Judgment Mehinder Singh Sullar, J. 1. This criminal appeal has been directed by Randhir Singh son of amar Singh-appellant-convict (hereinafter to be referred as "the appellant"), against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 4.5.1999, vide which, the trial Judge, has convicted and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 10 years, to pay a fine of Rs.1 lac and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year, for the commission of offence punishable under section 15 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short "the Act" ). 2. The facts barely needed, culminating in the commencement of, relevant for disposal of present appeal and emanating from the record, as unfolded during the trial, are that on 4.1.1997 at about 10.30 A. M. , the police party headed by pw8 ASI Rajender Singh consisted of PW6 HC Bhup Singh, UGC Matadin and constable Suresh Kumar, was present at the Bus-stand of Jhajjar. One person carrying a bag in his hand alighted from the bus. On the basis of suspicion, he was apprehended. He was told that he might be in possession of some intoxicant substance. PW8 apprised him his statutory right to be searched in the presence of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate. As the accused was stated to have reposed his faith in the police party, therefore, his search was conducted. According to the prosecution, in the wake of search, 6 Kgs. of Poppy Husk (choora post) was recovered from his bag, out of which, one sample of 500 grams was taken out. The sample and remaining poppy husk were sealed in separate parcels and were taken into possession vide recovery memo (Ex. PC ). The ruqqa (Ex. PE) was sent to the police station for registration of the case. The Investigating Officer recorded the statements of the witnesses and completed all other formalities at the spot. The accused, case property and witnesses were produced before the SHO of the concerned police Station and after verifying the facts, he put his seal on the parcels. The case property was then deposited with the MHC with seals intact. In due course, the sample was sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Haryana, madhuban for its examination. The accused, case property and witnesses were produced before the SHO of the concerned police Station and after verifying the facts, he put his seal on the parcels. The case property was then deposited with the MHC with seals intact. In due course, the sample was sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Haryana, madhuban for its examination. On receipt of report of Chemical Examiner, the sample was found to be that of Poppy Husk (choora post ). 3. Levelling a variety of allegations, in all, according to the prosecution that as 6 kgs. of poppy husk was recovered from the possession of the appellant without any permit or licence, therefore, he was liable to be punished under section 15 of the Act. On the basis of aforesaid allegations and in the wake of ruqqa, the present case was registered against the appellant vide FIR No.4 dated 4.1.1997, on accusation of having committed the offence punishable under section 15 of the Act by the police of Police Station Jhajjar, in the manner indicated here-in-above. 4. Having completed all the codal formalities, the appellant was charge sheeted for commission of offence under section 15 of the Act by the trial Judge, vide order dated 3.10.1997. As the appellant did not plead guilty and claimed trial, therefore, the case was slated for evidence of the prosecution. 5. The prosecution, in order to substantiate the charge framed against the appellant, examined PW1 HC Siri Niwas, PW2 Constable Krishan Kumar, PW3 HC Daya nand, PW4 HC Jagbir Singh, PW5 SI Ranbir Singh, PW6 HC Bhup Singh, PW7 SI Brij lal and PW8 ASI Rajender Singh in oral evidence. The prosecution has also tendered affidavit of HC Siri Niwas Ex. PA, affidavit of Krishan Kumar Ex. PB, affidavit of Daya Nand Ex. PC, report of FSL Ex. PD, ruqqa ex. PE, formal FIR Ex. PE/1, endorsement Ex. PE/2, report u/s 173 Cr. PC Ex. PF, notice under section 50 of the Act Ex. PG, endorsement made by the accused Ex. PG/1, notice Ex. P1, recovery memo Ex. PH and site plan Ex. PJ in documentary evidence. 6. After the close of the prosecution evidence, statement of the appellant was recorded as contemplated under section 313 Cr. PC, but he stoutly denied the prosecution version in its entirety and pleaded false implication. 7. The Trial Judge convicted and sentenced the appellant, in the manner indicated here-in-above. 8. PH and site plan Ex. PJ in documentary evidence. 6. After the close of the prosecution evidence, statement of the appellant was recorded as contemplated under section 313 Cr. PC, but he stoutly denied the prosecution version in its entirety and pleaded false implication. 7. The Trial Judge convicted and sentenced the appellant, in the manner indicated here-in-above. 8. The appellant did not feel satisfied with the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence and filed the present appeal. That is how, I am seized of the matter. 9. At the very out set, learned counsel for the appellant has contended with some amount of vehemence that the story of the prosecution is highly improbable, although the recovery is from a very busy place i. e. main Bus stand, Jhajjar, but no independent person, though available, was joined by the investigating Officer at the time of recovery. The argument further proceeds that the mandatory provisions of the Act have not been complied with by the investigating agency at the time of the alleged recovery, which cast shadow of doubt on the prosecution story. 10. Raising a variety of arguments, in all, according to learned counsel for the appellant that since the evidence brought on record by the prosecution is discrepant and untrustworthy, therefore, the appellant deserves to be acquitted. 11. On the contrary, learned State counsel has urged that chain of evidence of prosecution is complete by reliable evidence and thus the prosecution was successful and fully proved its case against the appellant. 12. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, having gone through the evidence on record with their valuable help and after bestowal of thoughts over the entire matter, to my mind, it would be expedient to have a brief resume of the evidence brought on record by the prosecution, in order to decide the real controversy and points involved in this appeal. 13. First of all, PW1 HC Siri Niwas has stated that SI/sho Brij Lal deposited case property with him on 4.1.1997 as MHC of the Police Station. On 9.1.1997, he sent the sample parcel to the Laboratory through Daya Nand Constable No.776. He has proved his affidavit Ex. PA. The evidence of PW2 Constable Krishan Kumar is only to the effect that on 4.1.1997, he had delivered the special report to illaqa Magistrate. He has also produced his affidavit Ex. On 9.1.1997, he sent the sample parcel to the Laboratory through Daya Nand Constable No.776. He has proved his affidavit Ex. PA. The evidence of PW2 Constable Krishan Kumar is only to the effect that on 4.1.1997, he had delivered the special report to illaqa Magistrate. He has also produced his affidavit Ex. PB in this respect. PW3 HC Daya Nand deposed that on 9.1.1997, he had handed over the sample in the laboratory for examination and on return to the Police Station, produced the receipt to MHC. He has also produced his affidavit Ex. PC. Ex. PD is the report of FSL. PW4 HC Jagbir Singh on 4.1.1997 after the receipt of ruqa Ex. PE recorded the formal FIR Ex. PE/1 and sent ruqqa back with his endorsement ex. PE/2. PW5 SI Ranbir Singh has prepared the report Ex. PF on 19.7.1997. 14. Sequelly, PW7 SI Brij Lal has stated that on 4.1.1997 at about 1.30 P. M. , he had reached the Bus stand, Jhajjar, where ASI Rajender Singh had produced the accused before him. He verified the facts and sealed the two parcels with the seal of SN. The seal after use was handed over to ASI Rajender Singh. He forwarded the report of arrest to SP. Thereafter, he reached the police station alongwith the accused at about 5.25 P. M. Accused and case property were handed over to the MHC. 15. The next to note, is the testimony of PW6 HC Bhup Singh, recovery witness and PW8 ASI Rajender Singh, main Investigating Officer, who have, inter-alia, stated that on 4.1.1997, they were present at 10.30 A. M. at Bus stand, Jhajjar. Accused Randhir Singh had alighted from the bus. He was having a bag Ex. P2 in his hand. PW8 informed the accused and served with a notice Ex. PG under section 50 of the Act and apprised the accused of his right of search before a Gazetted officer or a Magistrate. On this, accused had given his option Ex. PG/1 that he may be searched by PW8. Accordingly, in the wake of search, 6 kg. of poppy husk was recovered.500 grams of poppy husk was separated as sample. The sample was sealed separately. The sealed parcel is Ex. P1. The remaining chura post was separately sealed with the seal of rs. The seal after use was handed over to HC Bhup Singh. Accordingly, in the wake of search, 6 kg. of poppy husk was recovered.500 grams of poppy husk was separated as sample. The sample was sealed separately. The sealed parcel is Ex. P1. The remaining chura post was separately sealed with the seal of rs. The seal after use was handed over to HC Bhup Singh. The sealed parcel ex. P1 and bag Ex. P2 were taken into possession vide recovery memo Ex. PH, which was attested by the witnesses. They maintained that SI Brij Lal also reached the spot. After verifying the facts, he had put his seal sn on both the sealed parcels. After use of seal sn, it was handed over to PW8. PW8 recorded the statements of the witnesses and completed the other formalities at the spot. He also sent report Ex. PI to superior officers. 16. Proceeding on these premises, the argument of learned counsel for the appellant that non-joining of independent witness, though available at the Bus stand, Jhajjar, casts a shadow of reasonable doubt on the veracity of the case of the prosecution, has considerable force. It is not a matter of dispute that the alleged recovery of contraband was stated to have been effected from the appellant on 4.1.1997 at 10.30 a. m. from Bus stand, Jhajjar, where many persons were present. But the Investigating agency did not join any independent witness, at the time of recovery. The feeble explanation put forth by PW6 and pw8 that as none wanted to be a witness to a police case, so, no person from the public was joined in the police party, cannot possibly be accepted. No cogent explanation is forth coming on record as to when, how, in what manner and to whom PW8 asked to join the investigation at the time of recovery. In the absence of the same, it cannot possibly be saith that as none wanted to be a witness of the police, so, no person was joined as a witness by the police. On the contrary, it was the duty of the police to join the independent witness at the time of recovery from the Bus stand, Jhajjar, which is surrounded by the shops. 17. Meaning thereby, no effort was made to join an independent witness by the investigating Officer. On the contrary, it was the duty of the police to join the independent witness at the time of recovery from the Bus stand, Jhajjar, which is surrounded by the shops. 17. Meaning thereby, no effort was made to join an independent witness by the investigating Officer. Since the recovery was effected from the Bus stand, jhajjar, which is a busy place, where number of passengers are always available to board and to alight from the buses. A number of public persons must be available at the Bus stand, at shops and stalls located inside and outside the bus-stand. PW8 did not utter even a single word that he made an effort to join the independent witness. Had no independent witness been available, the matter would have been different. In this case, independent witnesses despite availability were not intentionally and deliberately joined by the Investigating officer nor an attempt was made to join them. 18. Keeping, the minimum stringent punishment provided for the offence under the Act into focus and also as per provisions of section 51 of the Act, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding the search, seizure and arrest shall apply to the extent the same are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, therefore, in that eventuality, it was imperative on the part of the Investigating Officer to join an independent witness, at the time of alleged search and seizure or at least to make a genuine, sincere and real effort, to join such a witness. The search and seizure, before an independent witness would have imparted much more authenticity and creditworthiness, to the proceedings, so conducted. It would have also cogently strengthened the prosecution case. The said safeguard to join an independent witness was also intended to avoid criticism of arbitrary and high-handed action of the authorized officer under the Act. 19. It means, the legislature in its wisdom considered it necessary to provide such a statutory safeguard as contemplated in Cr. P. C. , which was made applicable to the Act, to lend credibility to the procedure relating to search and seizure keeping in view the severe punishment prescribed under the Act. Above being the position, it was mandatory for the Investigating Officer to follow the reasonable, fair and just procedure, as envisaged by the Statute and failure to do so, must be viewed with suspicion. Above being the position, it was mandatory for the Investigating Officer to follow the reasonable, fair and just procedure, as envisaged by the Statute and failure to do so, must be viewed with suspicion. The legitimacy of judicial procedure, may come under cloud, if the Court is seen to condone acts of violation of statutory safeguards, violated by the investigating agency, during the period of search and seizure. 20. Possibly, no one can dispute that in the absence of corroboration through an independent source, the evidence of official witnesses cannot be disbelieved or ignored only on the ground of their official status, but when the evidence of official witnesses is found to be not cogent, convincing, reliable and trust-worthy, then on account of non-corroboration thereof through an independent source certainly a doubt is cast on the prosecution version. 21. In the instant case, no implicit reliance can be placed on the prosecution evidence, because admittedly the alleged recovery was effected at 10.30 A. M. from bus stand, Jhajjar on the fateful day by PW6 and PW8. PW7 had reached the spot at about 1.30 P. M. at bus stand, Jhajjar and verified the facts. The accused and case property were handed over by him to the MHC of the police station at 5.30 P. M. PW8 has also admitted that the SHO Brij Lal reached the spot at about 1.30 P. M. PW7 has categorically stated that they ultimately reached the police station at 5.25 P. M. That means, the accused and the case property remained in custody of police at the spot till 5.25 P. M. when the police party reached the police station. No cogent explanation in this respect is forth coming on record, which creates a doubt on the veracity of the prosecution case. Therefore, in this view of the matter, non-corroboration of evidence of the official witnesses through an independent source certainly makes the case of the prosecution doubtful. In such similar circumstances, in case State of Punjab V/s. Bhupinder Singh 2001 (1) RCR (Crl.) 356 (Pandh), a division Bench of this Court, held the case of the prosecution, to be doubtful, on account of non-joining of an independent witness, though the recovery was effected from a busy locality. 22. In such similar circumstances, in case State of Punjab V/s. Bhupinder Singh 2001 (1) RCR (Crl.) 356 (Pandh), a division Bench of this Court, held the case of the prosecution, to be doubtful, on account of non-joining of an independent witness, though the recovery was effected from a busy locality. 22. Likewise, in State of Punjab V/s. Ram Chand 2001 (1) RCR (Crl.) 817, a division Bench of this Court, held that it was imperative to join an independent witness, to vouchsafe the fair investigation. On account of non-joining of an independent witness, it was held that the accused was entitled to be given the benefit of doubt. The ratio of the aforesaid judgments "mutatus mutandi" is fully applicable to the facts of the present case. 23. Again, it is not a matter of dispute that 6 kgs. of poppy husk was recovered from the appellant at 10.30 A. M. on 4.1.1997. The case property was deposited with PW1 MHC Siri Niwas. According to PW1, on 9.1.1997, he had sent the sample parcel for testing at Madhuban through Daya Nand Constable No.776. PW3 HC Daya Nand maintained that on 9.1.1997, he had handed over the sample in fsl Madhuban and receipt was handed over to MHC on the same day. 24. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the investigating agency has violated the standing instructions No.1/88 dated 15.3.1988 issued by the Narcotic Control Bureau, New Delhi. Clause 1.13 of these instructions postulates the mode and time limit for dispatch of sample to Laboratory. As per these instructions, the sample should be sent either by insured post or through special messenger duly authorized for the purpose. The dispatch of samples by registered post or ordinary mail should not be resorted to. The samples must be dispatched to the Laboratory within 72 hours of seizure to avoid any legal objection. Therefore, it was the duty of the Investigating agency to send the sample parcels to the Laboratory within 72 hours of the seizure to avoid any legal objection but in the present case, the samples were admittedly not sent within 72 hours, which were sent after five days. Therefore, it was the duty of the Investigating agency to send the sample parcels to the Laboratory within 72 hours of the seizure to avoid any legal objection but in the present case, the samples were admittedly not sent within 72 hours, which were sent after five days. Thus, the prosecution has violated the instructions issued by Narcotic Control Bureau and no explanation for late sending the samples is forth coming on record, which creates doubt about the veracity of the prosecution version and appellant deserves the benefit of doubt, in view of the observations in case Amar Singh @ Kabu vs. State of Haryana 2008 (4) RCR (Crl.) 440. 25. This is not the end of the matter. The prosecution has also not connected the case property produced in the court with the poppy husk recovered from the appellant. PW6 is a recovery witness, who has admitted that the bag Ex. P2 is not having any seal. The cloth with the seal is lying separate. Sequelly, PW7 has also stated that the bag Ex. P2 is not sealed and the cloth with the seal is lying separately and its bottom portion is damaged and hence separated from the main bag. Likewise, PW8 also maintained that the case property of choora post contained in a polythene bag Ex. P2 is not at present sealed, as the cloth with seal is lying separately as its bottom portion is deleted. Meaning thereby, it is not proved that the bag Ex. P2 is the same bag in which 6 kgs of poppy husk was stated to have been recovered and was firstly sealed by PW8 and thereafter subsequently sealed by PW7. 26. Meaning thereby, it is not proved that the bag Ex. P2 is the same bag in which 6 kgs of poppy husk was stated to have been recovered and was firstly sealed by PW8 and thereafter subsequently sealed by PW7. 26. Thus, it would be seen that if the fact of non-joining of independent witness, though available, by the police at the time of recovery from the appellant from the main bus-stand, Jhajjar, absence of corroboration from independent source, improbability of the prosecution version, delay in sending the sample to the Laboratory, non-production/non-connection of the case property in the Court with the alleged recovery of poppy husk from the appellant and totality of other facts and circumstances, emerging out of the evidence on record, as discussed here-in-above, are put together, then, to my mind, an irresistible and inescapable conclusion is that the evidence brought on record by the prosecution falls short, as is required to prove a criminal charge against the appellant, where minimum stringent punishment is provided under the Act. Hence, since the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the charge framed against him, so, to me, the appellant deserves the benefit of reasonable doubt. 27. In the light of the aforesaid reasons, the appeal is hereby accepted, impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence are set aside. Having extended the benefit of reasonable doubt, the appellant is acquitted of the charge framed against him.