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2010 DIGILAW 443 (MP)

SITARA v. HEMCHAND

2010-04-19

U.C.MAHESHWARI

body2010
Judgment U.C.Maheshwari J. ( 1. ) This appeal is directed by the appellants/ defendants under Section 100 of CPC being aggrieved by the judgment dated 27.3.2000 passed by 5th Additional District Judge, Sagar Camp at Khurai District Sagar in Civil Regular Appeal No.46-A/1999, affirming the judgment and decree dated 31.10.1998 passed by II Civil Judge Class-II Khurai in Civil Original Suit No.207-A/98 decreeing the suit of the respondents filed for possession and perpetual injunction against them. ( 2. ) The facts necessary to adjudicate this appeal in short are that the respondents herein filed the suit for possession and perpetual injunction against the appellants stating that one Munnala Modi, the father of respondent No.1 and his other son Pannalal purchased with possession 14,400 sq. ft. land bearing survey no. 51/1 comprising with six plots 40x60 sq. ft. each situated at Khurai, vide registered sale deeds dated 2.4.1946 from its earlier owner Gopilal Jhumaklal and Laxman Prasad. Thereafter in the year 1951 on carrying out the family partition by Munna Lal between his family members the aforesaid six plots came in the share of Munnalal and respondent No. 1 Hemchand. Out of them in the year 1960 said Munnalal and respondent No.l had sold two plots to Prem Narayan Mishra and Pramod Kumar respectively who had constructed their houses on the same. Subsequent to such sell the respondent no. 1 and Munnalal each one remained owner of two plots. On 22.6.1960 by executing a Will said Munnalal bequeathed his two plots in favour of respondent No.2 Abhay Kumar the son of respondent No.l, on which after death of Munnalal, respondent no. 2 became owner of his two plots. Earlier the same were bounded with fencing but due to efflux of time the same was damaged on which in the year 1988 new fencing was carried out. In the month of May 1992 the appellants constructed a Godown on some part of these plots. The same is shown with red colour in the annexed map with the plaint. They also constructed foundation on some part of such plots, shown with the blue colour in the aforesaid map. Subsequent to it again on 16.6.1992 respondents were digging the foundation on the western side open land of such plots. On making the report to the police a proceeding under Section 145 of Cr. They also constructed foundation on some part of such plots, shown with the blue colour in the aforesaid map. Subsequent to it again on 16.6.1992 respondents were digging the foundation on the western side open land of such plots. On making the report to the police a proceeding under Section 145 of Cr. P. C. was initiated, on culminating the same against the respondents a revision was filed in which the interim stay Was granted. In pendency of such revision the appellants have constructed another Godown on the part of the plots shown with the blue colour in the aforesaid map. The appellants also threatened to carry out the construction on other open land of such plots, on which the impugned suit for possession of the land with a further prayer for issuing perpetual injunction restraining the appellants from any interference in their rights and possession of the abovementioned property was filed. ( 3. ) In the written statements of the appellants by denying the averments of the plaint. In addition it is stated that the land on which the alleged construction was carried out by them is not a part of the land purchased by the respondents. The respondents were never remained in possession of such disputed land. As per further averments the alleged construction of the house and the foundation was not carried out by the respondents in may 1992. It is also stated that they are coming in peaceful possession of such land as owner since last 20 years without any obstruction of the respondents. In the year 1975 such land was purchased by them in an oral transaction from one Chintra Singh. With these pleadings the prayer for dismissal of the suit was made. ( 4. ) In view of the pleadings of the parties after framing the issues the evidence was recorded. On appreciation the suit of the respondents was decreed by the trial Court, on challenging the same by the appellant in appeal by affirming such decree of the trial Court the same was dismissed. Hence, the appellants have come forward to this Court with this appeal. ( 5. ) On earlier occasion vide order dated 12.2.2000, this appeal was admitted for final hearing on following substantial questions of law:- (i) "Whether the suit could not have been decreed without impleading the State as a party ? Hence, the appellants have come forward to this Court with this appeal. ( 5. ) On earlier occasion vide order dated 12.2.2000, this appeal was admitted for final hearing on following substantial questions of law:- (i) "Whether the suit could not have been decreed without impleading the State as a party ? (ii) Whether the finding arrived at by the learned courts below that the plaintiffs/ respondents are owners of the suit property, is perverse as it is not based on legal evidence ?" ( 6. ) Shri A. K. Jain, learned counsel of the appellants after taking me through pleadings, evidence and the exhibited documents on record said that the impugned suit has been decreed by the courts below taking into consideration the inadmissible evidence adduced by the respondents while the admissible evidence of the appellants, whereby they proved their perfected right and title over the disputed property has been discarded under the wrong premises. On proper appreciation of the evidence, the courts below ought to have dismissed the suit. He also argued , that disputed land being agricultural land in view of mandatory provision of Order , 1 Rule 3-B of CPC without impleading the State of Madhya Pradesh as defendant the suit of respondents could not be entertained by the trial court but contrary to such provision not only the suit was entertained but the same was decreed by the trial court. The appellate court also committed error in affirming the decree without considering such material aspect of the case. With these submissions, he prayed to answer the aforesaid substantial questions of law accordingly in favour of the appellants by allowing this appeal. ( 7. ) On the other hand Shri R. K. Samaiya learned counsel for the respondents by justifying the findings of the courts below said that the same is based on proper appreciation of evidence and is in conformity with law. He also argued that on account of not impleading the State of Madhya Pradesh as defendant in the suit in view of provision of Order 1 Rule 3-B of CPC the impugned decree cannot be set aside at this stage because the suit was not filed stating the disputed land to be an agricultural land. The disputed property, being plots for construction, the provision of order 1 rule 3-B was neither applicable nor could be invoked. The disputed property, being plots for construction, the provision of order 1 rule 3-B was neither applicable nor could be invoked. In such premises, the courts below had not committed error in passing the decree even in the absence of the State of Madhya Pradesh as party in the suit. So far other question is concerned,he said, the concurrent findings of the court below based on appreciation of the evidence, being findings of fact could not be interfered at the stage of second appeal and prayed for dismissal of this appeal. In addition by referring some case law he argued that even in the absence of his cross-objection in the appeal in the available circumstances, the appellants are entitled for the mesne profit as prayed in the plaint and prayed for allowing the same. ( 8. ) Having heard keeping in view the arguments advanced by the counsel, I have carefully gone through the records of both the courts alongwith the impugned judgments. ( 9. ) True, it is when matter is relating to the agricultural land, then in view of the provisions of Order 1 Rule 3-B of CPC the respondents/ plaintiffs are duty bound to implead the State of Madhya Pradesh as formal party in the case. According to such provision the State may be impleaded at any subsequent stage in pending litigation. Undisputedly, the State of Madhya Pradesh has been impleaded as respondent No.3 in the present matter by the appellant at the stage of this appeal. Accordingly, if it was a default, the same has been cured at this stages. But according to me in the available set of facts mere on account of non-impleading the State of Madhya Pradesh as party in the suit, the decree passed by the courts below could not be set aside specially when according to the pleadings of the parties the dispute is not based or related to the agricultural land. Besides this, it has not been proved by either of the parties that with respect of the disputed plots filing any return under Section 9 of the Agricultural Holding Act 1960 was necessary and the same was not filed. It is also apparent that no interim or final prayer or claim is made against the State of Madhya Pradesh. Besides this, it has not been proved by either of the parties that with respect of the disputed plots filing any return under Section 9 of the Agricultural Holding Act 1960 was necessary and the same was not filed. It is also apparent that no interim or final prayer or claim is made against the State of Madhya Pradesh. Under such premises, holding that the courts below have not committed any error in entertaining the suit and passing the impugned decree in the absence of State of Madhya Pradesh. the first question is answered accordingly.. ( 10. ) Coming to second substantial question of law. As per pleadings of the parties the suit of the respondents has been contested by the appellants mainly on three grounds; firstly, the disputed plots are not the part of the property purchased by the respondents; secondly, the disputed property was purchased by the appellants in some oral transaction in the year 1975 and thirdly, the appellants have perfected their right by adverse possession over the disputed property. Aforesaid all three questidns after taking into consideration the evidence adduced by the parties were decided by the trial court against the appellants, even on re-appreciation of evidence in first appeal such findings have been affirmed by the appellate court. Such concurrent findings of the courts below based on appreciation of evidence with respect of the aforesaid defence of the appellants being findings of the fact could not be interfered at this stage under Section 100 of CPC even if the same are erroneous. My such view is fully fortified with the law laid down by the Apex Court in the matter of "Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar" reported in AIR 1999 S. C. 2213, in which it was held as under:- "4..............The concurrent findings of facts, howsoever erroneous, cannot be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the powers under this section........." ( 11. ) Apart the above it is also settled proposition of law that the concurrent findings of the courts below on the question of adverse possession being based on appreciation of evidence could not be interfered at the stage of second appeal under Section 100 of CPC as laid down by this Court in the matter of Seeganram Vs. Magnia reported in 1986 MPWN (Vol.1) 87 and Ram Singh Vs. Kashiram reported in 1997 RN 195. ( 12. Magnia reported in 1986 MPWN (Vol.1) 87 and Ram Singh Vs. Kashiram reported in 1997 RN 195. ( 12. ) It is apparent fact on record that the appellants had neither produced nor proved any document of title whereby the disputed property was purchased by them from its earlier owner and on appreciation of evidence their plea of purchasing such property was not found trustworthy. In the lack of any document of title or admissible evidence in support of the case of appellants, the courts below have not committed any error in decreeing the suit of the respondents. Besides this in any case, if the property was purchased by the appellant then as per settled position of law they could not claim the property on the ground of perfecting their title on the same by ad verse possession. ( 13. ) In the course of the arguments the appellants counsel has not apprised me by referring any part of the deposition of any witness showing the same was inadmissible under the law and taking into consideration the same decree was passed by the trial court and upheld by the appellant court. In the lack of such evidence the findings of the courts below could not be held to be based on any inadmissible evidence. ( 14. ) In view of aforesaid discussion, I am of the considered view that framed second substantial question of law cannot be treated to be a substantial question of law under Section 100 of CPC. Even otherwise I have not found any infirmity in appreciation of the evidence by the courts below. In such premises, the aforesaid second question is also answered against the appellants and it is held that courts below have not committed any error in appreciation of evidence. ( 15. ) So far awarding the mesne profit or compensation to the respondents is concerned, it is apparent on record that findings of the trial court after refusing such prayer of mesne profit was not challenged by the respondents by filing their cross objections in this regard either before the first appellate court or even in the present appeal. ( 16. ) In support of aforesaid prayer the respondents counsel placed his reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Narayan Rao Vs. ( 16. ) In support of aforesaid prayer the respondents counsel placed his reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Narayan Rao Vs. Sudarshan reported in 1995 Supp (4) SCC 463 and the case of this Court in the matter of Yashwant Rao Khogal and Ors Vs. Mst. Jahoorbi reported in 2001 (1) MPJR 77. ( 17. ) In the case of Narayan Rao (Supra) the prayer for mesne profit was neither made before the trial Court nor refused by the courts below. In such situation by invoking the provision of Order 41 Rule 33 of CPC the mesne- profit was granted. But in the present case the prayer of the mesne-profit was specifically made by the respondents in the plaint and on consideration the same was not allowed by the trial court against which no cross-objection was filed by the respondents at any stage either in the first appellate Court or before this Court, as stated above. In such premises the finding of the trial court in this regard has got its finality between the parties, therefore, the cited case being distinguishable on facts is not helping to the respondents. ( 18. ) The case of Yashwant Rao (Supra) is also decided taking into consideration the aforesaid case of the Apex Court on the same principle, hence the same is also not helping to the respondents. ( 19. ) Apart the above, it is settled proposition of law that a party could not be permitted to raise any such plea which was not raised before the subordinate appellate court. Even otherwise at the stage of second appeal without framing any substantial question of law in accordance with the provision of Section 100 of CPC no such question could be considered for granting any such relief. Therefore, the prayer of the respondents for mesne profit/compensation is rejected. ( 20. ) Under the aforesaid premises, this appeal being devoid of any merits by affirming the impugned judgment and decree the same is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Decree be drawn up accordingly. Appeal is dismissed as indicated above. Appeal dismissed.