JUDGMENT : K.M. Thaker, J. The two writ petitions, actually and in substance involve and raise, inter alia, the issue regarding non-compliance or breach of the earlier order passed by the Court, which is neither set aside nor stayed, until now, in any proceeding. By the order impugned in the petitions the learned Court has directed the concerned defendants-present petitioners-to comply the earlier order dated 20.1.2010. 1.1 The learned Trial Court has, while passing the said direction observed that the Court was constrained to pass the impugned order, though mandatory in nature, so as to ensure compliance of its order and to uphold the dignity and honour of the Court's order and to curb the tendency or attitude of not complying the Court's direction. 2. In both the petitions, the order under challenge is common, the respondents are common, the subject matter is common and the cause of dispute is almost similar. Therefore, with the consent of the learned advocates for the contesting parties, both the petitions are heard and decided by this common judgment. The concerned Counsel have made the submission with the understanding that the petitions are to be heard and decided finally. Rule. Mr.Kapadiya, learned advocate for the contesting opponent has waived Notice of Rule in both the petitions. 3. The petitioner in SCA No. 10105 of 2010 is the original defendant No. 1 and the petitioner in SCA No. 10573 of 2010 is the defendant No. 4 in the Regular Civil Suit No. 583 of 2009 from which these petitions arise. For the sake of convenience the contesting parties are referred to as per their said position in the suit i.e. as defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 4 and present opponent No. 1 (in both the petitions) is referred to as the plaintiff. The original defendant No. 1 in the suit is the owner of the suit premises. 4. Background:- 4.1 Both the petitioners are aggrieved by the same order dated 17.7.2010 passed below Exhibit 33 in the aforesaid suit. By the impugned order dated 17.7.2010 the learned trial Court has directed the defendant No. 1 and the defendant No. 4 to hand over the possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff and comply the parent order dated 20.1.2010. 4.2 The facts of the case would bear-out that narration and discussion of certain events and factual aspects, at little extra-length is necessary. 4.2 The facts of the case would bear-out that narration and discussion of certain events and factual aspects, at little extra-length is necessary. 4.3 At the outset it is necessary to state that since the original order dated 20.1.2010 passed below Exhibit-5 is not the subject matter of present appeals and since appeal against the said order is pending before the learned First Appellate Court, this Court would refrain from making any observation regarding the said injunction order (below Exhibit5) or with regard to the factual aspects (except where necessary for this order) so that the case of either side before the learned First Appellate Court may not be influenced by the observation in present order. It is, also, clarified that all observations in present order are purely prima facie observations and that therefore the learned Courts shall decide the matter and issues before them on its own merits and on the basis of the relevant evidence available on record and in accordance with law without being influenced by the observations in present order. 5. Facts:- The premises, more particularly described in the lease deed, shops No. F/1 and F/2 admeasuring about 1450 sq. feet in Tanishk complex at Vadodara (in this judgment referred to as the "suit premises") were given on lease by virtue of lease deed dated 11.4.2006 by the defendant No. 1 to a registered partnership firm M/s. A.P. Associate of which the original defendant Nos. 2 and 3 are the partners. It does not come out from the record as to whether the firm continues or is dissolved. In August 2006, the said partnership firm, through its partner/s, entered into an agreement by way of "sub-lease-deed" with the plaintiff and thereby sub-let the suit premises to the plaintiff at the monthly rent of Rs.45,000/- wherein the plaintiff started her business in the name and style of "Bhumi Beauty Saloon". "The application exh. 5 in suit no. 1 being Regular suit No. 206 of 2009 is...... ...... it is ordered that the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit shop viz. "The application exh. 5 in suit no. 1 being Regular suit No. 206 of 2009 is...... ...... it is ordered that the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit shop viz. "Bhoomi Beauty Saloon" at F/1, F/2 Tanishk Complex and so temporary injunction is granted in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants till final disposal of this suit, to the effect that the defendants shall not appropriate or get appropriated and will not restrain the plaintiff or will not get the plaintiffs restrained from doing business and will not obstruct or cause obstruction (i.e. get the plaintiffs obstructed) from doing business therein. The order may be conveyed either to the opponents of suit no.2 or their learned Advocate. The cost ..... One copy of said order..... Pronounced the order by reading over today on 20/01/2010 in open Court." (free translation from vernacular) (emphasis supplied) 5.2 What is pertinent to note is the fact that for almost 5 months any appeal against the said order dated. 20.1.2010 was not filed and it was only on or around 17.6.2010 that the defendant No. 1 filed the appeal challenging the said order dated 20.1.2010. 5.3 Despite the said injunction order dated 20.1.2010 was in operation, the defendant No. 1 executed Agreement to Sell on 7.5.2010 in respect of the suit premises and on the same day she also passed the possession receipt (in token of handing over the possession) in favour of one Mr. Pathan and she also received payment - in installments - to the tune of Rs.45 lakhs. 5.4 In the interregnum i.e. after the order dated 20.1.2010 was pronounced but before the originally scheduled next date i.e. 30.6.2010 certain events took place in view of which the plaintiff moved an application on 10.5.2010 alleging, inter alia, that the defendant No. 1, with the help of Mr. Gulabkhan Pathan (who came to be impleaded as defendant No. 4) had forcibly taken away the possession of the suit premises and thereby they (defendant No. 1 and said Mr. Pathan) also committed breach of the order dated 20.1.2010. The plaintiff prayed that the possession of the suit premises be restored. The said application was taken on the record as Exhibit 33 wherein the Court passed the order and fixed the date (12.5.2010) for filing defendant's reply and for hearing of the said Exhibit 33 application. Pathan) also committed breach of the order dated 20.1.2010. The plaintiff prayed that the possession of the suit premises be restored. The said application was taken on the record as Exhibit 33 wherein the Court passed the order and fixed the date (12.5.2010) for filing defendant's reply and for hearing of the said Exhibit 33 application. However the defendant No. 1 filed her reply only on 31.5.2010 (exhibit 60) in response to the application exhibit 33, wherein she inter alia, averred that actually it was the plaintiff who had, on 6.5.2010, voluntarily returned the possession of the suit premises. 5.5 At this stage it is pertinent to note that even before the defendant No. 1 (owner of the property) filed her reply in response to the application exhibit 33, Mr. Gulabkhan Pathan (now the defendant No.4) had, on 26.5.2010, filed an application (Exhibit-48) under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC wherein he prayed that he may be impleaded as a party defendant. The learned Court passed the order dated 3.6.2010 and allowed the application exhibit 48 impleading Mr. Pathan as defendant (No.4). 5.6 Mr. Pathan (defendant No. 4) also moved another application (Exhibit-86) dated 8.7.2010 praying that the plaintiff and their agents etc. may be restrained from entering the suit premises and not to dispossess him without due process of law. The learned Trial Court passed separate order dated 17.7.2010 and rejected said application. (Exhibit-86) 5.7 In the background of, and upon considering, the above noted facts the learned Trial Court on 17.7.2010 passed the order below exhibit 33 directing the defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 4 to return the possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff within 10 days. 5.8 Though the defendant No. 4 filed appeal against the order dated 17.7.2010 (passed below exhibit 86) he did not file (atleast until beginning of September 2010) appeal against the parent order dated 20.1.2010. Aggrieved by the order and direction dated 17.7.2010 passed below Exhibit 33, the defendant No. 1 has preferred the petition being SCA No. 10105 of 2010 (on or around 23.8.2010 i.e. almost one month after the order dated 17.7.2010 was passed) and although almost one month has passed since the said order dated 17.7.2010 the defendant Nos. 1 and/or 4 have not complied the direction and has not been handed over the possession to the plaintiff. 1 and/or 4 have not complied the direction and has not been handed over the possession to the plaintiff. Subsequently on or around 31.8.2010 the defendant No. 4 also filed petition being SCA No. 10573 of 2010 against the said order dated 17.7.2010. 6. Mr. Vakhariya learned Senior Counsel has appeared with Mr. D.C. Shah learned advocate for the defendant No.4 and Mr. B.S. Patel learned Counsel has appeared with Mr. Umang Oza learned advocate for the defendant No. 1 and Mr. Kavina, learned Counsel has appeared with Mr. Kapadiya learned advocate for the original plaintiff in both the petitions. I have heard the learned Counsel for the contesting parties and perused the record. 7. Submissions:- Mr. Vakhariya, learned Senior Counsel for the defendant No. 4 has submitted that (a) the order dated 17.7.2010 has been passed in violation of principle of natural justice, (b) that the application exhibit 33 was filed for the purpose of execution of the order dated 20.1.2010 and that therefore the learned Trial Court ought to have differed the decision on the said exhibit 33 till the appeal against order dated 20.1.2010 was heard and disposed of. [At this stage it should be noted that though such submission on behalf of the defendant No. 4 has been made, it is an admitted position that he has, until 7.9.2010 not filed appeal against the order dated 20.1.2010 but has filed appeal only against the order below Exhibit-86 (c) the impugned order is passed under Section 151 of the Code and the discretionary power under Section 151 of the Code should be exercised only for the purpose of meeting the ends of justice or preventing abuse of process of Court, however though none of the said reasons existed the impugned order dated 17.7.2010 came to be passed and (d) the defendant No. 1 was not party to the proceedings when order dated 20.1.2010 was passed and since he was impleaded as party to the proceedings by the Trial Court by order below Exhibit 48, he is rendered without remedy because he cannot file appeal against the order below Exhibit 5 and the appeal filed by him against the order passed below exhibit 86 has been rendered infructuous. 7.1 Mr. 7.1 Mr. B.S. Patel learned Counsel for the defendant No.1, the owner of the suit premises has, inter alia, submitted that it was the plaintiff who voluntarily handed over the keys and thereby the possession of the suit premises in the evening on 6.5.2010 and that therefore the allegation that the possession of the suit premises has been taken away is without substance and in view of said action of the defendant No. 1 she had entered into the agreement to sale with defendant No. 4 and in view of the payment of Rs.45 lakhs she had passed the possession receipt (i.e. had handed over the possession to defendant No. 4). The defendant No. 1 also alleged that it was agreed that the defendant No. 1 would withdraw the complaint and the plaintiff would withdraw the Regular Civil Suit No. 583 of 2009, however the plaintiff subsequently resiled from the said agreement and filed the application (exhibit- 33). He also contended that the learned Trial Court has found that the respondent No. 4 is in possession of the suit premises and that therefore the order is incapable of being implemented by the defendant No. 1 and he referred to the application dated 27.8.2010 submitted by the defendant No. 1 requesting the Court to appoint Commissioner. Dated 8.9.2010 : 7.2 Mr. Kavina learned Senior Counsel for the original plaintiff has vehemently opposed the submission of opponent No. 4 and submitted that the advocate of defendant No.4 was present during the entire hearing of Exhibit 33 which is evident from the order sheet (Rojkam) of the proceedings. He referred to the order sheet (Rojkam) of the proceedings and submitted that in light of the record it is unjustified for the defendant No. 4 to claim that he was not afforded opportunity of hearing and the order is in violation of principles of natural justice. He submitted that the possession has been forcibly taken over in breach of the order dated 20.1.2010 and that the contesting defendants are required to comply the order. The learned Senior Counsel and the learned advocate have not made any other submission. 8. He submitted that the possession has been forcibly taken over in breach of the order dated 20.1.2010 and that the contesting defendants are required to comply the order. The learned Senior Counsel and the learned advocate have not made any other submission. 8. As noted earlier so far as the opponent No.4 is concerned he has assailed the order below Exhibit 33 on the allegation that the impugned order has been passed in violation of principles of natural justice as he has not been heard in respect of Exhibit 33 inasmuch as before he was formally impleaded as party-defendant the hearing of Exhibit 33 was concluded. 8.1 In this context it is relevant to recall that the defendant No. 4 is the person who approached the Court, even before the owner (defendant No.1) of the suit premises, by filing application Exhibit 48 on 26.5.2010 wherein he, inter alia, averred that: "3. The applicant has learnt that the plaintiff herein instead of withdrawing a civil suit which she ha d filed against the defendant no. 1 has filed an application to return back the possession of the property which she has already handed over to the defendant no. 1. However the possession of the property at present is with the present applicant. 4. The applicant at the very first instance on knowing that the plaintiff wants to take the possession of the property has appointed a lawyer and seeked permission to be added as a necessary party. The applicant has sought for the certified copies of the complete matter however due to holidays of summer vacations he has not been able to get the same as on date, however as the Hon'ble Court had ordered the applicant files the present application without any proof from the suit, however he reserves his right to file further clarifications as and when the certified copy is received. 5. The applicant has spent a huge amount for the sale deed of the property and is in no mood to return the property to the defendant no.1. 6. The present applicant feels that he will face double jeopardy if the present matter is decided on merits without making the applicant a defendant in the party. 5. The applicant has spent a huge amount for the sale deed of the property and is in no mood to return the property to the defendant no.1. 6. The present applicant feels that he will face double jeopardy if the present matter is decided on merits without making the applicant a defendant in the party. It is submitted that the valuable right of possession by the applicant would be defeated if he is not added as a necessary party." and then on 8.7.2010 he moved another application (exhibit 86) and averred, inter alia, that:- "2. the defendant No. 4 was looking for good investment in the City of Vadodara. The defendant No. 1 wanted to sell the property being shop No. F/1 and F/2 in viz. Tanishk complex situate at Vadodara. The defendant No. 4 entered into agreement to sell with defendant No. 1 through her power of attorney on 7.5.2010. The defendant No. 4 was handed over the possession of the property on the same day and letter of possession was executed on the same day. The defendant No. 4 is in absolute possession of the property situated at shop No. F/1 and F/2 in Tanishk complex......" 3. The defendant no. 4 learnt through the husband of the defendant no. 1 that the plaintiff had filed a frivolous suit against the defendant no. 1. The same was withdrawn by the plaintiff herein. However instead of withdrawing the civil suit which she had filed against the defendant no. 1, the plaintiff filed an application to return back the possession of the property which was already handed over to the defendant no. 1. The defendant no. 4 was in possession of the property when the application under Exhibit 33 was moved by the plaintiff. 4. The defendant no. 4 herein at the very first instance on knowing that the plaintiff wants to take the possession of the property appointed a lawyer to seek permission to be added as a necessary party. This Ho'nble Court was pleased to allow the application of the defendant no. 4 and added him as a necessary party. 4. The defendant no. 4 herein at the very first instance on knowing that the plaintiff wants to take the possession of the property appointed a lawyer to seek permission to be added as a necessary party. This Ho'nble Court was pleased to allow the application of the defendant no. 4 and added him as a necessary party. (emphasis supplied) 8.2 The said Exhibit 48 filed after application Exhibit-33 was filed but was heard and decided before the decision on Exhibit 33 while the Exhibit 86, which was also filed after Exhibit- 33 and came to be decided, though by a separate order, alongwith i.e. on the same day - with Exhibit-33. In the backdrop of such facts, the defendant No.4 has alleged, and wants this Court to believe, that he has not been heard in the matter of Exhibit 33, though the hearing of the said Exhibit-33 had also run (i.e. the said Exhibit 33 had also been heard) between 12.5.2010 and 16.7.2010 alongwith or parallel to or conjointly with the said two applications Exhibits 48 and 86. So as to support the contention, the defendant No. 4 has relied upon the order sheet (Rojnama) and the provision under Sub-Rules 4 and 5 of Rule 10 Order 1 and claimed that the defendant No. 4 was not party to the proceedings until 3.7.2010 (when the amended plaint was filed) at that time the hearing in respect of exhibit 33 was concluded. 8.3 So far as the order regarding Exhibit 48, by which the defendant No. 4 was impleaded as party to the suit proceedings is concerned it emerges that the order bears the date 3.6.2010 (and not 3.7.2010). However since some of the other signatures (probably of learned advocates) on the order appear to have been made on 3.7.2010, the defendant No. 4 now alleges that the order was made on 3.7.2010 and not on 3.6.2010. Reliance is placed on the Rojkam to claim that no proceeding was held on 3.6.2010 and that the hearing of the application exhibit 33 was concluded before 3.7.2010. What is important, and what deserves to be noted in this context, is that the signature of the learned Single Judge is dated 3.6.2010 i.e. appears to have been put on 3.6.2010. Reliance is placed on the Rojkam to claim that no proceeding was held on 3.6.2010 and that the hearing of the application exhibit 33 was concluded before 3.7.2010. What is important, and what deserves to be noted in this context, is that the signature of the learned Single Judge is dated 3.6.2010 i.e. appears to have been put on 3.6.2010. Further, the date which appears on each of the pages of the said order is 3.6.2010 and the signature of learned Judge also appears to have been put on 3.6.2010. Likewise in the last line of the order, which records the date on which the order was read/pronounced in the Court, the date mentioned is 3.6.2010. In teeth of these vital facts, the absence of notings in the order sheet on 3.6.2010 cannot be over emphasized and does not help the case of defendant No.4. The signature and the date put by the learned Judge on the judgment would carry weight and credence as against the absence of noting in the order sheet, more so when any specific noting about the order is not made in the order sheet for 3.7.2010 also. 9. At this stage it is necessary to note that in view of the dispute raised and allegations made by the defendant No. 4 it appeared necessary and appropriate to call for the report regarding the proceedings in the learned trial Court after the Exhibit 33 was filed and taken up for hearing. Hence, this Court had made order on 3.9.2010 The said order reads thus:- "...Therefore, it has become necessary to ascertain, as a matter of fact, (a) the date on which the hearing in respect of Exh.33 was concluded, and (b) whether any submission by or on behalf of the subsequent purchaser, i.e. petitioner of S.C.A. No.10573 of 2010, was made in respect of application Exh.33 and heard by the learned trial Court before passing the impugned order dated 17.07.2010 or not......." 9.1 It is necessary to mention that when this Court passed the aforesaid order on 3.9.2010 calling for the report neither of the two petitioners (i.e. neither the defendant No. 1 and/or 4) nor the plaintiff had expressed any objection or even any reservation with regard to the order calling for the report. 9.2 The report reached the Court in late evening on 6.9.2010. 9.2 The report reached the Court in late evening on 6.9.2010. During the hearing the report was shown, to the learned advocates of the defendant No. 1 and 4 and the plaintiff. The relevant part of the report reads thus:- "...That defendant No.4 after he became party to the suit argued at length on application Ex-48 and Ex-86. All this while, application at Ex-33 is remained pending. That the argument on side of defendant No. 4 on application at Ex-33 was the same as the arguments made by him on this applications at Ex-48 and Ex-86. That while arguments on Ex-33 was going on before this court, the advocate of defendant No. 4 namely Miss Sabiha Sindhi was present. That she was also heard in respect of application at Ex-33. That she had never cared to give written reply to application at Ex-33. That learned advocate of defendant No. 4, since she had argued at length on application at Ex-48 and Ex- 86, had preferred to argue in short mentioning to the court that as she had already argued at length on applications at Ex-48 and Ex-86, she would like to be brief. That this court had given opportunity to all the defendants of hearing on application at Ex-33. That this court had followed the rule of natural justice by hearing both the parties. That in the order below Ex-33, on the last page, this court has made a special mention to the effect hat all the parties to the suit have been duly heard. That the hearing on application at Ex-33 was carried out by all the parties including defendant No. 4 on dated 19.6.2010 itself. That since the hearing by the advocate of defendant No. 4 on the application at Ex-33 was brief, the board clerk seems to have forgotten to mention in rojnama the fact of hearing by the learned advocate of defendant No.4 in respect of Ex-33. Though, board clerk did mention in the rojnama the presence of learned advocate of defendant No. 4. That at the time of arguments by the learned advocates for defendant No. 4 and other parties hereof on application at Ex-33, this court had promptly noted down arguments at length of defendant No. 4 and the same is attached herewith for prompt perusal. That at the time of arguments by the learned advocates for defendant No. 4 and other parties hereof on application at Ex-33, this court had promptly noted down arguments at length of defendant No. 4 and the same is attached herewith for prompt perusal. In this way, this court has given ample opportunity to defendant No. 4 for hearing carried out on dated 19.6.2010 on application at Ex-33 and learned advocate of defendant No. 4 did make arguments on Ex- 33." 9.3 The said report would, as such, take away all force and substance from the allegations by the defendant No. 4. 9.4 After reading the details mentioned in the report, the defendant No. 4 who had, at the relevant time (i.e. on 3.9.2010), not opposed the order on any ground, suddenly raised objection against the said report. The learned Counsel for the defendant No. 4 contended that the report cannot be taken into consideration and that after passing the order the learned Court become functus officio and that therefore it could not have made the report. He also submitted that in view of Section 152 of the Code the learned Court can only make correction of clerical or mathematical error but cannot add anything. He submitted that if separate review application is made order can be reviewed but the report is not an order made in pursuance of review application, it cannot be taken into consideration. The learned Senior Counsel relied upon judgments in the case between Mohinder Singh Gill and another v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi reported in 1978 (1) SCC 405 ; Chandra Singh and others v. State of Rajasthan and another reported in 2003 (6) SCC 545 , United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Patricia Jean Mahajan and others, reported in AIR SC 2607 and State of Punjab v. Darshan Singh reported in AIR 2003 SC 4179 . 9.5 It is to be mentioned that the report has been submitted, not with a view to adding anything in the order or for explaining what was in the mind of the learned Judge but pursuant to the order made by this Court to ascertain the factual aspects regarding opportunity of hearing in view of the allegations. In the facts of the case the judgments would not help the case of the defendants. In the facts of the case the judgments would not help the case of the defendants. It is, clarified that this Court has examined the said allegation in light of the order sheet (Rojnama) and averments made in Exhibits 48 and 86 and the report is not made the base for the observations or conclusions by this Court. 9.6 The most important aspect, on this count, is that the defendant No. 4, in his objections, did not contend, rather did not even whisper that the factual aspects stated in the report are not correct. Not a word of objection against even a single factual aspect stated in the report, is raised, much less pointed out by the learned Counsel of defendant No. 4 or even No.1. 10. Despite the aforesaid position and without entering into the merits or demerits of the contentions if the report of the learned Trial Court is, for a while, kept aside and if the events starting from 7.5.2010 until the date of the impugned order i.e. (17.7.2010) and the facts emerging from the conjoint reading of the averments in the Exhibit 48 and Exhibit 86 (applications by defendant No. 4) and Exhibit 60 (reply of the defendant No. 1) and the notings in the order sheet (Rojkam) are taken into account, then it emerges that the defendant No. 4 had been active participant, through his advocate, during the hearing of the application exhibit 33, rather during the entire period from 12.5.2010 until 17.7.2010 and there is no room or scope to make sustainable allegation and/or to believe and accept the allegation that he did not get opportunity of hearing and it also becomes clear that the allegation does not have substance. 11. It deserves to be noted, in the aforesaid context, that in the order sheet (Rojkam) for 19.5.2010 it is noted that on behalf of the defendant No. 4 the learned advocate was present at the time of hearing of exhibit 33 and by an application (exhibit 40) he had requested for adjournment. The proceeding was adjourned for receiving reply to exhibit 33, to 21.5.2010. It is recorded that the learned advocate of defendant No. 4 filed her Vakalatnama (Exhibit 44) on 21.5.2010 and also made an application (Exhibit 45) for adjournment. The proceeding was adjourned for receiving reply to exhibit 33, to 21.5.2010. It is recorded that the learned advocate of defendant No. 4 filed her Vakalatnama (Exhibit 44) on 21.5.2010 and also made an application (Exhibit 45) for adjournment. On the next date i.e. 26.5.2010 the defendant No. 4 filed application under Order 1 Rule 10 which was registered as exhibit 48. On the same day the defendant No. 4 also produced certain documents (Exhibit-49). Then on 28.5.2010 the plaintiff filed another application Exhibit 55 requesting Court to pass order below her application exhibit 33 and the defendant No.4 also filed application (Exhibit 56) requesting for adjournment. The notings also show that on 28.5.2010 that the proceedings were adjourned to 29.5.2010 for hearing of Exhibit 40, 41 and 48 and order in respect of exhibit 33, and on the adjourned date i.e. 29.5.2010 again the defendant No.4 had moved application for adjournment which was registered as exhibit 58 and the proceedings were adjourned to 31.5.2010 with similar remarks as was made on 28.5.2010. On 31.5.2010 also defendant No. 4 had moved an application (Exhibit 63) seeking adjournment. It is only on 31.5.2010 that the defendant No. 1 had filed her reply (exhibit 60) to the plaintiff's application exhibit 33. Thus, it cannot be alleged that Court had concluded the hearing of Exhibit 33 before 31.5.2010. Actually in the Rojkam of 31.5.2010 it is recorded that the hearing was adjourned for further arguments to 15.6.2010. On 15.6.2010 the plaintiff had filed application (Exhibit 72) requesting the Court that the submissions of the defendant No.1 in respect of the application Exhibit 33 may be directed to be completed. Thus, the noting also indicates that until 15.6.2010 the hearing of Exhibit 33 was not over. This aspect is further fortified from the noting recorded in the order sheet (rojkam) for 15.6.2010 that the proceedings were adjourned to 18.6.2010 for hearing of exhibit 33 and 72. Likewise, on 18.6.2010 also it is recorded in the order sheet (rojkam) that the proceedings were adjourned to 19.6.2010 for hearing the further argument in respect of exhibit 33 and 72 and order in respect of exhibit 75. The said notings in the order sheet for 15.6.2010, 18.6.2010 and 19.6.2010 demonstrates that the hearing in respect of exhibit 33 was not closed atleast until 19.6.2010. By order dated 19.6.2010 the proceedings were adjourned to 25.6.2010. The said notings in the order sheet for 15.6.2010, 18.6.2010 and 19.6.2010 demonstrates that the hearing in respect of exhibit 33 was not closed atleast until 19.6.2010. By order dated 19.6.2010 the proceedings were adjourned to 25.6.2010. Again on 25.6.2010 the proceedings were adjourned to 30.6.2010. However in between the matter was taken up twice on 21.6.2010 and 23.6.2010. On 30.6.2010 the plaintiff filed amended plaint and the proceedings were adjourned to 3.7.2010. On 3.7.2010 the proceedings appear to have been adjourned to 8.7.2010. On 8.7.2010 defendant No.4 moved application (exhibit 86) under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2. As per the noting for 8.7.2010 the proceedings were adjourned to 12.7.2010 for orders in respect of exhibit 33, exhibit 86, exhibit 61 and exhibit 72. On 9.7.2010 the plaintiff filed her reply (Exhibit-88) to the application (exhibit 86) filed by defendant No. 4. Thereafter the proceedings were adjourned to 12.7.2010 for order on Exhibit 33, 61, 86 and 72 and then on 14.7.2010 then to 17.7.2010 and on 17.7.2010 the Court passed impugned order below exhibit 33. 11.1 Thus, apart from (i.e. even without) the report of the learned Trial Court it becomes clear from the conjoint reading of the (i) aforesaid notings (in the order sheet) with (ii) the exhibit 48 and 86 filed by the defendant No. 4 that atleast from 19.5.2010 the defendant No. 4 was aware about and was actively participating in the proceedings taken out by the plaintiff and that he had claimed/asserted his rights including hearing by way of exhibit 48 and 86 and by making his submissions and that in light of the aforesaid details regarding the proceedings it is not possible to believe the allegation of the defendant No. 4 that he was not afforded opportunity of hearing or that the hearing of the exhibit 33 was concluded without hearing his submissions. 11.2 There are certain other pointers or indications which also prima facie demonstrate the lack of substance in the allegation by defendant No.4. 11.2 There are certain other pointers or indications which also prima facie demonstrate the lack of substance in the allegation by defendant No.4. The defendant No.4 was extremely vigilant and attended the hearing right from 19.5.2010, and entered his appearance on 21.5.2010 and on 26.5.2010 moved application (Exhibit 48) for being joined as party to the proceedings wherein he expressly stated that he was aware about the proceedings instituted by the plaintiff and also about the fact that the plaintiff was claiming the possession of the premises hence he had immediately appointed lawyer and that having spent huge amount he was in no mood to return the property to the plaintiff. Having taken all such steps and actions noted above the defendant No.4 wants the Court to believe that though present through-out the proceedings (through advocate) he remained only a spectator and did not ask for and did not get hearing. 11.3 It is pertinent that if the defendant No.4 is right in his allegation then he would have and ought to have atleast submitted an application (all along he was represented by lawyer) placing on record his objection of not being heard, however, interestingly he did not make any application. He did not even make any averment to such effect in his application Exhibit 86 which he filed subsequently on 8.7.2010. There is not a word in the said application that any opportunity of being heard in the matter of Exhibit 33 has not been granted. Furthermore, even after the date of the impugned order any application placing on record the fact that he was not granted hearing before passing order on Exhibit 33 or application seeking order dealing with the allegation that the order below Exhibit 33 came to be passed without hearing him, has not been made. 11.4 If at all the defendant no.4 is right, such application ought to have been made so that the learned trial court could have dealt with the said allegation by passing appropriate order. But the defendant chose not to file such an application immediately after the order was passed or even later-on. 11.5 Having not made any allegation, in writing, to the said effect right from 21.5.2010 (when he entered appearance through advocate) until 17.7.2010 (date of the order) the defendant No.4 has come out with such allegation in the petition. But the defendant chose not to file such an application immediately after the order was passed or even later-on. 11.5 Having not made any allegation, in writing, to the said effect right from 21.5.2010 (when he entered appearance through advocate) until 17.7.2010 (date of the order) the defendant No.4 has come out with such allegation in the petition. In the interregnum also i.e. after filing exhibit 48 and/or even in his application exhibit 86 and thereafter also such allegation is not made. The defendant No. 4 filed present petition after almost 1 = months since the date of the impugned order and even during the said period of 1 = months also any application making such allegation or placing on record the objection is not made by the defendant No.4. It is for the first time that the allegation is made in the petition. 11.6 When all these aspects are considered conjointly it transpires, at this stage in absence of any evidence that the said allegation is without substance and appears to have been made as an afterthought or with unjustified intention. If what the defendant has alleged is correct then the right and proper course for defendant No.4 was to make proper application before the learned Trial Court with such averments/allegations. In absence of any such step or action, the said allegation cannot be entertained in petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 11.7 Even otherwise, having examined the allegation on merits in light of material on record and from the facts flowing from the conjoint reading of the order sheet (rojkam) exhibit 48, exhibit 60 (reply of defendant No.1) and exhibit 86, it is noticed that the allegation coming from the person whose applications exhibit 48 and 86 have been heard simultaneously or alongwith Exhibit-33 and appropriate orders have been passed and who has remained present right from 19/21.5.2010 until the date of the order and has been represented by advocate throughout the proceedings does not appear acceptable when a word of protest has never been uttered. Likewise, in view of the notings in the order sheet (rojkam) discussed hereinabove the allegation that hearing of exhibit 33 was concluded is also not sustainable at this stage. Likewise, in view of the notings in the order sheet (rojkam) discussed hereinabove the allegation that hearing of exhibit 33 was concluded is also not sustainable at this stage. The reliance placed on Sub-Rule 4 and 5 of Rule 10 of Order 1 of the Code is based on misconstruction of the provision under Sub-Rule 5 which, in effect, makes provision for calculating period of limitation. 11.8 Besides the aforesaid, it is pertinent to note that even as of today the defendant No. 4 has, in his hands only agreement to sell and by virtue of the agreement to sell the defendant No. 4 would not, acquire any right much less title in the property. 12. Furthermore, in the facts and circumstance of the case and in light of the material which is presently available on record and in absence of any cogent evidence from the side of defendant No.1 and 4 supporting their respective allegations, it is not possible to consider or hold the defendant No.4 a bonafide purchaser for value without notice. The defendant No.4 does not appear to have exercised even elementary diligence, much less due diligence inasmuch as despite being aware, as per his own claim, about the suit proceedings he did not exercise care and caution or diligence to ascertain whether the plaintiff had, as per the allegation and claim by defendant No.1, actually returned the possession and whether there was any document acknowledging that the possession was voluntarily and actually returned by the plaintiff. 13. The said allegation and contention by defendant No. 4 are, in light of the aforesaid facts, not tenable and acceptable and when the said contention is found to be not acceptable then the order dated 17.7.2010 cannot be faulted so far as defendant No. 4 is concerned, on the alleged ground of no opportunity of hearing. 14. On perusal of the order dated 20.1.2010 it can be seen that the defendant No. 1 was not only restrained by the order dated 20.1.2010 passed by the learned Court below exhibit 5 from taking away and/or from obstructing the possession but was also restrained from causing or getting the possession of the suit premises taken away or from causing obstruction. Thus, even if the possession of the suit is caused to be taken away then also it would amount to, during the operation of the order dated 20.1.2010, non-compliance or breach of the order or circumventing the order and the Court cannot remain a spectator-and that too helpless spectator and allow the order to be frustrated or allow it to be rendered ineffective. Dated 13.9.2010 : 15. So far as the defendant No. 1 is concerned, the ground on which the said defendant No. 1 opposed the application exhibit 33 and has now assailed the order dated 17.7.2010 is that the plaintiff had voluntarily handed over the possession of the suit premises to her husband (husband of defendant No. 1) in the late evening on 6.5.2010. The learned Trial Court has addressed the aforesaid defence raised by the defendant No. 1 and for the reasons recorded in the impugned order the learned Court came to the conclusion that the said defence is not acceptable. 16. The defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 4 want the Court to also believe that the plaintiff who is so aggressively fighting-prosecuting the suit for possession since June 2009 and in whose favour the interim relief was operating since last about 4 months would suddenly go to the defendant No. 1 in the late evening on 6.5.2010 and without any reason and without any formal agreement or without even a plain document or any other material-even simple acknowledgment/receipt in writing, which may act as proof acknowledging that possession has been handedover, would actually handover the possession of the suit premises by merely handing over the keys to the husband of the defendant No. 1. The learned trial Court has not found the said claim palatable, particularly in view of the attending and connected facts and evidence available on record and has declined to believe such defence. At this stage, in absence of any material which may lend even prima facie support to the claim and allegations of defendant No. 1, the said view cannot be said to be incorrect and cannot be faulted, particularly when the plaintiff appears to have placed on record prima facie evidence, though rebuttable, to demonstrate that on 7.5.2010 plaintiff was in possession of the premises which falsifies or cast doubt on the version given by defendant No.1. 17. 17. What is more relevant and pertinent is that during the operation of the injunction order dated 20.10.2010 without permission from the Court and/or without even informing the Court the defendant No. 1 accepted the payment and executed the alleged Agreement to Sell and also passed the possession receipt to the defendant No. 4. It is noticed from the impugned order that there was material on the record before the learned Trial Court which demonstrated that on 7.5.2010 certain clients were attended by the plaintiff/her staff and they had also made payment on 7.5.2010 which prima facie establish that on 7.5.2010 the possession of the suit premises was with the plaintiff who had carried on her business activity in the suit premises. The said material, demolishes the allegation and defence that the plaintiff had handed over the possession on 6.5.2010. 17.1 It also emerges that (a) on the date on which the impugned order came to be passed, any material, which may demolish or rebut the said material put by the plaintiff-applicant or any evidence which may support the claim and allegation by the defendant No.1 was not placed on record; (b) neither the defendant No. 1 nor the defendant No. 4 could produce any material proof before the Trial Court evidencing actual payment of Rs.45 lakhs claimed to have been made by the defendant No. 4 to the defendant No. 1; (c) there was no material on record to persuade the Court to believe that the consideration for the Agreement to Sell was actually paid i.e. the consideration necessary for valid agreement was actually paid by alleged purchaser to the so-called seller; (d) that the alleged Agreement to Sell has not been registered i.e. the document placed on record is not the copy of registered document. 17.2 Furthermore, as noticed by the learned Trial Court the entire chronology of events pleaded by the defendant Nos. 1 and 4 did not inspire confidence in the mind of learned Trial Court. 17.2 Furthermore, as noticed by the learned Trial Court the entire chronology of events pleaded by the defendant Nos. 1 and 4 did not inspire confidence in the mind of learned Trial Court. It is pertinent that despite the injunction order dated 20.1.2010 on the very next date i.e. 7.5.2010 the defendant No. 1, through her constituted attorney entered into an Agreement to Sell with the defendant No. 4 (who ordinarily resides at Ahmedabad) and on the same day i.e. 7.5.2010 without even asking the plaintiff to withdraw the suit and/or without even waiting for the withdrawal of the suit and the order dated 20.1.2010 being vacated the defendant No. 1 also passed the possession receipt (i.e. handover the possession) in favour of the defendant No. 4 who then took over the possession on the very same day i.e. 7.5.2010 and also removed the belongings of the plaintiff from the suit premises and on the very same day i.e. 7.5.2010 and the defendant No. 3 Mr. Patel also made the affidavit (mark as 34/7) on the same day. All the aforesaid events took place on same day i.e. 7.5.2010. Then on 26.5.2010 even before the defendant No. 1 filed her reply, the defendant No. 4 filed the application exhibit 48 by which the defendant No. 4 sought to be impleaded as party and also averred that since 7.5.2010 the possession of the suit premises is with him and that he is aware about the fact that the plaintiff has taken out the proceeding to claim the possession of the premises. 18. All the above referred facts, at this stage and in absence of any cogent material from the side of defendant No.1 or even defendant, No.4 coupled with the contrary evidence from the side of plaintiff obtaining on record (showing that the plaintiff had attended the clients on 7.5.2010) cast a shadow of serious doubt on the version of the defendant No.1 and make it very difficult to digest that the plaintiff had gone or would go, while the order of interim relief is operating, to the defendant No. 1 and voluntarily (and that too without any documentation acknowledging the alleged handover) handover the possession of the suit premises. The learned Trial Court has, on examining the material on record, not believed the said submission. The learned Trial Court has, on examining the material on record, not believed the said submission. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in light of the material which is placed on record of present petitions it is not possible, at this stage, to find any fault or error in the said decision of not accepting the submission and defence of defendant No.1, more so when Court was merely considering complaint about non-compliance or breach of the order. 19. As noted earlier the said defence is the only reason given by the defendant No. 1 in support or justification of the impugned action despite the fact that the order dated 20.1.2010 was in operation at the relevant time. When it is found that the defence or the explanation is not plausible or tenable or palatable and cannot be believed the logical corollary would be that the defendant No. 1 has not complied the order dated 20.1.2010 and/or has committed the breach or caused the breach committed. At this stage and on the basis of the material on record, as of now, it prima facie emerges that the defendant No. 1 has, through the defendant No.4, got the possession taken over by allegedly entering into so-called the Agreement to Sell during the operation of the order dated 20.1.2010 and that too without permission of or without even informing the Court. In such circumstances and facts the impugned order requiring the defaulting parties to comply the order dated 20.1.2010 cannot be faulted. 20. So as to escape and wriggle out of the situation arising on account of the said acts which frustrates the order dated 20.1.2010 and prima facie amount to overreaching the said order, the defendant No. 1 also made allegation that her advocate had not informed her about the order dated 20.1.2010. Obviously the said allegation is made with a view to pleading ignorance and absence of knowledge/information about the order dated 20.1.2010. The discussion which follows would demonstrate that the said excuse is not tenable at this stage in light of the material available on record. Obviously the said allegation is made with a view to pleading ignorance and absence of knowledge/information about the order dated 20.1.2010. The discussion which follows would demonstrate that the said excuse is not tenable at this stage in light of the material available on record. 20.1 In this context it is pertinent to note that the concerned advocate has not been examined and/or his (the learned advocate) affidavit has not been filed and the defendant No. 1 does not seem to have made any complaint about such conduct and/or has not placed on record any material which would support the said submission. Furthermore such defence would not be tenable in the matter concerning compliance of Court's direction when the advocate represents the defendant/client in the Court proceedings and when the person in whose favour any order is passed alleges breach or noncompliance thereof and requires the compliance of the direction, but the person who is required to comply the order tries to escape the responsibility and/or consequences by explaining the conduct on the ground that the advocate did not inform the order, then the Court may very well not accept such explanation or defence. 20.2 However, in present case there is yet another angle to this particular defence, namely, the plaintiff had, after the order dated 20.1.2010 was passed, filed caveat in the learned First Appellate Court and forwarded the caveat to the defendant No. 1. The acknowledgment of the receipt evidencing the receipt of the caveat by the defendant No.1 is said to have been placed on record by the plaintiff as mark 22/10 and 80/2. Thus, even otherwise the excuse or the plea that she did not have knowledge or information about the order is, prima facie , not available to the defendant No.1. In arriving at the decision to not to believe the said defence by the defendant No. 1 the learned Trial Court has taken into consideration the aforesaid documents and has, as a conjoint effect of the aforesaid aspects, decided not to believe the explanation of the defendant No. 1. In view of the said discussion by the learned Trial Court, particularly in paragraph No. 16 of the order, it cannot be said that the learned Trial Court has committed any error in not believing or accepting the said defence of defendant No. 1. In view of the said discussion by the learned Trial Court, particularly in paragraph No. 16 of the order, it cannot be said that the learned Trial Court has committed any error in not believing or accepting the said defence of defendant No. 1. 20.3 Thus, so far as the defendant No. 1 is concerned the fact about noncompliance of the order dated 20.1.2010 passed below exhibit 5 and/or its breach is prima facie seen from the reply (Exhibit 60) filed by the defendant No.1 herself and from the exhibit 48 and Exhibit 86 filed by the defendant No. 4 and from the copy of the possession receipt. The said action of defendant No. 1 prima facie amounts to noncompliance of the order dated 20.1.2010. of course this aspect is rebuttable and may be rebutted by the defendant No. 1 and No. 4 during the trial however as of now the said defendants appear to have failed to produce any material in rebuttal. Therefore, the learned Trial Court passed the impugned order dated 17.7.2010 which in light of the aforesaid discussion cannot be faulted. 21. When the factum of the injunction order and its existence/operation is not in dispute and when its operation has not been stayed by competent Court and when it is not disputed that the injunction order is not being complied with, ordinarily the subsequent order, asking the parties to comply the said earlier order cannot be interfered with and/or set aside unless arbitrariness or patent illegality in the subsequent order is ex facie shown by the party in default. 22. The impugned direction which also applies to defendant No.4, though he was not party to the proceedings when the injunction order dated 20.1.2010 was passed, doesn't warrant interference or it cannot be faulted even so far as respondent no. 22. The impugned direction which also applies to defendant No.4, though he was not party to the proceedings when the injunction order dated 20.1.2010 was passed, doesn't warrant interference or it cannot be faulted even so far as respondent no. 4 is concerned also for the reason that the order dated 20.1.2010 required the defendant no.1 to not only not takeaway or not disturb or obstruct the possession of the suit premises from the plaintiff but it also directed the defendant No. 1 to not to get the possession taken over or not to get disturbance or obstruction caused and yet the defendant No.1 executed the Agreement to Sell in favour of the defendant No.4 and passed possession receipt in his favour without permission from or without informing the Court and before the stay order gets vacated or stayed. Accordingly the defendant No.4 prima facie appear to be a party to the noncompliance or breach of the injunction order and it prima facie appears that and the defendant No.l is hiding behind the defendant No.4 and is trying to escape the duty and obligation of complying the direction under the injunction order dated 20.1.2010 and/or 17.7.2010 on the pretext that now the possession is in the hands of defendant no.4. Under such facts and circumstances the direction to defendant No.4 also cannot be said to be unwarranted or unjustified, much less illegal or arbitrary. 23. When the Court passes an order to ensure compliance of its earlier direction then such order becomes an order under Section 151 of the Code i.e. an order made in exercise of inherent jurisdiction. The Court is not to sit as or remain a mute spectator of the act of noncompliance of its directions nor can the Court be helpless and passive spectator of such acts. When any direction, including interim injunction is issued then unless it is set aside or its operation is stayed by the Court of competent jurisdiction, the Court has all necessary power and authority of law to ensure compliance of the directions and even those who are party to or aid the noncompliance, though not party to the proceedings at the relevant time, also can be directed to comply the original direction/injunction. If the direction/injunction order by the Court is willfully or intentionally or with a design committed breach of or not complied with, then it is not only an inherent right but the bounden duty and obligation of the Court to get the wrong undone. Anyone cannot be allowed to take undue advantage of its own wrong, more particularly when such act is carried out for circumventing or frustrating any direction and order by the Court. In such cases the Court is duty-bound and obliged to intervene and pass appropriate and necessary directions. Any failure or delay, on part of the Court, to intervene would undermine the dignity and honour of the Court and of the Rule of law. Seeker of justice, equity and relief is bound to and must comply and respect the Court's order. In such cases there cannot be anything higher or supreme than the Court's order and the duty to comply the order. The other contentions raised by the petitioners are such which are materially related to the injunction order and/or which are required to be raised during the hearing of appeal e.g. the plaintiff is trespasser and that about Rs.5 lakhs towards arrears of rent are outside and that original leasee has tried to earn profit and that defendant No.1 is not party to the sub-tenancy or that defendant Nos. 2 and 3 have committed offence under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 etc. and that therefore it would not be proper to deal with the same or to make any observations in that regard at this stage. Thus, what emerges and follows on overall consideration of the matter and the issue on hand and in light of the aforesaid discussion regarding the contentions raised by the petitioners, is that the impugned order cannot be said to be illegal, arbitrary or without authority of law and jurisdiction. Any sound and strong reason against the impugned order and direction is not made out. The petitioners have failed to make out strong case against the impugned order which would persuade the Court to hold that the impugned order is arbitrary or patently wrong and deserve to be set aside. The petitions, therefore, fail and deserve to be rejected. Dated 17.9.2010 : 24. Before parting it is, however necessary to record that Mr. The petitioners have failed to make out strong case against the impugned order which would persuade the Court to hold that the impugned order is arbitrary or patently wrong and deserve to be set aside. The petitions, therefore, fail and deserve to be rejected. Dated 17.9.2010 : 24. Before parting it is, however necessary to record that Mr. Patel, learned advocate for the defendant No. 1 has submitted that the petitioners are concerned about the hearing of the appeal i.e. it may not be influenced by the observations in the order. So as to allay the apprehension of the petitioners, though it is already clarified in the earlier part of the order, it is again made clear that it goes without saying that the observations made in or with regard to interlocutory orders are, ordinarily, prima facie. Likewise the observations in present order are also only prima facie and they are not supposed to, and they shall not, in any manner, affect or influence the hearing and decision of the appeal filed by the petitioners. It is, also clarified that the observations made in the present order have been made only with a view to examining the challenge against the order dated 17.7.2010. So far as the appeal pending before the First Appellate Court is concerned, it shall be decided on its own merits and strictly in accordance with law without being influenced by the order and after taking into account the material obtaining on record of the Regular Civil Suit No. 583 of 2009 and/or the appeal. It has been clarified in the earlier part of the order and it is again clarified that present decision is purely on the basis of material presented before this Court purporting to be the material on record before the learned trial Court as on the date of the decision below Exhibit 33. 25. So far as the application/pursis dated 27.8.2010 given by the defendant No. 4 are concerned, it has to be noted that ordinarily this Court would not make any observation with regard to the application/pursis which is submitted by any of the party to the litigation, after the date of the impugned decision for the reason that such application/pursis would not be the subject matter of the challenge raised in the petition. However, in present case considering the scope of the issue raised in the petition and particularly in view of the fact that the question is about compliance of the order which was passed by the Court and considering the reason mentioned in the application/pursis as to why the said application/pursis was submitted and since its copy is presented on record of petitions, this Court considers it appropriate to observe that it would be in the fitness of things that the learned Trial Court may make appropriate order on the said application/pursis as early as possible, after hearing all concerned parties, instead of keeping the application pending without any decision thereon. 26. The petitioners in both the petitions have expressed that appropriate direction may be passed to the learned First Appellate Court for expediting the hearing and decision of the appeal. Having regard to the facts and circumstances and pendency of the subject matter it is hoped that the learned First Appellate Court would expedite the hearing of the appeal preferred by the present petitioners against the order dated 20.1.2010 below exhibit 5 passed by the learned Trial Court and decide the said appeal/s as expeditiously as possible and preferably within period of one month. In view of large number of admission matters (Appeal from Order as well as Writ Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India) being listed on daily cause list, the dictation of the order could be taken up only during the last 30- 45 minutes or an hour, and in between on one of the days (i.e. 9.9.2010) in the second half Division Bench was constituted and that therefore dictation of the order could not be continued on the said date and on 10,11 and 12 being the nonworking holidays hence the dictation could not be continued on the said dates also. The dictation of the order is, therefore, spread over different dates. 27. With the aforesaid clarifications the petitions are disposed off. The petitions are hereby rejected. Rule discharged. No costs. Petition dismissed.