakki (2005) Cri. LJ 2719. 9. Before proceeding with the submission of the learned Counsel for the parties, it would be proper on our part to reproduce the relevant part of the evidence of P. Ws. 7, 8, 9 and 10, as according to the learned Addl. P.P., the learned trial court failed to consider their evidences. More so, being an appellate court, it is also our duty to re-appreciate/review the evidence upon which an order of acquittal took place being this Court is exercising its power as a court of first appeal so that their cannot be any miscarriage of justice to any of the parties. 10. P.W.7, Dr. Subodh Kr. Shil who caused the post mortem on the body of the deceased stated in his statement that on 14.2.1991 as requisitioned by Jatrapur P.S., he held post mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased Putul, who was at the relevant time aged about 16 years. On external examination of the body, he found bruise around the neck and left side of the body with multiple in number, cause might be by strangulation. After dissection of the body, he also found congestion of brain, spinal cord and thorax. There was bleeding from mouth, congestion of stomach, small intestine and large intestine. Liver, spleen, kidney bladders all congested. While he was required his opinion regarding the cause of death, he opined that the cause of death was cardio respiratory failure by strangulation of homicidal nature. He also identified the post mortem report which was marked as Exhibit P-2 and his signature marked as Exhibit P-2/1. He also stated that the body of the Putul was identified to him by one Sukumar Mog, constable 1723 of Jatrapur P.S. In his cross, he stated that as per inquest report, there was no sign of injury. He also did not ascertain the age of the injury. 11. P. W 8, Gouri Pal is a neighbor of Putul who stated that after marriage of Putul, she visited her parents' house several times and also to their house and told them that her mother in law and husband tortured upon her demanding a cot and an almirah. He also did not ascertain the age of the injury. 11. P. W 8, Gouri Pal is a neighbor of Putul who stated that after marriage of Putul, she visited her parents' house several times and also to their house and told them that her mother in law and husband tortured upon her demanding a cot and an almirah. This witness also stated that she noticed a mark of injury on her left hand and on being asked, Putul stated to her that her mother in law struck a blow with a dao which caused such injury. She also stated that she did not know the mother in law of Putul. In her cross, she stated that after 15/20 days of the death of Putul, she gave her statement to the police. 12. P.W.9, Smt. Archana Pal stated in her deposition that Putul after her marriage visited her parents house few times and also met her and she (Putul) told her that there is no peace in her life as she is subjected to ill treatment by her husband and mother in law because one cot and one almirah could not be given during her marriage as assured by her parents. She also stated that her husband was characterless as he had illicit relation with one girl and her name was Puspa Rani. She also stated that her husband married Puspa. 12A. P.W. 10, Smt. Usha Rani Majumder, is the mother of the deceased Putul who stated in her deposition that in the marriage, they gave Rs. 5,000 to the bridegroom but could not give one Khat (cot) and one almirah as demanded. She also stated that her daughter Putul after her marriage when visited them made complaints that there was no peace in her life and her husband in law assaulted her on the plea that they could not give the cot and almirah which were assured by them. She further stated that P.W.5 Laxmi Majumder, brother in law of Putul on one morning came to them and told them that Putul was seriously ill and told them to see her. Thereafter, she along with her husband and son went to Nidaya and saw her daughter lying on a cot in her house dead. She noticed some marks on the either side of the throat. Thereafter, she along with her husband and son went to Nidaya and saw her daughter lying on a cot in her house dead. She noticed some marks on the either side of the throat. They told them that Putul died out of illness, but they had doubt of murder and as such informed the police. Her husband on having written the contents of ejahar through another person and after putting his thumb impression in the complaint have lodged the same in the police station. In cross, he stated that she cannot say who wrote the complaint of her husband and also she was not present at the time of writing of complaint. She also stated that she had noticed the marks on the either side of throat of Putul. But no such statement is found in her 161, Code of Criminal Procedure statement. 13. As it appears from the submission of the learned Counsel for the parties, particularly, the learned Addl. P.P Mr. Ghosh, that the allegation against the Respondents were mainly that the deceased was killed by her husband as well as mother in law on demand of dowry as made by them which could not be fulfilled by the parents of Putul. Therefore, it is necessary on our part to consider what is the meaning of 'cruelty' and 'dowry'. Cruelty - By Explanation (a) and (b) of Section 498A of IPC cruelty has been defined as: (a) Any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) Harassment of the women where such harassment is with a view of coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. Dowry - Dos muliers. 'Lat' otherwise called maritagium, or marriage goods, that which the wife brings to the husband in marriage. This word should not be founded with dower-Co. Litt 31.Wharton's Law Lexicon. The definition of 'dowry' will also be available in Section 2 of the Dowry (Prohibition) Act, 1961. Dowry - Dos muliers. 'Lat' otherwise called maritagium, or marriage goods, that which the wife brings to the husband in marriage. This word should not be founded with dower-Co. Litt 31.Wharton's Law Lexicon. The definition of 'dowry' will also be available in Section 2 of the Dowry (Prohibition) Act, 1961. In common parlance, dowry means where the husband or his relations demand valuable security from the parents and other relations of the wife after the marriage. 14. In Vikram Singh v. State of Rajasthan 2007 Cri. LJ 1622, about the definition of dowry was also discussed in paras 11, 12, 13 and the same are reproduced hereunder: 11. In Satvir Singh v. State of Punjab 2001) 8 SCC 633: (2001) Cri. LJ 4625), the Hon'ble apex Court considered the definition of 'dowry' as defined under Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, with reference to the offence under Section 304B of the IPC, and held that it should be any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given in connection with the marriage. Customary gift or payment in connection with birth of child or other ceremonies unrelated to the marriage ceremony, held, do not fall within the ambit of 'dowry'. The relevant para No. 21 of the judgment reads as under - 21. Thus, there are three occasions related to dowry. One is before the marriage, second is 'at any time' after the marriage. The third occasion may appear to be an unending period. But the crucial words are 'in connection with the marriage of the said parties'. This means that giving or agreeing to give any property or valuable security on any of the above three stages should have been in connection with the marriage of the said parties. There can be many other instances for payment of money or giving property as between the spouses. For example, some customary payments in connection with birth of a child or other ceremonies are prevalent in different societies. Such payments are not enveloped within the ambit of 'dowry'. Hence, the dowry mentioned in Section 304B should be any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given in connection with the marriage." 12. In K. Prema S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao (2003) 1 SCC 217 P: (2003) Crl. Such payments are not enveloped within the ambit of 'dowry'. Hence, the dowry mentioned in Section 304B should be any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given in connection with the marriage." 12. In K. Prema S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao (2003) 1 SCC 217 P: (2003) Crl. LJ 69, the Hon'ble Apex Court considered the definition of 'dowry' in the context of offence under Section 304A, IPC, along with Section 113B of the Evidence Act and held that one of the key ingredients of the offence is that deceased must have been subjected to 'cruelty and harassment' in connection with the demand for 'dowry' shortly before her death. Para 16 of the judgment reads as under: 16. The evidence which has been found, acceptable by the courts below against accused 1 is that the cruel treatment and harassment of the deceased by him led her to commit suicide which was a death "otherwise than under normal circumstances". To attract the provisions of Section304B, IPC, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that "soon before her death" she was subjected to "cruelty and harassment in connection with the demand for dowry". There is no evidence on record to show that the land was demanded as dowry. It was given by the father to the deceased in marriage ritual as pasupukumkuma. The harassment or cruelty meted out to the deceased by the husband after the marriage to force her to transfer the land in his name was "not in connection with any demand for dowry". One of the main ingredients of the offence of "demand of dowry" being absent in this case, the High Court cannot be said to have committed any error in acquitting accused 1 for offence under Section 304B, IPC." 13. In Appasaheb and Anr. One of the main ingredients of the offence of "demand of dowry" being absent in this case, the High Court cannot be said to have committed any error in acquitting accused 1 for offence under Section 304B, IPC." 13. In Appasaheb and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra 2007 (i) Crimes 110: AIR 2007 SC 763 (SC), their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the similar point in the context of offence under Section 304B, IPC with the meaning of 'dowry' as defined under Section 2of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, and held that giving or taking of property or valuable security must have some connection with the marriage of the parties and a correlation between the giving or taking of property or valuable security must have some connection with the marriage of the parties and a correlation between the giving or taking of property or valuable security with the marriage of the parties is essential. A demand for money on account of some financial stringency or for meeting some urgent domestic expenses or for purchasing manure cannot be termed as a demand for dowry as the said word is normally understood. Para 9 of the judgment reads as under: 9. Two essential ingredients of Section 304B, IPC, apart from others, are (i) death of woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances, and (ii) woman is subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with any demand for 'dowry'. The explanation appended to Sub-section (1) of Section 304B, IPC says that "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of Dowry Prohibition Act read as under: 2. Definition of "dowry". - In this Act "dowry" means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly- (a) By one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; (b) By the parent of either party to a marriage or by any other person to either party to the marriage or to any other person, at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (shariat) applies. In view of the aforesaid definition of the word "dowry" any property or valuable security should be given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly at or before or any time after the marriage and in connection with the marriage of the said parties. Therefore, the giving or taking of property or valuable security must have some connection with the marriage of the parties and a correlation between the giving or taking of property or valuable security with the marriage of the parties is essential. Being a penal provision it has to be strictly construed. Dowry is a fairly well known social custom or practice in India. It is well settled principle of interpretation of statute that if the act is passed with reference to a particular trade, business or transaction and words are used which everybody conversant with that trade, business or transaction knows or understands to have a particular meaning in it, then the words are to be construed as having that particular meaning. (See Union of India v. Garware Nylonds Ltd. AIR 1996 SC 3509 and Chemical and Fibres of India v. Union of India AIR 1997 SC 558 ). A demand for money on account of some financial stringency or for meeting some urgent domestic expenses or for purchasing manure cannot be termed as a demand for dowry as the said word is normally understood. The evidence adduced by the prosecution does not, therefore, show that any demand for "dowry" as defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was made by the Appellants as what was allegedly asked for was some money for meeting domestic expenses and for purchasing manure. Since an essential ingredient of Section 304B, IPC, viz., demand for dowry is not established, the conviction of the Appellants cannot be sustained. 15. Again the definition of 'dowry' has also been considered by the Apex Court while their Lordship considered a case under Section 304A, IPC along with Section 113B of the Evidence Act in K. Prema S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao (2003) Cri. LJ 69, wherein it is held that one of the key ingredients of the offence is that deceased must have been subjected to cruelty and harassment in connection with the demand for dowry shortly before her death. 16. It would be evident from Appaasaheb and Anr. LJ 69, wherein it is held that one of the key ingredients of the offence is that deceased must have been subjected to cruelty and harassment in connection with the demand for dowry shortly before her death. 16. It would be evident from Appaasaheb and Anr. (supra), that the Apex Court also noted that giving or taking of property or valuable security must have some connection with the marriage of the parties and a correlation between the giving or taking of property or valuable security with the marriage of the parties is essential. A demand for money on account of some financial stringency or for meeting some urgent domestic expenses or for purchasing manure cannot be termed as a demand for dowry as the said word is normally understood. 17. The meaning of 'dowry' was also considered by the Apex Court in Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam AIR 2004 SCW 344. 18. It is the admitted position that marriage was solemnized between the accused Respondent No. 1 and the deceased. From the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court, it would be evident that to establish a case under Section 498A of the IPC, the prosecution is to prove that just immediate before the death, there was demand for dowry which in the instant case is absent. Not only that P. Ws. 8 and 9 though in their statement stated that the deceased Putul had disclosed to them that she was tortured by the accused Respondents demanding a cot and almirah, but when and how she was tortured that was not disclosed. More so, it is also absent from the statement of those two witnesses that just immediate before the death of the deceased, she made any statement to them regarding demand of dowry from the side of the accused Respondents, rather it appears from the evidence of P.W.1 Sri Barada Baidya whose ashram is near to the house of the accused Respondents and who was requested by the father of the accused Respondent No. 1 to see his-daughter in law that he went to their house and saw Putul and considering her health, he advised them to take her to a doctor and on the next day, he heard about the death of deceased Putul. It also appears from the evidence on record that at the time of death or even so called illness, the accused Respondent No. 1, the husband of the deceased was not present in his home, he went to Kalikrishnanagar to enjoy an Utsav. The said fact of absence of the Respondent No. 1 also get support from the evidence of P. W. 10, the mother of the deceased, as she nowhere stated in her deposition that while she visited the house of the accused Respondents, the accused Respondent No. 1, the husband of the deceased Putul, was there. More so, P.W.12, the brother of the deceased also admitted the fact in his examination in chief that the accused Respondent No. 1 was absent from his house. Not only the aforesaid witnesses, even P.W.3 in his cross has specifically stated that he had not seen any bleeding injury or bleeding through nose or mouth of the deceased and he did not find the accused Respondent No. 1 in his house. 19. Therefore, according to us, the prosecution has failed to connect the accused Respondents with the alleged crime of kiling Putul, even by way of strangulation. From Exhibit P-1 surathal report, it appears that there was no injury over the body of the deceased. Not only that none of the prosecution witnesses has claimed to have seen the accused persons while demanding the dowry, inter alia, for cot and almirah and also for committing mental and physical torture. The prosecution evidence amply shows that the deceased Putul was suffering from some illness, for which the family inmates of the accused persons went to doctor and brought medicine for her. Before us, there is no evidence to disbelieve those portions of the prosecution evidence as are available on record. 20. The only question in this case which is necessary to examine by us is that whether the evidence of medical officer, P.W.7, can be fully believed for convicting the accused Respondents quashing the order of acquittal as the doctor (P.W.7) in his statement as well as in the post, mortem report stated that the cause of death is strangulation. 20. The only question in this case which is necessary to examine by us is that whether the evidence of medical officer, P.W.7, can be fully believed for convicting the accused Respondents quashing the order of acquittal as the doctor (P.W.7) in his statement as well as in the post, mortem report stated that the cause of death is strangulation. According to the medical jurisprudence, the fracture of corona of Thyroid bone is the best proof of strangulation, but at the same time, it is the duty of the court to consider how and in what manner the strangulation was done, whether it is by the deceased herself or by the inmates including the husband, the accused Respondent No. 1. 21. There is nothing in the prosecution evidence from which it can be said that either the accused Respondent No. 1 or the mother in law, the Respondent No. 2 is a party to the strangulation as opined by the medical officer, P.W.7. By this time, it is also settled by the Apex Court that the medical evidence is a opinion evidence and only on the basis of the medical evidence, a person should not be convicted unless such evidence is corroborated by other ocular evidence of prosecution witnesses. As in the instant case, there is no corroborative evidence to support the evidence of the doctor, P.W.7, we are unable to accept the evidence of doctor, P.W.7 so far his opinion regarding the cause of death by strangulation. In the absence of any injury on the body of the deceased, the evidence of doctor also cannot be relied upon by us as he did not mention in the post mortem report regarding the age of the injury, which he found on the body of the deceased and whether those evidences are ante mortem or post mortem are highly essential to prove the case of the prosecution, but those are totally absent. 22. In Vazir Hakki (supra) as relied by Mr. 22. In Vazir Hakki (supra) as relied by Mr. Saha, learned Counsel for the Respondents, the Apex Court laid down the cardinal rules required to be followed in a case of appeal against the acquittal, i.e., (a) a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused which has been strengthened by the acquittal of the accused by the trial court, (b) if two views are possible, a view favourable to the accused should be taken, (c) that the trial Judge had the advantage of looking at the demeanour of the witnesses, and (d) the accused is entitled to a reasonable benefit of doubt, a doubt which a thinking man will reasonably, honestly and consciously entertain. 23. The same principle is echoed again by the Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Shibu alias Shiv Narain and Ors. AIR 2008 SCW 5400 wherein it is stated that there is no embargo on the appellate court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. As a matter of fact, in an appeal against acquittal, the High Court as the court of first appeal is obliged to go into greater detail of the evidence to see whether any miscarriage has resulted from the order of acquittal, though it has to act with great circumspection and utmost care before ordering the reversal of an acquittal. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the court is to ensure that the miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. 24. In a criminal case, mere suspicion is not enough to convict an accused, as the degree of proof required is strict than the civil proceedings. By this time it is also settled that the criminal trial is meant for doing justice to the accused, the victim and the society, so that the law and order is maintained. 24. In a criminal case, mere suspicion is not enough to convict an accused, as the degree of proof required is strict than the civil proceedings. By this time it is also settled that the criminal trial is meant for doing justice to the accused, the victim and the society, so that the law and order is maintained. Court should not search the evidence of the prosecution witnesses only to punish the accused person for the charges levelled against him. It is the duty of the court to find out whether the accused is really involved and/or connected with the offence for which charge is levelled against him. The duty of the court is also to see that no innocent person should be punished as well as no guilty person should escape without punishment. The first one is as important as the latter one. Both are important for the court while performing its duties either under the Constitution or under any law. 25. As our entire Constitution is basically based on one word "people," the court is also not above the people and law. The court should not scrutinize the probative material in an easy manner in an appeal preferred by State against the order of acquittal so that the person who has been acquitted by the trial court should get acquittal in the hand of the appellate court also, as the judicial institution is also accountable to the people and society though in criminal jurisprudence, another principle is developed, namely, to pull the husk/pod to draw the seed, i.e., doctrine of sifting. Thus, the true evidence is to be separated from the insignificant and bulky evidence. If there is slightest doubt in the mind of the court after going through the evidence regarding involvement of the accused in the offence for which he has been tried, then it should be the duty of the court to acquit the accused of the charge levelled against him." 26. In Venkata Subbarao v. State represented by Inspector of Police, A.P. 2007 Cri. LJ 754 also observed in para 30 as follows: 30. In Kalyan Singh v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 12 SCALE 577, this Court has held: The High Court while dealing with the matter, in our considered opinion, failed to apply the proper tests in deciding a case where a judgment of acquittal has been recorded. LJ 754 also observed in para 30 as follows: 30. In Kalyan Singh v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 12 SCALE 577, this Court has held: The High Court while dealing with the matter, in our considered opinion, failed to apply the proper tests in deciding a case where a judgment of acquittal has been recorded. The views of the learned Trial Judge cannot be said to be wholly unsustainable. It is now well-known that if two views are possible, the appellate court shall not ordinarily interfere with the judgment of acquittal. We do not, however, mean to lay down the law that the High Court, in a case where a judgment of acquittal is in question, would not go into the evidence brought on records by the prosecution or by the State but we would like to point rut that even if the High Court reversed the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court, it is incumbent on the High Court to arrive at the conclusion that no two views are possible. 27. We have gone through the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and the judgment impugned. We do not consider that miscarriage of justice was done by the trial court by passing the order of acquittal of the accused Respondents. Therefore, we do not find any reasons to interfere with the impugned judgment. 28. For the foregoing reasons and discussion, we do not find any merit in this appeal. The appeal, thus, fails and accordingly stands dismissed. Appeal dismissed.