Judgment :- M.Y. Eqbal, C.J. & T.S. Sivagnanam. J. 1. This Appeal is by the State against the order made in W.P.No.27844 of 2008, dated 24.6.2009. The Respondent herein is the Writ Petitioner. 2. The prayer in the Writ Petition was for issuance of a direction upon the Appellants to transfer the patta and re-convey the property to the Writ Petitioner in respect of Survey Nos.76/1, 76/2, 76/5 and 80/4 with an extent of 1.98, 0.12, 3.00 and 0.54 acres of Jeyganperumalpatti Village, Salem Taluk. 3. The case of the Writ Petitioner is that his father V. Narayanan was the owner of the said property and the property was subject matter of Acquisition proceedings under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act (for short the ‘Act’), for a project of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board. Section 4(1) Notification was published on 22.7.1981, Section 5-A enquiry was conducted on 21.12.1981 and the Notification under Section 6 of the Act was published on 18.7.1984. The Writ Petitioner’s father Mr. V. Narayanan challenged the Acquisition proceedings, on 16.9.1986 by filing a Writ Petition in W.P.No.9807/1986 and an order of interim stay was granted on 19.9.1986 in W.M.P.No.14705 of 1986 in W.P.No.9807 of 1986. The Writ Petitioner’s father died on 3.7.1987 and the Writ Petition was allowed by order dated 20.11.1996 and the Acquisition proceedings were quashed. Though in the interregnum notice under Sections 9(3) and 10 of the Act was issued, the Writ Petitioner’s father did not receive the compensation and continued to be in possession of the land. It appears that the death of the Writ Petitioner’s father was not brought to the notice of this Court, when the earlier Writ Petition was allowed. Subsequently, the Writ Petitioner herein and the other legal heirs submitted Application during 1999 for change of Patta and since no orders were passed in spite of representation to the Hon’ble Chief Minister Special Cell and other authorities, a Writ Petition in W.P.No.27844 of 2008 was filed seeking for direction, upon the Respondents to transfer the patta and re-convey the property. This Writ Petition was allowed by order dated 24.6.2009 and the said order is impugned in this Appeal. 4. This Writ Petition was allowed by order dated 24.6.2009 and the said order is impugned in this Appeal. 4. Only contention raised by the learned Government Pleader appearing for the Appellants is that the Writ Petitioner’s father, who filed the earlier Writ Petition died on 3.7.1987 and no steps were taken to implead the legal heirs of the deceased Writ Petitioner in W.P.No.9807 of 1986 and the Writ Petition automatically abates and the order passed in the Writ Petition is a nullity. Therefore, the learned Government Pleader would submit that the judgment has to be set aside. 5. Per contra, the learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents would submit that merely on account of the death of the Writ Petitioner’s father will not render the order passed in the Writ Petition as void and the present proceedings being a proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be made applicable and the proceedings will not abate. Further, the learned Counsel would submit that the Appellant originally acquired an extent of 267 acres at Ayyamperumalpatti Village, Salem Taluk and the lands belonging to the Writ Petitioner’s father measured 5.64 acres and as on date, except for 20 acres of land, the Appellants have not taken possession of remaining portion and the Acquisition proceedings in respect of the lands in Survey Nos.90/1A, 89/3, 89/6, 89/2A, 89/2B, 90/1C, 90/1D, 90/8B, 90/1H, 90/8A, 85/3, 83/4B, 88/1, 89/4, 90/6, 90/5, 89/5 and 87/10 lapsed, since the award was not passed within time and this has been admitted by the Third Appellant in his proceedings dated 22.1.1990. Further, the learned Counsel would submit that the lands in Survey Nos.83, 83/4A, 84/11-B, 84/12, 85/1 & 114/4 have been deleted from the Acquisition proceedings by order passed by the Government. Further, the scheme originally envisaged has not been implemented, despite lapse of 26 years. Therefore, it is submitted that the Writ Appeal is devoid of merits. 6. We have considered the submission on either side and perused the materials available on record. 7. Further, the scheme originally envisaged has not been implemented, despite lapse of 26 years. Therefore, it is submitted that the Writ Appeal is devoid of merits. 6. We have considered the submission on either side and perused the materials available on record. 7. The following facts are not in dispute: that the Writ Petitioner’s father filed W.P.No.9807 of 1986 on 16.9.1986, challenging the Land Acquisition proceedings and an interim stay of all further proceedings was granted by this Court on 19.9.1986 in W.M.P.No.14705 of 1986, while the Writ Petition was pending, he died on 3.7.1987; that the death of V. Narayanan was not brought to the notice of this Court and ultimately, the Writ Petition in W.P.No.9807 of 1986 was allowed by order dated 20.11.1996 and the Land Acquisition proceedings were quashed and the matter was remanded to the authorities for fresh disposal in accordance with law after giving an opportunity with a direction to dispose of the matter within 90 days from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. 8. Admittedly, no steps were taken by the Appellants to comply with the direction issued in the Writ Petition and the order in the Writ Petition attained finality. Thereafter, the Appellant did not proceed further in the matter and it is asserted by the Respondent that they are in actual physical possession of the lands in question. Since, the Patta was not transferred, the Petitioner filed the Writ Petition in W.P.No.27844 of 2008 seeking transfer of Patta in their names and this Writ Petition was allowed by the learned Single Judge and as against which the present Appeal is preferred. 9. The only contention raised by the Appellant is that on account of the death of the Writ Petitioner’s father, who was the Petitioner in the earlier Writ Petition the order passed in the Writ Petition is a nullity and in support of the said contention, the learned Government Pleader placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lila Vati Bai v. State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 521 ; and Kamal Krishan Rastogi and others v. State of Bihar and another, 2008 (15) SCC 105 . 10. 10. It is to be seen that the case before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Smt. Lila Vati Bai, referred supra, arose under the provisions of the Bombay Land Regulation Act, 1948 and in context of proceedings initiated under the said Act, their Lordships held that if proceedings were intended by the Act as judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings between named parties, it may be legitimately argued that an order passed against the dead person is a complete nullity. In the case of Kamal Krishan Rastogi and others, referred supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court was examining a matter arising under the Bihar Lands Reforms Act, and in the said contest held that an order of Additional Collector passed against the dead person was sustainable. 11. However, it is to be borne in mind that the present proceedings is a Writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. At this stage, it is necessary to look into Section 141 of C.P.C., which is as follows: 141. Miscellaneous proceedings. – The procedure provided in this Code in regard to Suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of Civil jurisdiction. Explanation: In this Section, the expression “proceedings” includes proceedings under Order 9, but does not include any proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. 12. In terms of the Explanation to Section 141, there is total exclusion of the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, which is an extraordinary power conferred on the High Courts. This very issue came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Puran Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others, 1996 (2) SCC 205 : AIR 1996 SC 1092 and their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court held thus: “5. The question with which we are concerned is as to whether the aforesaid provisions made under Order 22 of the Code are applicable to proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Prior to the introduction of an explanation by Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976, Section 141 of the Code was as follows: “141. Miscellaneous proceedings. – The procedure provided in this Code in regard to Suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of Civil jurisdiction.” The Explanation which was added by the aforesaid Amending Act said: Explanation. Miscellaneous proceedings. – The procedure provided in this Code in regard to Suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of Civil jurisdiction.” The Explanation which was added by the aforesaid Amending Act said: Explanation. – In this Section, the expression ‘proceedings’ includes proceedings under Order 9, but does not include any proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution.” There was controversy between different Courts as to whether the different provisions of the Code shall be applicable even to Writ proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Some High Courts held that Writ proceedings before the High Court shall be deemed to be proceedings “in any Court of Civil jurisdiction” within the meaning of Section 141 of the Code. (Ibrahimbhai Karimbhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1968 Guj. 202 ; Asstt. Distt. Panchayat Officer v. Jai Narain Pradhan, AIR 1967 All. 334 ; Krishnalal Sdhu v. State of W.B., AIR 1967 Cal. 275 ; Sona Ram Ranga Ram v. Central Government, AIR 1963 Punj. 510; Annam Adinarayana v. State of A.P., AIR 1958 AP 16). However, in another set of cases, it was held that Writ proceeding being a proceeding of a special nature and not one being in a Court of Civil jurisdiction Section 141 of the Code was not applicable. (Bhagwan Singh v. Addl. Director of Consolidation, AIR 1968 Punj. 360; Chandmal Naurat Mal v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1968 Raj. 20 ; Khurjawala Buckles Mfg., Co. v. CST, AIR 1965 All. 517 ; Ramachand Nihalchand Advani v. Anandlal Bapalal Kothati, AIR 1962 Guj. 21 ; Bharat Board Mills Ltd. v. R.P.F. Commr., AIR 1957 Cal. 702 ). Even before the introduction of the explanation to Section 141 of the Code, this Court had occasion to examine the scope of the said Section in the case of Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot, AIR 1974 SC 2105 : 1975 (2) SCR 71 . It was said: “It is not necessary for this case to express an opinion on the point as to whether the various provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to Petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was said: “It is not necessary for this case to express an opinion on the point as to whether the various provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to Petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution. Section 141 of the Code, to which reference has been made, makes it clear that the provisions of the Code in regard to Suits shall be followed in all proceedings in any Court of Civil jurisdiction as far as it can be made applicable. The words ‘as far as it can be made applicable’ make it clear that, in applying the various provisions of the Code to proceedings other than those of a Suit, the Court must take into account the nature of those proceedings and the relief sought. The object of Article 226 is to provide a quick and inexpensive remedy to aggrieved parties. Power has consequently been vested in the High Courts to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within the jurisdiction of the High Court, orders or Writs, including Writs in the nature of Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, Prohibition, Quo warranto and Certiorari. It is plain that if the procedure of a Suit had also to be adhered to in the case of Writ Petitions, the entire purpose of having a quick and inexpensive remedy would be defeated. A Writ Petition under Article 226, it needs to be emphasized, is essentially different from a Suit and it would be incorrect to assimilate and incorporate the procedure of a Suit into the proceedings of a Petition under Article 226.” It can be said that in the judgment aforesaid, this Court expressed the view that merely on basis of Section 141 of the Code it was not necessary to adhere to the procedure of a Suit in Writ Petitions, because in many cases the sole object of Writ jurisdiction to provide quick and inexpensive remedy to the person who invokes such jurisdiction is likely to be defeated. A Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Dr. A Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj, AIR 1963 SC 946 said as follows: “It is, therefore, clear from the nature of the power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution and the decisions on the subject that the High Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution exercises original jurisdiction, though the said jurisdiction shall not be confused with the ordinary Civil jurisdiction of the High Court. This jurisdiction, though original in character as contrasted with its Appellate and Revisional jurisdictions, is exercisable throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction and may, for convenience, be described as extraordinary original jurisdiction.” When the High Court exercises extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, it aims at securing a very speedy and efficacious remedy to a person, whose legal or Constitutional right has been infringed. If all the elaborate and technical rules laid down in the Code are to be applied to Writ proceedings the very object and purpose is likely to be defeated. According to us, in view of the conflicting opinions expressed by the different Courts, Parliament by the aforesaid amending Act introduced the explanation saying that in Section 141 of the Code the expression ‘proceedings’ does not include “any proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution” and statutorily recognized the views expressed by some of the Courts that Writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution shall not be deemed to be proceedings within the meaning of Section 141 of the Code. After the introduction of the explanation to Section 141 of the Code, it can be said that when Section 141 provides that the procedure prescribed in the Code in regard to Suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable “in all proceedings in any Court of Civil jurisdiction” it shall not include a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. In this background, according to us, it cannot be held that the provisions contained in Order 22 of the Code are applicable per se to Writ proceedings. In this background, according to us, it cannot be held that the provisions contained in Order 22 of the Code are applicable per se to Writ proceedings. If even before the introduction of the Explanation to Section 141, this Court in the case Babubhai v. Nandlal, AIR 1974 SC 2105 had said that (SCC Headnote p.707) the words “as far as it can be made applicable” occurring in Section 141 of the Code made it clear that, in applying the various provisions of the Code to the proceedings other than those of a Suit, the Court has to take into consideration the nature of those proceedings and the reliefs sought for after introduction of the Explanation the Writ proceedings have to be excluded from the expression ‘proceedings’ occurring in Section 141 of the Code. If because of the Explanation, proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution has been excluded, there is no question of making applicable the procedure of Code “as far as it can be made applicable” to such proceeding. The procedures prescribed in respect of Suit in the Code if are made applicable to the Writ proceedings then in many cases it may frustrate the exercise of extraordinary powers by the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. 13. In the light of the decision referred supra, the contention raised by the Appellants deserves to be rejected. It cannot be contended that the proceedings stood automatically abated and consequently, the order in the earlier Writ Petition was a nullity. Thus, the sole ground raised by the Appellants is liable to be rejected. 14. For all the above reasons, the Writ Appeal stands dismissed. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed. No costs.