JUDGMENT Heard both the counsel. 2. As both the appeals arise out of the common judgment and decree dated 30.06.2003 passed by the court of III Additional Senior Civil Judge, Vijayawada in O.S.Nos.303 of 1997 and 479 of 2000, and the parties are common and the subject matter is connected, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. 3. O.S.No.303 of 1997 was filed by one Dr. R. Sampath Kumar s/o late Madhusudhan Rao, through his General Power of Attorney Dr. Chigurupati Nageswara Rao against the defendant - Pidikiti Venkataratnam, for ejectment of the defendant and for delivery of vacant• possession of the plaint schedule property and for past profits. 4. O.S.No.479 of 2000 was filed by the defendant in the suit in O.S.No.303 of 1997 Pidikiti Venkataratnam, against the plaintiff in O.S.No.303 of 1997 Le., Dr.R.5ampath Kumar and his sister MS. Kakani Sandhya, for specific performance of the suit agreement of sale dated 22.10.1971 executed by the father of the defendants late Ramavarapu Madusudhana Rao in favour of the plaintiff for a valuable consideration of Rs.16,200/- in respect of the suit schedule property. 5. The suit schedule property in both the suits is as under: "Immovable property in an extent of Ac.0-56 cents (0.227 hectares) in D.No.189/7 with terraced building therein situated at Enikepadu Village, Gram Panchayat limits, Vijayawada Rural Mandal, within Sub Registry of Gunadala, Vijayawada, Krishna District being bounded by: East - Koneru Subbaiah's house South - Koneru Sree Ramulu's Vacant site etc., West - Yalamcnchili N arasimha Rao's house. North - Yalamchili Veera Venkaiah @ Tataiah's house." 6. The plaint averments in O.S.No.303 of 1997 are that the plaintiff's father late Madusudhana Rao and the deceased elder brother of the defendant, by name Pidikiti Sreerama Murthy originally belong to Punadipadu village in Kankipadu mandal, Krishna District and they were close friends. In the fifties, like all other enterprising men, the two friends left the village to better their prospects in urban areas and selected Vijayawada and Guntur, for their operations. In the fifties, like all other enterprising men, the two friends left the village to better their prospects in urban areas and selected Vijayawada and Guntur, for their operations. Plaintiff's father purchased within the panchayat limits of the growing suburban village of Enikipadu, an extent of Ac.0-56 cents of dry land in Door No.1897 with a tiled house, a tobacco barn with a single furnace and a thatched shed, all enclosed by a compound wall, by a registered sale deed 10-9-1954 from Mandava Narasaiah and his sons, described in detail in the plaint schedule attached to the plaint. In course of time, the owner late R. Madhusudhana Rao, had removed the thatched house made into a terraced building, thus improved the property in his life time. As he was preoccupied with the growing activities of the cinema exhibition, catering and other business activities undertaken by himself and his partner late Sreerama Murthy at Guntur, it became necessary for the plaintiff's father to keep somebody in charge of the suit property. The defendant, who is no other than the brother of his friend and partner, was thought to be the right person to be confided in and entrusted with the custody and maintenance of the valuable house property. Thus the defendant shifted from Punadipadu, to occupy and live in the schedule house as a licencee. While so, the father of the plaintiff passed away in June, 1975 leaving behind him, his mother Ankamma, widow Javahari Bai, plaintiff and one daughter by name Sandhya. As the said persons executed a relinquishment deeds and will in favour of the plaintiff, this plaintiff became the owner of the entire plaint schedule property along with other properties. At the time of death of his father, the plaintiff was doing his post graduation in medicine and the said P. Sreeram Murthy, was in sole management of the business firms and other properties. The plaintiff's mother also died in the year 1977. The plaintiff shifted to the United Kingdom and then to U.S.A. for further studies. Before leaving the country, the plaintiff executed a joint power of attorney in August, 1979 in favour of the said Sreerama Murthy and his wife Smt. Santisri, to conduct the business and to deal with the properties. The plaintiff's mother also died in the year 1977. The plaintiff shifted to the United Kingdom and then to U.S.A. for further studies. Before leaving the country, the plaintiff executed a joint power of attorney in August, 1979 in favour of the said Sreerama Murthy and his wife Smt. Santisri, to conduct the business and to deal with the properties. Taking undue advantage of the absence of the plaintiff in the country, the said Sreerama Murthy conceived the idea of preparing ground for grabbing the properties of the plaintiff and enriching his own family members. Under those circumstances, in July, 1993 the plaintiff asked the said Sreerama Murthy and insisted for accounts. But he refused to disclose the same. So, the plaintiff herein cancelled the power of attorney executed in favour of the said Sreerama Murthy and appointed his father-in-law i.e., the power of attorney holder in the present suit, as a power of attorney holder and requested him to take steps to save and secure the properties. The plaintiff filed suit in O.S.No.7/1994 on the file of Subordinate Court, Guntur against Sreerama Murthty, for dissolution of partnership firm and for rendition of accounts. The plaintiff was also obliged to sue the co-owner for the partition of other joint properties as O.S.No.282/1995. Having come to know about the plaint schedule house and its continued occupation by the defendant, the power of attorney holder of the plaintiff called on the defendant to vacate and hand over possession of the property. But the defendant sought for time in the beginning and went on gaining time. Therefore, a registered notice was issued on behalf of the plaintiff on 30.5.1996, as the owner of the property to the defendant to vacate the plaint schedule property. The defendant gave a reply notice on 27.6.1996 with false allegations. Having seen the absurd contentions of the defendant, by letter dated 28.11.1996 the plaintiff's advocate, demanded to send a copy of the contract of sale, said to have been executed by the plaintiff's father in October, 1971. In response to the same, the defendant sent photo copy of the said document sought to be relied on by him to plead 'perfection of title by prescription', with a covering letter dated 17.12.1996. In response to the same, the defendant sent photo copy of the said document sought to be relied on by him to plead 'perfection of title by prescription', with a covering letter dated 17.12.1996. Even a casual perusal of the writing, signature of late Madhusudhana Rao and the contents of the said document, would reveal that they are forged sale papers for the nefarious purpose. The further contention of the defendant in the notice with regard to the prescription of title to the suit schedule property, is not acceptable, since the possession of the defendant is a permissible one. The contention of the defendant in the notice that he purchased the property under an oral sale and followed by a written one and that he perfected the title by adverse possession are self contradictory. The document relied on by the defendant is unlawful and cannot be countenanced in any court of law. The defendant has no f means to purchase the property. The defendant has no right to be in possession of f the property. The plaint schedule property f is a valid property and the plaint schedule site will get a minimum of Rs.2,500/- per month. So, the plaintiff is entitled for mesne profits since December, 1996. With these averments, the suit for ejectment and for mesne profits is filed by the plaintiff through his General Power of Attorney. 7. The defendant filed written statement and stated that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine. It is stated that the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the suit and the cause of action alleged in paragraph no. 13 of the plaint, is absolutely false and is only invented for the purpose of the suit. It is also quite significant to note that the plaint contains several vague allegations and the attorney of the plaintiff conveniently kept silent even• about the specific terms while not giving the dates and time as to when the right to sue occurred. As such, the suit is liable to be rejected. While admitting the close friendship between the father of the plaintiff and his brother Pidikiti Sreerama Murthy, the defendant further stated that the father of the plaintiff has purchased an extent of Ac.0-56 cents of dry land in D.No.189/7 of Enikepadu. As such, the suit is liable to be rejected. While admitting the close friendship between the father of the plaintiff and his brother Pidikiti Sreerama Murthy, the defendant further stated that the father of the plaintiff has purchased an extent of Ac.0-56 cents of dry land in D.No.189/7 of Enikepadu. village with a tiled house, a tobacco baron with a single furnace and a thatched shed, all enclosed by a compound wall by a registered sale deed dated 10.9.1954.The said sale deed was executed by Mandava Bhushaiah on behalf of himself and his minor sons and it is incorrect to allege that the vendor was Mandava Narasaiah. 8. In the written statement the defendant specifically denied the plaint averments, and further stated that he is not disputing the rights and title of the plaintiff's father, as the plaintiff's father never claimed any right and title over the plaint schedule property after he sold it to the defendant. The defendant is the younger brother of late Pidikiti Sreerama Murthy, who was the partner of the plaintiff's father. The defendant purchased the schedule property of Ac.0-56 cents along with super structures therein from late Madhusudhana Rao, the father of the plaintiff, under an agreement of sale dated 22.10.1971 for a valuable consideration of Rs.16,200/- and after receiving the sale consideration, the said Madhusudana Rao delivered the property on the same day. Ever since, the defendant has been in continuous and uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the said property. Subsequently, in the year, 1973, even during the life time of late Madhusudana Rao, the defendant got plans approved by the Gram Panchayat, Enikepadu and constructed a terraced building in the schedule site and has been living in it by paying necessary taxes to the panchayat, without any obstruction from any body. If the defendant had no right or title over the schedule property, the Gram Panchayat itself would have objected to grant permission to construct the terraced house in the schedule property and disapprove the plans submitted by the defendant in his name and even late Madhusudana Rao would have objected for the same. On account of the close association of the defendant and his brother with the said Madhusudhana Rao, the defendant never insisted for a registered sale deed in his favour. On account of the close association of the defendant and his brother with the said Madhusudhana Rao, the defendant never insisted for a registered sale deed in his favour. Even assuming for the sake of argument, but not conceding, that defendant was advised and abetted by his brother late Sirama Murthy to appropriate the schedule property, he would have got the agreement of sale registered by his brother, who was then power of attorney holder of the plaintiff along with his wife Smt. Santhisri. Though in the absence of the registered sale deed in his favour in respect of the said Ac.0-56 cents of land, the defendant has been absolute owner of the said property by virtue of long, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the property. Thus, he perfected his title and right in the said property, by prescription. The said Madhusudana Rao lived for nearly 18 years after the defendant admittedly entered into possession of the said property and during the said period, the said Madhusudana Rao never disputed, nor raised his little finger with regard to the rights or possession of the defendant over the property. It is respectfully submitted that the defendant perfected his title by prescription even during the life time of the said Madhusudana Rao and as such the said Madhusudana Rao himself had no right to dispute the title and possession of this defendant in respect of Acs.0-56 cents of land. Moreover when late Madusudana Rao, during his life time had never questioned the defendant's title or possession over the property, his legal heirs have no locus standi to file this speculative suit against the defendant in view of the sale agreement dated 22.10.1971. 9. It is further stated that the plaintiff is fully aware of the sale transaction between his father and the defendant and that he cannot make any claim against the defendant with reference to the plaint schedule property. However, the attorney of the plaintiff, who is no other than his father-in-law, being the anchor of this litigation, got issued a speculative registered notice dated 30.5.1996 with all false, frivolous and vexatious allegations and as this defendant got issued a reply notice dated 27.6.19% putting forth the truth. The attorney of the plaintiff got filed this suit almost 10 months latter in a speculative manner. 10. The attorney of the plaintiff got filed this suit almost 10 months latter in a speculative manner. 10. In view of the above facts and circumstances, it is stated that the allegations that the father of the plaintiff permitted this defendant to reside in the schedule property and that the defendant is in the permissive possession of the property, is an out and out lie. Though the schedule property originally belonged to late Madhusudana Rao, his son, the plaintiff herein never got any right over the schedule property as his father late Madhusudana Rao sold away the same to the defendant more than 16 years ago and the question of the schedule property devolving on the plaintiff, does not arise. Therefore, the defendant states that the plaintiff has no right, title or interest whatsoever in the plaint schedule property and the defendant is the absolute owner of the plaint schedule property, having perfected his title by adverse possession apart from the prescription. As such the plaintiff has no right to seek ejectment of the defendant and delivery of the possession and this suit which is filed for the said reliefs alone, is not maintainable without seeking declaration of title. 11. It is stated that any person who claims the relief of delivery of possession should prove that he was in possession of the property at any time during the 12 years prior to the filing of the suit. While so, the plaintiff was never in possession of the plaint schedule property at all and as such this suit is not within time and is barred by limitation. The plaintiff is put to strict proof that he was in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property at any time within 12 years prior to the filing of the suit. 12. The defendant denied that the other heirs of late Madusudhana Rao i.e., the paternal grand mother, sister and mother of the plaintiff, by release deeds and will, had relinquished and bequeathed their interest respectively in favour of the plaintiff and he became the sole owner of the assets and estate left by his father, since plaintiff did not file any documentary evidence i.e., will or release deeds etc. and as such it cannot be considered that the plaintiff is the sole owner of the estate of his father. and as such it cannot be considered that the plaintiff is the sole owner of the estate of his father. The other legal heirs also of late Madhusudhana Rao, who are necessary parties to the suit, have not been joined as co-plaintiffs. Hence the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. The plaintiff denied the claim with regard to mesne profits and stated that the suit is undervalued and with these averments, he sought for dismissal of the suit. 13. Based on the above pleadings, the trial court framed the following issues for trial: 1. Whether the agreement of sale dated 22.10.1971 for a value of Rs.16,200/- and delivery of possession on the same day after receiving full consideration, is true, valid and binding? 2. Whether defendant had perfected his title by continuous possession and enjoyment under the said agreement by prescription? 3. Whether the suit is barred by law of limitation? 4. Whether the suit is not maintainable for the reliefs prayed, without seeking the relief of declaration of title? 5. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of other heirs of late Madhusudhanarao? 6. Whether the defendant constructed the building after demolishing and removing the then existing super structures during the life time of Madhusudhana rao as claimed? 7. Whether there was a steep increase in the values of immovable property in the suit village, after the grant of certificate of value by the sub-registy on 22.5.1996? 8. Whether the suit is undervalued? 9. Whether the Court fee paid is not correct? 10. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of vacant possession of the suit property and mense pofits? 11. To what relief? 14. As al beady noted above, the defendant in O.S. No.303 of 1997 filed the other suit in O.S.No.479 of 2000 for specific performance of the agreement of sale against the plaintiff in O.S.No.303 of 1997 and his sister. 11. To what relief? 14. As al beady noted above, the defendant in O.S. No.303 of 1997 filed the other suit in O.S.No.479 of 2000 for specific performance of the agreement of sale against the plaintiff in O.S.No.303 of 1997 and his sister. The plaint averments in O.S.No.479 of 2000 are that the plaintiff has purchased the immovable property in an extent of Ac.0-56 cents in D.No.189/7 of Enikepadu village, which is the plaint schedule property from one Ramavarapu Madhusudhana Rao, who is no other than the father of the defendants on 22.10.1971 for a valuable consideration of Rs.16,200/- and on even date after receiving the sale consideration, the said Madhusudhana Rao has executed an agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff in aspect of the plaint schedule property and possession was also delivered to him on the same day. Ever since, the plaintiff has been in continuous and peaceful possession and enjoyment of the schedule property without any interruption from anybody and subsequently in the year 1973, even during the life time of the said Madhusudhana Rao, the plaintiff got plans approved in his favour by Gram Panchayat, Enikepadu and accordingly he constructed a terraced building in the schedule property by investing huge amount of Rs.36,000/- and has been living therein by paying necessary taxes to the Gram Panchayat without obstruction from anybody. On account of close association with the said a Madhusudhana Rao, the father of the defendants, the plaintiff never insisted him to execute and register the regular sale deed in his favour and subsequently the said a Madusudhana Rao died on 3.6.1975 leaving behind him, his mother Ankamma, wife Jawahari Bai and the defendants, as his nearest legal heirs and subsequently the mother of the said Madhusudhana Rao died in the year 1977 and Jawahari Bai, the mother of the defendants also died in the year 1979 and thus the defendants are only the present existing legal heirs of the said Madhusudhana Rao. Both the defendants are aware of the sale transaction in favour of the plaintiff by their father late Madhusudhana Rao, but they did not raise any objection with regard to the said alienation by their father during his life time and even after his death, the plaintiff had no opportunity, nor had any occasion, to insist the defendants to execute and register the regular sale deed in his favour in respect of the plaint schedule property, since the 1st defendant is living abroad and also in view of the confidence reposed upon the defendants that they will not object or raise any dispute with regard to the schedule property forever, as the defendants are well aware of the sale transaction as stated supra. Thus, the plaintiff has become the absolute owner of the plaint schedule property having perfected his title by adverse possession apart from the prescription. While so, after a long period of twenty years, after the death of the said Madhusudhana Rao, the first defendant being instigated by his father-in-law viz., Dr. Chigurupati Nageswara Rao, and also taking advantage of the fact that there is no registered document in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the plaint schedule property, got issued a registered legal notice dated 30.5.1996 through his father-in-law as his General Power of Attorney holder to the plaintiff with all false, frivolous and' vexatious allegations, demanding the plaintiff to vacate the plant schedule property, while describing the plaintiff as a licencee in the plaint schedule property and the same was acknowledged by the plaintiff and he got issued a reply notice dated 27.6.1996 putting forth the truth. On receipt of the said reply, the G.P.A. holder of the first defendant got issued another notice dated 28.11.1996 requesting the counsel for the plaintiff to send a photo copy of the aforesaid agreement of sale, while denying the contents of the reply notice and setting up fallacious pleas. However, the plaintiff sent .the photo copy of agreement of sale along with the rejoinder dated 17.12.1996. However, the plaintiff sent .the photo copy of agreement of sale along with the rejoinder dated 17.12.1996. In spite of the reply notice and rejoinder got issued by the plaintiff, the first defendant has filed the suit in O.S.No.303 of 1997 through his father-in-law as his C.P.A. holder in a speculative manner, though he is aware that the plaintiff had perfected his title by prescription, apart from the adverse possession, over the plaint schedule property and he has no right to evict the plaintiff there from. 15. It is further stated that after securing the registration charges etc., he got issued a notice dated 15.4.1999 to the defendants demanding them to execute and register the regular sale deed in his favour at his costs and the same was acknowledged by the second defendant on 26.4.1999 and she neither issued any reply nor expressed her willingness to execute and register the regular sale deed in favour of the plaintiff and the first defendant has acknowledged the same on 5.5.1999 and got issued a reply notice dated 16.5.1999 with all false and untenable allegations while denying the contents of the notice issued by the plaintiff and as such the plaintiff had no other alternative but to file the present suit for specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 22.10.1971. With these averments, the suit for specific performance was sought to be decreed. 16. The 2nd defendant remained ex parte. 17. The 1st defendant filed written statement through his power of attorney holder. The defendant denied all the allegations made in the plaint. The contention of the defendant is that the suit is bad for mis-joinder of parties. The other allegations made in the plaint are denied. The contention of the first defendant is that his sister by name 5andhya and the paternal grandmother by name Ankamma, had executed a registered deed, relinquishing their shares in the estate of late R. Madhusudhana Rao on 15.7.1975 in favour of this defendant and in the name of his mother Jawahari Bai. Later, his mother also passed away, executing a registered will dated 26.4.1978 in favour of her son and thereby this defendant, has become the absolute owner of the plaint schedule property. So, this suit is bad for mis-joinder of parties. Late Madhusudhana Rao never executed any agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff. It is a forged document. Later, his mother also passed away, executing a registered will dated 26.4.1978 in favour of her son and thereby this defendant, has become the absolute owner of the plaint schedule property. So, this suit is bad for mis-joinder of parties. Late Madhusudhana Rao never executed any agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff. It is a forged document. This suit is barred by limitation. The possession of the defendant over the plaint schedule property is a permissive one. As notice was issued to the plaintiff to vacate the plaint schedule property, he has no right to continue in permissive possession. The suit is barred by limitation. The said spurious document is inadmissible in a court of law. On the notice issued by the plaintiff, the defendant got issued a reply stating that as if there was a sale even in the year 1957 itself. The notice further reveals that possession was also delivered to him in the year 1957 itself. However, at present, the defendant is contending that this property was purchased by him under an agreement of sale in the year 1971. The plaintiff herein never made any construction. In fact late Madusudhana Rao has got the then existing structure of the baron, cattle shed etc., demolished and converted into a titled house with one terraced, on old walls with minor modifications. Whatever the modifications made were only as the agent of this defendant only. The averments made in the plaint are quite contrary to the averments made in the reply notice issued on behalf of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has no capacity to t make any construction. The plaintiff never r perfected his title by way of adverse possession apart from prescription. Having t requested by the first defendant and his wife, the present G.P.A. had agreed to look after the litigation regarding this property. The plaintiff is not entitled to any relief. Hence, the suit was sought to be dismissed. 18. Based on the averments, the court below framed the following issues for trial: 1. Whether the agreement of sale dated 22.10.1971 is true and valid? 2. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder (sic. mis-joinder) of necessary parties? 3. Whether the plaintiff is put in possession of schedule property under the suit agreement of sale dated 22.10.1971? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for specific performance of contract? 5. To what relief? Whether the agreement of sale dated 22.10.1971 is true and valid? 2. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder (sic. mis-joinder) of necessary parties? 3. Whether the plaintiff is put in possession of schedule property under the suit agreement of sale dated 22.10.1971? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for specific performance of contract? 5. To what relief? Additional Issue: Whether the plaintiff is entitled for past profits of Rs.2,500/- per month as prayed for? 19. Both the suits in O.S.No.303 of 1997 and O.S.No.479 of 2000 were clubbed and evidence was recorded in O.S.No.479 of 2000. Therefore, the status of the parties will be referred to as per their array in 0.5.No.479 of 2000. 20. In support of the case of the plaintiff, P.Ws.1 to 4 were examined and Exs. A-l to A-55 were got marked. On behalf of the defendants, D.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.B-1 to B-19 were got marked. 21. Considering the first issue in O.S.No.479/2000 and O.S.No.303 of 1997, with regard to suit agreement of sale dated 22.10.1971, the trial court held that there is discrepancy in between the oral evidence of P.Ws.1, 2 and 3 on one hand and the averment made in the reply notice, which is marked as Ex.A-3 and that as per the oral evidence, the possession was delivered in the year 1971, whereas as per Ex.A-3, the possession was delivered even in the year 1957 itself and hence P.W.1 is not certain when the possession was delivered to P.W.1 under this agreement alone and, therefore, held that plaintiff failed to prove the execution of EX.A-1 and accordingly answered the issue against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendants. With regard to the 2nd issue in O.S.No.303 of 1997, whether the plaintiff had perfected his title by continuous possession and enjoyment under the agreement by prescription, the court below held that since P.W.1 failed to establish all the essential ingredients, except possession, he is not entitled to claim adverse possession. Under 3rd issue in O.s.No.303 of 1997, whether the suit is barred by law of limitation, the trial court held that the suit is not barred by limitation and accordingly answered the issue in favour of the defendants (i.e., plaintiff in O.S.No.303/1997). Under 3rd issue in O.s.No.303 of 1997, whether the suit is barred by law of limitation, the trial court held that the suit is not barred by limitation and accordingly answered the issue in favour of the defendants (i.e., plaintiff in O.S.No.303/1997). In respect of 4th issue in O.S.No.303 of 1997, whether the suit is not maintainable for possession without seeking the relief of declaration of title, the trial court answered the issue in favour of the defendant and held that it cannot be said that the suit without seeking the relief of declaration is not maintainable. Coming to issue No.5 in O.S.No.303 of 1992 and issue No.2 in O.S.No.479/2000, with regard to non-joinder of necessary parties and mis-joinder, the trial court held that since the suit is filed only for possession and not declaration, non-impleadment of the sister of the defendant is not a ground to say that suit is bad and accordingly answered the issue in favour of the defendant (plaintiff in O.S.No.303 of 1992). With regard to issues 6 and 7 in O.S.No.303 of 1992 i.e., whether the plaintiff constructed the building after demolition and removing the existing structures and whether there is steep increase in the value of immovable property after granting of certificate by the sub registrar on 22.5.1996, the court held that there is no necessity to decide the said issues. Under issue nos.8 and 9 in O.S.No.303/1992, the court below held that the suit is not undervalued and the court fee paid is proper and accordingly answered both the issues in favour of the defendant. With regard to last issue i.e., issue No.10 and additional issue in O.S.No.479/2000, whether the defendant is entitled for delivery of vacant possession and mesne profits, the court below held that the defendant is entitled for possession as prayed for and that the plaintiff is liable to pay the past profits at Rs.2,500/- per month and accordingly answered the issues in favour of the defendant. In respect of 4th issue in O.S.No.479/2000, whether the plaintiff is entitled for the specific performance of the contract, the court below held that since Ex.A-1 is not genuine one, the plaintiff is not entitled to seek the relief of specific performance and accordingly answered the issue in the negative and in favour of the defendant. In respect of 4th issue in O.S.No.479/2000, whether the plaintiff is entitled for the specific performance of the contract, the court below held that since Ex.A-1 is not genuine one, the plaintiff is not entitled to seek the relief of specific performance and accordingly answered the issue in the negative and in favour of the defendant. Eventually, the court below decreed the suit in O.S.No.303 of 1992 and dismissed the suit in O.S. No.479/2000. 22. Aggrieved by the allowing of the suit in O.S.No.303 of 1992, the defendant in the suit, filed A.S.No.1845 of 2003 and similarly aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit in O.S.No.479/2000, the plaintiff in the suit, filed A.S.No.1846 of 2003. 23. The contentions of the learned Senior Counsel Sri V.L.N.G.K. Murthy and the learned counsel Sri S. Sridhar, who argued the matter, are that the court below failed to appreciate the evidence on record and by approaching the matter in a perverse manner, recorded findings without cogent and convincing reasons. It is submitted that the father of the defendant by name R. Madusudhana Rao executed EX.A-1 agreement of sale on 22.10.1971, after receipt of a valuable consideration of Rs.16,200/and ever since, the plaintiff has been residing in the said house as owner, though he is in possession since 1957. It is further stated that the plaintiff has proved Ex.A-1 by examining himself as P.W.1 and also the attestors as P.Ws.2 and 3. Even the signature on EX.A-1 tallied with the signature in Ex.B-17, which is the copy of the lease deed produced by the defendant. During the life time of R. Madhusudhana Rao, who died on 3.6.1975, the plaintiff got the plans approved and made constructions. They contended that no person would venture to construct a house in other's property. In the present case, the Gram Panchayat has sanctioned the plan in the name of the plaintiff and he has undertaken the construction by investing substantial amount. The said plan is marked as Ex.A-10. As per EX.A-1 agreement of sale, the property tax has to be paid by the plaintiff and accordingly the plaintiff has been paying the property tax in his name and he got marked the house tax payment receipts as Exs.A-12 to A-40. The said plan is marked as Ex.A-10. As per EX.A-1 agreement of sale, the property tax has to be paid by the plaintiff and accordingly the plaintiff has been paying the property tax in his name and he got marked the house tax payment receipts as Exs.A-12 to A-40. It is contended that though the defendant's case is that the house was constructed with the monies of late Madusudhana Rao and that the property tax was paid at his instance, there is no evidence to that effect. Though the defendant stated that after the demise of his father, his paternal grandmother, his sister and his mother executed will deed and relinquishment deed, bequeathing the entire properties to him; the said deeds do not mention the suit schedule property . Further, as per the evidence of D.W.1 in the cross-examination, he stated that his sister filed suit for partition. If really there is any relinquishment deed or any will bequeathing the properties of late Madushudhana Rao in favour of the defendant, there was no necessity for his sister to file the suit for partition. It is contended that in the said suit also the suit schedule property was not mentioned and the defendant, who is a party to the said suit, did not file the plaint copy to show that even the present property is included. Therefore, non-production of the plaint in the suit filed by his sister for partition, to which the defendant is a party, leads to an negative inference in their favour and it has to be positively inferred that the suit schedule property was disposed of by late Madusudhana Rao. He also contended that the suit in O.S.No.303/1997 is bad for non-joinder of the necessary party Le., the sister of the defendant. It is also contended that the will deed and relinquishment deeds said to have been executed by the mother and sister of the defendants do not mention the suit schedule property and further even if assuming for the sake of argument that the said execution of deeds is true, then his sister would not filed any suit for partition. Therefore, it is clear that the sister of the defendant is also claiming right over the properties left by late Madusudhana Rao, who died in-testate. Therefore, it is clear that the sister of the defendant is also claiming right over the properties left by late Madusudhana Rao, who died in-testate. Therefore, sister of the defendant is also a necessary party to the suit filed by him for eviction and her non-impalement, is fatal to his case and hence suit has to be dismissed on the score of non-joinder of necessary party. It is further submitted that the defendant filed declarations under the Estate Duty Act and the under Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act. The said declaration is filed by the plaintiff and is marked as EX.A-55. The plaintiff also examined P.W.4, who is the Inspector of Income Tax to speak about the assessment order and the declaration filed by the defendant no.1, which are marked as Exs.A-54 and 55. In the said declaration filed under EX.A-55 also, the defendant did not mention the suit schedule property. Further, the defendant was issued notice by the Superintendent, office of the Special Officer, Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceilings, Vijayawada dated 16.12.1980 requiring the defendant to file declaration for the suit schedule property, as it devolved on the defendant after the death of his father Madusudhana Rao and as the said property exceeds the ceiling limit and hence liable to be declared under Section 6(1) of the Act. The said document is marked as Ex.B-9. But the defendant has not filed declaration, which leads to the inference that his father sold the property to the plaintiff. It is further contended that the as per the own admission of the defendant in his evidence, he did not get his name mutated in the revenue records with regard to the suit schedule property and if really he inherited the property from his father, he ought to have got his name mutated in the revenue records, but he did not do so. This is also one of the circumstances to infer that they have no interest over the suit schedule property. This is also one of the circumstances to infer that they have no interest over the suit schedule property. All these documents and the circumstances clinchingly prove that EX.A-1 was a genuine document and has been acted upon and that due to the relationship between the plaintiff and the father of the defendant, the plaintiff did not insist for registration of the sale deed and as the G.P.A. holder issued notice to vacate the suit property, it necessitated him to issue notice to register the document and as it was not heeded to, the suit for specific performance was filed. With regard to adverse possession, he contended that there is no dispute that if the initial entry is with permission, the occupant of the land cannot claim ad verse possession, since his possession is permissive. He contended that there is also no dispute that in order to take the plea of adverse possession, the party raising that said plea shall have to prove that he has been in possession and enjoyment of the property openly continuously for more than 12 years with the knowledge of one and all, including the owner of the property and hostile to the real owner with an intention claiming ownership over the property and it is hostile to the interest of the real owner. There is no dispute with regard to this proposition. There is no dispute with regard to this proposition. But it is contended that the plaintiff has been in possession since 1957 without there being any dispute and from 1971 as owner under EX.A-1 and he has been paying house taxes in his name and also constructed the house by obtaining the necessary permission from the Gram Panchayat in his own right and the recitals in EX.A-1 also clear that the plaintiff has to pay the property tax and further in EX.A-1 there is clear recitals to the effect that the father of the defendant Madusudhana rao is conveying all his rights from the date of execution of Ex.A-1, over the property in his favour and it is also clear that from then onwards the plaintiff is at liberty to enjoy the same according to his will and wish with his heirs and that Madusudhana Rao or his heirs will not object his possession and ownership and that they will not disturb his possession and that if any disputes arose thereon, he will clear off and that he will make this sale in force and that from thereon, the plaintiff has to pay taxes etc., against the schedule property and that if the plaintiff wish to get the property registered at any time, it is his (Madusudhan Rao's) responsibility to register the property and get the original. Therefore, from the recitals in Ex.A-1, it is clear that the owner of the property has conveyed all his rights in the property in favour of the plaintiff and has continued his possession with clear animus and distinct understanding that from that time onwards, he shall have no right or title over the property. In such a case the owner of the property does not retain any vestige of right in regard to the property and his mental attitude is that he has ceased to be the owner of the property and the transferee after getting into the possession, retains the same with the animus that he has become the owner of the property and his possession becomes ad verse to the real owner and he can claim adverse possession. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court reported in Achal Reddy v. Ramakrishna Reddiar (1) AIR 1990 SC 553 . 24. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court reported in Achal Reddy v. Ramakrishna Reddiar (1) AIR 1990 SC 553 . 24. He further contended that for the last more than twenty years, the plaintiff has been in continuous possession in his own right by paying property taxes and also constructed house by obtaining necessary permission from the Cram Panchayat and the defendant has never been in possession and even during the life time of Madusudhana Rao, he never objected while paying taxes or obtaining permission. Therefore, the defendant has lost the title to the plaintiff by way of prescription. He further contended that under Section 65 of the Limitation Act, the limitation for possession of immovable property based on title is 12 years and the period begins to run when the possession of defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. In the present case, he stated that the suit is filed after the period of more than twenty years since the date of execution of execution of Ex.A-1 and, therefore, the suit is barred by limitation. For these propositions, the learned counsel relied on the judgment of a learned single Judge of this court reported in Y. Venkakka Choudary v. D. Lakshminarayana (2) 1996 (1) AL T 877. 25. It is further contended that the G.P.A. holder of the defendant has no locus standi to file the suit since no permission under Rule 32 of the Civil Rules of Practice has been obtained and hence the person who is representing the defendant, has no authority to represent in the suit. In support of this contention the learned counsel relied on the judgment of a learned single Judge of this court reported in Mohd Hasnuddin v. Dontagani Sathamma (3) 2002 (1) An. W.R. 480 (A.P) = 2002 (2) ALD 867. 26. With the above contentions, the impugned common judgment of court below was sought to be set aside and decree the suit filed by the plaintiff in O.S.No.479 of 2000 for specific performance and dismiss the suit filed by the defendant in O.S.No.303 of 1992 for eviction. 27. On the other hand Sri M. Chandrasekhara Rao, learned counsel for the respondent - contesting defendant, supporting the impugned common judgment and decree, sought for dismissal of the appeals. He has made elaborate arguments and had taken this court through the entire evidence on record. 27. On the other hand Sri M. Chandrasekhara Rao, learned counsel for the respondent - contesting defendant, supporting the impugned common judgment and decree, sought for dismissal of the appeals. He has made elaborate arguments and had taken this court through the entire evidence on record. While reiterating the plaint averments in O.S.No.303 of 1997, he submitted that there is no dispute that the father of the defendant R. Madushudhan Rao is the owner of the plaint schedule property, having purchased the same under registered sale deed dated 10.9.1954. He removed the thatched shed and tobacco barn and converted the tiled house into a terraced building. The brother of the plaintiff Sreerama Murthy and the father of the defendant, are friends and as they were pre-occupied with other business activities and they shifted to Guntur from their native place Punadipadu, necessity arose to keep some person in the suit schedule property and in that process, the plaintiff was entrusted with the custody of maintenance of the house and later Madusudhan Rao died in the year 1975. He stated that the father of the defendant never executed EX.A-1 agreement of sale and it is a forged document. He stated that as per Ex.A-3 dated 27.6.1996, which is the reply got issued by the plaintiff to the notice issued by the defendant dated 30.5.1996, the case of the plaintiff is that while Madusudhana Rao shifted from Vijayawada to Guntur in or about 1957, he sold the plaint schedule property along with superstructures to him and delivered possession of the same and in pursuance of the said oral sale, plaintiff has paid the entire sale consideration to Madusudhana Rao and since then he has been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the said property in his own right and that the said Madusudhana Rao had executed an agreement of sale on 22.10.1971 in his favour confirming the earlier oral agreement of sale, payment of the entire sale consideration and also delivery of the property to him. Therefore, as per EX.A-3 the case of the plaintiff is that there is an oral sale in the year 1957 and in pursuance of the same he was put in possession and he paid the entire sale consideration and the agreement of sale Ex.A-1 dated 22.10.197 is only confirmation of the past transaction. Therefore, as per EX.A-3 the case of the plaintiff is that there is an oral sale in the year 1957 and in pursuance of the same he was put in possession and he paid the entire sale consideration and the agreement of sale Ex.A-1 dated 22.10.197 is only confirmation of the past transaction. But the recitals in Ex.A-1 show that Madusudhana Rao received the entire sale consideration of Rs.16,2001- on the date of execution of Ex.A-1 i.e., on 22.10.1971 and on the said date after receiving the consideration, delivered the property. If really there was oral sale in the year 1957 and pursuant to the same, the plaintiff paid the entire sale consideration and that he was put in possession and that Ex.A-1 is only a confirmation of the earlier sale, then obviously Ex.A-1 should contain the said recitals. But in Ex.A-1 there is no reference to the oral sale, delivery of possession and receipt of sale consideration and on the contrary it is stated that sale consideration was received on 22.10.1971 and delivery of possession was also made on the said date. Therefore, the discrepancy in the recitals in Ex.A-1 and that of in Ex.A-3 reply notice issued by the plaintiff, clearly show that Ex.A-1 is a created document for the purpose of the suit. He further contended that since the plaintiff relied on Ex.A-1 agreement of sale, the burden is on his prove the same. In support of this contention, he relied on the judgment of a learned single Judge of this court reported in Bonaia Raju v. Sarupuru Sreenivasuiu (4) 2006 (2) ALT 2002. He stated that in order to prove Ex.A-1, the plaintiff has examined P.Ws.2 and 3, who are said to be the attestors of the said document. As per their evidence, they have no acquaintance with Madusudhana Rao and they deposed that the entire sale consideration was paid on the date of execution of Ex.A-1, which is contrary to the contents in Ex.A-3, which is the reply notice issued by the plaintiff. Therefore, there is any amount of discrepancy with regard to the oral evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3 on supporting the impugned common judgment and decree, sought for dismissal of the appeals. He has made elaborate arguments and had taken this court through the entire evidence on record. Therefore, there is any amount of discrepancy with regard to the oral evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3 on supporting the impugned common judgment and decree, sought for dismissal of the appeals. He has made elaborate arguments and had taken this court through the entire evidence on record. While reiterating the plaint averments in O.S.No.303 of 1997, he submitted that there is no dispute that the father of the defendant R. Madushudhan Rao is the owner of the plaint schedule property, having purchased the same under registered sale deed dated 10.9.1954. He removed the thatched shed and tobacco barn and converted the tiled house into a terraced building. The brother of the plaintiff Sreerama Murthy and the father of the defendant, are friends and as they were pre-occupied with other business activities and they shifted to Guntur from their native place Punadipadu, necessity arose to keep some person in the suit schedule property and in that process, the plaintiff was entrusted with the custody of maintenance of the house and later Madusudhan Rao died in the year 1975. He stated that the father of the defendant never executed Ex.A-1 agreement of sale and it is a forged document. He stated that as per Ex.A-3 dated 27.6.1996, which is the reply got issued by the plaintiff to the notice issued by the defendant dated 30.5.1996, the case of the plaintiff is that while Madusudhana Rao shifted from Vijayawada to Guntur in or about 1957, he sold the plaint schedule property along with superstructures to him and delivered possession of the same and in pursuance of the said oral sale, plaintiff has paid the entire sale consideration to Madusudhana Rao and since then he has been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the said property in his own right and that the said Madusudhana Rao had executed an agreement of sale on 22.10.1971 in his favour confirming the earlier oral agreement of sale, payment of the entire sale consideration and also delivery of the property to him. Therefore, as per Ex.A-3 the case of the plaintiff is that there is an oral sale in the year 1957 and in pursuance of the same he was put in possession and he paid the entire sale consideration and the agreement of sale EX.A-1 dated 22.10.197 is only confirmation of the past transaction. Therefore, as per Ex.A-3 the case of the plaintiff is that there is an oral sale in the year 1957 and in pursuance of the same he was put in possession and he paid the entire sale consideration and the agreement of sale EX.A-1 dated 22.10.197 is only confirmation of the past transaction. But the recitals in EX.A-1 show that Madusudhana Rao received the entire sale consideration of RS.16,200/- on the date of execution of EX.A-1 i.e., on 22.10.1971 and on the said date after receiving the consideration, delivered the property. If really there was oral sale in the year 1957 and pursuant to the same, the plaintiff paid the entire sale consideration and that he was put in possession and that EX.A-1 is only a confirmation of the earlier sale, then obviously EX.A-1 should contain the said recitals. But in EX.A-1 there is no reference to the oral sale, delivery of possession and receipt of sale consideration and on the contrary it is stated that sale consideration was received on 22.10.1971 and delivery of possession was also made on the said date. Therefore, the discrepancy in the recitals in EX.A-1 and that of in EX.A-3 reply notice issued by the plaintiff, clearly show that Ex.A-1 is a created document for the purpose of the suit. He further contended that since the plaintiff relied on EX.A-1 agreement of sale, the burden is on his prove the same. In support of this contention, he relied on the judgment of a learned single Judge of this court reported in Bonala Raju v. Sarupuru Sreenivasulu (4) 2006 (2) ALT 2002. He stated that in order to prove Ex.A-1, the plaintiff has examined P.Ws.2 and 3, who are said to be the attestors of the said document. As per their evidence, they have no acquaintance with Madllsudhana Rao and they deposed that the entire sale consideration was paid on the date of execution of Ex.A-1, which is contrary to the contents in Ex.A-3, which is the reply notice issued by the plaintiff. Therefore, there is any amount of discrepancy with regard to the oral evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3 on 20 one hand and the recitals in EX.A-3. Therefore, there is any amount of discrepancy with regard to the oral evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3 on 20 one hand and the recitals in EX.A-3. Since the document relied on by the plaintiff itself is contrary to his own case, then any amount of evidence to prove his case, cannot be looked into and the plaintiff utterly failed to prove EX.A-l. He stated that the signature of late Madusudhana Rao on EX.A-1 is a rank forgery and the court below, by considering the evidence of D.Ws.1 and 2 and also comparing the disputed signature of Madusudhana Rao on EX.A-1 with that of his admitted his signature on Ex.B-17, which is the copy of the lease executed by late Madusudhana Rao, has recorded a finding of fact that they are not tallying and that signature on EX.A-1 is not that of Madusudhana Rao. In view of these circumstances and the evidence on record, the learned counsel submitted that the finding of the fact recorded by the court below that the plaintiff failed to prove Ex.A-1, may not be interfered with. 28. With regard to grant of permission of house plan obtained by the plaintiff and payment of tax, the learned counsel submitted that it is not disputed that plaintiff was inducted into the suit schedule property by the father of the defendant and with his consent only, he has been residing in the suit schedule property. He stated that the defendant was not in India and therefore his G.P.A. was looking after his property. Referring to the evidence of P.W.1, he submitted that the plaintiff paid the tax only with the direction of Madusudhana Rao and not in his own capacity as owner. He submitted that the plaintiff is not a man of any avocation and he has no means to construct the house and only with the monies of Madusudhana Rao, he constructed the house. He stated that as per own deposition of the plaintiff, the panchayat authorities have not verified the title of the plaintiff and he has also not paid any fee. He stated that as per own deposition of the plaintiff, the panchayat authorities have not verified the title of the plaintiff and he has also not paid any fee. In the absence of any verification of title and payment of fee, no permission will be granted and since in the present case permission was given in the name of the plaintiff by the Gram Panchayat for construction of the house in the absence of any payment of fees and verification of title, it is nothing but a mala fide action of the panchayt authorities in connivance with the plaintiff and it is a brought up document and no credence can be given. Referring to Section 125-A of the Old Gram Panchayat Act, he stated that even a person in possession is also obligated to pay the house tax and in that process, the plaintiff might have paid the house tax and even if it is paid, it has to be constructed that it is on behalf of the owner. 29. He contended that the case of the plaintiff is that the sister of the defendant filed suit for partition and in the said suit the suit schedule property is not included. But the plaintiff failed to prove the said averment by producing the plaint copy. He stated that since the plaintiff has taken the plea of partition, it is his duty to prove the same and in the absence of proof, the presumption is with regard to continuance of the joint family. In support of this contention, he relied on the judgment of the Apex Court reported in Chinthamani Ammal v. Nandagopal Gounder (5) 2007 (5) ALT 65 (SC) = 2007 (6) SCJ 422 = (2007) 4 SCC 163 . 30. Replying to the adverse possession pleaded by the plaintiff, the learned counsel submitted that the plaintiff failed to prove EX.A-l. Even other wise he contended that agreement of sale under EX.A-1 is an executory contract and the possession under the said document is only a permissive possession and such possession for any length of time, will not become adverse to the real owner. In order to prove the adverse possession, the plaintiff has plead and prove that his possession is open continuously for a period of 12 years to the knowledge of one and all including the owner of the property and hostile to the real owner with an intention of claiming ownership over the property, hostile to the interest of the real owner. He stated that there shall be pleading and evidence to that effect and without there being any pleading and evidence, the adverse possession cannot be raised. He contended that possession under the agreement of sale is permissive and will never become adverse to the real owner. when the title of the owner is admitted, plea of adverse possession cannot be permitted to be raised. In support of these contention, he relied on the judgments reported in Achal Reddi, v. Ramakrishna Reddiar (1supra), Mohammed Masthan (Died) Per L.Rs. v. Abdul Rehman (6) 2007 (6) ALT 353, Annasaheb Patil v. Balwant Alis Balasaheb Babusaheb Patil (Dead) By Lrs. (7) AIR 1995 SC 895 , Modern Rajamouli v Modern Roshaiah (8) 2000 (3) ALT 687 , Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar (9) (1994) 6 SCC 591 , Md. Ibrahim v. Secretary to Govt., of India (10) 1996 (2) ALT 950 (D.B) = 1996 (2) ALD 404 (DB), Deva (Dead) Thr. Lrs. v. Sajjan Kumar (Dead) By Lrs. (11) AIR 2003 SC 3907 , Maddisetti Venkata Rathnamma v. P.Radhakrishna Murthy (12) 2001(6) ALT 174 (D.B), Rangulal Ram v. Makhan Lal (13) AIR (38) 1951 Orissa 183(2), K. Ramabrahmam v. G. Narsingh Rao (14) 2008 (2) ALT 389 and Eerappa v. Golla Nagaiah (15) 2008 (2) ALT 416 . Therefore, he reiterated that since the plaintiff is admitting the tile of the father of the defendant and he has been admittedly put in possession by the father of the defendant and he is also claiming under agreement of sale in recognition of the title of the defendant, and as he failed to plead and prove by adducing cogent and convincing evidence when his possession has become adverse to the real owner, the plaintiff is estopped from raising the plea of adverse possession and the court below considering these factors rightly rejected the plea of adverse possession and the same does not warrant any interference. 31. 31. He submitted that as the court below considering all the aspects in detail and by giving reasons, dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff and decreed the suit of the defendant for eviction, the same needs no interference. With these submissions, he sought to dismiss the appeals. 32. In reply to the above arguments, the counsel for the appellant reiterated the above averments and stated that the plaintiff has taken the plea of adverse possession even in the reply given by him under Ex.A-3 and also in the pleadings and proved the same by leading evidence and, therefore, he sought to allow the appeals and decree the suit for specific performance and dismiss the suit for eviction. 33. In view of the above rival contentions and also the pleadings of the respective parties and the material available on record, the following issues would arise for my consideration: 1. Whether the plaintiff proved Ex.A-1? 2. Whether the plaintiff perfected his title by continuous possession and enjoyment of the property under the said agreement of sale by prescription? 3. Whether the suit in No.303/1997 is barred limitation? 4. Whether the suit in O.S. No.303/1997 for eviction of the plaintiff, is not maintainable, without seeking the relief of declaration of title, when the plaintiff has set up title under Ex.A-1? 5. Whether the suit in O.S. No.303/1997 is bad for non-joinder of necessary party? 6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the decree for specific performance and whether time is not the essence of the contract? 34. In order to answer the above issues, y it is necessary to first briefly note the case of the respective parties and the relevant evidence available on record. 35. The plaintiff is the brother of one P. Srirama Murthy, who is the close friend of the father of the defendant. Both P. Srirama Murthty and Madusudhana Rao, are business partners. The father of the defendant by name R. Madusudhana Rao purchased the suit schedule property along with a tiled house, tobacco baron with a single furnace and a thatched shed, enclosed by a compound wall, under registered sale deed dated 10.9.1954 from Mandava Bhushaiah. Both P. Srirama Murthty and Madusudhana Rao, are business partners. The father of the defendant by name R. Madusudhana Rao purchased the suit schedule property along with a tiled house, tobacco baron with a single furnace and a thatched shed, enclosed by a compound wall, under registered sale deed dated 10.9.1954 from Mandava Bhushaiah. The case of the plaintiff is that he purchased the plaint schedule property from Madusudhana Rao under an agreement of sale on 22.10.1971 for a consideration of Rs.16,200/- and after receiving the said sale consideration, the possession was delivered and ever since he has been residing in the said house. The said Madusudhana Rao died on 3.6.1975. Even during his life time, the plaintiff got approved the plans from the Gram Panchayat and constructed a terraced building in the schedule property by investing huge amount of Rs.36,000/- and has been paying necessary taxes and land revenue and on account of close association with Madusudhana Rao, he did not insist for registration of sale deed. The said Madusudhana Rao died on 3.6.1975 leaving behind him the defendant and his sister by name Sandhya as his nearest legal representatives. The case of the plaintiff is that both the defendants in O.S.No.479/2000, are aware of the sale transaction and they never objected with regard to the said alienation. The plaintiff has been residing in the suit schedule property without any interference or objection from any body including the defendants, by paying house taxes and land revenue in his own name and also constructed the house by obtaining necessary permission in his name and his case is that he also perfected by the title by adverse possession. After a period of about twenty years, the 1st defendant being instigated by his father-in-law, who is his C.P.A. holder, issued legal notice dated 30.5.1996 demanding the plaintiff to vacate the suit schedule property stating that he is only a licencee in the plaint schedule property. The plaintiff gave reply dated 27.6.1996 stating the fact of alienation under the agreement of sale dated 22.10.1971. On receipt of the said reply, the C.P.A. holder of the defendant sought the photo copy of the agreement of sale dated 22.10.1971. Along with the rejoinder, the plaintiff sent copy of the agreement of sale. Thereafter, the defendant, represented through his C.P.A., filed suit in O.S.No.303/1992 for eviction and for delivery of possession. On receipt of the said reply, the C.P.A. holder of the defendant sought the photo copy of the agreement of sale dated 22.10.1971. Along with the rejoinder, the plaintiff sent copy of the agreement of sale. Thereafter, the defendant, represented through his C.P.A., filed suit in O.S.No.303/1992 for eviction and for delivery of possession. The further case of the plaintiff is that after securing the registration charges, he got issued notice dated 15.4.1999 to the defendants to execute the registered sale deed at his cost. The 1st defendant issued reply with untenable averments and hence he filed the suit for specific performance. 36. On the other hand, the case of the defendant no.1, while admitting the friendship between the brother of the plaintiff Sreerama Murthy and his father, is that his father and the said Sreerama Murthy were enterprising men and left their village Punadipaud for better prospects and selected. Vijayawada and Cuntur for their operations and his father purchased the suit schedule property on 10.9.1954. In the course of time, he removed the thatched house and made into a terraced building and improved the said property. As he is preoccupied with the business activities, he inducted the brother of his friend Sreerama Murthty i.e., the plaintiff, into the suit schedule property for its maintenance and thus the plaintiff shifted from his village Punadipadu to the suit schedule property and is living therein as a licencee. The father of the defendant died on 3.6.1975 and at that time, the defendant was doing hi. post graduation in medicine and the said P. Srirama Murthty was looking after their business and other properties. The father of the plaintiff died during the year 1975, living behind him his mother Ankamma, widown Javahari Bai and the plaintiff and his sister Sandhya. The said persons executed relinquishment deed and will in favour of the plaintiff and that his mother also died in the year 1977 and she also executed a will. The plaintiff shifted to United Kingdom and U.S.A., for further studies and before living the country, he executed a joint power of attorney in August, 1979 in favour of the said Sreeram Murthy and his wife Smt. Santisri to conduct the business and to deal with the properties. The plaintiff shifted to United Kingdom and U.S.A., for further studies and before living the country, he executed a joint power of attorney in August, 1979 in favour of the said Sreeram Murthy and his wife Smt. Santisri to conduct the business and to deal with the properties. Taking undue advantage of the absence of the defendant, the said Srirama Murthy conceived an idea of illegally enriching his own family and that when he refused to disclose the accounts, the defendant cancelled the G.P.A. and appointed his father-in-law. He also filed O.S.No.7/1994 on the file of the Subordinate Court, Guntur for dissolution of partnership and for rendition of accounts. The plaintiff was also obliged to sue the co-owner for the partition of other joint properties in O.S.No.282/1995. Having come to know that the suit schedule property was in the possession of the plaintiff, notice was issued on 30.5.1996 for vacating the plaint schedule property, but plaintiff failed to vacate and issued reply on 27.6.1996 stating that he purchased the property under the agreement of sale. By letter dated 28.11.1996 the copy of the agreement of sale was sent and he also raised the plea of perfection of title by prescription by covering letter dated 17.12.1996. The case of the defendant is that the said agreement of sale is a forged document. His case is that since the possession of the plaintiff is permissive, he cannot raise the plea of adverse possession. His further case is that in the reply notice issued by the plaintiff he stated that he purchased the property under an oral sale and followed by a written one and that he perfected the title by adverse possession and the said grounds are self contradictory and that the plaintiff has no means to purchase the suit schedule property. With these averments, the suit filed by him was sought to be allowed, by dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiff. The defendant also sought for mesne profits. 37. In order to prove the case of the plaintiff, he got examined himself as P.W.1. With these averments, the suit filed by him was sought to be allowed, by dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiff. The defendant also sought for mesne profits. 37. In order to prove the case of the plaintiff, he got examined himself as P.W.1. In his evidence he deposed that he is the plaintiff in O.S.No.479/2000 and he filed the suit for specific performance of the agreement of sale, which was executed by the father of the plaintiff on 22.10.1971 in respect of the plaint schedule property as bill makta for Rs.16,200/- that the said Madusudhana Rao has executed an agreement in his favour; it is Ex.A-1; EX.A-1 was scribed by Nanduri Gopalakrishna Murthy, the then village karanam of Musthabada village, and he is no more; Kodali Subbarao and Garapti Kuntumba Rao (P.Ws.2 and 3), were present at the time of Ex.A-1 and they have attested the same; that he paid the entire sale consideration of Rs.16,200/- to the father of the defendant on the same day of execution of Ex.A-1; and even prior to EX.A-l agreement, his father and himself were in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule land since 1957; that there used to be an old tiled house and one. tobacco barn and in the year 1973 he dismantled the old house and constructed a new building after obtaining approval from the Grampanchayat of Enikepadu village and that he has been paying the taxes for the suit building and he has also been paying land revenue to the officials and that due to his relationship with Madusudhana Rao, he could not press him for registration of sale deed and that Madusudhana Rao died on 3.6.1975 and that the present defendants i.e., the son and daughter of Madusudhana Rao, who are the present defendants, are his nearest legal heirs and that they knew the fact that their father sold away the plaint schedule property to him under EX.A-l. He further deposed about the Ex.A-10, which is the approved plan and the certificate issued by the Gram Panchayat dated 26.4.2000 in his favour with regard to approval of the plan, which is EX.A-11. He deposed that he has been paying the house tax to the panchayat since 1974 under Exs.A-12 to A-36 and that Gram Panchayat Enikipaud issued special notice to him on 29.9.1974 asking him to pay house tax and since then, he has been paying taxes and that Exs.A-37 and A-38 are the demand notices issued in the year 1979 asking him to pay the house tax and EX.A-39 is the demand notice; that assessment numbers of the house of plaint schedule house are being changed from time to time; that he filed a certificate issued by the Gram Panchayat Enikipadu to that effect, which is EX.A-40. He deposed that he has also been paying land revenue for the suit property since 1974 and Exs.A-41 to 51 are the land revenue receipts; that he was maintaining accounts at the time of construction of the building in plaint schedule property, which are Exs.A-52 and A-53; that he filed written statement in the suit filed by the 1st defendant; that he took the plea in the written statement that he purchased the property under an agreement of sale in 1971 and that he has been in continuous possession of the same and acquired the title by adverse possession; that the father of the 1st defendant or the 1st defendant never questioned him with regard to construction of the building in the suit site and; that the defendants were never in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property at any time since 1971. 38. 38. In his cross-examination, he further deposed that he is the native of Punadhipadu; that he entered into the plaint schedule house in the year 1957 by coming over from Guntur; that the plaint schedule property was purchased by R. Madhusudhana Rao from one Mandava Bushaiah and his son; that he knew that fact; that on the advise given by Madusudhana Rao and also with his consent, he entered into the plaint schedule house and began living in it; by that time Madhusudhan Rao was not living in disputed house; that since 1948 Madusudhana Rao had been living in Guntur, even in 1957 also Madhusudhana Rao was living in Guntur; that he was not having any house or site any where; that at the invitation of Madhusudhana Rao, he entered into the house; that he has been paying the house tax since 1957; that he has been paying land revenue tax for the remaining site; that out of love and affection, he asked him to stay in this house; that there is no agreement to pay the rent; that as he was residing in that house and that a demand notice was issued, he paid the house tax and land revenue; that he showed the demand notices to Madhusudhan Rao and on his direction only, he paid the tax and the land revenue; that he owned Acs.7-00 of land up to 1981 in Prasadampadu village; that he did not file any document to show that he own that property; that he has no personal business; that he never had any bank account; that it is not correct to say that he mentioned in EX.A-3 to the effect that he purchased the house in 1957 from R.Madusudhana Rao and that he paid the entire consideration and took delivery of the property and ever since lived there as of right and; that EX.A-3 also contain his signature. He deposed that there was no oral contract in 1957 and that in order to get over the self contradictory contract EX.A-3 and in the plaint, now he is deposing as if there is no oral agreement. He further denied that after receipt of notice, he got issued under Ex.A-2 and that he created EX.A-1 in order to grab the property. He further denied that after receipt of notice, he got issued under Ex.A-2 and that he created EX.A-1 in order to grab the property. He further denied the suggestions with regard to instigating of his brother to grab the property he created EX.A-l. He deposed that contents in Ex.A-1 were read over to him. He further deposed that EX.A-1 was not shown to their Gram Panchayat and no necessity arose and; that even prior to 1971 Enikipaud was upgraded as Major Panchayat and there was an Executive Officer for Gram Panchayat. He deposed that Gram Panchayat never conducted enquiry to ascertain who is the owner of the site. He denied the suggestion that as an agent of Madhusudhana Rao, he submitted the plan to the panchayat. He also deposed that Panchayat did not ask him to produce his title deed. He denied the suggestion that he made a misrepresentation or managed the panchayat people to get the approval. He stated that the Panchayat did not collect any fee from him. He also denied the suggestion that he did not purchase the property for Rs.16,200/- and that he has no property at all at any place. He stated that he construed the daba house by spending Rs.35,000/-to Rs.40,000/-. He also denied the suggestion that with the amount provided by Madusudhana Rao, he spent the amount for construction of daba house and he accounted for the amounts spent by him and used to obtain his instructions. He also denied the suggestion that his wife and children are not living with him and that he alone has been living in the house. He stated that for the last ten years, he is not doing any business and that he is depending on his son. He denied that suggestion that he never did any work for earning and that he was always indulging in panchayat politics. He denied the suggestion that he has no money and did not pay the stamp duty and penalty immediately and took one year for that purpose. He also denied that he created EX.A-1 after Sampath Kumar filed the suit for eviction in order to grab his property at Vijayawada. He volunteered that if he had such a bad intention, he would have obtained a regular sale deed from his brother. He specifically denied the suggestion that he forged EX.A-1 with the help of his political friends. He also denied that he created EX.A-1 after Sampath Kumar filed the suit for eviction in order to grab his property at Vijayawada. He volunteered that if he had such a bad intention, he would have obtained a regular sale deed from his brother. He specifically denied the suggestion that he forged EX.A-1 with the help of his political friends. He denied that he never purchased the property at any time and that he has no capacity to purchase the house or to make any construction. In his further cross-examination, he denied the suggestions that the documents filed by him relating to payment of house tax, land revenue, demand notices and approved plan are spurious documents. Though he was cross-examined at length, the same questions have been put repeatedly and hence further extraction of the evidence, may not be necessary. 39. P.W.2 is one of the attesting witnesses to EX.A-l agreement of sale. He deposed that he is the third party to the suit and he knew the plaintiff as well as the plaint schedule property in the suit and received the suit summons from the court and he is the resident of Enikepadu village. He deposed that since 1957 he knew the plaintiff; that the plaintiff purchased the schedule property from one Ramavarapu Madusudhana Rao under an agreement of sale dated 22.10.1971 for a valuable consideration of Rs.16,200/- and the agreement of sale was executed near Sub-Registrar's Office, Gandhinagar, Vijayawada; that the transaction under the aforesaid agreement of sale, which was marked as Ex.A-1, payment of consideration and execution of the document were taken place before him and he attested the agreement of sale as 1st attester and Kodali Subbarao atttsted the same as 2nd attester after signing the agreement by Ramavarapu Madusudhana Rao and; that subsequently the plaintiff in the suit got constructed a building in the plaint schedule property in the year 1973 while removing old tiled house and tobacco barn therein and since then, the plaintiff has been residing therein. 40. 40. In the cross-examination, he deposed that he saw Madhusudhana Rao, but he has no acquaintance with Madhusudhana Rao; that P.W.3 does cultivation and he is also not the member of any political party; that Madhusudhana Rao never resided in their village; that except at the time of execution of Ex.A-1, he never saw the said Madhusudhana Rao at any time and; that P.W.1 told him that the person who executed in Ex.A-1 is Madhusudhana Rao; that P.W.3 had also no acquaintance with the executant of Ex.A-1. He denied the suggestion that P.Ws.1 and 3 are in the habit of grabbing the properties of others by creating documents and that Ex.A-1 is one of said documents and P.W.1 created it by impersonating the executant. 41. P.W.3 is another attesting witness to Ex.A-1. He also deposed in the same lines as that of P.W.2. 42. P.W.4 is the Inspector of Income Tax. He is examined to depose about the Exs.A-54 and A-55, which are the assessment order and the declaration filed by the defendant under the Estate Duty Act. He deposed that he received summons for production of Estate Duty file of R. Madhusudhana Rao and hence he brought the record; that Ex.A-54 is the Estate Duty Assessment order and Section 58(3) of Estate Duty Act dated 10.5.1979; that it is the assessment order; that Ex.A-55 is the declaration given by R. Sampath Kumar, return of estate duty dated 15-11-1977. He further deposed that he is the Inspector of Income Tax Ward 2(2) Guntur; that as the Estate Duty Act was abolished on 1.4.1984, later the Income Tax Officer Ward 2(2) Guntur is the in-charge of Asst. Controller of Excise Duty ACED and hence he produced documents. 43. In the cross-examination he deposed that Ex. A-54 revels that the deceased Madhusudhana Rao and his partner Sreeramamurthy maintained a joint life policy; that he do know whether the entire papers got prepared by RSreeramamurthy and simply obtained the signature of RSampathKumar on Ex.A-55. 44. Now, I will refer to the evidence adduced on behalf of the defendants. The 1st defendant in O.S.No.479 of 2000 was examined as D.W.1. 44. Now, I will refer to the evidence adduced on behalf of the defendants. The 1st defendant in O.S.No.479 of 2000 was examined as D.W.1. In his chief examination, he first got marked Exs.B-1 to B-17, which are the registered extract of sale deed dated 10.9.1954 executed in favour of Madhusudhana Rao; relinquishment deed executed by Ankamma and sister Sandhya in favour of his mother and himself; registration extract of the will dated 26.4.1978 executed by his mother in his favour; copy of the registered notice dated 30.5.1995; reply notice got issued by the plaintiff dated 27.6.1996; copy of the notice dated 28.11.1996 on his behalf demanding for the supply of the agreement of sale; postal acknowledgment; reply notice to Ex.B-6, under which copy of the agreement of sale was sent; certified copy of the notice sent by the competent authority under Urban Land Ceiling Vijayawada for not filing declaration for the suit schedule property; application with an endorsement of sub-registrar that records are burnt on 26.12.1988, hence no E.C. could be issued; E.C. showing nill transaction dated 23.5.1996; notice issued to the Sarpanch, E.O. Grampanchayat, Enikepadu about issuing a wrong certificate in favour of the plaintiff without conducting enquiry; copy of the acknowledgment of the Executive Officer, Gram Panchayat; copy of the acknowledgment of M.R.O., acknowledging the receipt of copy of notice issued under Ex.B-12; valuation certificate issued by the Sub-registrar dated 22.5.1996; encumbrance certificate dated 5.8.1994 and; certified copy of the registered lease deed dated 25.9.1963, to show the original signature of R.Madhusudhana Rao. 45. In his cross-examination he deposed that after consulting with the power of attorney holder, he issued legal notice on his behalf and that the photo copy of power of attorney shown to hill, contain his signature and it was executed by him; that he also executed power of attorney dated 28.9.1993 and it is a specific power of attorney, it does not reveal the plaint schedule property, but it covers the cinema hall etc. He denied the suggestion that power of attorney has no right to get the notice issued under EX.B-4. He deposed that he has seen the copy of agreement sent to his advocate on behalf of the plaintiff and that they did not give any rejoinder after receipt of the said copy of agreement. He denied the suggestion that power of attorney has no right to get the notice issued under EX.B-4. He deposed that he has seen the copy of agreement sent to his advocate on behalf of the plaintiff and that they did not give any rejoinder after receipt of the said copy of agreement. In his further deposition he deposed about the friendship between his father and Sreerama Murthy and his (D.Ws.1's) canceling of power of attorney of Sreerama Murthy in the year 1993. He deposed that there is no connection between the subject matter in the present suit and the subject matter in the suit pending in Guntur Court. He stated that unless papers were placed by his father and Sreerama Murthy, he wont sign on any blank papers; that the acknowledgement Ex.A-7 does not contain his signature; that EX.A-55 contains his signature; that it is the estate duty returns filed by him; that Ex.A-55 does not reveals the plaint schedule property herein; that he do not know whether his father signed in different styles; that he do know there will be variation in the style of signing, due to lapse of time; that he can identify the signature of his father; that all pages in EX.B-17 contain the signature. of his father; that there is subtle difference between the signature of his father at page Nos. of his father; that there is subtle difference between the signature of his father at page Nos. 26 and 27in Ex.B-17;thatP.W.1 worked in the business of his father and Sreerama Murthy in the year 1965; that some time thereafter he went to Enikipadu; that he do not know the year when he went to Enikipadu; that P.W.1 was doing cultivation in Prasadampadu village in an extent of few acres of land; that he do not know its extent and who was the owner of that landed property; that he do not know whether P.W.1 was cultivating 10 acres of land situate at Mustabada; that he do not know that P.W.1 was earning Rs.7 to 8 thousand per year during those days; that in 1945 his father and Sreerammurthty came to Guntur from Punadhapadu and settled there; that his paternal grand parents lived in the disputed property for some time, but he do not know for how many years they resided in the house and in which calendar year they resided in that house and; that P.W.1 and his parents were residing in the plaint schedule property, but he do not know from which calendar year they started residing in the house. He denied that P.W.1 constructed the house in the disputed property in the year 1973 with his own amount. He stated that the amount was provided by his father and P.W.1 constructed the said house. He deposed that he do not know whether the plan was approved in the name of P.W.1; that with the amount provided by his father P.W.1 paid the taxes, but he do not know whether in whose name the receipts were issued; that they allowed him to stay in the house and they never objected him for his occupation; that he never asked P.W.1 to vacate the house prior to the disputes started between him and Sreerama Maurthy; that there is no• documentary evidence to show that his father provided the amount to P.W.1; that there is no house tax receipt to show that the tax was paid in the name of his father; that he never interfered with the business affairs of Sreerama Murthy during the life time of his father. He denied that his father sold away the property to P.W.1 in the year 1971 under Ex.A-1. He deposed that he did not submit any fresh declaration after receipt of Ex.B-9. He denied that his father sold away the property to P.W.1 in the year 1971 under Ex.A-1. He deposed that he did not submit any fresh declaration after receipt of Ex.B-9. He volunteered that his power of attorney was looking after this affair. 46. He further deposed that he has never given any declaration in respect of his property while living India; that Ex. B-2 does not reveal plaint schedule property; that in Ex. B-3 also the plaint schedule property is not specifically mentioned and; that his sister filed a suit for partition of the properties; that he do not know whether the plaint schedule property was not mentioned by her in that suit. He denied that he knew that his father sold the plaint schedule property to P.W.1 and due to that reason only he did not mention the plaint schedule property in the returns submitted under Ex.A-55. He stated that the original of Ex. B-1 was with Sreerama Murthy; that he did not issue any notice to the sons of Sreerama Murthy for return of original of Ex.B-1. He denied the suggestion that his father-in-law after coming to know that the transaction under Ex.A-1 was not mentioned in Ex.B-16, got issued a legal notice to P.W.1 under Ex.A-2. He stated that in 1996 when he had gone through the copy of document, which was sent to his advocate, he found that it was a forged one; that he did not take any steps to send the document for expert; that Ex.A-1 does not contain the signature of his father; that there are no similarities between the disputed signature of his father in Ex.A-1 and the signature of his father at page no.26 of Ex.B-17. He denied the suggestion that the land was not shown in the return since it was sold to P.W.1 and that if it is shown in return, it should have been declared that it is an excess land. 47. He denied the suggestion that the land was not shown in the return since it was sold to P.W.1 and that if it is shown in return, it should have been declared that it is an excess land. 47. In his further cross-examination he deposed that he do not know when his father constructed the house; that since 1960 his father was an Income Tax Assessee; that he do not know whether he maintained the accounts accurately; that he do not know whether the expenditure incurred for the construction of the house was shown in the income tax returns filed by his father and; that he never verified the income tax returns of his father. He denied that that he never discussed with him (D.W.1's father) about the property affairs including purchasing and selling the properties; that most of the times he (father) take independent decision in dealing with the property, when he was a student; that since 1967, he used to discuss with him while he was dealing with properties; that he stated in O.S.No.7/1994 on the file of Prl. Sr. Civil Judge, Guntur to the effect that Vijayalakshmi talkies was constructed in 1970 or 1971; that he also stated that probably Sreeramamurty and his father borrowed for construction of Vijayalakshmi talkies, and that he also stated that he did not know how much they borrowed; that he do not know whether he borrowed the amount or not. Sr. Civil Judge, Guntur to the effect that Vijayalakshmi talkies was constructed in 1970 or 1971; that he also stated that probably Sreeramamurty and his father borrowed for construction of Vijayalakshmi talkies, and that he also stated that he did not know how much they borrowed; that he do not know whether he borrowed the amount or not. He denied the suggestion that he(Madusudhana Rao) sold the plaint schedule property to meet the expenses of the construction of the cinema hall; that he do not know whether his father verified the panchayat records to ascertain in whose name the tax was paid; that he never enquired in whose name the house tax was paid; that he did not make any application so far as the properties of his father at Guntur for mutation of records; that Sreeramamurthy looked after this property affairs; that he did not take any interest; that in the year 1965 also P.W.1 herein used to take meals in his house for some time along with them; that his father treated P.W.1 as his brother; that he do not know whether his father asked P.W.1 to vacate the plaint schedule property; that he do not know V. subbarao who obtained Ex.B-16; that he do not know who obtained the E.C; that he do not know whether it was obtained by his father-in-law; that as Sreeramamurthy looked after the properties, he did not know whether the house tax was paid in his name or not; that he did not mention this property in the C.P.A. given to Sreeramamurthy specifically. He volunteered stating that it was executed in respect of all properties. He volunteered stating that it was executed in respect of all properties. He deposed that he never verified at any time even after the death of his father in whose name the house tax was being paid; that he has no dispute with Venkataratnam (P.W.1); that he used to stay in India only 10 to 15 days per year; that he do not know whether the suit was filed for specific performance of the agreement; that he received the notice under the original of Ex.A-6; that his power of attorney issued a reply; that it is not specifically mentioned in C.P.A. for issuing a notice; that it is a G.P.A. for all the purposes; that he received the summons while he was staying in America and; that he did not specifically mention in G.P.A. to the effect that he can file the written statement etc. He denied that the suit filed by him is barred by limitation. He stated that he do not know the suit number filed by his sister against him for partition of point family property in Guntur court; that after consulting his advocate, if necessary, he can file the plaint of that suit; that EX.B-6 revels that it was sent to his sister Sandhy also; that he do not know Sandhya is also a party to the suit; that he do not know whether she contested this suit or not; that he cannot say the reason for non-contesting the suit by his sister is that she knows this property does not belong to their family; that he do not know whether his sister questioned the will filed by him; that he do not know that due to close relationship with his father, P.W.1 did not insist his father for execution of the regular registered deed. 48. In his cross-examination, he further deposed that he does not know whether his father-in-law knows or not about the property owned by his father; that he do not know whether he is a party in O.S.No.516/1988 on the file of the Addl. Subordinate Court, Guntur; that he do not know who were the parties in that suit; that he do not remember the contents in Ex.B-12; that he did not file any suit against Gram Panchayat, Enikipadu; that he do not know whether the remaining 13 cents under original of Ex. Subordinate Court, Guntur; that he do not know who were the parties in that suit; that he do not remember the contents in Ex.B-12; that he did not file any suit against Gram Panchayat, Enikipadu; that he do not know whether the remaining 13 cents under original of Ex. B-1 is in his possession or not and; that he do not know whether the panchayat gave any reply or not (Ex.B-12). He further denied the suggestion that there is a glaring change between the signature of his father at page nos.26 and 27 of EX.B-17. 49. He was further cross-examined with regard to execution of G.P.A. 50. D.W.2 is the G.P.A. holder of the defendant D.W.1 and he is his father-in-law. In his chief affidavit he deposed as per the plaint averments in O.S.No.303 of 1997. His further chief affidavit is to the effect that when their demands on the plaintiff to vacate and hand over the suit property did not yield result, they decided to proceed against him legally. 51. In the cross-examination while denying the suggestion that he do not know about the properties and business affairs of Madhusudhana rao, he further deposed that the said Madhusudhana Rao used to write letter to him, so he knew his signature; that the said letters are not available with him; that he also used to send the patients to him with letters; lastly about 30 years back, when he wrote letter to him, he saw his signature; prior to 1976, he has no relationship with Madhusudhana Rao; he volunteered that he was his friend since 1976; that he is his friend in 1966 and; that he do not know whether Sreeram Murthy and Madhusudhana Rao, were living as brothers. In his further cross-examination he deposed about the cancellation of power of attorney by his son-in-law in favour of Sreerama Murthy and execution of C.P.A. in his favour. He further deposed that after receipt of copy of Ex.A-1, after consulting with his advocate, he confirmed that it is a forged one; after seeing the signature itself, he came to a conclusion that it is a forged one; that he do not remember whether he issued any rejoinder or not and; that he do not remember whether in the first time, he stated in his pleadings only that this agreement is a forged one. He further deposed that he do not know whether P.W.1 purchased the plaint schedule property under Ex.A-1; that he do not know whether P.W.1 has been paying the house tax in his name. He was further also cross-examined at length and the said deposition may not be relevant. 52. In the light of the above evidence, I will consider the case of the respective parties. The 1st issue is whether the plaintiff proved EX.A -1? 53. The case of the plaintiff is that he purchased the plaint schedule property from Ramavarapu Madhusudhana Rao, who is none other than the father of the defendant on 22.10.1971 under an agreement of sale, which is marked as Ex.A-1, for a valuable consideration of Rs.16,200/- and on the said date, after receiving the sale consideration, he was put in possession. As per the recitals in Ex.A-1 it could be seen that the plaintiff was in possession since 1957 and the said Madhusudhana Rao settled at Guntur and that when he intended to sell the suit schedule property, the plaintiff requested him to sell the same and accordingly the property was sold to him and executed EX.A-l agreement of sale and in pursuance of the same, the property was officially delivered i.e., from that date the vendor of the property divested all his rights and the plaintiff started residing from that date, as owner. The case of the defendant is also to the effect that the plaintiff was in possession of the plaint schedule property even prior from 1971. Hence the possession of the plaintiff even prior to 1971 was admitted by the defendant. 54. From a perusal of the evidence of P.W.1, which is extracted above, it is clear that he categorically deposed that R. Madusudhana Rao, who is the father of the defendant executed Ex.A-1 after receiving the sale consideration. He further deposed that he was put in possession in the year 1957 and that after his purchase of the suit schedule property under Ex.A-1, he removed the old tiled house and tobacco barn and constructed a terraced building after obtaining approval of the plan from the Grampanchayat of Enikepadu village and that he has been paying land revenue and house taxes to the Gram Panchayt in his name and that the defendants were never in possession of the suit schedule property since 1971. In the cross-examination also he deposed that he entered into the suit house in the year 1957 on the invitation of late Madusudhana Rao and out of love and affection, he asked him to stay in this house and that as he has been paying the house tax. since 1957 and has been paying the land revenue for the remaining site and that, as he was residing in that house and that a demand notice was issued, he paid the house tax and land revenue and that he showed the demand notices to the Madhusudhan Rao and on his direction, he paid the tax and land revenue to the Gram Panchayat. Though he was cross-examined at length, there is no specific suggestion to him that Madusudhana Rao did not execute Ex.A-1 and on the other hand, he had specifically stated that after execution of Ex.A-1, he has constructed the house by obtaining approval of plan in his name and also has been paying house tax and land revenue to the Gram Panchayat in his name and he categorically denied the suggestions that he constructed the house as an agent to Madusudhana Rao with the amounts provided by him and he also denied the suggestion that he created Ex.A-1 after defendant filed the suit for eviction, in order to grab his property. He stated that if he had such an intention, he would have obtained a regular sale deed from his brother, who was the G.P A. of Sampath Kumar. 55. It is to be noticed that the statements in cross-examination, highlighted by the counsel for the defendant, that he did not pay fees to the panchayat and that panchayat never enquired into the title, may not be relevant, since he specifically denied the suggestion that he misrepresented and managed the Panchayat people to get the approval. The approval of the plans and the receipts of the house tax and land revenue and the issuance of the demand notices are done in regular course of administration and if the defendant wanted to prove that these official documents are spurious, he ought to have examined the panchayat officials along with the record. But he did not do so and they simply put suggestions, which have been specifically denied and the presumption is always in favour of the official documents issued in the course of regular administration. But he did not do so and they simply put suggestions, which have been specifically denied and the presumption is always in favour of the official documents issued in the course of regular administration. A Division Bench of this court in Md. Ibrahim v. Secretary to Govt of India (10 supra), considering Section 81 of the Evidence Act, 1872 held that for the official documents which are prepared in the course of official business, due presumption exists that the entries therein have been made in due performance of official duties and they are to receive due weight-age in evidence. The relevant portion is extracted as under for ready reference: "12. . . That apart, the pahanies are prepared in the usual course of official business of preparation of Records of Rights and hence there is a due presumption that the entries made therein have been made in due performance of official duties. They are hence to receive weight-age in evidence particularly when there is no other rebutting evidence to the contrary.. . ." 56. Further, the defendant in his chief examination got marked Ex.B-12, which is the notice issued to the Executive Officer of Gram Panchayat, Enikepaud about issuing of alleged wrong certificate in favour of the plaintiff without conducting any enquiry. To the said notice, the plaintiff could not obtain any reply and there is no material on record, that he pursued the matter. In his cross-examination, he deposed that he does not know the contents in Ex.B-12 and that he did not file any suit against Gram Panchayat Enikipadu. 57. The evidence of P.Ws.2 and 3 is specifically to the effect that the plaintiff purchased the suit schedule property from one Ramavarapu Madhusudhana Rao under an agreement of sale dated 22.10.1971 for a valuable consideration of Rs.16,200jand the agreement of was executed near Sub Registrar's Office, Gandhinagar Vijayawada. The transaction under the aforesaid agreement of sale which was marked as Ex.A-1, payment of consideration and execution of the document were taken place before them and they attested the agreement of sale after signing of the agreement by Ramavarapu Madusudhana Rao and that subsequently the plaintiff in the suit got constructed the building in the plaint schedule property in the year 1973 while removing the old tiled house and tobacco baron therein and since then the plaintiff has been residing therein. In the cross-examination, their evidence is consistent. In the cross-examination, their evidence is consistent. In the cross-examination, they deposed that except at the time of execution of Ex.A-1, they never saw the said Madhusudhana Rao and that P.W.1 told him that the person who executed in Ex.A-1 is Madhusudhana Rao and P.W.3 also had no acquaintance with the executed of Ex.A-1. 58. Based on these statements of P.Ws.2 and 3 in the cross-examination, the counsel for the defendant sought to contend that since P.Ws.2 and 3 had no acquaintance with Madusudhana Rao, their attestation is of no use. This contention cannot be countenanced in view of definition of 'attested' under Section 3, Interpretation Clause of Transfer of Property Act. The said section defines 'attested' and the same is extracted as under: "attested", in relation to an instrument, means and shall be deemed always to have meant attested by two or more witnessed each of whom has seen the executed sign or affix his mark to the instrument, or has seen some other person sign the instrument in the presence and by the direction of the executant, or has received from the executant a personal acknowledgement of his signature or mark, or of the signature of such other person, and each of whom has signed the instrument in the presence of the executant; but it shall not be necessary that more than one of such witnesses shall have been present at the same time, and no particular form of attestation shall be necessary; 59. From the above definition attestation means signature of two or more persons on a document, in proof of execution by executant for which one of the attestors has witnessed the execution or attested the document on the acknowledgment of the executant. In the evidence of P.Ws.2 and 3 they categorically deposed that the transaction under the aforesaid agreement of sale, which was marked as Ex.A-1, payment of consideration and execution of the document were taken place before them and they attested the agreement of sale after signing of the agreement by Ramavarapu Madusudhana Rao. 60. In view of the above, it cannot be said the evidence of P.Ws.2 and 3 cannot be believed and on the other hand, their evidence corroborated the evidence of P. W.1 61. The case of the plaintiff is that Madushudhana Rao executed EX.A-1 after receipt of the sale consideration. 60. In view of the above, it cannot be said the evidence of P.Ws.2 and 3 cannot be believed and on the other hand, their evidence corroborated the evidence of P. W.1 61. The case of the plaintiff is that Madushudhana Rao executed EX.A-1 after receipt of the sale consideration. The contesting defendant (D.W.1) disputed the signature of Madusudhana Rao in Ex.A-1. He produced Ex.B-17, which is the registered lease deed dated 25.9.1963, to show the original signature of Madusudhana Rao. In his deposition in the cross-examination, he categorically deposed that EX.B-17 contains the signature of his father. At the first instance he deposed that there is subtle difference between the signature of his father at page Nos.26 and 27 in Ex.B-17. At the later part of his deposition in the cross-examination, he denied the suggestion that there is a glaring change between the signature of his father at page Nos.26 and 27 of Ex.B-17. Therefore, at one breath he deposed that there is subtle difference at page Nos.26 and 27 and at another breath, he deposed that there is no glaring change between the signatures of his father at page Nos.26 and 27. But his categorical admission is Ex.B-17 contains the signature of his father. There cannot be any dispute that under Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, the court is empowered to compare the disputed signature with that of admitted one. Accordingly the court below undertook the exercise of comparing the disputed signature with that of the admitted signature. On perusal of EX.B-17 the trial court observed that when the signatures of Ex.B-17 are perused carefully, they reveal that the signature of the said R. Madhusudhana Rao in all pages is one and the same, except at page No.26. It court below observed that under all the circumstances, it can be said that the person signed from pages 1 to 15 and from pages 27 to 25 is one and the same person. It court below observed that under all the circumstances, it can be said that the person signed from pages 1 to 15 and from pages 27 to 25 is one and the same person. It further observed that this document reveals that the entire document was signed on one and the same date and that if all the signatures of Ex:B-17 are perused it clears a doubt whether really the person who signed in pages 1 to 25 and in pages 27 to 35 also signed at page 26 or not and that in view of these circumstances, it can be said that it is doubtful whether really the said R. Madhusudhana Rao signed at page 26 of EX.B-17. The court below further observed that there are some similarities in the disputed signature in Ex.A-1 and the signature at page No.26 of Ex.B-17. It further observed that even though there are some similarities in between the disputed signature and the signature at page 26, it could not be said that the disputed signature is a genuine one. 62. From the above observations and the conclusion of the court below based on Ex.B-17, it could be seen that it has categorically held that there are similarities between the disputed signature in Ex.A-1 and the admitted signature at page No.26 of the lease deed under EX.B-17. But it eventually held that since the disputed signature in Ex.A-1is not totally tallying with other 34 signatures, it held that the signature on Ex.A-1 is not genuine. The strange finding of' the court below cannot be appreciated. 63. It is to be noticed that Ex.B-17 is produced by the defendant to show the admitted signature of his father Madusudhana Rao. As per the finding of the court below, the signature at page No.26 is similar to the signature in Ex.A-1. It is not the case of the defendant that page No.26 of Ex.B-17 was not signed by his father and moreover his categorically admission is that all pages in Ex.B-17 contains the signature of his father. As per the finding of the court below, the signature at page No.26 is similar to the signature in Ex.A-1. It is not the case of the defendant that page No.26 of Ex.B-17 was not signed by his father and moreover his categorically admission is that all pages in Ex.B-17 contains the signature of his father. When the case of the defendant is that all pages in Ex.B-17 contains the signature of his father, the finding of the court below that if all the signatures of EX.B-17 are perused, it created a doubt whether really the person who signed in pages 1 to 25 and 27 to 35 also signed at page No.26 or is a perverse finding, contrary to the admitted case of the defendant. 64. Moreover, it is to be noticed that the admitted signature in EX.B-17 is of the year 1963 and the present disputed signature is one of the year 1971. It is an undisputed fact that because of long gaps, definitely there will be change in the signature of any individual and even the handwriting expert to arrive at a conclusion, will ask for at least 10 to 15 signatures. In the cross-examination D.W.1 deposed that he does not know that his father signed in different styles and that he does not know that there will be variation in the style of signing due to lapse of time and that he can identify the signature of his father and that all pages in Ex.B-17 contain the signature of his father. From this evidence in the cross-examination, it is to be specifically noticed that defendant as D.W.1 did not deny that his father signs in different styles and that there will be variation in the style of signature due to lapse of time. 65. With regard to signature of Madusudhana Rao, the case of the plaintiff is that Madusudhana Rao signed on EX.A-1 and P.Ws.2 and 3 also supported the case of the plaintiff who was examined as P.W.1. Though P.Ws.2 and 3 were cross-examined, their version is consistent with regard to signature of Madusudhana Rao. The court below also on comparison found that the signature on Ex.A-1 is similar to one of the signatures at page no.26 in Ex.B-17, which is the document produced by the defendant himself and he also deposed that all the pages in Ex.B-17 contains the signature of his father. The court below also on comparison found that the signature on Ex.A-1 is similar to one of the signatures at page no.26 in Ex.B-17, which is the document produced by the defendant himself and he also deposed that all the pages in Ex.B-17 contains the signature of his father. The court below lost sight of this important piece of admission of the defendant as D.W.1. 66. The case of the defendant is that the signature of EX.A-1 is forged. The plaintiff as P.W.1 has categorically denied the suggestion that he forged EX.A-1. The plea of forgery has been taken by the defendant. To the reply notice got issued on behalf of the defendant on 28.11.1996, the plaintiff sent photo copy of the agreement dated 22.10.1971 along with the rejoinder dated 17.12.1996. Denying the agreement of sale, no reply was given by the defendant. In the evidence of D.W.1 also, he deposed that they did not give any rejoinder after receipt of the said copy of the agreement. In the cross-examination D.W.1 further deposed that in 1996 when he had gone through the copy of the document, which was sent to his advocate, he found that it was a forged one and; that he did not take any steps to send the document for expert. D.W.2 is the G.P.A. holder of D.W.1. In his cross-examination he deposed that Madusudhana Rao used to write letters to him and so he knew his signature; that the said letters are not available with him; that last about 30 years back, when he wrote letter to me, he saw his signature. So as per his admission he had seen the signature of Madusudhana Rao about thirty years back. In his further deposition in the cross-examination he deposed that after receipt of copy of Ex.A-1, after consulting his advocate, he confirmed that it is a forged one; that after seeing the signature itself, he came to a conclusion that it is a forged one; that he do not remember whether he issued any rejoinder or not and; that he do not remember whether in the first time, he stated in his pleadings that this agreement is a forged one. He further deposed that he do not know whether P.W.1 purchased the plaint schedule property under Ex.A-1; that he do not know whether P.W.1 has been paying the house tax in his name. He further deposed that he do not know whether P.W.1 purchased the plaint schedule property under Ex.A-1; that he do not know whether P.W.1 has been paying the house tax in his name. Therefore, from the deposition of D.W.2 it is clear that he had seen the signature of Madusudhana Rao about thirty yeans back and that immediately after seeing the signature on the copy of Ex.A-1 itself, he came to the conclusion that it was forged. It is not his case that after consulting with D.W.1 they came to the conclusion that it was forged. He says that he do not remember whether they issued any rejoinder on receipt of Ex.A-1. Therefore, it is clear that he could not remember the issuance of any rejoinder to Ex.A-1, which was received in the year 1996, but he remembers the signature of Madusudhana Rao, which he had seen about thirty years back. He also do not know whether P.W.1 had purchased the plaint schedule property under EX.A-l. It is not the case of the defendant that they sent the document to any expert for opinion. On seeing the signature in the copy of Ex.A-1, they came to the conclusion that it is forged. But as discussed above, one of the signatures in EX.B-17 at page no.26 is similar to the signature on EX.A-l and the court below also recorded a finding to this effect. 67. It is further to be noticed that the plaintiff has discharged his burden of proving the signature on Ex.A-1, since he got examined himself as P.W.1 and his evidence is supported by the other witnesses i.e., P.Ws.2 and 3, who witnessed Madusudhana Rao executing Ex.A-1 and one of the signatures in Ex.B-17 which is the lease produced by the defendant from his custody, is similar to the disputed signature on Ex.A-1. Even the defendant who was examined as D.W.1 categorically admitted that all pages in Ex.B-17 contains the signature of his father. Therefore, from this material evidence, it can safely be concluded that the plaintiff proved the signature on Ex.A-1. But the defendants have taken the plea of forgery. When the defendants have taken the plea of forgery, they ought to taken steps to send the document to an expert for opinion. They did not do so. Therefore, from this material evidence, it can safely be concluded that the plaintiff proved the signature on Ex.A-1. But the defendants have taken the plea of forgery. When the defendants have taken the plea of forgery, they ought to taken steps to send the document to an expert for opinion. They did not do so. Therefore when the plaintiff could discharge the burden on him, the defendant having taken the plea of forgery, should discharge the burden, if they want to succeed. They failed to discharge the burden. 68. In the decision reported in Natabar v. Batakrushna (16) 1999 (II) OLR-319, a learned single Judge of High Court of Orissa, while considering a second appeal filed by the original plaintiff in the suit for declaration of title, recovery of possession and injunction, wherein the plaintiff relied on an unregistered permanent lease deed dated 17.1.1937. The defendant disputed the said document and contended that the said document is forged. In these circumstances, it was held that the question whether the document is fabricated or forged, the burden is on the person who alleges the same as such. The relevant portion in the judgment is extracted as under: "10. The lower court held that the said lease deed in favour of the plaintiff was a genuine one since the defendant who challenged the same to be a fabricated one should have sent it for opinion of the expert. Such a finding cannot be said to be incorrect since burden of proving a document as fabricated or forged is on the person who alleges this fact. The lower appellate court, so far as Ext.2 is concerned, was wrong in holding that since the plaintiff had brought the suit the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to establish his case. By observing this the lower appellate court forgot that the burden of proving that a particular document was a forged one was on the person who alleges such forgery." 69. By observing this the lower appellate court forgot that the burden of proving that a particular document was a forged one was on the person who alleges such forgery." 69. Therefore, taking the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3 and admission of the defendant as D.W.1 that all the pages in Ex.B-17 contains the signature of his father and that the signature in Ex.B-17 at page No.26 is tallying with the disputed signature on Ex.A-1 and the court below also recorded a finding to this effect, I am of the view that the execution of Ex.A-1 is proved by the plaintiff and though the defendant had taken the plea of forgery, he failed to prove the same. 70. The next vehement contention of the counsel for the defendant is that there is any amount of discrepancy with the regard to the contents of Ex.A-1 and the reply notice given by the plaintiff under Ex.A-3. He stated that as per Ex.A-1 the said Madusudhana Rao received the sale consideration of Rs.16,200/- at the time of execution of the said agreement of sale and delivered possession on the said date. Whereas under Ex.A-3, which is the reply notice got issued by the plaintiff, it is stated that the brother of the plaintiff and Madushudhana Rao shifted their residence from Vijayawada to Guntur in or about 1957 and while shifting from Vijayawada, the said Madhusudhana Rao had sold the property of Ac.0-56 cents along with superstructures therein to his client and delivered possession of the same to him and in pursuance of the said oral agreement of sale, the plaintiff paid the entire sale consideration to the said Madusudhana Rao and has been continuing in possession and enjoyment of the said property in his own right openly and without any obstruction by anybody. It is further contended that in Ex.A-3 it is further stated that the said Madhusudhana Rao had executed an agreement of sale on 22.10.1971 in favour of the plaintiff, confirming the earlier oral agreement of sale, payment of the entire sale consideration and also delivery of property by him. It is further contended that in Ex.A-3 it is further stated that the said Madhusudhana Rao had executed an agreement of sale on 22.10.1971 in favour of the plaintiff, confirming the earlier oral agreement of sale, payment of the entire sale consideration and also delivery of property by him. Therefore, the contention of the learned senior counsel is that as per Ex.A-3 the plaintiff was put in possession in pursuance of the oral sale in the year 1957 and the entire sale consideration was also paid during the year 1957 and the execution of Ex.A-1 is only an acknowledgement of said sale, whereas in Ex.A-1 it is stated that on 22.10.1971 after receipt of Rs.16,200/- the said Madusudhana Rao has executed an agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the plant schedule property and possession also delivered to him on the same day. He stated there is no reference of oral sale made in 1957 in Ex.A-1 and as per Ex.A-1 possession was delivered in the year 1971 and whereas under Ex.A-3, the possession was delivered in 1957. Therefore, the evidence of r.Ws.1 to 3 that consideration was paid on 22.10.1971 and possession was delivered on the said date and the execution of Ex.A-1, is utter falsehood. 71. From a perusal of the contents of Ex.A-1 it could seen that it is stated that with his own earnings, Madusudhana Rao got the suit schedule property through document bearing no.2149/54 dated 10.9.1954 of Sub-Registrar, Vijayawada vide Book no.1, Volume no.799, page nos.127 to 129 from Mandava Bhooshaiah, s/o Narasiah r/o Kounapuram village, Narsampet tq. Warangal District of Nizam area and since then he is in possession and occupation of the same without any disturbance. Since, he is a permanent resident of Guntur and the schedule property is very far from his residence and the said property is of no use for him and in the tiled house existing therein, the plaintiff is residing since the year 1957 and as he has requested him to sell the schedule property along with the tiled house, he agreed to sell the same for a total sale consideration of Rs.16,200/- (Rupees sixteen thousand two hundred only) and the total sale consideration of Rs.16,200/- (Rupees sixteen thousand two hundred only) was paid to him and he received the same at the time of execution of this document. From then onwards i.e., from the date of execution of Ex.A-1, he is leaving all his easement rights over the property in favour of the vendee (plaintiff) and from then onwards he conferred such rights in favour of the plaintiff and conveyed the property to the plaintiff. And that the plaintiff is at liberty to enjoy the same according to his will and wish: with his heirs and himself and that his heirs will not object his (plaintiff's) possession and ownership and they will not disturb his possession and if any dispute arises, he will clear off all the disputes and he will make the sale in force.; that from then onwards, the plaintiff has to pay all the taxes etc., against the schedule property; that if the plaintiff wishes to get the property registered at any time on his request, it is his responsibility to get the original registered sale deed in his favour. It is further stated that as the said Madusudhana Rao lost the original sale deed, he is giving the photo copy of the same and that if the same was found in future, he will handover the same to him, as and when it was traced. 72. From a perusal of Ex.A-1 it is clear that the plaintiff is in possession of the property right from the year 1957 and he requested the said Madusudhana Rao to sell the property and accordingly he agreed to sell and after receipt of the sale consideration of Rs.16,200/- on the date of execution of EX.A-1 i.e., on 22.10.1971, he conveyed all his easement rights over the property in favour of the plaintiff and agreed to execute the sale deed in future at any time at the request of the plaintiff. It is to be noticed that the possession of the plaintiff over the suit schedule property even prior to 1971 was admitted by the defendant and the plaintiff also deposed that he is in possession of the plaint schedule property since 1957 and the recitals in Ex.A-1 are also to that effect. A careful perusal of Ex.A-1 clearly shows that since the possession of the plaint schedule property is with the plaintiff since 1957 on execution of Ex.A-1, the said Madusudhana Rao, conveyed all his rights in favour of the plaintiff. A careful perusal of Ex.A-1 clearly shows that since the possession of the plaint schedule property is with the plaintiff since 1957 on execution of Ex.A-1, the said Madusudhana Rao, conveyed all his rights in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore, it is clear that there is no discrepancy with regard to the delivery of possession stated in Ex.A-3 and in Ex.A-1. Even as per the recitals in Ex.A-1, the plaintiff had requested the defendant to sell the suit schedule property as he is residing since 1957. The only discrepancy between Ex.A-1 and A-3 is that there is no mention of any oral sale and that consideration was received in the year 1957. The plaintiff as P.W.1 denied that there is any oral sale in the year 1957. This discrepancy, appearing in Ex.A-1 with regard to payment of sale consideration and existence of oral sale, which has been denied by the plaintiff as P.W.1, in my considered view, need not be given due weight-age, for the reasons to be discussed infra. 73. The execution of EX.A-1 on 22.10.1971 is fortified by the reason that the agreement of sale contemplates that the plaintiff shall pay all taxes etc., against the schedule property. The plaintiff has been paying all the house taxes and land revenue to the Gram Pancayat and the demand notices were also issued in his name and moreover after obtaining the sanctioned plan from the Gram Panchayat, he removed the old tiled house and tobacco baron, and constructed the house. The obtaining of plan and payment of taxes and land revenue, were during the life time of Madusudhana Rao, who died on 3.6.1975. The evidence, both oral and documentary, in all these aspects will be dealt with in detail in the further course of the judgment. 74. Another factor to be conspicuously noticed is that Ex.A-3 legal notice was issued based on Ex.A-1. Can the contents in Ex.A-3, which are based on Ex.A-1, be contrary to the contents in Ex.A-1 itself, is a debatable question. The plaintiff, as already noted above, proved the execution of Ex.A-1 by Madusudhana Rao in his favour by examining himself as P.W.1 and his evidence was corroborated by P.Ws.2 and 3 who are the attesting witnesses. Can the contents in Ex.A-3, which are based on Ex.A-1, be contrary to the contents in Ex.A-1 itself, is a debatable question. The plaintiff, as already noted above, proved the execution of Ex.A-1 by Madusudhana Rao in his favour by examining himself as P.W.1 and his evidence was corroborated by P.Ws.2 and 3 who are the attesting witnesses. In order to compare the disputed signature on Ex.A-1, the defendant has produced Ex.B-17, which is the copy of the registered lease deed said to have been executed by Madusudhana Rao. The court below also recorded a finding that the signature at page no.26 of Ex.B-17 is similar to the one in Ex.A-1. The categorical admission of the defendant as D.W.1 is that all the pages in Ex.B-17 contain the signature of his father. Therefore, in the light of proving Ex.A-1, whether the contents in Ex.A-3 legal notice, which is issued by the plaintiff himself based on the very same Ex.A-1, cannot be considered to hold that Ex.A-1 is not proved, 75. At this juncture it is necessary to note Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act which contemplates exclusion of oral evidence. The said section states "When the terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document have been proved according to the last sanction, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest, for purpose of contradicting, varying, addition to, or subtracting from, its terms". Therefore, in view of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence, the defendant cannot take advantage of the recitals in Ex.A-3 reply. 76. The court failed to appreciate the above evidence and also failed to consider the recitals in Ex.A-1 and its real purport and also the admission of D. W.1 in his cross-examination that all pages in Ex.B-17 contains the signature of his father and that the signature of his father is tallying with Ex.A-1. 76. The court failed to appreciate the above evidence and also failed to consider the recitals in Ex.A-1 and its real purport and also the admission of D. W.1 in his cross-examination that all pages in Ex.B-17 contains the signature of his father and that the signature of his father is tallying with Ex.A-1. As already noted above, as per the recitals in Ex.A-1 the plaintiff was in possession even since 1957 and the oral evidence of P.W.1 is also to the effect that he was in possession since 1957 and the defendant also admitted the possession of the plaintiff even prior to 1971 and in Ex.A-1 it is clearly stated that since the date of execution of Ex.A-1 the father of the defendant is conveying all his rights in favour of the plaintiff and hence it is clear that though the plaintiff was in possession since 1957, from the date of execution of Ex.A-1, the rights of the said Madusudhana Rao, stood divested and the plaintiff started residing as owner and not in derivation of the title from Madusudhana Rao. 77. In view of the above circumstances, the finding of the court on issue Nos.1 in O.S.No.479 of 2000 and O.S.No.303 of 1997 and issue No.3 in O.S.No.479 of 2000 is set aside and they are answered in favour of the plaintiff holding that Ex.A-1 is true, valid and binding on the defendant and that the plaintiff was put in possession of the properly as owner since the said Madusudhana rao, by divesting his rights, conveyed all his rights in favour of the plaintiff from the date of execution of Ex.A-1. Accordingly the issue No.1 in the first appeals is answered in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendant. 78. The other circumstance to be considered is that the case of the plaintiff is that he constructed the house on his own and not as an agent of late Madusudhana Rao and similarly he also paid land revenue and house tax in his name as owner. 79. 78. The other circumstance to be considered is that the case of the plaintiff is that he constructed the house on his own and not as an agent of late Madusudhana Rao and similarly he also paid land revenue and house tax in his name as owner. 79. The contention of the counsel for the defendant is that as per the admission of the plaintiff himself he was inducted into the possession of the plaint schedule property by Madusudhana Rao out of love and affection and further the plaintiff also categorically deposed that he showed the demand notices to the Madusudhana Rao and on his direction only, he paid the tax and land revenue. He further deposed that even as per Section 125-A of old Gram Panchayat Act, even the occupier has to pay tax and further as per admission of the plaintiff himself, he did not pay the fee to the Gram Panchayt for sanction of house plan and the Gram Panchayat also did not enquire his title. He further contended that P.W.1 has no means to either construct the house or to pay the taxes, since as per his own deposition, he has no personal business and that he had no bank account. In these circumstances, he contended that payment of tax and sanction of plan in the name of the plaintiff are of no avail and they have to be construed as payment and construction made on behalf of Madusudhana Rao. 80. As already stated and recorded above, the plaintiff has proved execution of Ex.A-1 and there is also no dispute that even prior to the execution of Ex.A-1 he is in possession of the suit schedule property. D.W.1 deposed that his paternal grand parents live in the disputed property for some time and he does not know for how many years they resided in this house and in which calendar year they resided in this house and; that P.W.1 and his parents resided in the plaint schedule property, but he does not know from which calendar year they started residing in the house. He denied the suggestion that P.W.1 constructed the house in the disputed property in the year 1973 with his own amounts. He stated that the amount was provided by his father and P.W.1 construed the said house. He denied the suggestion that P.W.1 constructed the house in the disputed property in the year 1973 with his own amounts. He stated that the amount was provided by his father and P.W.1 construed the said house. He further deposed that he did not know whether the plan was approved in the name of P.W.1 that with the amount provided by his father P.W.1 paid the taxes and; that he does not know whether in whose name the receipts were issued. He further deposed that there is no documentary evidence to show that his father provided the amount to P.W.1 and there is no house tax receipts to show that the tax was paid in the name of his father. He also deposed that he does not know the year when his father constructed the house; that since 1960 his father was an income tax assesses; that he do not know whether he maintained the accounts accurately; that he does not know whether the expenditure incurred for the construction of this house was shown in the income tax returns of his father. These statements are clear to the effect that he does not know anything about the construction of the house in the plaint schedule property and he only made an averment that his father provided the amount without any documentary evidence in support of his case. 81. Therefore, from the evidence it could be seen that though the defendant stated that the plaintiff constructed the house and paid the taxes with the amounts provided by his father, there is no documentary evidence to show that his father provided the amount to P.W.1. In the absence of any documentary evidence to show that the father 'of the defendant provided the amount, the contention of the defendant that his father provided the amount, cannot be accepted. The specific case of the plaintiff is that during the year 1973, even during the life time of the said Madhusudhana Rao, he got the plans approved in his favour by Gram Panchayat, Enikepadu and accordingly constructed a terraced building in the scheduled property by investing huge amount of Rs.36,000/- and has been living therein by paying necessary taxes to the Gram Panchayat without obstruction from any body. In his deposition as P.W.1 he also stated that in 1973 he dismantled the old house and constructed a new building after obtaining the approval plan from Enikepaud Gram Panchayat village; and that he has been paying the taxes for the suit building; that he is also paying land revenue to the revenue officials for the plaint schedule property. He got marked the plan as Ex.A-10 and the subsequent approval as Ex.A-11. He also got marked Exs.A-12 to A-36 which are the house tax receipts. He also got marked the special notice and the demand notices issued to him for payment of taxes under Exs.A-37 and A-38. He got marked Exs.A-41 to A-51, which are the payment receipts for land revenue to the suit schedule property since 1974. He also filed certificate issued by the Gram Panchayat Enikipaud , which is marked as Ex.A-40. He further deposed that he was maintaining accounts at the time of construction of the building in the plaint schedule property and he got marked Ex.A-52 and A-53, which are the account books. He further deposed that the father of the 1st defendant or the 1st defendant never questioned him with regard to construction of the building in the suit site and that the defendants were never in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property at any time since 1971. 82. The above statement of P.W.1 is clear that even during the life time of Madusudhana Rao, he constructed the house by getting the plans approved and by paying the taxes to the Gram Panchayat and he also got filed the account books under Exs.A-52 and A-53 maintained by him with regard to amount spent towards construction. The court below disbelieved Exs.A-52 and A-53 on the ground that bills for construction are not produced and that the account books are not maintained in the regular course of business. As already noted above, though the defendants pleaded that their father provided money for the construction of the house, no documentary evidence is produced and moreover the plaintiff got approved the plan on his name and also has been paying taxes to the Gram Panchayat in his name. As already noted above, though the defendants pleaded that their father provided money for the construction of the house, no documentary evidence is produced and moreover the plaintiff got approved the plan on his name and also has been paying taxes to the Gram Panchayat in his name. In these circumstances, and in the absence any positive evidence on behalf of the defendant, considering the approved plan under and other documents under which the plaintiff paid taxes, the account books maintained by the plaintiff under Exs.A-52 and A-53, can be taken to corroborate his version of construction made by him on his own and not as agent of late Madusudhana Rao. 83. The other contention of the defendant is that the plaintiff has no means to make construction or to pay taxes. As already held above, though the defendant had taken the plea that his father provided the amount for construction, he failed to prove the said averment by producing any evidence. The specific case of the plaintiff is that in the year 1973 after demolishing the old tiled house and removing the tobacco baron, he constructed the terraced building. This version is supported by P.Ws.2 and 3. The plaintiff as P.W.1 deposed that he own Acs.7-00 of land up to 1981 in Prasadampadu village and however, he did not file any document to show that he own the property. D.W.1 in his cross-examination deposed that P.W.1 worked in the business of his father and Sreerama Murthty in the year 1965; that P.W.1 was doing cultivation in Prasadampadu village in an extent of few acres of land; that he do not know its extent and who was the owner of the landed property and; that he do not know whether P.W.1 was doing cultivating 10 acres of land situate at Mustabada; that he do not know that P.W.1 was earning Rs.7 to 8 thousands per year during those days. The evidence of P.W.1 is that he own Acs.7-00 of land in Prasadampadu village. D.W.1 in his cross-examination deposed that the plaintiff was doing cultivation in Prasadampavu village in an extent of few acres of land. He also did not specifically deny that the plaintiff was earning amount of Rs.7 to 8 thousand per year in those days. He also deposed that P.W.1 worked in the business of his father and Sreerama Murthy in the year 1965. He also did not specifically deny that the plaintiff was earning amount of Rs.7 to 8 thousand per year in those days. He also deposed that P.W.1 worked in the business of his father and Sreerama Murthy in the year 1965. In view of this evidence available on record, the contention of the defendant that the plaintiff has no means, cannot be accepted. 84. The other contention of the defendant is that even the occupier of the building, though he is not the owner, is obliged to pay the tax and further as per own admission of P.W.1, he showed the demand notices to the Madhusudhana Rao and on his direction, only he paid the tax and land revenue. In view of this admission of the plaintiff, it cannot be said that plaintiff paid the tax and land revenue on his own and not as agent of Madusudhana Rao. 85. It is to be noticed that there is no averment in the plaint in O.S.No.303/1997 or in the written statement filed in O.S.No.429/2000 that the occupier of the property has to pay the tax and there is also no evidence in this regard. The specific case of the plaintiff, which is established is that he paid the taxes and land revenue in his name as owner and not as agent to Madusudhana Rao and the demand notice and special notice were issued in his name. Therefore, the contention in this regard cannot be countenanced. 86. Further as already observed above, though the defendant contended that his father provided the amount for payment of tax, he could not produce any documentary evidence and the plaintiff constructed the house by getting the sanctioned plan in his name and he has been paying taxes and land revenue in his name. It is to be noticed that no suggestion was put to the plaintiff that he paid the tax and land revenue with the amount provided by him. Further no prudent man will direct the others to pay taxes in their names. Therefore, in these circumstances and the evidence available on record, no ad verse inference can be drawn on the admission of the plaintiff that he paid tax and land revenue on the directions of Madusudhana Rao. 87. Under issue No.1 this court found that plaintiff proved Ex.A-1 agreement of sale. Therefore, in these circumstances and the evidence available on record, no ad verse inference can be drawn on the admission of the plaintiff that he paid tax and land revenue on the directions of Madusudhana Rao. 87. Under issue No.1 this court found that plaintiff proved Ex.A-1 agreement of sale. Therefore, considering the ExA-10 and Exs.A-12 to A-36 which are the house tax receipts and demand notices issued to the plaintiff under Exs.A-37 to A-39 and Exs.A-41 and A-51 which are the land revenue receipts, I hold that the plaintiff paid house taxes and constructed in his own capacity as owner and not as agent to the father of the defendant. 88. The other circumstance to be noticed is that the plaintiff got marked Ex.A-55 which is the estate duty returns filed by the defendant and it does not reveal about the plaint schedule property. The defendant as D.W.1 admitted that Ex.A-55 contains his signature and he also admitted that it does not reveal the plaint schedule property herein. The plaintiff got examined the Inspector of Income Tax as P.W.4 to depose about Exs.A-54 and 55. He deposed that he received the summons for production of estate duty file of R. Madhusudhana Rao; that Ex.A-54 is the Estate Duty Assessment order and Section 58(3) of ED. Act dated 10.5.1979; that it is the assessment order; that Ex.A-55 is the declaration given by R.5ampath kumar, return of estate duty dated 15.11.1997. As per the own admission of the defendant, the declaration given under Ex.A-55 does not reveal the suit schedule property. 89. Further, the defendant No.1 in his deposition also got marked Ex.B-9 dated 16.12.1980. Sx.B-9 is the notice issued to the defendant under Section 6(2) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regula ion) Act, 1976 to file declaration in respect of the suit schedule property. The said notice to the extent relevant is extracted as under: It is reported that an extent of Ac.0-56 in R.S.No.189/7 of Enikepadu village has been purchased by Sri late Ramavarapu Madhusudhana Rao on 10.9.1954 and after his death, the land devolved on his son Sampath Kumar. As the land is a site with building and the extent exceeds the ceiling limit, the said Sampathkumar is liable to declare the land u/s 6(1) of the Act. As the land is a site with building and the extent exceeds the ceiling limit, the said Sampathkumar is liable to declare the land u/s 6(1) of the Act. In addition to the above land, if he holds an urban or unbanizable property in any of the Urban Agglomeration in India, to which this Act applies he has to show them in his declaration if they are either vacant lands and lands with buildings, within a week after receipt of this notice." 90. The defendant has not responded to the above notice and in his evidence he has categorically admitted that he did not submit any fresh declaration after receipt of Ex.B-9. The court below records a finding that, there are number of reasons for non-mention of the suit schedule property in the declarations. This reasoning of the court below cannot be said to be a sound reasoning, since the court is expected to record reasons for giving any finding. In the present 'finding, without any reason, the court below records that there are number of reasons. Hence, the finding of the court below cannot be appreciated. 91. One more factor to be noticed is that the contesting defendant did not get his name mutated in the revenue records. He deposed in his cross-examination that he did not make any application, so far as the properties of his father at Guntur for mutation of records. 92. The present suit schedule property is claimed by 15t defendant alone, but his sister Sandhya, the 2nd defendant in O.S. No.479/2000 is alive. Plaintiff got issued notice under Ex.B-6 to her, prior to the filing of the suit. She received the same and kept quiet without issuing any reply and she had received the suit summons and did not appear before the court and was set ex parte. According to the own admission of D.W.1, his sister filed a suit. Plaintiff got issued notice under Ex.B-6 to her, prior to the filing of the suit. She received the same and kept quiet without issuing any reply and she had received the suit summons and did not appear before the court and was set ex parte. According to the own admission of D.W.1, his sister filed a suit. In his cross-examination he deposed that his sister filed a suit for partition of the properties; that he does not know whether the present plaint schedule property was not shown by her in the suit; that he does not remember the suit number filed by his sister against him for partition of joint family properties in Guntur Court; that after consulting his advocate, if necessary, he can file the plaint of that suit; that Ex.B-6 reveals that it was sent to his sister Sandhya also; that he does not know whether she contested the suit or not; that he cannot say the reason for non-contesting the suit by his sister is that she knows this property does not belong to their family. The defendant No.1 did not file the copy of the said plaint. As such, an adverse inference can be drawn against him for non-production of the same. Admittedly his sister filed a suit against the D.W.1 at Guntur court for partition of the joint family properties. The contesting defendant who is a party to the said suit, failed to file the plaint copy and in the present case though she received notice, she remained ex parte and failed to contest the suit. These circumstances would lead to strong inference that their father already alienated the suit schedule property in favour of P.W.1. 93. Another factor to be noticed is that the case of the defendant is that his father died in June, 1975 leaving behind him his mother Ankamma, widow Javahari Bai, plaintiff and one daughter by name Sandhya. As the said persons executed a relinquishment deeds and will in favour of the plaintiff, he became the owner of the entire plaint schedule property along with the other properties. The registered relinquishment deed and the will are marked as Exs.B-2 and B-3. On a perusal of these two documents, it is clear that they do not mention the suit schedule property. The defendant as D.W.1 also categorically deposed that Ex. The registered relinquishment deed and the will are marked as Exs.B-2 and B-3. On a perusal of these two documents, it is clear that they do not mention the suit schedule property. The defendant as D.W.1 also categorically deposed that Ex. B-2 does not reveal plaint schedule property specifically and; that in Ex. B-3 also the plaint schedule property is not mentioned and; that his sister filed the suit for partition of the properties. It is to be noticed that the case of the defendant is that his mother and sister had relinquished the plaint schedule property in his favour. The said documents do not mention about the suit schedule property. Therefore, nonmention of the suit schedule property in Exs.B-2 and B-3 and filing of the suit by the sister of the defendant for partition of the properties and also non-filing of the plaint in the said partition suit, to which the defendant is a party, leads to an irresistible conclusion that the suit schedule property was disposed of by his father in favour of the plaintiff. 94. As already recored above, Ex.A-1 is proved by the plaintiff. The proof of Ex.A-1 is further fortified in view of the evidence which is to the effect that the plaintiff got constructed the house by getting tile plan approved in his favour and paying the house tax to the gram panchayat since 1974 under Exs.A-12 to A-36 and issuance of special notice to the plaintiff on 29.9.1974 asking him to pay house tax and also issuing demand notices under Exs.A-37 and A-38 and further issuance of demand notice in the year 1979 asking him to pay the house tax under Ex.A-39 and the payment of land revenue by the plaintiff under Exs.A-41 to A-51 and maintenance of account books by the plaintiff under Exs.A-52 and A-33 with regard to construction undertaken by him, leads to the conclusion that he purchased the suit schedule property under Ex.A-1 and has been residing therein. Further this conclusion is fortified by the fact that the defendant failed to show the plaint schedule property under Ex.A-55 declaration and though he was issued notice under Ex.B-9 to file declaration, he failed to respond to the said notice. Further this conclusion is fortified by the fact that the defendant failed to show the plaint schedule property under Ex.A-55 declaration and though he was issued notice under Ex.B-9 to file declaration, he failed to respond to the said notice. Further, though the defendant deposed that the plaintiff constructed the t house on behalf of his father and that he paid taxes on his behalf, he failed to produce any documentary evidence in support of his case. Further, though his sister was served with a notice, she failed to contest the suit and remained ex parte and as per the admission of the defendant, his sister filed suit for partition of properties. Though the defendant is a party to the said partition suit, he failed to produce a copy of the plaint. In the relinquishing deed and the will deed, the plaint schedule property is not mentioned. Further the theory of relinquish of property in favour of the plaintiff by his sister, is not correct, since as per his own admission, his sister filed the suit for partition. Therefore, all these circumstances leads to an irresistible conclusion that the plaintiff purchased the property under Ex.A-1 and it is binding on the defendants. 95. Issue No.2 : Whether the plaintiff perfected his title by continuous possession and enjoyment of the property under the said agreement of sale by prescription? 96. The contention of the counsel for the defendant is that agreement of sale under EX.A-1 is an executory contract and the possession under the said document is only a permissive possession and such possession for any length of time will not become ad verse to the real owner. In order to prove the ad verse possession, the plaintiff has to prove that his possession is open continuous for a period of 12 years to the knowledge of one and all including the owner of• the property and hostile to the real owner with an intention of claiming ownership over the property, hostile to the interest of the real owner. He stated that there shall be pleading and evidence to that effect and without there being any pleading and evidence, the adverse possession cannot be raised. He contended that possession under the agreement of sale is permissive and will never become adverse to the real owner. He stated that there shall be pleading and evidence to that effect and without there being any pleading and evidence, the adverse possession cannot be raised. He contended that possession under the agreement of sale is permissive and will never become adverse to the real owner. When the title of the owner is admitted, plea of adverse possession cannot be permitted to be raised. 97. On the other hand, the contention of the counsel for the plaintiff while not disputing the above proposition of law submitted by the counsel for the defendant with regard to adverse possession, is that plaintiff has been in possession without there being any dispute at least from 1971 and he has been paying house taxes in his name and also constructed the house by obtaining the necessary permission from the Gram Panchayat in his own right and the recitals in Ex.A-1 also are clear that the plaintiff has to pay the property tax and accordingly he paid the taxes and further in Ex.A-1 there is clear recitals to the effect that the father of the defendant Madusudhana rao is conveying all his rights over the property in favour and also all rights over the property and that the plaintiff is at liberty to enjoy the same according to his will and wish with his heirs and that Madusudhana Rao or his heirs will not object his possession and ownership and that they will not disturb his possession and that if any disputes arose thereon, he will clear off and that he will make this sale in force and that from thereon the plaintiff has to pay taxes etc against the schedule property and that if the plaintiff wish to get the property registered at any time, it is his responsibility to register the property and get the original. Therefore, from the recitals in Ex.A-1, it is clear that the owner of the property has conveyed all his rights in the property in favour of the plaintiff and has put him in possession with clear animus and distinct understanding that from that time as owner, divesting his rights. Therefore, from the recitals in Ex.A-1, it is clear that the owner of the property has conveyed all his rights in the property in favour of the plaintiff and has put him in possession with clear animus and distinct understanding that from that time as owner, divesting his rights. In such a case the owner of the property does not retain any vestige of right with regard to the property and his mental attitude is that he has ceased to be the owner of the property and the transferee after getting into the possession retains the same with the animus that he has become the owner of the property and his possession becomes adverse to the real owner and he can claim adverse possession. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court reported in Achal Reddy v. Ramakrishna Reddiar (1 supra). 98. In the present case, the plaintiff in his reply notice under Ex.A-3 has taken an alternative plea that though there is no valid sale deed in the name of the plaintiff in respect of the said Ac.0-56 of land, he is the absolute owner of the said property by virtue of long, continuous, open and uninterrupted possession of the property and thus he perfected his title and right in the said property by prescription. Even in the plaint in O.S.No.429/2000 and in the written statement filed in O.S.No.3030f 1997, the plaintiff has categorically stated that he became the absolute owner of the plaint schedule property having perfected his title by adverse possession apart from the prescription. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the plaintiff has not raised the plea relating to perfection of title by prescription. Now it is necessary to consider the evidence available on record on this aspect. 99. The case of the plaintiff as P.W.1 is that he has been residing in the plaint schedule property since 1957 and it is not denied by D.W.1 and the recitals of Ex.A-1 also reveal that the P.W.1 has been residing in the suit schedule property since 1957 and purchased the same under EX.A-1 on 22.10.1971 by virtue of which the vendor i.e., Madusudhana Rao, transferred all his rights over the suit schedule property in favour of the plaintiff. In view of the same, the plaintiff constructed the house therein after getting the plan approved under Ex.A-1. In view of the same, the plaintiff constructed the house therein after getting the plan approved under Ex.A-1. Ex.A-10 is of the year 1973. In pursuance of the recitals in Ex.A-1, the plaintiff has paid the house tax under Exs.A-12 to A-36. The Gram Panchayt issued demand notices to the plaintiff in his name under Exs.A-37 to A-39. P.W.1 also paid the land revenue in his name for the schedule property since 1971 under Exs.A-41 to A-51. The recitals of Ex.A-1 are clear to the effect that P.W.1 has to pay the taxes. P.W.1 in his cross-examination has categorically stated that as he is residing in that house and that a demand notice was issued, he paid the tax and land revenue; that he showed the demand notice to the Madusudhana Rao and on his direction only, he paid the tax and land revenue. It is to be noticed that no negative suggestion was put to P.W.1 in this regard stating that he paid the tax on behalf of Madusudhana Rao. Therefore, it is an admission against the case of the D.W.1. It is to be noticed that the plaintiff paid the house tax and land revenue with the knowledge of Madudhana Rao in the name of the plaintiff. No prudent person will allow any other person to pay tax for his property in his name. Further in the cross- examination of D.W.1 he deposed that with the amount provided by his father, P.W.1 paid the taxes; that he deposed that he does not know whether in whose name the receipts were issued; that there is no documentary evidence to show that his father provided the amount to P.W.1; that there is no house tax receipts to show that the tax was paid in the name of his father; that he does not know whether his father verified the panchayat records to ascertain in whose name the tax was paid; that he never enquired in whose the name the tax was paid; that after the death of his father also, he did not make any application for mutation of records in respect of this property; that he never verified at any time even after the death of his father in whose name the house tax was being paid. 100. 100. From the oral evidence of P.W.1 coupled with Exs.A-12 and A-36 and A-41 to A-51, it is crystal clear that P.W.1 has been paying the house tax and land revenue after showing the demand notices to the said Madhusudhan Rao and according to his direction, P.W.1 has paid the house tax ~ and land revenue, whereas from the f evidence of D.W.1, there is no house tax receipts in the name of the said Madhusudhan Rao and he does not know in whose name the tax was paid and he never enquired in whose name the tax receipts were being issued and even after his father's death, he did not make any application for mutation of the record in respect of the schedule property. It is to be noticed that if really the property was left by late Madusudhan Rao, without alienating the same in favour of the plaintiff, the defendant would have enquired into the matter in whose name the tax was being paid and further he would have filed application for mutating his name in the revenue records. But he did not do so. As already discussed above, he also failed to show the suit schedule property in Ex.A-55 declaration and though a notice under EX.B-9 was issued to file declaration with regard to suit schedule property, he failed to file any declaration. His sister failed the contest the present case and was remained ex parte and she also filed suit at Guntur Court for partition of the properties and the defendant though is a party to the said suit, failed to produce the plaint copy in order to show that the present schedule property is also included in the said partition suit. 101. Therefore all these circumstances would lead to a strong presumption that defendant has the knowledge about the transaction under Ex.A-1. Further, as per the evidence of P.W.1, after showing the demand notices he paid the taxes. As already noted above, on prudent person would allow another person to pay the tax with regard to his property in the name of that person and also would not allow him construct the house. 102. Further, as per the evidence of P.W.1, after showing the demand notices he paid the taxes. As already noted above, on prudent person would allow another person to pay the tax with regard to his property in the name of that person and also would not allow him construct the house. 102. The other aspect to be conspicuously noticed is that the defendant as D.W.1 did not state either in the pleadings or in his evidence that either himself or his father resided in the plaint schedule property at any time within twelve years prior to the institution of the suit by him and he did not file any single scrap of paper to show that the schedule property was in their possession within 12 years prior to the filing of the suit. On the other hand, the plaintiff has taken a specific plea both in the reply notice under Ex.A-3 and also in the plaint in O.S.No.429/2000 and in the written statement in O.S.No.303/1997 that he perfected the title by prescription. D.W.1 also did not deny the possession of P.W.1 prior to the execution of Ex.A-1, nor adduced any evidence to show that his father is in the possession of the property even prior to execution of Ex.A-1 agreement of sale. Therefore it is clear that the contesting defendant or his father were ever in possession and that the plaintiff is in possession of the property right from the year 1957 and more particularly as owner of the property since 1971. 103. In view of the above it can safely be concluded that the plaintiff has perfected his title by prescription as he acquired the title by adverse possession over the plaint schedule property. 104. The other vehement contention of the counsel for the defendant is that since the plaintiff is claiming possession under the agreement of sale Ex.A-1, it is a permissive possession. 105. The recitals in Ex.A-1 is already noted above. As per the said recitals it is clear that Madusudhana Rao transferred all his rights over the schedule property in favour of the plaintiff and only the registration of the regular sale deed is left. 105. The recitals in Ex.A-1 is already noted above. As per the said recitals it is clear that Madusudhana Rao transferred all his rights over the schedule property in favour of the plaintiff and only the registration of the regular sale deed is left. By virtue of the Ex.A-1, the said Madhusudhana Rao transferred the property and put the plaintiff in possession with the clear animus and on the distinct understanding that from that time onwards, he shall have no right of title to the property. Therefore it is clear that the rights of the vendor have been divested and have been conferred on the plaintiff. At this juncture it is necessary to note the law laid down by the Apex Court in Achal Reddi v. Ramakrishna Reddiar (1 supra). In the said judgment, the Apex Court held that executory contract is an acknowledgment and recognition of the title of the vendor, which excluded the theory of adverse possession. But at paragraph no.9 it held as under: "9. In the case of an executory contract of sale where the transferee is put in possession of the property in pursuance of the agreement of sale and where the parties contemplate the execution of a regular registered sale deed the animus of the purchase throughout is that he is in possession of the property belonging to the title has to be perfected by a duly executed registered deed of sale under which the vendor has to pass on and convey his title. The purchaser's possession in such cases is of a derivative character and in clear recognition of and in acknowledgement of the title of the vendor. The position is different in the case where in pursuance of a oral transfer or deed of transfer not registered the owner of a property transfers the property and puts the transferee in possession with the clear animus and on the distinct understanding that from that time onwards he shall have no right of title to the property. In such a case the owner of the property does not retain any vestige of right in regard to the property and his mental attitude towards the property is that it has ceased to belong to him altogether. In such a case the owner of the property does not retain any vestige of right in regard to the property and his mental attitude towards the property is that it has ceased to belong to him altogether. The transferee after getting into possession retains the same with the clean animus that he has become the absolute owner of the property and in complete negation of any right or title of the transferor, his enjoyment is solely as owner in his right and not derivatively or in recognition of the title of any person. So far as the vendor is concerned both in mind and actual conduct there is a total divestiture of all his right, title and interest in the property. This applies only in a case where there is a clear manifestation of the intention of the owner to divest himself of the right over the property. On the other hand in the case of an executory contract the possession of the transferee until the date of registration of the conveyance is permissive or derivative and in law is deemed to be on behalf of the owner himself." (Emphasis added) 106. From the above judgment it is clear that if in pursuance of any oral transfer or a deed of transfer not registered, the owner of the property transfers the property puts the transferee in possession with such clear animus and on the distinct understanding that from that time onwards, he shall have no right of title to the property, then the owner of the property does not retain any vestige of right in regard to the property and his mental attitude towards the property is that it has ceased to belong to him altogether and the transferee after getting into possession retains the same with the clear animus that he has become the absolute owner of the property and in complete negation of any right or title of the transferor and his enjoyment is solely as owner in his right and not derivatively or in recognition of the title of any person. The Apex Court clearly held in such circumstances, that the concept of permissive possession does not arise. 107. The Apex Court clearly held in such circumstances, that the concept of permissive possession does not arise. 107. In the present case as already noted above, the recitals in Ex.A-1 are clear to the effect that the vendor transferred all his rights over the property in favour of the plaintiff by putting him in possession and he did not retain any vestige of right over the property and the evidence on record clearly goes to show that the plaintiff after execution of Ex.A-1 retained the same with clear animus that he has become the absolute owner of the property and in complete negative of any right or title of the transferor and his enjoyment is solely as owner and not derivatively or in recognition of title of any person. Since, as per the evidence already discussed, after the execution of Ex.A-1, the plaintiff got the plan approved and constructed the house and also has been paying the house tax and land revenue and the demand notices were issued to him in his name and after showing the same to Madusudhana Rao, he paid the said taxes. 108. From the above discussion it is concluded that the defendant failed to prove that the plaintiff is in permissive possession of the suit schedule property and on the other hand, the plaintiff with cogent and convincing evidence proved that he perfected the title by prescription. The issue is accordingly answered in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. 109 Issue No.3 Whether the suit in O.s.No.303/1997 is barred by limitation? 110. As per the above discussion it is clear that the defendant failed to prove that his father' or himself were ever in possession within twelve years prior to the filing of the suit and he also did not choose to file any scrap of paper to show that the property was in their possession within 12 years prior to the filing of the suit. In the above issue, it is categorically held that the plaintiff perfected the title by prescription. 111. The present suit filed by the contesting defendant is based on title. Therefore, Article 65 of the Limitation Act governs the suit based on title. In the above issue, it is categorically held that the plaintiff perfected the title by prescription. 111. The present suit filed by the contesting defendant is based on title. Therefore, Article 65 of the Limitation Act governs the suit based on title. Article 65 contemplates the period of 12 years for filing the suit for recovery of possession of immovable property or any interest based on title when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. As already noted above, the defendant failed to prove that he is in possession 12 years prior to filing of the suit. On the other hand, the plaintiff has specifically proved that he is in possession since 1957 and as owner since the date of execution of Ex.A-1. The suit is filed in the year 1997 Le., after 3. period of 25 years. In these circumstances, it has to be held that the suit is barred by limitation. A learned single Judge of this court in the decision reported in Dy. Commissioner (P &E) v. Shobalal (sic. Y. Venkakka Choudary v. D. Lakshminarayana) (2 supra) it held as under: "31. . . The suit is for possession based on title and therefore, it is governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The period of limitation for such a suit is 12 years when the possession of the defendants become adverse to the plaintiffs. . . .Thus the suit was hopelessly barred by limitation when it was filed by operation of the law of prescription read with Article 65 of the Limitation Act." 112. In view of the above it is held that the suit in O.S.No.303/1997 is barred by limitation and the issue is accordingly answered in favour of the plaintiff. 113. Issue No.4. Whether the suit for possession is not maintainable without the seeking the relief of declaration of title, when the plaintiff claimed the title under Ex.A-1? 114. The case of the plaintiff is that he has purchased the suit schedule property from the father of defendant under Ex.A-1 and he is denying the title of the defendant. In this regard, it is necessary to look into Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. The said section is extracted as under for better appreciation: 34. 114. The case of the plaintiff is that he has purchased the suit schedule property from the father of defendant under Ex.A-1 and he is denying the title of the defendant. In this regard, it is necessary to look into Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. The said section is extracted as under for better appreciation: 34. Discretion of court as to declaration of status or right- As person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief: Provided that no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so. Explanation:. . . 115. As already noted above, the plaintiff is denying the title of the plaintiff and set up title under Ex.A-1. Hence, there is clear cloud cast upon the title and as such under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, he has to seek the relief of declaration of title over the plaint schedule property. 116. Further, according to own admission of the defendant his sister is also claiming right over the properties of his father and she also filed suit for partition of the joint family properties and hence the defendant cannot be termed as sole owner of the properties. It is well settled that a suit for mere recovery of possession or ejection without seeking declaration of title when a cloud is cast on the title is not maintainable. 117. In these circumstances, the suit filed by the defendant in O.S.No.303/1997 for mere possession without seeking declaration of title, when the• plaintiff has set up title under Ex.A-1, is not maintainable. 118. Issue No.5: Whether the suit in O.S.No.303/1997 is bad for non-joinder of necessary party. 119. As per the plaint averments, the defendants 1 and 2 are the legal representatives left by late Madusudhana Rao. 118. Issue No.5: Whether the suit in O.S.No.303/1997 is bad for non-joinder of necessary party. 119. As per the plaint averments, the defendants 1 and 2 are the legal representatives left by late Madusudhana Rao. Though the defendant pleaded that the properties of late Madusudhana Rao were bequeathed to him by his sister and mother by executing registered relinquishment deed and will deed under Exs.B-2 and B-3, he failed to prove and said deeds does not mentions about the suit schedule property. Moreover as per the own admission of the defendant as D.W.1, his sister filed the suit for partition of the joint family properties. Therefore, it is clear that the defendant No.1 is not the owner of the property. The plaintiff in the suit filed by him in 0.5.No.479/2000 im-pleaded the sister of the defendant and got the notice served on him, but she remained ex parte. Therefore, in these circumstances, the suit in O.S.No.303/1997 is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. 120. Issue No.6: Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a decree for specific performance and whether time is not the essence of the contract? 121. The relief of decreeing the suit for specific performance is governed by Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act. The relevant provisions under the said Section is extracted as under for ready reference: 20. Discretion as to decreeing specific performance: (1) The jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so, but the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal. (2) ... (3) The court may properly exercise discretion to decree specific performance in any case where the plaintiff has done substantial acts or suffered losses in consequence of a contract capable of specific performance. (4) ... 122. From the above provision it is clear that the jurisdiction of the court to grant decree for specific performance is discretionary and the exercise of such discretion by the court shall not be arbitrary, but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles. (4) ... 122. From the above provision it is clear that the jurisdiction of the court to grant decree for specific performance is discretionary and the exercise of such discretion by the court shall not be arbitrary, but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles. Further as per subsection (3) of Section 20, the court may properly exercise discretion to decree specific performance in any case, where the plaintiff has done substantial acts or suffered losses in consequence of a contract capable of specific performance. 123. It is well settled that the normal rule is that the relief of specific performance shall be granted and in the absence of fixed time, conduct of the parties to be considered at the time of entering into the contract after the execution of the same. The Apex court in Sardar Singh v. Krishna Devi (17) (1994) 4 SCC 18 held that court would take into consideration the circumstances in each case, the conduct of the parties and the respective interest under the contract. Further, as per the judgment of a learned single Judge of this court in T.J. Jayarama Reddy v. Bingi Sreeramaiah Chetty (18) 2000 (4) ALT 81 and also the judgment of the Apex Court reported in Prakash Chandra v. Angadlal (19) (1979) 4 SCC 393 the ordinary rule is that the specific performance should be granted, but it can be denied only when equitable considerations point in its refusal and that the circumstances show that damages would constitute an adequate relief. 124. Keeping in view the Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act and the law laid down by the Apex court and this court and the conduct of the parties I would like to consider the case of the plaintiff and whether the discretion can be exercised to grant the relief of specific performance. 125. As already noted above, the plaintiff could prove execution of Ex.A-1 by late Madusudhana Rao. On perusal of Ex.A-1 it is clear that Madusudhana Rao executed the said document in total divesture of his rights and conferred same on the plaintiff to enjoy as owner from the date of execution of the document and he has also undertaken to execute the registered sale deed at any time on the request of the plaintiff. Therefore, time is not made the essence of the contract. 126. Therefore, time is not made the essence of the contract. 126. After the execution of Ex.A-1, the plaintiff got constructed the house and has been paying the house taxes and land revenue and demand notices were also issued in his name and he has been residing in the said house as owner in his own right. The defendant failed to prove that Ex.A-1 is forged and that either his father or himself ever resided in the suit schedule property. 127. The admitted case on record is that there are no disputes between plaintiff and the contesting defendant. In the cross-examination, defendant as D.W.1 categorically deposed that they allowed the plaintiff to stay in that house and they never objected him for his occupation and that he never asked P.W.1 to vacate the house prior to the disputes started between him and Sreerama Murthy and D.W.1. Further the case of the plaintiff is that because of his close association with Madusudhana Rao, he did not insist to execute a regular sale deed in his favour and that the contesting defendant also never objected with regard to his possession. As per the evidence of D.W.1 only after the disputes started between him and Sreerama Murthy, the plaintiff was issued notice to vacate the suit schedule property. Thereafter the plaintiff got issued reply notice and subsequently after filing the suit for eviction, he filed the present suit for specific performance, wherein he had categorically proved his case by leading cogent and convincing evidence. Further under Ex.A-1, time is not made the essence of contract. Therefore, in these circumstances, delay in seeking the relief of specific performance, cannot be taken to reject his claim. This court in the decision reported in T. Venkata Subrahmanyam v. Viswanadharaju (20) AIR 1968 A.P 190 held a under: "11. . . . Now the law in regard to the exercise of discretion is fairly settled. The relief of specific performance cannot be claimed as a matter of right nor it is granted as a matter of course. It is an equitable relief, the grant of which lies entirely in the discretion of the court. It just however be remembered that the discretion has to be exercised judicially and in accordance with the principles laid down in that behalf. See Satyanarayana v. Yelloji Rao, AIR 1965 SC 1405 and Hutchiraju v. Sri Ranga Satyanarayana. AIR 1967 Andh. Pra. 12. It just however be remembered that the discretion has to be exercised judicially and in accordance with the principles laid down in that behalf. See Satyanarayana v. Yelloji Rao, AIR 1965 SC 1405 and Hutchiraju v. Sri Ranga Satyanarayana. AIR 1967 Andh. Pra. 12. The trial Court refused to exercise the discretion in favour of the plaintiff merely on the ground that the plaintiff after receiving Exhibit A-5 kept quiet for over 19 months without filing the suit and meanwhile allowed the 1st defendant to convey the property to the 2nd defendant. The lower appellate court did not accept this approach as correct and I think the lower appellate Court was correct in reaching that conclusion. It is now fairly settled that mere delay does not deprive a plaintiff of the equitable relief unless coupled with it there are supervening circumstances which alter the situation and create right, title or interest in third parties validly.. . . . . . The lower appellate court, in my view, has given ample reasons for reaching the conclusion that this is a fit case in which the plaint ff should get the equitable relief of specific performance in spite of some delay on his part." 128. At the cost of repetition it is to be noticed that plaintiff proved execution of Ex.A-1 and in pursuance of the same, he had demolished the old structures and constructed the terraced building by spending huge amount, after obtaining approved plan from the Gram Panchayat and also has been paying house tax, land revenue and he was also issued demand notices. All these documents i.e.., sanction of the plan, payment of taxes., etc were in the name of the plaintiff. Therefore, in pursuance of Ex.A-1, the plaintiff had made substantial acts. In view of these circumstances, I am of the view that the discretionary jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Special Relief Act, 1963, needs to be exercised in favour of the plaintiff and he be granted decree for specific performance. Accordingly the issue is answered in favour of the plaintiff. 129. The other contention of the counsel for the plaintiff is that no permission under Rule 32 of the Civil Rules of Practice has been obtained by the G.P.A. holder of the contesting defendant to represent the suit and he has no authority to represent the plaintiff. Accordingly the issue is answered in favour of the plaintiff. 129. The other contention of the counsel for the plaintiff is that no permission under Rule 32 of the Civil Rules of Practice has been obtained by the G.P.A. holder of the contesting defendant to represent the suit and he has no authority to represent the plaintiff. From the material on record, it could be seen that the court below while passing the final decree, allowed I.A. No.477/2003 filed for grant of permission and hence the contention in this regard, cannot be accepted. 130. For the foregoing reasons, all the issues are answered in favour of the plaintiff and the findings of the court below on all the issues are set aside and accordingly the common judgment and decree of the trial court dated 30.06.2003 in allowing O.S.No.303 of 1997 and dismissing O.S.No.429/2000, is hereby set aside and consequently the suit in O.S.No.303 of 1997 filed for ejectment, is dismissed and the suit in O.S.No.429 of 2000 filed for specific performance, is decreed and the defendants 1 and 2 therein are directed to execute the registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff at his costs within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In case if the defendants fail to execute the register sale deed, the plaintiff is at liberty to approach the court below and get the sale deed registered through court. 131. During the course of hearing it is brought to the notice of this court that initially this court granted interim stay of the impugned common judgment by order dated 7.8.2003 in CM.P.No.17321/2003 in A.S.No.1845/2003 subject to appellant depositing the suit costs within a period of six weeks from the date of the order and accordingly the suit costs have been deposited. Subsequently the respondent in the appeal, filed vacate petition in CMP.No.24009/2003 and CMP.No.17321 of 2003 in A.S.No.1845/2003 and a Division Bench of this court by order dated 1.12.2003 vacated the interim stay. 132. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that subsequent to the vacation of the interim order, the decree and judgment in O.S.No.303/1997 is worked out and the plaintiff is evicted from the suit schedule property. 133. 132. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that subsequent to the vacation of the interim order, the decree and judgment in O.S.No.303/1997 is worked out and the plaintiff is evicted from the suit schedule property. 133. As the judgment and decree of the court below in O.S.No.303/1997 is set aside and the suit is dismissed and the suit in O.S.No.429/2000 for specific performance is decreed by this common judgment, the plaintiff is given liberty to move the court below under Section 144 of CP.C for restoration of possession. 134. In the circumstances of the case, both the appeals are allowed with costs throughout