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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2010 DIGILAW 439 (MP)

TEJ KUMAR v. SHANTI CHAND JAIN

2010-04-16

A.M.NAIK

body2010
Judgment Abhay M.Natik, J. ( 1. ) This appeal has been preferred by the defendants against decree for eviction granted by the courts below, in concurrent manner on grounds under sections 12(l)(b) and (f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short "the Act"). ( 2. ) Short facts, relevant for the purpose of this appeal, are that the plaintiff/ respondent instituted a suit for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent mainly with the allegations that late Rambabu (father of defendant No.I and husband of defendant No. 2) had obtained the suit shop from the father of the plaintiff @ Rs.200 p.m. on rent, vide rent-note dated 10/6/1974. Rent was increased from time to time and was @ Rs.640/-, at the time of institution of the suit. After the death of Rambabu, defendants shifted to Surat (Gujrat) and handed over the suit shop to a third person without the consent of the plaintiff. Plaintiffs son Nirmal Kumar was earlier engaged in J.C.Mills, Gwalior but on account of its closure, he became unemployed. Plaintiffs younger son, namely, Kamal Kumar Jain was running his business of grocery in a rented shop in Danaoli, Gwalior. Suit shop is bona fide required by the plaintiff for the business of his aforesaid two sons pertaining to clothes. There is no other alternative suitable vacant non-residential accommodation in the city of Gwalior. ( 3. ) Defendants/appellants by submitting joint written statement denied the claim of the plaintiff. It has been denied that the defendants have shifted to Surat after parting with possession in favour of third person. Business which is being run in the suit shop still belongs to the defendants. Apart from this, it is stated that the plaintiff earlier instituted Civil Suit No.63-A/80 (Now C.S.No.69-A/88) for the alleged need of Nirmal Kumar and Kamal Kumar which was got dismissed after enhancing the rent. It was denied that Nirmal Kumar was unemployed. Nirmal Kumar was engaged in the joint family business of the plaintiff in the name and style of Patodi Creations Thus, the civil suit was instituted with an alternative motive of enhancement of rent. ( 4. ) Learned trial judge granted a decree on grounds under sections 12(1)(b) and (f) of the Act in favour of the plaintiff vide judgment and decree dated 24/6/05. ( 5. ( 4. ) Learned trial judge granted a decree on grounds under sections 12(1)(b) and (f) of the Act in favour of the plaintiff vide judgment and decree dated 24/6/05. ( 5. ) Aggrieved by the aforesaid, defendants submitted Civil Appeal No.10- A/05, which having been dismissed vide impugned judgment and decree, present appeal has been preferred. ( 6. ) This second appeal has been heard on the following substantial questions of law:- (i) Whether, under the facts and circumstances of the case looking to the previous order in respect of eviction suit by which rent was enhanced, the need could be said to be bona fide ?. (ii) Whether the decree for eviction under Section 12(l)(b) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, is sustainable in law despite there being permission to introduce partner in the rent note marked as Ex.P/3 and D/4.?" ( 7. ) Shri V.K.Bhardwaj, learned Senior Advocate for the appellants and Shri Ravmdra Malav, learned Advocate for respondent made their respective submissions, which have been considered in the light of the material on record. Substantial question of Law No.(i) :- ( 8. ) It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that the plaintiff had earlier instituted Civil Suit No.63-A/80 for eviction on the basis of alleged need of his both the sons, namely, Nirmal Kumar and Kamal Kumar, which is evident from the copy of the plaint marked as Ex.D/1 and D/2. On perusal, it is found that the earlier suit was instituted on the ground of alleged need of Nirmal Kumar and Kamal Kumar. Suit was being opposed. It ended into a compromise, as revealed in Ex.D/5, after enhancement of rent to Rs.500 p.m. w.e.f. 1/10/89. ( 9. ) Pursuant to the said plea, plaintiff by way of amendment incorporated that Nirmal Kumar was unemployed at the time of institution of earlier suit bearing No.63-A/80, During pendency of the said suit, Nirmal Kumar was employed in J.C. Mills, Gwalior and his need, therefore, came to an end. Kamal Kumar alone was not able to run the business of clothes in the suit shop, therefore, the suit was compromised. Likewise, Civil Suit No.277-A/80 was also instituted for the need of Nirmal Kumar and Kamal Kumar. It also ended into a compromise vide Ex. D/7. Kamal Kumar alone was not able to run the business of clothes in the suit shop, therefore, the suit was compromised. Likewise, Civil Suit No.277-A/80 was also instituted for the need of Nirmal Kumar and Kamal Kumar. It also ended into a compromise vide Ex. D/7. A portion in the basement was handed over to the plaintiff, as revealed in Ex.D/7 but since Nirmal Kumar was employed in the meantime in J.C.Mills, Gwalior and Kamal Kumar was alone not able to run the business, the said portion so vacated has been occupied by plaintiffs another son, namely, Dharmendra who is running his partnership business in the name and style of Patodi Creations in the said portion. ( 10. ) Aforesaid factual position could not be successfully refuted by the defendants as is apparent from the evidence on record. ( 11. ) It is a trite law that mere enhancement of rent does not necessarily lead to the inference about: absence of the need of the plaintiff. Admittedly, J.C. Mill, Gwalior has been closed down which being subsequent event, has to be taken note of. Thus, in the facts and circumstances, increase in rent is not indicative of absence of bonafide need. Increase in rent at earlier occasion does not come in way of the plaintiff to seek eviction on the ground of bonafide need for the proposed clothes business of Nirmal Kumar and Kamal Kumar. I may successfully refer to the following decisions :- In the case of Gopal Bhai Vs. Omprakash Chaudhary 2004 (II) MPACJ 73, it has been held by this court that. increase in rent before need arose is of no consequence. In the case of State Bank of Indore Vs. Satya Narayan Bajaj 2002 (II) MPACJ 115 it has been held by this court that increase in rent, ii it does not indicate that the real purpose and intent of filing of the suit was to increase rent of the suit premises, is of no consequence. Earlier increase in rent is no ground to negate the bonafide need, if established as observed by this court in the case of Hiralal Vs. 0m Prakash [1983 MPRCJ SN(118)] ( 12. ) Learned counsel for the appellants has relied on 1989 MPRCJ 282 (Smt. Chandra Bai Vs. M/s. Motilal Kishanlal and Co.). Earlier increase in rent is no ground to negate the bonafide need, if established as observed by this court in the case of Hiralal Vs. 0m Prakash [1983 MPRCJ SN(118)] ( 12. ) Learned counsel for the appellants has relied on 1989 MPRCJ 282 (Smt. Chandra Bai Vs. M/s. Motilal Kishanlal and Co.). In the case of Smt. Chandra Bai (supra), the son whose need was projected was found to be engaged in his own business from time prior to the suit which was suppressed. Moreover, one shop was vacated during the pendency which was let out on higher rent without proving unsuitability. In the case in hand, the reason for non use at the relevant time has been duly explained. Moreover, the portion received by the landlord was in basement and is in occupation of the plaintiffs third son. This being so. appellants do not get assistance from the case of Smt. Chandra Bai (supra). ( 13. ) In the case of Amarjit Singh Vs. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain ( AIR 1987 SC 741 ), the landlady was found to have obtained alternative premises which was not found occupied by her for no justifiable reason. This is not applicable to the present case because the third son of the landlord has already occupied the accommodation in basement despite being not at par with the suit premises. ( 14. ) In the case of M/s. Rahabhar Productions Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Rajendra K. Tandon ( AIR 1998 SC 1639 ), it was held that the courts are under a legal obligation to harmoniously read the provisions of the Act so as to balance the rights of the landlord and the obligations of the tenant towards each other keeping in mind that one of the objects of the legislature while enacting the Act was to curb the tendency of the greedy landlords to throw out the tenants, paying lower rent, in the name of personal occupation and rent out the premises at the market rate. In the instant case, need of the plaintiff is real, genuine and bonafide since he has not been found proved to have let out premises despite need. ( 15. ) Decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Rajeshwari Vs. Puran Indoria (2005)7 SCC 60 , deals with the scope of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 15. ) Decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Rajeshwari Vs. Puran Indoria (2005)7 SCC 60 , deals with the scope of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Learned lower appellate judge is not found to have ignored any material piece of evidence or found to have taken into consideration any inadmissible evidence. He is also not found to have passed the impugned judgment contrary to the provisions of law. This being so, the appellants do not get any assistance from the case of Rajeshwari (supra). ( 16. ) Accordingly, substantial question of law No.(i) is answered against the appellants. Substantial question of Law No.(ii);- ( 17. ) It is further contended on behalf of the appellants that the rent note by the defendants predecessor, namely, Rambabu executed in favour of plaintiffs father is dated 10/6/74 which is on record as Ex.P/3. According to clause (3) thereof, the tenant was prohibited from inducting other tenant or licensee and from parting with suit shop. However, the tenant was given a right to run partnership business with any other person from his family (Kutumb, in specific, as mentioned in the rent-note). It is strenuously argued that the alleged tenant is nephew of Rambabu and was introduced in the partnership business of defendants/appellants in exercise of powers under clause (3) of the rent-note being a member of the family. This being so, the ground of eviction under Section 12(1)(b) of the Act is not available to the plaintiff. Reliance for this purpose has been placed on the decision of Delhi High court in the case of Govind Das and others Vs. Kuldip Singh (AIR 1971 Delhi 151) and Division Bench decision of Allahabad High court in the case of Shri Ram Nath Yadav Vs. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad and others (AIR 1994 AIL 398). ( 18. ) Both the aforesaid rulings deal with the cases of residential need whereas the present case is of non-residential need in addition to ground of illegal sub- tenancy for eviction. ( 19. ) Section 14 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 prohibits subletting in following words :- "14. ( 18. ) Both the aforesaid rulings deal with the cases of residential need whereas the present case is of non-residential need in addition to ground of illegal sub- tenancy for eviction. ( 19. ) Section 14 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 prohibits subletting in following words :- "14. Restrictions on sub-letting-(l) No tenant shall, without the previous consent in writing of the landlord,- (a) sub-let the whole or any part of the accommodation held by him as a tenant; or (b) transfer or assign his rights in the tenancy or in any part thereof. (2) No landlord shall claim or receive the payment of any sum as premium or pugree or claim or receive any consideration whatsoever in cash or in kind for giving his consent to the sub-letting of the whole or any part of the accommodation held by the tenant." ( 20. ) Scheme of the Act makes it clear that the sub-letting has been condemned except with the . written consent of the landlord. It is true that in the rent-note (Ex.P/3) the right was conferred upon the tenant to run partnership with the members of the family. Word family employed in "Ex.P/3" is not synonymous to Joint Hindu Family. It is to be construed in limited sense. It may also be so inferred from the rent-note (Ex.P/3) itself wherein Rambabu , the tenant is shown as an individual with Madan Lal as his father. His status as partner of firm Harbaksh Madan Lal is found to have been scored out, in specific, as revealed in rent- note (Ex.P/3). Defendant Tej Kumar s/o Rambabu has clearly admitted m his crossexamination in paragraph 12 that other persons Munni Devi and Ajay Gurg are not members of his family because they are respectively wife and son of his fathers late brother. This being so, it cannot be accepted that the alleged sub- tenants being members of the family of tenant were rightly included in the partnership and their inclusion is not hit by the bar created by virtue of Section 12(l)(b) read with Sections 14 and 15 of the Act. Partnership contained in Ex. D/17 is found to have been created merely to defeat the legal prohibition contained in section 12(l)(b) r/w Sections 14 and 15 of the Act. Partnership contained in Ex. D/17 is found to have been created merely to defeat the legal prohibition contained in section 12(l)(b) r/w Sections 14 and 15 of the Act. Sub-tenants are shown to have share in profit and loss to the extent of 80% whereas the main tenant namely, Tejkumar is shown to have share of merely 20%. This disproportionate shares speak for themselves. Moreover, Tejkumar has admitted that he is residing in Surat and running business of textile in the name and style of Har Baksh Tex in Hariom Market, Surat. Thus, it has been rightly found that the tenant has no control on the business which is being run by sub-tenants in the suit premises. In the case of Joginder Singh Sodhi Vs.Amar Kaur [2004 (23) AIC 44(SC)], the son of the tenant was adjudged as sub-tenant. In the case of Smt. Rajbir Kaur and another Vs, M/s S, Chokesiri Co. [1989] 1 SCC 19 it has been observed by Hon. Supreme Court of India:- "If exclusive possession is established, and the version of the tenant as to the particulars and the incidents of the transaction is found unacceptable in the particular facts and circumstances of the case, as in the present case, it may not be impermissible for the Court to draw an inference that the transaction was entered into with monetary considerations in mind. It is open to the respondent to rebut this. Such transaction of sub-letting in the guise of licences are in their very nature, clandestine arrangements between the tenant and the sub-tenant and there cannot be direct evidence. It is not, unoften, a matter for legitimate inference. The burden of making good a case of sub-letting and establishing facts and contentions which support the partys case is on the party who takes the risk of non-persuasion viz., the landlord. If at the conclusion of the trial, a party has failed to establish these to the appropriate standard, he will lose. Though the burden of proof as a matter of law remains constant throughout a trial, the evidential burden which rests initially upon a party bearing the legal burden, shifts according as the weight of the evidence adduced by the party during the trial. Though the burden of proof as a matter of law remains constant throughout a trial, the evidential burden which rests initially upon a party bearing the legal burden, shifts according as the weight of the evidence adduced by the party during the trial. In the circumstances of the present case, the landlord-appellants having been forced by the Courts below to have established exclusive possession of the person inducted by the tenant- respondent of a part of the demised premises and the explanation of the transaction offered by the respondent having been found by the Courts below to be unsatisfactory and unacceptable, it was not impermissible for the Courts to draw an inference, having regard to the ordinary course of human conduct, that the transaction must have been entered into for monetary considerations. There is no explanation forthcoming from the respondent appropriate to the situation as found." If the tenant is proved to have parted with possession and fails to establish control after parting with possession, he is liable to be evicted under Section 12(l)(b) of the Act as held by this court in the case of Hemchand Jain Vs. Bhagchand Jain [1998 MPACJ 219], Under clause (b) of Section 12(1) of the Act it is not necessary for the landlord to prove that parting with possession is for consideration, as held by this court in the case of Bhagchand and another Vs. Laxminarayan and others [2002(1)MPLJ 365]. This is obviously because the word "otherwise" employed in this provision indicates that it is not necessary for the landlord to prove that the tenant has parted with for consideration. ( 21. ) Learned lower appellate judge after discussing the evidence with respect to this ground vide paragraphs 16 to 28 has rightly concluded that the defendant Tej Kumar has parted with possession in favour of Ajay Garg. Learned counsel for the appellants has been unable to impeach this finding. ( 22. ) Accordingly, substantial question of Law No.(ii) is also answered against the appellants. ( 23. ) In the result, appeal fails and is hereby dismissed being devoid of force. ( 24. ) Appellants to bear the costs of respondent. Lawyers fee is allowed to the tune of Rs.5,000/-, if already certified. Appeal dismissed.