ORDER Viney Mittal, J. 1. The defendant is in first appeal. 2. The facts leading to the present controversy may be noticed. The plaintiffs, who are the legal heirs of one Sukhram (brother of defendant Ganpat), filed a suit for possession of a house at Ujjain, claiming-themselves to be the owners thereof. The aforesaid suit was filed on February 17, 1992. It was pleaded by the plaintiffs that the house in question was originally owned by Panchamji, their grandfather (father of Sukhram and Ganpat), who according to the plaintiffs had died on February 16, 1983 (the said date of death of Panchamji was disputed by the defendant, who claim that Panchamji had died on March 2, 1977). 3. According to the plaintiffs, Panchamji had left behind a Will dated January 14, 1977, bequeathing the said house to Sukhram as exclusive owner. After the death of Sukhram, the house in question had been succeeded by the plaintiffs. It was pleaded that the defendant had been living in the said house with the consent of Sukhram, being his real brother but had absolutely no legal right to retain the possession of the house. It was further pleaded by the plaintiffs that earlier a suit was filed with regard to the house in question, by defendant-Ganpat, claiming a declaration and ownership of the said house. However, on setting up a Will of Panchamji, dated January 14, 1977, by Sukhram and the present plaintiffs, the said suit was dismissed on August 25, 1990. Consequently, the plaintiffs claimed the possession of the suit property. 4. The suit was contested by the defendant. Although he admitted that the house in question was originally owned by Panchamji, his father, but he denied the execution of the Will dated January 14,1997 by Panchamji, in favour of Sukhram. He also claimed that the suit filed by the plaintiffs was barred by limitation. A plea was also set up by him to the effect that he had become the owner of the said house, by way of adverse possession. 5. The Trial Court framed the necessary issues, arising out of the pleadings of the parties, such as, with regard to the execution of the Will by Panchamji, in favour of Sukhram; whether the suit had been filed within limitation; whether the defendant Ganpat had acquired the ownership of the suit property, by way of adverse possession. 6. 5. The Trial Court framed the necessary issues, arising out of the pleadings of the parties, such as, with regard to the execution of the Will by Panchamji, in favour of Sukhram; whether the suit had been filed within limitation; whether the defendant Ganpat had acquired the ownership of the suit property, by way of adverse possession. 6. Through the judgment and decree dated November 16, 2000, the suit filed by the plaintiffs, has been decreed by the Trial Court. It has been held that as per the earlier litigation between the parties, the due execution of the Will by Panchamji in favour of Sukhram had been upheld by the Trial Court and the said judgment of the Trial Court had been upheld in first appeal as well as the second appeal. It has also been held that the suit filed by the plaintiffs was not barred by limitation. With regard to the plea raised by the defendant that he had matured his title, by way of adverse possession, the Trial Court has held that the hostile possession set up by the defendant had not matured into a title, as yet. 7. It is in these circumstances, that the defendant has chosen to file the present first appeal. 8. I have heard Shri M.K. Jain, learned Counsel for the respondent-appellant and Shri S.K. Shastri, learned Counsel for the plaintiff-respondents, and with their assistance have also gone through the record of the case. 9. At the commencement of the arguments, Shri M.K. Jain, learned Counsel for the defendant-appellant has argued that while filing a suit on February 17, 1992, the plaintiffs had given a wrong date of death of Panchamji, when it had been stated that he had died on February 16, 1983, whereas, in fact, the death certificate produced by the defendant clearly indicated that Panchamji had died on March 2, 1977. According to the learned Counsel, if Panchamji is taken to have died on March 2, 1977, as proved, then obviously, the suit filed by the plaintiffs on February 17, 1992, was clearly barred by limitation. 10. According to the learned Counsel, if Panchamji is taken to have died on March 2, 1977, as proved, then obviously, the suit filed by the plaintiffs on February 17, 1992, was clearly barred by limitation. 10. The learned Counsel for the defendant-appellant has vehemently argued that a plea of adverse possession has been raised by the defendant-appellant, when it has been pleaded that in the year 1977 itself a dispute with regard to the house in question had taken place, between the two brothers Sukhram and Ganpat, and a Panchayat had intervened to resolve the said dispute. A Panchayatnama was written. Shri Jain states that the aforesaid evidence clearly indicates that in the year 1977 itself the defendant had set up a title to the suit property, and therefore, for all practical purposes, the limitation for computing the period of adverse possession of the defendant has to be considered from the said date only. 11. According to the learned Counsel, mere filing of a civil suit by the defendant Ganpat himself, earlier, would be of no consequence, in as much as, Sukhram or his heirs, at no stage, were prevented from, themselves filing a suit for possession, even during the pendency of the said suit filed by Ganpat. According to Shri Jain, a suit for possession should have been filed by Sukhram or his legal heirs within 12 years from the year 1977 only, and as such the present suit filed by the plaintiffs is liable to be treated as barred by limitation. Learned Counsel points out that the Trial Court has erred in law in treating the time for accrual of cause of action, as November 28, 1991, i.e., the date of serving of a notice by the present defendant to the plaintiffs, before filing of the earlier suit. 12. Shri Jain has also argued that limitation, once it starts to run, does not stop, and therefore, since the claim of title had been set up by defendant Ganpat in the year 1977 itself, therefore, the period of 12 years for maturity of his title by adverse possession has to be counted from the said time. 13. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the aforesaid contentions of the learned Counsel for the defendant-appellant, but find myself unable to agree with the same. 14. 13. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the aforesaid contentions of the learned Counsel for the defendant-appellant, but find myself unable to agree with the same. 14. The facts are not in dispute, except with regard to the date of death of Panchamji. Whereas plaintiffs have claimed that Panchamji had died on February 16, 1983, the defendant has produced a death certificate of Panchamji claiming his date of death as March 2, 1977. However, in my considered view, the date of death of Panchamji would be absolutely irrelevant for the controversy in hand, the only issue for adjudication being, whether the defendant has perfected his title by adverse possession. It is not in dispute that on an earlier occasion, in the year 1977, defendant Ganpat had set up some title to the house in question. The said claim of Ganpat was disputed by Sukhram. Thus, a dispute arose between the two brothers, at that point of time. Since a threat to his alleged title was perceived by Ganpat, having been challenged by Sukhram, he chose to file a civil suit on November 28, 1981 against Sukhram and his family members. A declaration of title qua the house in question was sought by him. It was claimed by him that the house in question was the joint ownership of his father Panchamji and his mother Hariyabai, and after death of Panchamji, had been succeeded by Hariyabai exclusively. Ganpat set up a Will, alleged to have been executed by Hariyabai in his favour. In the said civil suit, Sukhram etc. filed a written statement. They set up a Will dated January 14, 1977, executed by Panchamji in favour of Sukhram, with regard to the house in question. The said Will was accepted by the Trial Court and the claim of Ganpat was rejected, when the suit filed by him was dismissed on August 25, 1990. Consequently, the claim of Ganpat was rejected. The aforesaid judgment dated August 25, 1990 is Exh. P-5 on the record of the case. It is also not in dispute that after the judgment of the Trial Judge, the parties continued the litigation in first appeal as well as second appeal, thereafter as well. 15. Consequently, the claim of Ganpat was rejected. The aforesaid judgment dated August 25, 1990 is Exh. P-5 on the record of the case. It is also not in dispute that after the judgment of the Trial Judge, the parties continued the litigation in first appeal as well as second appeal, thereafter as well. 15. In these circumstances, at the most what can be inferred is that Ganpat had remained in possession of the suit property from the year 1977 till November 28, 1981 when the earlier suit was filed by him. However, parties were litigating in the Civil Court. Apparently, prior to the filing of the earlier suit itself, the title of Ganpat was being continuously challenged by Sukhram. It was only because of that reason that Ganpat felt the need of filing the earlier civil suit. In these circumstances, it would be totally wrong to suggest that during the pendency of the said civil suit, first appeal or the second appeal, i.e., from the year 1981 till the decision of the Second Appeal, somewhere in the year 1991, the possession of the defendant could be taken to have matured into a title, by way of adverse possession. 16. It is well settled that an adverse possession has to have a characteristic of adequacy, continuity and exclusiveness. The possession of a person can only be treated to be adverse to the true owner if it is hostile possession, i.e., a possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of the title of the true owner. A person who sets up an adverse possession has to prove not only the ouster of the true owner, from actual and physical possession, but also is required to prove his hostile intention; long and uninterrupted possession; and exercise of right of exclusive ownership openly to the knowledge of the true owner. 17. At this stage, it would be relevant to extract certain observations of the Supreme Court in the various judgments. 18. In Amrendra Pratap Singh v. Tej Bahadur Prajapali and Ors. (2004) 10 SCC 65 , it was observed: 22. Every possession is not, in law, adverse possession. 17. At this stage, it would be relevant to extract certain observations of the Supreme Court in the various judgments. 18. In Amrendra Pratap Singh v. Tej Bahadur Prajapali and Ors. (2004) 10 SCC 65 , it was observed: 22. Every possession is not, in law, adverse possession. Under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, a suit for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title can be instituted within a period of twelve years calculated from the date when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. By virtue of section 27 of the Limitation Act, on the determination of the period limited by the Act to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property stands extinguished. The process of acquisition of title by adverse possession springs into action essentially by default or inaction of the owner. A person, though having no right to enter into possession of the property of someone else, does so and continues in possession setting up title in himself and adversely to the title of owner, commences prescribing title on to himself and such prescription having continued for a period of twelve years, he acquires title not on his own but on account of the default or inaction on the part of the real owner, which stretched over a period of twelve years, results in extinguishing of the latter's title. It is that extinguished title of the real owner which comes to vest in the wrongdoer. The law does not intend to confer any premium on the wrongdoing of a person in wrongful possession; it pronounces the penalty of extinction of title on the person who though entitled to assert his right and remove the wrongdoer and re-enter into possession, has defaulted and remained inactive for a period of twelve years, which the law considers reasonable for attracting the said penalty. Inaction for a period of twelve years is treated by the doctrine of adverse possession as evidence of the loss of desire on the part of the rightful owner to assert his ownership and reclaim possession. (Underlining supplied) 19. In the case of Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India and Ors. Inaction for a period of twelve years is treated by the doctrine of adverse possession as evidence of the loss of desire on the part of the rightful owner to assert his ownership and reclaim possession. (Underlining supplied) 19. In the case of Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India and Ors. (2004) 10 SCC 779 , it was observed: Adverse possession is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of the true owner. It is a well-settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is "nec vi, nec dam, nec precario", that is, peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period. (Underlining done) 20. Again in the case of T. Anjanappa and Ors. v. Somalingappa and Anr. (2006) 7 SCC 570 , it was held as follows: 12. The concept of adverse possession contemplates a hostile possession, i.e., a possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of the title of the true owner. Possession to be adverse must be possession by a person who does not acknowledge the other's rights but denies them. The principle of law is firmly established that a person who bases his title on adverse possession must show by clear and unequivocal evidence that his possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to denial of his title to the property claimed. For deciding whether the alleged acts of a person constituted adverse possession, the animus of the person doing those acts is the most crucial factor. Adverse possession is commenced in wrong and is aimed against right. A person is said to hold the property adversely to the real owner when that person in denial of the owner's right excluded him from the enjoyment of his property. (Underlining supplied) 21. In the case of P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy and Ors. v. Revamma and Ors. (2007) 6 SCC 59 , the Supreme Court observed: 5. A person is said to hold the property adversely to the real owner when that person in denial of the owner's right excluded him from the enjoyment of his property. (Underlining supplied) 21. In the case of P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy and Ors. v. Revamma and Ors. (2007) 6 SCC 59 , the Supreme Court observed: 5. Adverse possession in one sense is based on the theory or presumption that the owner has abandoned the property to the adverse possessor on the acquiescence of the owner to the hostile acts and claims of the person in possession. It follows that sound qualities of a typical adverse possession lie in it being open, continuous and hostile. It was further observe: 8. Therefore, to assess a clam of adverse possession, two-pronged enquiry is required: 1. Application of limitation provision thereby jurisprudentially "wilful neglect" element on part of the owner established. Successful application in this regard distances the title of the land from the paper-owner. 2. Specific positive intention to dispossess on the part of the adverse possessor effectively shifts the title already distanced from the paper-owner, to the adverse possessor. Right thereby accrues in favour of adverse possessor as intent to dispossess is an express statement of urgency and intention in the upkeep of the property. (Underlining done) From the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court, it is clear that Sukhram or his heirs, at no stage, had remained inactive, in as much as, in the earlier suit filed by Ganpat, they had specifically asserted their own title to the suit property. From the said fact alone, it has to be inferred that the true owner, at no stage, remained inactive or had wilfully neglected his title, so as to give a justification to Ganpat to have matured his title by adverse possession. 22. Still further, it would be relevant to notice that at no stage, after the year 1977 itself, which is claimed to be starting point of the hostile title by Ganpat, he had ever admitted Sukhram or his heirs to be the true owner, of the suit property. It is only in a situation when the hostile title is set up against a true owner, openly and to the knowledge of the true owner, and by admitting the true ownership, a claim for adverse possession may arise. It is only in a situation when the hostile title is set up against a true owner, openly and to the knowledge of the true owner, and by admitting the true ownership, a claim for adverse possession may arise. In the present case, at no stage, the ownership of Sukhram or his heirs was ever admitted by Ganpat. Thus, essential ingredients of adverse possession being missing, the plea of adverse possession taken by Ganpat cannot be accepted. 23. In the present case, as noticed above, although in the year 1977, defendant Ganpat had set up some title to the house in question, but there was a challenge to the said title by Sukhram, which led Ganpat in filing a Civil Suit on November 28, 1981. He set up a Will alleged to have been executed by his mother Hariyabai, but failed. On the other hand, the Will set up by Sukhram executed by Panchamji was accepted. Thus, it cannot be suggested that the assertion of title by Ganpat, though in actual physical possession of the suit property, was without any challenge by the true owner. A mere physical possession of a person, setting up by a hostile title, cannot be taken to be in peaceful and uninterrupted possession, when a challenge in appropriate proceedings is raised by the true owner by taking up appropriate pleas. 24. Although a strong reliance has been placed by learned Counsel for the appellant on some Panchayatnama, shown to have been executed between Ganpat and Sukhram in the year 1977, but the Trial Court itself has rejected the same on the ground that the same had not been proved properly. Thus, no reliance whatsoever, could be permitted to be placed on such a document, even before this Court. Even otherwise, I feel that as per the above discussion, the said document is even irrelevant for the claim raised by the defendants. 25. In the present case, when Ganpat had filed a civil suit on November 28, 1981, against Sukhram and his family, then in the written statement filed by Sukhram etc., they set up a Will shown to have been executed by Panchamji. The said Will set up by Sukhram was duly accepted by the Civil Court, when the suit filed by the Ganpat was dismissed on August 25, 1990. First Appeal/Second Appeal against the said judgment were also dismissed by the Appellate Courts. 26. The said Will set up by Sukhram was duly accepted by the Civil Court, when the suit filed by the Ganpat was dismissed on August 25, 1990. First Appeal/Second Appeal against the said judgment were also dismissed by the Appellate Courts. 26. Consequently, uptill the year 1991, there was a continuous challenge to the title of the defendant Ganpat by Sukhram or his heirs, when the said litigation continued. Obviously, in such circumstances, it cannot be suggested that Ganpat had been able to prove his peaceful, uninterpreted and continuous hostile possession, to the knowledge of the true owner, for a period of more than 12 years and that the true owners had remained inactive. 27. To be fair to the learned Counsel, reliance placed by him upon a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Vasantiben Prahladji Nayat v. Somnath Muljibhai Nayak AIR 2004 SC 1893 , and upon a judgment of the Single Bench of this Court in the case of Raghuwardayal v. Tulsiram 1982 MPWN SN 296, be also noticed. 28. In the aforesaid judgments, it has been held that when the plaintiffs had not filed a suit for possession within 12 years from the date the possession of the defendant had become adverse, then such a suit has to be treated to be barred by limitation, and that the starting point of limitation for commencing the adverse possession would be the date when the right of possession arises to the plaintiffs. 29. There is no quarrel with the aforesaid proposition of law. However, in the present case, as noticed above, the suit in question had been filed immediately after the earlier litigation had ended in favour of Sukhram and his heirs. When the matter had remained pending in the Courts with regard to title set up by Ganpat, and the same was being duly contested by Sukhram and his heirs, then obviously, it cannot be suggested that Sukhram or his heirs were required to file suit for possession, even when the said adjudication had not attained finality. 30. Lastly, it has been argued by Shri Jain that limitation once started cannot be suspended and therefore, since a cause of action had arisen to Sukhram to file a suit in the year 1977 itself, therefore, the present suit filed in the year 1992 is clearly barred by limitation. 30. Lastly, it has been argued by Shri Jain that limitation once started cannot be suspended and therefore, since a cause of action had arisen to Sukhram to file a suit in the year 1977 itself, therefore, the present suit filed in the year 1992 is clearly barred by limitation. In fact, the aforesaid argument has already been dealt with in detail, as per the earlier discussion. It may be noticed that in the present case, the suit has been filed by the plaintiffs on the basis of title. As per Article 65 of the Limitation Act, no period of limitation has been prescribed for such a suit for possession on the basis of title. The only requirement of Article 65 of the Limitation Act is that a suit for possession has to be filed within a period of 12 years, when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse. Since in the present case, the possession of Sukhram cannot be held to be adverse at all till the year 1991, the suit filed by the present plaintiffs on February 17, 1992 cannot be held to be barred by limitation. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I do not find any merit in the present appeal. The same is hereby dismissed.