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2010 DIGILAW 4335 (MAD)

G. Shanthi v. C. Subramaniam

2010-09-28

R.SUBBIAH

body2010
Judgment :- 1. The unsuccessful plaintiff in both the courts below is the appellant herein, who filed this second appeal, challenging the decree and judgment dated 06.12.2001 passed by the learned III Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, in A.S.No.139 of 2000, whereby the decree and judgment dated 02.12.1999 passed by the learned II Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, in O.S.No.15487 of 1996, were affirmed. 2. The appellant instituted the suit in O.S.No.15487 of 1996 against the respondent herein, to grant a permanent injunction restraining the respondent/defendant from transferring the suit property to anyone either in full or in part. 3. The case of the plaintiff, in brief, was as follows: The suit property-a vacant land measuring to an extent of 2141 sq.ft. situated in No.1/1, adjacent to HIG Block-I, Rajaram Colony, Kodambakkam, was allotted to the defendant by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board (in short TNHB) in an auction and the same was confirmed by the TNHB on 12.11.1987 and the allotment was re-affirmed by a decree for specific performance dated 10.11.1993 granted in C.S.No.1643 of 1992 by this Court. Though there was a decree in favour of the defendant, the Board has not conveyed the same to him. The defendant, who was constructing a house at Choolaimedu for his residential purpose during that period, was facing financial commitments and he was in need of funds to complete the construction and apart from that, there was an undue delay on the part of the TNHB in executing the conveyance in his favour and as such, he decided to sell the suit property. The plaintiff came to know that and after negotiation, an agreement of sale was entered into between the parties on 14.07.1994 by fixing the sale consideration at Rs.10 lakhs and an advance of Rs.2.50 lakhs was paid to the defendant on the same day. In that agreement, the defendant had agreed to take necessary steps for getting the conveyance deed executed in his favour by the TNHB or the High Court as the case may be, and after such execution, the plaintiff had to pay the balance of sale consideration within two months and also fulfil the other obligations cast upon her in that agreement. Though the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform her part of the agreement, the defendant was unable to perform his part. Though the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform her part of the agreement, the defendant was unable to perform his part. Whenever the plaintiff demanded to take action, the defendant persuaded her to take up the responsibility of getting the conveyance of the suit property in his favour through her political influence, if any, and also agreed to refund a sum of Rs.2 lakhs from the advance amount and had also agreed to bear any incidental expenses to the tune of Rs.75,000/-in obtaining the conveyance in his favour. Thereafter, another agreement of sale was entered into on 19.04.1995 in her favour and as per clause 9 in the said agreement, an amount of Rs.75,000/-was permitted to be spent by her towards incidental expenses in obtaining the conveyance in favour of the defendant, which should be reimbursed by him. At the time of execution of the second agreement, the defendant had refunded a sum of Rs.2 lakhs as agreed earlier and retained the balance amount. As per clause 11, the option to rescind the agreement of sale has been given to the plaintiff, but she never exercised the same at any point of time. Thereafter, the plaintiff had taken sincere efforts to get the sale deed executed in favour of the defendant by the TNHB and he was apprised with the progress then and there. But, the defendant, with an ulterior motive, had decided to rescind the agreement of sale on the false plea of frustration, by issuing a letter dated 06.11.1996 along with a bankers cheque for a sum of Rs.1,00,000/-representing the balance amount with interest. On receipt of the legal notice, the plaintiff sent a reply on 27.11.1996 demanding the specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 19.04.1995. Since the defendant has not come forward to comply with the demand, she had filed the suit for a permanent injunction stating that since the agreement of sale was not opposed to public policy, the defendant was bound to perform his part of the contract. 4. The case of the plaintiff was resisted by the defendant by filing a written statement stating that though the auction was confirmed by the Board on 12.11.1987, the allotment was cancelled by its letter dated 04.10.1990 and against which, he filed an appeal to the Government and the same was pending. 4. The case of the plaintiff was resisted by the defendant by filing a written statement stating that though the auction was confirmed by the Board on 12.11.1987, the allotment was cancelled by its letter dated 04.10.1990 and against which, he filed an appeal to the Government and the same was pending. Further, the Board had taken steps to set aside the ex parte decree passed in C.S.No.1643 of 1992 and the same was also pending. Since the defendant was unable to obtain the sale deed from the TNHB in spite of his sincere efforts, the plaintiff and her husband declared that they were having much political influence and by using the same, they could obtain the sale deed with a condition that the defendant should bear a sum of Rs.75,000/-. On relying upon the plaintiffs political influence and her undertaking to obtain the sale deed, the defendant consented to the second agreement of sale. Due to the change in the political circumstances, the plaintiff was disabled from performing her part of the agreement and as such, the defendant had rescinded the second sale agreement. Further, the contract was unlawful and unenforceable because the exercise of political influence over a public officer for private gain is contrary to public policy and the plaintiff was not entitled to get any relief. Hence, the suit had to be dismissed. 5. On the basis of the above said pleadings, the trial court framed five issues and on the side of the plaintiff, she examined herself as P.W.1 and marked Exs.A-1 to A-8 and on the side of the defendant, D.W.1, his power agent, was examined and Exs.B-1 and B-2 were marked. The trial court, on considering the entire evidence on record, both oral and documentary, had dismissed the suit and as against the said judgment of the trial court, the plaintiff filed an appeal in A.S.No.139 of 2000 before the III Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, wherein the appeal was also dismissed. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment of the appellate court, the plaintiff has filed the present second appeal. 6. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment of the appellate court, the plaintiff has filed the present second appeal. 6. At the time of admission of the second appeal, this Court framed the following substantial question of law for consideration: Whether the courts below erred in law while dismissing the suit under Section 23 of the Contract Act, when the alleged illegal purpose has not been carried into effect and the appellant does not rely on clause 9 to make out her claim ? 7. Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff submitted that the courts below have come to an erroneous conclusion that Ex.A-2 was unlawful and unenforceable because clause 9 was opposed to public policy, by relying upon a judgment reported in 1978(2) M.L.J.417 (N.V.P.PANDIAN ..vs.. M.M.ROY), which is not correct for the reason that the said decision was reversed by a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in 1984 (2) M.L.J.303 (M.M.ROY ..vs.. PANDIAN). But the subsequent judgments were not brought to the notice of the courts below on the side of the appellant/plaintiff. In this regard, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that it was the specific case of the respondent/defendant as if the appellant had agreed to get the sale deed from the TNHB by exercising her political influence. But a reading of clause 9 of Ex.A-2 would show only that the respondent had to bear the incidental expenses for getting the sale deed executed and registered in his favour by the TNHB or through court, but it does not convey the meaning as if the appellant would exercise her political influence to get the sale deed executed in favour of the respondent by the TNHB. Therefore, it is incorrect to state that clause 9 in Ex.A-2 is opposed to public policy. Moreover, as per the Division Bench judgment, even if the clause was against the public policy, only the illegal purpose embodied in the said clause was achieved by the further act of the appellant, it could be said that the agreement was unenforceable. In the instant case, even assuming that there was a clause opposed to public policy, no further act was done by the respondent pursuant to the said clause. In the instant case, even assuming that there was a clause opposed to public policy, no further act was done by the respondent pursuant to the said clause. Moreover, in the instant case, if the agreement was unlawful, the respondent ought to have entered into the witness box and adduced evidence; but, the power agent of the respondent was examined as D.W.1 and, as such, an adverse inference could be drawn that the case put forth by the respondent was not correct. Moreover, if the object under the clause to the agreement is unlawful, it could be said to public policy. In the instant case, the ultimate object was to get the sale deed executed in favour of the respondent and as such, the object of the policy cannot be said to be unlawful and the agreement was opposed to the public policy. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff further submitted that the courts below have held that there was no cause of action arising for the suit, on a reasoning that only on getting the sale deed from the TNHB, the respondent could alienate the property and even before getting the sale deed from the TNHB, the appellant had hurriedly approached the Court on mere apprehension. Attacking the said finding, the learned counsel submitted that there was every likelihood of entering into an agreement with third parties by the respondent and unless he was prevented from doing so, the interest of the plaintiff would be solely affected. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel has relied upon a judgment reported in the case of INCOME TAX OFFICER, MADRAS .vs.. K.A.GOVINDASWAMY (AIR 1978 MADRAS 186). 9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent/ defendant by relying upon clause 3 of Ex.A-2 agreement, submitted that there was a specific clause that the purchaser shall pay the balance sale consideration to the vendor, after he obtained the sale deed from the TNHB, within two months. Similarly, in clause 7, it was agreed by the vendor that the purchaser shall bear the entire registration expenses like stamp duty, registration charges, etc. for registration of the document. When the said clauses would say that the appellant has to bear the entire registration expenses, there was no need to have another clause No.9 for the same purpose. Similarly, in clause 7, it was agreed by the vendor that the purchaser shall bear the entire registration expenses like stamp duty, registration charges, etc. for registration of the document. When the said clauses would say that the appellant has to bear the entire registration expenses, there was no need to have another clause No.9 for the same purpose. Since the appellant had assured that she would get the sale deed by exercising political influence, clause No.9 was introduced. This could be understood from the reply sent by the appellant to the legal notice sent by the respondent, wherein she made an assurance that she would get the sale deed executed from TNHB by exercising her influence. A reading of the terms of the agreement coupled with the reply notice shows that it would give a clear meaning that the appellant had agreed to get the sale deed executed by exercising political influence. Hence, she was permitted to spend the amount, which should be reimbursed by the respondent. Further, by inviting the attention of this Court to para 7 of the plaint, the learned counsel submitted that even it has been admitted that the appellant had taken sincere efforts to get the sale deed executed in favour of the respondent by the TNHB and he was apprised with the progress then and there. Therefore, by considering all the recitals and the evidence, the courts below came to the conclusion that Ex.A-2 was unenforceable. It was further submitted that at the time of filing the suit, the property was not conveyed by the TNHB in favour of the respondent and only in the event of the suit property being conveyed in favour of the respondent, the plaintiff will get cause of action to file the suit. Therefore, the courts below have correctly held that there was no cause of action to file the suit. In support of this contention, the learned counsel has relied upon the judgments reported in the case of MANINDRA CHANDRA NANDI ..vs.. ASWININ KUMAR (AIR 1921 CALCUTTA 185), RATANCHAN ..vs.. ASKAR NAWAZ JUNG (AIR 1976 A.P.112), RATTAN CHAND HIRACHAND ..vs.. ASKAR NAWAZ JUNG ( (1991) 3 SCC 67 ), JASMER SINGH ..vs.. KANWALJIT SINGH (AIR 1991 P & H 194) and RAJENDRA KUMAR ..vs.. MAHENDRA KUMAR MITTAL (AIR 1992 ALLAHABAD 35). 10. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 11. ASKAR NAWAZ JUNG (AIR 1976 A.P.112), RATTAN CHAND HIRACHAND ..vs.. ASKAR NAWAZ JUNG ( (1991) 3 SCC 67 ), JASMER SINGH ..vs.. KANWALJIT SINGH (AIR 1991 P & H 194) and RAJENDRA KUMAR ..vs.. MAHENDRA KUMAR MITTAL (AIR 1992 ALLAHABAD 35). 10. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 11. In view of the submissions made on either side, the questions that have to be decided are, (1) whether clause 9 of the agreement marked as Ex.A-2 conveys the meaning that the appellant had agreed to exercise her political influence in getting the sale deed executed from the TNHB in favour of the respondent or whether the respondent had agreed to bear the expenses of Rs.75,000/-? (2) Even assuming that if it was opposed to public policy, whether the appellant had proceeded with any act pursuant to the said clause so as to say the agreement is unenforceable ? and (3) Whether the suit has been filed without any cause of action ? 12. For deciding the said questions, it is appropriate to extract the following relevant clauses: "3. That the PURCHASER shall pay the balance sale consideration to the VENDOR within two months after the VENDOR obtains the sale deed from the T.N.H.B. or from the High Court. 7. That the PURCHASER shall bear the entire registration expenses like stamp duty registration charges etc., for registration of the same in her favour or in favour of her nominee/s. 9. The VENDOR undertake to bear the expenses to the tune of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees Seventy Five thousand only), that may be spent by the PURCHASER for getting the sale deed executed and registered in favour of the VENDOR by TNHB or through Court and the VENDOR shall also bear the above expenses over and above the amount payable to T.N.H.B. by him by way of interest or penal interest etc". 13. Now, according to the appellant/plaintiff, the said clause No.9 did not convey the meaning that there was an agreement between the appellant and the respondent and that the appellant would exercise her political influence to get the sale deed executed in favour of the respondent by the TNHB; whereas, according to the respondent, when there were the specific clauses 3 and 7 to bear the expenses for registration, there was no need to have another clause, i.e. clause No.9 for the same purpose. Further, according to the respondent, a combined reading of the averments in the plaint and the admission made in the reply notice sent by the appellant, would show that clause 9 was introduced only for the purpose of getting the sale deed from the Housing Board by exercising political influence by the appellant. The relevant portion from the plaint and the reply of notice sent by the appellant are as follows: "Plaint: 7. The plaintiff states that after execution of the second agreement of sale on 19.4.1995 in her favour, which superceded the earlier agreement of sale dated 14.7.1994, she had taken sincere efforts to get the sale deed executed in favour of the defendant by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board and he was apprised with the progress then and here....." Reply notice: "2. .... You have also agreed to bear any incidental expenses to the tune of Rs.75,000/-in obtaining the conveyance in your favour through political influence over and above the amount payable to Tamil Nadu Housing Board by you by way of interest or penal interest. Accordingly, my client on such persuasion, has agreed to make an attempt, which prompted you to execute another agreement of Sale dated 19.4.1995 in her favour at her insistence incorporating the amount of Rs.75,000/- to be spent by my client in getting the conveyance deed executed in your favour under Clause No.9..." 14. Moreover, P.W.1, in her chief examination, had admitted the exercise of political influence in getting the sale deed executed, as follows: 15. A combined reading of the above extracted portions would show that clause 9 was introduced only for the purpose of exercising political influence by the appellant to get the sale deed executed. Further, I find that had it been the intention of the appellant not to exercise political influence under clause 9, the appellant would have very well proceeded with the transaction by the earlier agreement itself and there was no necessity to cancel the earlier agreement and to enter into the second sale agreement. Therefore, this factual aspect would undoubtedly show that clause 9 was introduced only for the purpose of getting the sale deed executed by the appellant by exercising political influence. 16. Therefore, this factual aspect would undoubtedly show that clause 9 was introduced only for the purpose of getting the sale deed executed by the appellant by exercising political influence. 16. With regard to the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant, by relying upon the decision reported in 1984(2) MLJ 303 , that only if any act furtherance to the agreement has been done, the agreement can be said enforceable, a perusal of the plaint would show that after entering into the agreement, the appellant had been informing the respondent about the progress then and there in getting the sale deed from the TNHB. Probably, the appellant might have failed in achieving the object; but the pleadings found in the plaint, the averments made in the reply notice dated 27.11.1996 marked as Ex.A-4 and certain admission made in P.W.1 in her chief examination, undoubtedly, would show that clause 9 in Ex.A-2 was introduced only for the purpose of getting the sale deed executed by exercising political influence. In this regard, a reference could be placed in AIR 1921 Cal 185 (supra), wherein it has been stated that it is contrary to public policy to induce public officers for money or other valuable consideration, to use their position and influence to procure a benefit. Therefore,I am of the opinion that both the courts below have come to the correct conclusion that clause 9 is opposed to public policy and as such, the agreement is unenforceable. 17. With regard to the other fold of submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant that only the power agent of the respondent was examined as P.W.1 and the respondent did not enter into the witness box, I am of the opinion that no much significance can be given for examining the power agent of the respondent since it is a well settled principle that the power agent is legally entitled to speak the case of the party concerned. 18. With regard to the next fold of the submission in respect of cause of action, both the courts below have held that there was no cause of action to file the suit. 18. With regard to the next fold of the submission in respect of cause of action, both the courts below have held that there was no cause of action to file the suit. Attacking the said finding, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the suit plot was allotted to the respondent by the TNHB in an auction and the letter dated 12.11.1987 was issued to that effect and hence, it has to be construed that the respondent had a right over the suit property and in support of his contention, the learned counsel has relied on the decision reported in AIR 1978 MADRAS 186 (supra); but a perusal of the said judgment shows that in that case, the allottee was declared as an insolvent and an agreement (lease-cum-sale agreement) was entered into between the TNHB and the insolvent and it was the contention that the insolvent does not acquire any property right which he could transmit to the Official Assignee after adjudication and in that background, a Division Bench of this Court came to the conclusion that the right under the lease-cum-sale agreement is not equitable to contingent right and it is a right in immovable property. The relevant paragraphs from the said judgment are extracted hereunder: (TAMIL) "6. We have seen that in July, 1965, the insolvent entered into an agreement with the Housing Board with regard to the property in question. This is ordinarily known as a lease-cum-sale agreement. What is contended is that the right flowing under the said agreement is a personal right and that the insolvent does not acquire any property right which he could transmit to the Official Assignee after adjudication. On a perusal of the lease-cum-sale agreement the primary intention of the parties appears to be to create a saleable interest in the property provided, the allottee-lessee (insolvent herein) complies with the terms and conditions therein. The allottee-lessee is entitled to occupy the property on the terms and conditions mentioned therein and under Cl.15 thereto, the Board shall sell the property to the lessee for such price as the Chairman of the Board may fix; the allottee-lessee is bound to bear all the expenses of sale, besides paying the price fixed by the Board. If the allottee-lessee commits default, the agreement is liable to be terminated. If the allottee-lessee commits default, the agreement is liable to be terminated. Clause 24 provides that if the allottee-lessee commits breach of any of the terms of the agreement, the Board is at liberty but is not bound to determine the lease and the agreement of sale without prejudice to the rights of the Board to recover from the allottee-lessee any loss incurred by the Board. No doubt Cl.29 interdicts the lessee, from assigning, transferring or dealing with his rights in favour of third parties and provides that the lessor-Board is not bound to recognise any such transfer or assignment in favour of third parties. The agreement is however silent in the case where the lessee-allottee becomes an insolvent. It is in the light of these provisions that the counsel for the appellant contends that Vasudevan as insolvent-lessee-allottee, obtained only a contingent right under the lease-cum-sale agreement and such rights would not vest in the Official Assignee". ... 8. It is seen that all such property over which the insolvent had the capacity to exercise rights and take proceedings for exercising all such powers, in or over or in respect of property as might have been exercised by the insolvent for his own benefit at the commencement of his insolvency shall be deemed to be property of the insolvent. On a fair reading of the lease-cum-sale agreement it is clear that he has a right to obtain ownership over the property on fulfilment of certain conditions agreed to therein. Once the stipulations under the agreement are satisfied he has a right to purchase the property from the Board and the Board has no option except to sell it to the allottee-lessee. There is no discretion in the Housing Board to avoid such a result. This right to obtain a conveyance of immovable property which is apparent in the lease-cum-sale agreement is not equable to a contingent right. It has to be fairly held that this right is a right in immovable property and is certainly property which comes within the meaning of the expression "property over which he has the capacity to exercise and take proceedings for exercising of such powers in or over or in respect of property". It has to be fairly held that this right is a right in immovable property and is certainly property which comes within the meaning of the expression "property over which he has the capacity to exercise and take proceedings for exercising of such powers in or over or in respect of property". Palaniswamy, J. rightly relied upon the decision in Willingham v. Joyce ((1796) 30 ER 951) and Buckland v. Papillon ((1866) 2 Ch App 67) and held the benefit of the rights which flow from the lease-cum-sale agreement being property rights would pass on the Official Assignee. In our view, the rights in-built in the lease-cum-sale agreement are not bare expectancies or possibilities, but are rights which could be transmitted in accordance with law and in this sense,the right, title and interest of the insolvent over the property under the said agreement would vest in the Official Assignee after adjudication. As the effect of an order of adjudication is to vest in the Official Assignee every beneficial matter belonging to the insolvency estate, it cannot be said that the benefit which the insolvent has obtained under the lease-cum-sale agreement cannot pass on to the Official Assignee. The learned counsel for the State Housing Board was unable to place, before us any decision or authority to hold that the insolvent did not have a right in the property at the time of adjudication and that it was the Board alone which had the predominant right over it and that the insolvent had no rights at all under it. The Division Bench which approved of the judgment of Palaniswamy, J. in Application No.589 of 1971 and O.S.A.No.2 of 1972 also reiterated that the rights which the allottee-lessee acquired are valuable rights which could be treated as property which on adjudication will vest in the Official Assignee. We respectfully agree with the view expressed by the learned Judges as above and hold on the first point that the insolvent Vasudevan had an interest in the property in question and the benefit of such an interest automatically got transmitted and vested in the Official Assignee under S.52 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act". 19. We respectfully agree with the view expressed by the learned Judges as above and hold on the first point that the insolvent Vasudevan had an interest in the property in question and the benefit of such an interest automatically got transmitted and vested in the Official Assignee under S.52 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act". 19. The said decision cannot be made applicable to the case on hand because, in the instant case, the allotment order issued in favour of the respondent was subsequently cancelled by the TNHB and, as such, the appeal filed by the respondent as against the TNHB was pending before the Government. Therefore, as on the date of the agreement, it was not definite whether the appeal would be allowed in favour of the respondent or not, particularly in the circumstances, the ex parte decree passed in C.S.1643 of 1992, the suit filed by the respondent for specific performance, was set aside by this Court on the application filed by the TNHB. Therefore, I do not find any infirmity in the finding arrived at by the courts below that there is no cause of action for filing the suit. Moreover, I find that though the sale consideration was Rs.10 lakhs, the appellant had paid only Rs.50,000/-as advance under the second agreement and no substantial amount was paid. Therefore, I find that the courts below have correctly appreciated the evidence and the documents adduced by the parties and the concurrent findings reflect the evidence on record. The reasonings and findings do not suffer from any infirmity and the questions of law raised in this appeal must be answered in the negative and as such, the concurrent findings cannot be interfered with in the second appeal. For the reasons stated above, the second appeal fails and the same is dismissed by confirming the decree and judgment of the courts below. No costs.