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2010 DIGILAW 430 (MAD)

R. Sudha v. V. Senthil

2010-02-01

M.M.SUNDRESH, R.BANUMATHI

body2010
Judgment :- M.M. Sundresh, J. This appeal has been preferred by the wife challenging the judgment rendered in O.P.No.866 of 1998 on the file of the First Additional Principal Family Court, Chennai, granting a decree for divorce against her. .2. Thecase of the respondent/husband is as follows: .It is the case of the respondent/husband that he married the appellant on 18. 1996 and thereafter both the appellant/wife and respondent lived for about eight moths. It is the further case of the respondent that the appellant was short tempered, which created a tension in the family life. The appellant, did not give any respect to the elders of the family. The appellant used to pick up quarrel with the respondent and used to leave the matrimonial home without consent and permission. The appellant used to insist on a separate residence and separate living, which the respondent refused. The appellant went for delivery on 15. 1997 and at that point of time, she took all her belongings except some sarees. The appellant finally left the matrimonial home on 17. 1997 and thereafter did not join the respondent. Inspite of the attempts made by the respondent, the appellant had refused to join and hence the respondent has filed the petition for divorce, in view of the continuous harassment meted out to him by the appellant. .3. The case of the appellant/wife is as follows: .It is true that the marriage was solemnized on 18. 1996. After the marriage, the appellant found one person by name Ms. Karpagam, who is the relative of the respondent staying with them after getting divorced. The appellant was shocked to find that the said Karpagam was the deciding authority and she alone was allowed to accompany the respondent. The appellant has been neglected by the respondent. The said Karpagam is having her parents. But, it was informed by the respondent to the appellant that she is an orphan. When the appellant questioned the respondent about the close contact with the said Karpagam, she was tortured by the respondent. The appellant was taken to her parents home after she became pregnant on 15. 1997 and thereafter gave birth to male child on 26. 1997. The respondent did not come to see the son after the delivery and even thereafter. When the appellant questioned the respondent about the close contact with the said Karpagam, she was tortured by the respondent. The appellant was taken to her parents home after she became pregnant on 15. 1997 and thereafter gave birth to male child on 26. 1997. The respondent did not come to see the son after the delivery and even thereafter. When the appellant and her parents came to the matrimonial home, she was not allowed to enter into the house by the respondent and his mother. It was also denied that the appellant used to leave the matrimonial home without permission and she has not taken the jewelry and dresses belonging to her. The appellant never insisted to have a separate residence, but only stated that the said Karpagam will have to be put up in a separate residence, in order to have peace at home. The appellant is always ready and willing to live with the respondent. Therefore, the appellant/wife prayed for dismissal of the petition filed for divorce. 4. Before the Court below, four witnesses have been examined on the side of the respondent and the appellant examined herself as R.W.1. The respondent marked the marriage invitation as Exhibit P-1. The Court below on a consideration of the pleadings and evidence available on record, has granted a decree for divorce. Challenging the said judgment and decree, the appellant herein has filed the present appeal. 5. A reading of the averments made in support of the petition filed for divorce would show that a decree for divorce has been sought for on the ground of cruelty. It has been stated in the said petition that the appellant herein was highly short tempered and made life miserable. It has been further stated that the appellant used to pick up quarrels and she refused to join the respondent, after the delivery inspite of the efforts made by the respondent to take her back. It is seen from the above said pleadings that no specific incident has been mentioned for coming to the conclusion that the appellant herein has committed cruelty. The averments made are very general in nature. It is also to be noted that there is no averments that the appellant herein has made life miserable for the respondent by alleging that he was having illicit relationship with the above said Karpagam. 6. The averments made are very general in nature. It is also to be noted that there is no averments that the appellant herein has made life miserable for the respondent by alleging that he was having illicit relationship with the above said Karpagam. 6. P.W. the respondent himself has stated in his chief examination that even from date of marriage, there were problems between the family. It is further stated that the appellant never used to give food and coffee, but only his mother used to give the same. The appellant used to go to her house after the pregnancy very often. However, for the function conducted by the appellant’s family after she became pregnant for the well being of the motherhood and foetus the respondent and his family members were called and they attended the same. However, for the naming ceremony of the child, the family members of the respondent were not called except the respondent. After the birth of child, the appellant has sent a letter to the respondent to which the respondent has not replied. Thereafter, the appellant came to the house of the respondent along with the child and took her belongings. She also made an attempt to live with the respondent after the filing of the case which was prevented. The said Karpagam is the close relative of the respondent and the allegation made by the appellant connecting the said Karpagam with the respondent has hurt the respondent. In view of the said allegation, the said Karpagam was taken back by her family members. The appellant wanted to control the respondent through the child, which was not acceptable to the respondent. All these steps have been taken by the appellant with a view to live separately. In the cross examination, P.W.1 has stated that the appellant used to avoid the relatives of the respondent. In order to hurt the respondent, the appellant used to say that she has go to her parent’s house. The appellant and her family members came to the house along with the child knowing fully well, the respondent would not be available. The respondent did not take any steps to take the appellant in to the marital home. He did not write any letter for the said purpose. However, the relatives of the respondent did make an effort. 7. The appellant and her family members came to the house along with the child knowing fully well, the respondent would not be available. The respondent did not take any steps to take the appellant in to the marital home. He did not write any letter for the said purpose. However, the relatives of the respondent did make an effort. 7. The evidence of P.W.1 would clearly show that it is a specific case of the respondent that the appellant created trouble in order to live separately with the respondent. In the chief examination, he also admits that he attended the function conduct by the appellant’s family. He further admits in the cross examination that the said Karpagam was taken back into her house by her family after the allegation made by the respondent. It is also seen from the evidence of P.W.1 that he did not make any efforts to take the appellant back. Even for her letter, he did not make any reply. Therefore, the evidence of P.W.1 would clearly show that the allegation of cruelty as mentioned Section 13(i)(ia) has not been made out. 8. P.W.2 is the close relative of the respondent. He has stated that P.W.3 has made complaints about the conduct of the appellant to him as she has not shown the child to P.W.3, who is the mother of the respondent. It is the further evidence of P.W.2 that the appellant and her family members have created troubles by going to the house of the respondent. In the cross examination, P.W.2 has stated that he was working at Karur in 1996 and he came to Chennai only 1997. 9. The evidence of P.W.2 does not inspire any confidence. Admittedly, P.W.2 is the close relative of the respondent. Most of the evidence is hearsay in nature. He was working in Karur in 1996 whereas the appellant and the respondent were in Chennai. Even the trial Court has eschewed the evidence of P.W.3. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion, the evidence of P.W.2 cannot help the case of the respondent. 10. Insofar as P.W.3 is concerned, she is the mother of the respondent. In the chief examination, she speaks about the strained relationship between the families. She further deposes that the appellant never used to give proper food to the respondent and used to quarrel. 10. Insofar as P.W.3 is concerned, she is the mother of the respondent. In the chief examination, she speaks about the strained relationship between the families. She further deposes that the appellant never used to give proper food to the respondent and used to quarrel. It is the further evidence of P.W.3 that the appellant has alleged about the illicit intimacy between Karpagam and the respondent. She also admits that R.W.1 (appellant) was working and used to return home at about 5.45 p.m. to 6.00 p.m. 11. Admittedly, P.W.3 is the mother of the respondent. Even the trial Court has rejected the evidence of P.W.3 stating that her evidence is interested in nature and therefore the same cannot be looked into. A perusal of the evidence would show that the allegation made against the appellant are trivial in nature except the allegation regarding the illicit intimacy. On a consideration of the said evidence and also even the fact that the petitioner was also working, we are of the view that the evidence of P.W.3 also does not inspire any confidence. Further, it is seen from the said evidence that, the appellant has refused to live with the respondent when he went to take her back after the delivery. The said evidence is contrary to evidence of the respondent himself, wherein he stated that he has not made any such attempt. 12. P.W.4 is the landlord of the respondent. He has stated that for a period of three months the appellant and respondents living happily. He further stated that the appellant has shouted against the respondent that as to whether she is the wife of the respondent or his sister. He has been informed by the appellant about the troubles in the family. He further says that after the filing of the case trouble was created by the appellant and her family members resulting in a complaint. 13. From the evidence of P.W.4, it is seen that he has not seen (sic) the occurrence in person. Further, he himself says that the appellant and the respondent were living happily initially. Moreover, he has stated that he did not know who was responsible for throwing of the utensils. 13. From the evidence of P.W.4, it is seen that he has not seen (sic) the occurrence in person. Further, he himself says that the appellant and the respondent were living happily initially. Moreover, he has stated that he did not know who was responsible for throwing of the utensils. The statement of P.W.4 about the shouting by the appellant even assuming as true cannot by itself be a reason to hold that she has committed cruelty since P.W.4 does not know what caused such a reaction. From the evidence of P.W.1 to 4, it is clear that the said Karpagam was living with the respondent. The fact that the appellant wanted Karpagam to leave the house cannot by itself a ground for cruelty. The said fact shows the love and affection of a young woman, who gets in the house of her husband with expectation and excitement. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the evidence of P.W.4 also does not inspire any confidence. 14. The appellant has examined herself as R.W.1. She has stated that initially the relationship between her and Karpagam was good. She was working as a assistant in Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation. She and her father wrote letters to the respondent expressing the desire to join the matrimonial home after delivery. The child born out of the wedlock is a special child. There is no problem between her and the respondent. She has not made any allegation of illicity relationship between Karpagam and her husband. The respondent after admitting the appellant in the hospital has never saw her and the child. Thereafter, he refused to admit her into the matrimonial home. There is no doubt about the relationship between the Karpagam and the respondent. The problem arose because the respondent insisted that she should act on the direction of the said Karpagam. 15. The evidence of R.W.1 would clearly show that she very much wanted to live with P.W.1. Admittedly, she was working as an employee of the Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation. Therefore, she was leaving the house early and coming in the evening hours after the arrival of her husband due to her work load. From the said evidence, one cannot say that she has refused to perform the matrimonial duties. Admittedly, she was working as an employee of the Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation. Therefore, she was leaving the house early and coming in the evening hours after the arrival of her husband due to her work load. From the said evidence, one cannot say that she has refused to perform the matrimonial duties. Her evidence that the respondent did not allow her to join is supported by the evidence of P.W.1 himself who has stated that he never asked her to come back. .16. The trial Court has granting a decree for divorce under Section 13(i)(i-a) by observing that the appellant has not proved the reason for not allowing her into the matrimonial home. The trial Court has further held that P.W.3 was alone doing the house work and the appellant used to go for music concepts. The trial Court further observed that the appellant has not even made coffee for the respondent thereby not acting as a dutiful house wife. The trial Court further held that in view of the allegation made in the counter about the illicit relationship mental cruelty has been inflicted on the respondent. The Court below has also held that the fact that the appellant has not made any steps to file the application for Restitution of Conjugal Right earlier, and the filing of such an application, subsequent to the divorce petition by itself would prove the lack of bona fides of the appellant. It was also stated that the appellant has not joined the respondent and in any case she has not taken any steps to re-join. Hence, on the above said facts, the trial Court has granted the decree for divorce. 17. We have perused the judgment rendered by the trial Court. A reading of the judgment would show that the learned judge has put the entire onus, on the appellant to prove the case of the respondent. It is a well settled principle of law that a party seeking divorce will have to substantiate and prove his case. The approach of the Court below in granting the decree for divorce is totally unacceptable and unwarranted. A Court cannot inject or infuse its own personal views in to the judgment. Unfortunately, the Court below without appreciating the pleadings and evidence available on record has rendered the judgment getting influence by its personal views. .18. The approach of the Court below in granting the decree for divorce is totally unacceptable and unwarranted. A Court cannot inject or infuse its own personal views in to the judgment. Unfortunately, the Court below without appreciating the pleadings and evidence available on record has rendered the judgment getting influence by its personal views. .18. It is not in dispute that the appellant was working in a Government Corporation, it is also not in dispute that the appellant wanted the said Karpagam to live separately. The appellant has clearly stated in her pleadings and evidence that the said Karpagam was influencing her husband and interfered in her life. It is nothing but natural for an young lady to live a life of her own. It is also to be seen that the pleadings will have to be looked as a whole. In the present case on hand, the pleadings made by the respondent would clearly show that there is absolutely no allegation about the cruelty caused by the appellant claiming illicit relationship between Karpagam and the respondent. It is only in the chief examination such an attempt has been made. The said Karpagam has not been examined. Moreover, it is the evidence of P.W.1 that Karpagam has left his house after starting of the trouble. R.W.1 in her evidence has clearly stated that she did not mean to say about any illicit relationship but only meant about the amount of control Karpagam exercised over her husband and her. A perusal of the pleadings of the appellant also would clearly establish that her grievance is about the conduct of Karpagam and not about any illicit relationship. The appellant has stated in her evidence that she used to attend music concerts as a singer before the marriage. The said statement cannot be a ground to presume that she would leave her husband very frequently to attend the concept. As observed earlier, the evidence of P.W.1 and the evidence of R.W.1 would clearly show that the intention of the respondent is not to take the appellant back. In fact, the respondent did not go to take the appellant and join after delivery. Letters have been written by the appellant and her father which were followed by attempts to get into the matrimonial home. It is the respondent who prevented her into the house. In fact, the respondent did not go to take the appellant and join after delivery. Letters have been written by the appellant and her father which were followed by attempts to get into the matrimonial home. It is the respondent who prevented her into the house. Therefore, the above said facts would clearly indicate that the appellant was ready and willing to join her husband and in fact, the evidence of P.W.3 itself would show that it was believed that the relationship would get smoother after the delivery. There is no material to show that the appellant was behaving badly after delivery, since, admittedly the respondent has refused to take her. The Court below has committed an error in coming to a conclusion about the conduct of the appellant after holding that the evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.3 cannot be relied on. If the said evidence is eschewed, then there is no other sufficient evidence to prove cruelty. 19. Inan identical situation, the Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court in the judgment in P. Kalyanasundaram v. K. Paquialatchamy (2003) 1 MLJ 669 has held that when an allegations is made by the husband alleging abnormal relationship of wife with her father and the same has been explained in the cross-examination to the effect that the said allegation would only mean extreme attachment between father and daughter, then such an allegation would not amount to cruelty. Applying the said judgment of the Division Bench to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the mere words mentioned in the counter affidavit by the appellant stating that the respondent was having close contact with the P. Karpagam by itself cannot be construed to mean illicity relationship between them particularly with reference to the other pleadings of the appellant and in the absence of any pleadings in the petition filed for divorce by the respondent. 20. The word cruelty has not been defined and the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. In order to define cruelty, the conduct of a party should be so dangerous, so that a spouse is unable to live with the other. It is not the isolatory incident which is relevant but the whole matrimonial life that will have to be seen. A marriage is a meeting and union of two minds. In order to define cruelty, the conduct of a party should be so dangerous, so that a spouse is unable to live with the other. It is not the isolatory incident which is relevant but the whole matrimonial life that will have to be seen. A marriage is a meeting and union of two minds. There will always be difference between two person who come from different background having different behaviors, thoughts, attitude, conduct and values. The above said factors are determined by the environment in which a person is brought up. Therefore, mere bickerings in a marital life cannot be a ground for cruelty. In order to make out cruelty, the intensity and gravity of one’s action will have to be seen. 21. In order to consider mental cruelty, the social status of the parties, their customs and traditions, educational level and the environment, in which they have been living will have to be looked into. The Court will have to draw inference and decide on the basis of the probabilities of the case having regard to the effect on the mind of the spouse. The Hon’ble Apex Court in judgments in G.V.N. Kameswara Rao v. G. Jabilli AIR 2002 SC 576 : (2002) 2 SCC 296 : (2002) 1 MLJ 194 and in A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur AIR 2005 SC 534 : (2005) 2 SCC 22 have taken the view that cruelty will have to be seen by applying the above said principles. 22. There (sic) cannot be any specific definition for (sic) mental cruelty. The mental cruelty cannot put in a strait-jacket formula. The concept of mental cruelty cannot remain static. Therefore, no uniform standard can be laid down and Courts will have to be (sic) prudent and have a practical approach in adjudicating a case based upon its own facts. A sustained course of abusive and humiliating treatment rendering the life of spouse is one of the factum to decide the mental cruelty. However, mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of the married life would not amount to mental cruelty. If by the continued ill conduct of a spouse the relationship deteriorates, then such an action alone amount to mental cruelty. The Hon’ble Supreme judgment Samar Chosh v. Jaya Ghosh (2007) 2 MLJ 1185 : 2007 (3) ALT 62 has observed as follows at p. 1209 of MLJ: “68. If by the continued ill conduct of a spouse the relationship deteriorates, then such an action alone amount to mental cruelty. The Hon’ble Supreme judgment Samar Chosh v. Jaya Ghosh (2007) 2 MLJ 1185 : 2007 (3) ALT 62 has observed as follows at p. 1209 of MLJ: “68. Human mind is extremely complex and human behaviour is equally complicated. Similarly human ingenuity has no bound, therefore, to assimilate the entire human behaviour in our definition is almost impossible. What is cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in other case. The concept of cruelty differs person to person depending upon his upbringing, level of sensitivity, educational, family and cultural background, financial position, social status, customs, traditions, religious beliefs, human values and their value system. 69. Apart from this, the concept of mental cruelty cannot remain static. It is bound to change with the passage of time, impact of modern culture through print and electronic media and value system etc. etc. what may be mental cruelty now may not remain a mental cruelty after a passage of time or vice versa. There can never be any strait-jacket formula of fixed parameters for determining mental cruelty in matrimonial matters. The prudent and appropriate way to adjudicate the case would be to evaluate it on its peculiar facts and circumstances while taking aforementioned factors in consideration. 70. No uniform standard can ever be laid down for guidance, yet we deem it appropriate to enumerate some instance of human behaviour which may be relevant in dealing with the cases of ‘mental cruelty’. The instances indicated in the succeeding paragraphs are only illustrative and not exhaustive. .(i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life of the parties, acute mental pain, agony and suffering as would not make possible for the parties to live with each other could come within the broad parameters of mental cruelty. .(ii) On comprehensive appraisal of the entire matrimonial life of the parties. It becomes abundantly clear that situation is such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with other party. (iii) Mere coldness or lack of affection cannot amount to cruelty, frequent rudeness of language, petulance of manner, indifference and neglect may reach such a degree that it makes the married life for the other spouse absolutely intolerable. .(iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. (iii) Mere coldness or lack of affection cannot amount to cruelty, frequent rudeness of language, petulance of manner, indifference and neglect may reach such a degree that it makes the married life for the other spouse absolutely intolerable. .(iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of deep anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of other for a long time may lead to mental cruelty. .(v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating treatment calculated to torture, discommode or render miserable life of the spouse. .(vi) Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of one spouse actually affecting physical and mental health of the other spouse. The treatment complained of and the resultant danger or apprehension must be very grave, sustained and weighty. (vii) Sustained reprehensible conduct, studied neglect in difference or total departure from the normal standard of conjugal kindness causing injury to mental health or deriving sadistic pleasure can also amount to mental cruelty. (viii) The conduct must be much more than jealousy, selfishness, possessiveness, which causes unhappiness and dissatisfaction and emotional upset may not be a ground for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty. .(ix) Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of the married life which happens in day to day life would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty. .(x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole and a few isolated instances over a period of years will not amount to cruelty. The ill-conduct must be persistent for a fairly lengthy period, where the relationship has deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and behaviour of a spouse, the wronged party finds it extremely difficult to live with the other party any longer, may amount to mental cruelty. .(xi) If a husband submits himself for an operation of sterilization without medical reasons and without the consent of knowledge of his wife and similarly if the wife undergoes vasectomy or abortion without medical reason or without the consent of knowledge of her husband, such an act of the spouse may lead to mental cruelty. (xii) Unilateral decision of refusal to have intercourse for considerable period without there being any physical incapacity or valid reason may amount to mental cruelty. (xii) Unilateral decision of refusal to have intercourse for considerable period without there being any physical incapacity or valid reason may amount to mental cruelty. (xiii) Unilateral decision of either husband or wife after marriage not to have child from the marriage may amount to cruelty. (xiv). Where there has been a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie, the law in such cases, does not serve the sanctity of marriage, on the contrary. It shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the parties. In such like situations, it may lead to mental cruelty.” Applying the said principles to the facts of the case, we are of the opinion that the respondent has not made out a case for both mental and physical cruelty. 23. The learned counsel for the respondent Ms. K. Santhakumari has relied upon the following judgments: .(i) InBhagavan Prasad v. Chandramaul AIR 1966 SC 735 para 9 to 10. .(ii) In Smt. Savitri Balchandani v. Mulchand Balachandani AIR 1987 Delhi 52. (iii) In Sh. Ashok Sharma v. Smt. Santosh Sharma AIR 1987 Delhi 63. .(iv) In Mv. R II (2001) DMC 556 .(v) In G.V.N. Kameswara Rao v. G. Jabilli (supra) and .(vi) In Indu Mishra v. Kovid Kumar Gaur and another I (2007) DMC 427 (DB). The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the serious allegations made in the counter filed by the appellant by itself would amount to cruelty warranting a divorce. 24. As observed earlier in the present case on hand, the appellant has no where stated either in her pleadings or in evidence in clear terms about the alleged illicit relationship. The Court below has given undue importance to specific words mentioned in the counter affidavit without considering the entire pleadings in order to understand the case of the appellant. In all these cases referred by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent, the allegations made by a party are not proved. However, in the present case, the respondent himself has not stated in his pleadings about the harassment caused by the petitioner regarding the illicit relationship. In all these cases referred by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent, the allegations made by a party are not proved. However, in the present case, the respondent himself has not stated in his pleadings about the harassment caused by the petitioner regarding the illicit relationship. Hence, on a consideration of the above said facts coupled with the other available evidence, we are of the considered view that no ground is made out for granting divorce on the ground of cruelty in favour of the respondent. 25. In judgment in Valsamma Paul v. Cochin University AIR 1996 SC 1011 : (1996) 3 SCC 545 Vol.3, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as follows: “A judge must be a jurist endowed with the legislator’s wisdom, historian’s search for truth, prophet’s vision capacity to respond to the needs of the present, resilience to cope with the demands of the future to decide objectively disengaging himself/herself from every personal influence or predilections.” Similarly, in a recent judgment in Director (studies). Dr. Ambedkar Institute of Hotel Management, Nutrition & Catering Technology, Chandigarh and Others v. Vaibhav Singh Chauhan (2009) 1 SCC 59, the Apex Court has held as follows: “14. Here again, we respectfully cannot approve of the above observation of the learned single Judge. A Judge is supposed to keep his personal views in the background and not inject them in the judgments. What was done in his student days was surely irrelevant for deciding the case or even passing an interim order.” Therefore, on a consideration of the above said position of law, we are of the opinion that the Court below has completely mis-directed itself by granting a decree for divorce. 26. In the present case on hand, admittedly, there was a male child born out of a wedlock between the parties. The learned counsel for the appellant produced documents to show that the child is a special child requiring continuous treatment. He is suffering from AUTISM and requires special Psycho Educational Treatment including speech therapy and behaviour therapy. The learned counsel further submitted that the child is undergoing treatment continuously, the said fact is also not disputed by the learned counsel for the respondent, it is seen from the records that in the interim order granted by this Court pending appeal the respondent was directed to pay a sum of Rs.2,000/-per month to the child. The learned counsel further submitted that the child is undergoing treatment continuously, the said fact is also not disputed by the learned counsel for the respondent, it is seen from the records that in the interim order granted by this Court pending appeal the respondent was directed to pay a sum of Rs.2,000/-per month to the child. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that after eight months of compliance, the said amount has not been paid. The learned counsel for the respondent fairly submitted that all the arrears would be paid as ordered by this Court. 27. In this connection, we would like to refer Section 26 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The said provision is extracted here under. “Custody of Children: In any proceedings under this Act, the Court may, from time to time, pass such interim orders and make such provisions in the decree as it may deem just and proper with respect to the custody, maintenance and education of minor children, consistently with their wishes, wherever possible, and may, alter the decree, upon application by petition for the purpose, make from time-to-time, all such orders and provisions with decree, shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within sixty days from the date of service of notice on the respondent.” A reading of the above said Section would show that in any proceedings under the Act, the Court can pass interim orders and make provision in the decree fixing the just and proper amount towards maintenance and education of the minor child. The provision also provides for passing appropriate orders, not only pending proceedings and even after the decree is passed. When such a power is conferred under Section 26 of Hindu Marriages Act, for the pending proceedings and after passing of the decree to pass appropriate orders, in the interest of minor, the said power can also be exercised while passing a decree as well. 28. In the judgment in Padmja Sharma v. Ratan Lal Sharma AIR 2000 SC 1398 : (2000) 4 SCC 266 , the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as follows: “Maintenance has not been defined in the Act or between the parents whose duty it is to maintain the children. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Hindu Minority and guardianship Act, 1956. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Hindu Minority and guardianship Act, 1956. Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 and Hindu succession Act, 1956 constituted a law in a coded form for the Hindus. Unless there is anything repugnant to the context definition of a particular word could be lifted from any of the four Acts constituting the law to interpret a certain conducting the law to interpret a certain provision. All these Acts are to be read in conjunction with one another and interpreted accordingly. We can, therefore, go to Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (for short the Maintenance Act) to understand the meaning of the ‘maintenance’. In Clause (b) of Section 3 of this Act “Maintenance includes (i) in all cases. Provisions for food, clothing, residence, education and medical attendance and treatment; (ii) in the case of an unmarried daughter also the reasonable expenses of and incident to her marriage.” And under clause (c) “minor” means a person who has not completed his or her age of eighteen years.” Under Section 18 of Maintenance Act, a Hindu wife shall be entitled to be maintained by her husband during her life time. This is course subject to certain conditions with which are not concerned. Section 20 provides for maintenance of children and aged parents. Under this Sections a Hindu is bound, during his or her life time to maintain his or her children. A minor child so long as he is minor can (sic) claim maintenance from his or her father or mother. Section 20 is therefore, to be contrasted with Section 18. Under this Section it is as much the obligation of the father to maintain a minor child as that of the mother. It is not the law that how affluent mother may be it is the obligation only of the father to maintain the minor.” 29. On consideration of the above said judgment, it is clear that in order to consider the maintenance of a minor child, one has to see the various enactment such as Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 and Hindu Succession Act 1956 and take advantage of any of the provisions contained therein. In other words, the above said enactments should be read as a whole for granting the relief to the child. Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 and Hindu Succession Act 1956 and take advantage of any of the provisions contained therein. In other words, the above said enactments should be read as a whole for granting the relief to the child. Admittedly, in the present case on hand, the child is a minor and a special one. Hence, taking into consideration of the above said facts, we are of the opinion that while reversing the judgment and decree of the Court below, in the interest of the child, a sum of Rs.3,000/- per month is directed to be paid by the respondent, considering the position of the child which requires continuous treatment till the possible reunion between the parties. 30. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is hereby allowed and the judgment and decree passed in O.P.No.866 of 1998 on the file of the First Additional Principal Family Court, Chennai is set aside with a direction to the respondent to pay a sum of Rs.3,000/- per month to the appellant to be used for the welfare of the child until the possible reunion between the parties. 31. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. No costs.