ORDER (Per P.V. Sanjay Kumar. J.) SUO motu exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 166-B of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317-Fasli (for brevity, 'the Land Revenue Act') by the Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District, under Notice dated 31.12.2004 proposing cancellation of entries in the revenue records in respect of the land bearing survey Nos.36 and 37, Gopanpally Village of Serilingampally Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, was called in question in Writ Petition No.1731 of 2005. 2. Earlier, W.P.No.21719 of 1997 was filed by some of the petitioners in W.P.No.1731 of 2005 and others challenging G.O.Ms.No.850, Revenue (ASN-III) Department, dated 24.09.1991 reserving an extent of 477 acres in survey Nos.36 and 37, Gopanpally Village in Ranga Reddy District for provision of house sites to Government employees. 3. By common order dated 15.09.2009, a learned single Judge allowed both the writ petitions. Hence, these appeals by the State. 4. Perusal of the order under appeal demonstrates that the learned single Judge opined that the Suo motu revision undertaken after a long lapse of time, even in the absence of any period of limitation, was arbitrary and opposed to the concept of the rule of law. The learned Judge further held that the summary remedy of a revisional enquiry for cancellation of entries in the revenue records dating back to more than 50 years was not proper. 5. The State contends that when Section 166-B of the Land Revenue Act does not prescribe any limitation, its power of revision cannot be stalled on the ground of delay. Further contention is that only a show cause notice was issued and therefore the learned Judge ought to have refused interference in the matter. Reliance is placed on Special Director v. Mohd. Chulam Chouse (1) (2004) 3 SCC 440 in this regard. 6. Fairly well settled is the proposition of law that even if no period of limitation is prescribed, the power of revision must be exercised within a reasonable time which must be determined by the facts of each case and the nature of the order being revised (State of Cujarat v. Patil Raghav Natha (2) AIR 1969 SC 1297 , Mohd. Kavi Mohamad Amin v. Fatmabai Ibrahim (3) (1997) 6 SCC 71 and State of Punjab v. Bhatinda District Coop. Milk Producers Union Ltd.) (4) (2007) 11 SCC 363 . Kavi Mohamad Amin v. Fatmabai Ibrahim (3) (1997) 6 SCC 71 and State of Punjab v. Bhatinda District Coop. Milk Producers Union Ltd.) (4) (2007) 11 SCC 363 . In Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil v. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale (5) 2009 (2) AL T (Crl.) 386 (SC) = 2009 (5) SCJ 100 = (2009) 9 SCC 352 the Supreme Court observed: "11. It seems to be fairly settled that if a statute does not prescribe the time limit for exercise of revisional power, it does not mean that such power can be exercised at any time; rather it should be exercised within a reasonable time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a long lapse of time. Where the legislature does not provide for any length of time within which the power of revision is to be exercised by the authority, suo motu or otherwise, it is plain that exercise of such power within reasonable time is inherent therein." 7. It is relevant to note that Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code which was under consideration before the Supreme Court in the above case was similar in its wording to Section 166-B of the Land Revenue Act. Construing this provision, the Supreme Court held that ordinarily reasonable period for exercising the power of revision under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, subject to exceptional circumstances, would be 3 years. The exercise of revisional power after a lapse of 17 years was therefore found to be unreasonable. 8. Closer home, a Division Bench of this Court while considering Section 166-B of the Land Revenue Act in P.Mangamma v. Women's Co-op. Housing Society Ltd., Barakatpura, Hyderabad (6) 1995 (3) ALT 330 (D.B.) held that exercise of revisionary jurisdiction thereunder after a lapse of 31 years was totally irrational, unreasonable and violative of fair play in administrative action. Reference was made therein to the earlier Division Bench Judgments of this Court in A.Kodanda Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (7) 1981 (2) ALT 280 (D.B.) and K. Venkata Reddy v. Director of Settlements, Survey and Land Records, Hyderabad (8) 1975 (2) An.W.R. 43 = 1975 (1) APLJ 11 (D.B.) enunciating the same principle. 9. Viewed thus, the contention of the State that the exercise of revisional power under Section 166-B of the Land Revenue Act is temporally unbounded must necessarily fail. 9. Viewed thus, the contention of the State that the exercise of revisional power under Section 166-B of the Land Revenue Act is temporally unbounded must necessarily fail. In the present case, admittedly, the State proposes to exercise its revisionary jurisdiction to upset entries dating back to more than half a century. No valid reasons are forthcoming to justify the delay so as to make this exercise 'reasonable~. 10. Apropos the contention that a writ petition was not maintainable against a Show Cause Notice, the Notice dated 31.12.2004 was not merely a Show Cause Notice but was indicative of the initiation of suo motu revisional power. The exercise of such revisional power after a lapse of over 50 years being moot, the very jurisdiction to commence such exercise fell for examination. In this regard, the observations of the Supreme Court in Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse (1 supra) relied upon by the State are of guidance: "5. This Court in a large number of cases has deprecated the practice of the High Courts entertaining writ petitions questioning legality of the show-cause notices stalling enquiries as proposed and retarding investigative process to find actual facts with the participation and in the presence of the parties. Unless the High Court is satisfied that the show-cause notice was totally non est in the eye of the law for absolute want of jurisdiction of the authority to even investigate into facts, writ petitions should not be entertained for the mere asking and as a matter of routine, and the writ petitioner should invariably be directed to respond to the show-cause notice and take all stands highlighted in the writ petition." 11. As the delay in the present case had the effect of wiping out the very jurisdiction of the revisionary authority to initiate such exercise suo motu, the Notice dated 31.12.2004 was amenable to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. The contention of the State in this regard is therefore rejected. 12. So far as G.O.Ms.No.850 dated 24.09.1991 is concerned, we are in complete agreement with the learned Judge that the reservation of land in the subject survey numbers without even indicating the subdivision numbers was clearly unsustainable in the light of the entries in the revenue records demonstrating the claims of the respondents over their extents of land in those survey numbers. To that extent, the G.O. was liable to be set aside and we find no reason to interfere with the order of the learned Judge doing so. 13. It is to be noticed that the learned Judge made it clear that the State was at liberty to work out its remedies in accordance with law. We reiterate the same. 14. The Writ Appeals are accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances without costs.