JUDGMENT Rekha Sharma, J. (Oral) 1. The appellant had filed a suit for the recovery of a sum of Rs.61,631/against the respondent, i.e. the Union of India through General Manager, Northern Railways. The suit was filed on August 06, 1987 in the Court of the District Judge. It was later transferred to the Railway Claims Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal). The Tribunal by order dated June 05, 1996 held that the recovery made by the respondent was illegal and consequently further held that the respondent was liable to refund the same to the appellant subject to its findings on additional issues No.1 & 4 which issues were as under:- "1. Whether the suit is within time? OPP. 4. Did the defendants promise to pay the amount of Rs.61,631/- to plaintiff at any time, if so its effect? OPP." 2. The findings on the aforesaid two issues went against the appellant. The Tribunal held the claim of the appellant to be barred by the law of limitation and further held that the respondent made no promise to the appellant to pay the sum of Rs.61,631/-. The result was that the appellant, even though it succeeded on merits, failed to get the refund of the amount claimed. Feeling aggrieved by the order so passed, the present appeal was preferred way-back in the year 1996. The facts are not in dispute and they are as under:- The appellant booked at consignments a from Singrauli to Sahibabad under Invoice No. 4 (RR No. 093966) dated June 20m 1982. As per the relevant rules, the consignments had to be booked by the Railways via the shortest route at the cheapest rate, The appellant had booked the consignment via chopan Chnmar which was the shortest route and the freight charges were also invoiced according by the forwarding station. However, on arrival of the consignments at the destination station, an excess freight of Rs, 61,631/- was demanded form the appellant by6 the via a longer rout, The appellant did pay the extra freight of Ts, 61,631/- but under protest, the payment was made on June 34,1982. 3. It is not disputed that after making the payments, the appellant was engaged in correspondence with the respondent resulting in a letter dated January 09, 1986 from the latter informing the former that the amount of Rs. 3. It is not disputed that after making the payments, the appellant was engaged in correspondence with the respondent resulting in a letter dated January 09, 1986 from the latter informing the former that the amount of Rs. 61,650/- had been provisionally passed/sanctined and that the same would he remitted to it by the Additional FA & CAO, Ta Brach after necessary verification by that office. This letter was followed by another letter dated February 14, 1986 where by the appellant was further informed that its claim for refund of Rs, 61,615/- had been considered and passed and the payment had arranged vide cheque No. 009720/45971 dated February 06, 1986. However subsequently the respondent reneged from its said stand and by a letter dated September 11, 1986 conveyed to the appellant what no refund was admissible and that the freight charges were correctly recovered, According to the appellant, is is this letter of September 11, 1986 which gave rise to the cause of action to file the suit, Accordingly, the same was filed on August 06, 1987 in the court of the District Judge which was noticed above, was subsequently transferred to the Tribunal. The Tribunal vide the impugned order dated June 05, 1996 had held that it is Article 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which is applicable to the facts of the case and the suit having not been filed within three years in terms of the said Article the same was barred by time. 4. Before i proceed further let me reproduce Article 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It runs as under- Description Period of Limitation Time from which period being to run 24 For money payable Three years when the money is received By the defendant to the plaintiff for money received by the defendant for the plaintiff use The learned counsel fore the appellant has assailed the order of the Tribunal on the ground that it is not Article 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which is attracted to the facts of the present case, but Article 113 of Act. According to the counsel, the facts of the present case are such that no other Article of the Limitation Act fits the bills except Article 113 and that what is to be seen is whether the suit is within limitation in terms of thee said Article, Insofar as Article 113 is concerned, it provides that, “ in a suit for which no period of limitaioin is provided elsewhere in the Schedule, the period of limitation will be three years form the date when the right to sue accruse.” 5. IN view of the aforesaid, the question that arises for consideration is whether it is Article 24 or Article 113 of the Limitation Act which is applicable to the facts of the present case an also, whether the respondent at any time made a promise to the appellant to pay the amount of Rs. 61,560/- 6.what is of significance is that after the sum of Rs. 61,631/- was paid by the appellant to the respondent, the parties remained in correspondence with each other and what is further of significance is that on January 09. 1986 the respondent informed the appellant that the amount of Rs. 61,560/- had been provisionally passed/sanctioned and the same would be remitted to is Not only this on February 14, 1986 the appellant was informed that its request for refund of the amount had been passed and the payment had been arranged by cheuqe No. 009720/485971 dated February 06, 1986. What does one make out form these two communications ? Do they not go to show that the respondent conceded to the claim of the appellant ? In my view they do. It was only on September 11, 1986 that the respondent made a turn around and is was through this letter that the appellant was finally told that no refund was admissible. This being the position, there was no occasion for the appellant to have filed, the suit for the recovery of the amount prior to September 11, 1986 It was the letter of September 11, 1986 which gave rise to the cause of action and if the period of limitation is computed from the said date, the suit which was initially filed in the Court of the District Judge on August 06, 1987 was within limitation. The finding of the Tribunal that it is Article 24 of the Limitation Act which was applicable is not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case. 7. Insofar as the finding is issue No;. 4 is concerned. it was contended before the Tribunal and so also before me that the letter dated January 09, 1986 whereby the respondent had informed the appellant sanctioned and the same would of Rs. 61, 560/- had been provisionally passed/sanctioned and the same would be remitted to it. constituted a promise referred to as the Contract Act and it tantamount to a contract in terms of the said section. 8. Before i deal with the submission let me reproduce the relevant provision of Section 25(3) of the contract Act, It runs as under:- “25. Agreement without consideration, void unless it is in writing and registred, or is a promise to compensate for something done, or is a promise to pay a debt barred by limitation law. - An agreement made without consideration is void, unless (1) xxxxx (2) xxxxx (3) it is a promise, made in writing and signed by the person to be . charged therewith, or by his agent generally or specially authorized in that behalf, to pay wholly or in part a debt of which the creditor might have enforced payment but for the law for the limitation of suits." .. 9. The Tribunal has held that the so-called promise was not absolute, in as much as the letter dated January 09, 1986 was provisional in nature in the sense that the sum of Rs.61,560/- was passed/sanctioned subject to necessary verification by the Additional FA & CAO, TA Branch. It is true that the respondent through letter dated January 09,1986 did convey to the appellant that its claim had_been provisionally passed/sanctioned as refundable subject to the verification by the Additional FA & CAO, TA Branch but the verification referred to in the said letter was not with regard to the admissibility of its claim. It was only $hat the payment was to be made after going through the formality of verification from the concerned office. The Triburial has not construed the letter in the correct perspective. It was only $hat the payment was to be made after going through the formality of verification from the concerned office. The Triburial has not construed the letter in the correct perspective. In any case, the respondent had itself acted upon the letter, for as noticed above by a subsequent letter dated February 14, 1986 it informed the appellant that a cheque for Rs.61,615/- had been prepared. Hence, the letter dated January 09, 1986 did constitute a contract in terms of Section 25(3) of the Con traer Act and if the period of limitation is computed from that angle, then also the suit is within limitation. 10. For what has been noticed above, I set-aside the order of the Railway Claims Tribunal and hold the appellant entitled to the sum of Rs. 61,63Valong with 'interest @ 6% per annum from the date of the filing of the suit till realization. As the claim pertains to the year 1982, the Railway is directed to make the payment within five months from today, failing which the amount shall carry interest @ 9% instead of 6%.