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2010 DIGILAW 444 (MP)

Deepa Dubey v. Union of India

2010-04-19

R.S.JHA

body2010
ORDER R.S. Jha, J. 1. Heard on the question of admission as well as interim relief. 2. The petitioner has filed this petition being aggrieved by order dated 19-3-2010 suspending the petitioner and the charge-sheet dated 31-3-2010. 3. The brief facts leading to the filing of this petition are that the petitioner is a teacher working in Army School No. 1, GRC, of the respondents at Jabalpur. It is alleged by the petitioner that she was harassed at her working place by the Principal. As her complaints against him were not addressed to by the Higher Authority, she filed a complaint before the Rajya Mahila Ayog on 31-10-2009 and news in that respect was published in the newspaper. On the complaint of the petitioner, the Rajya Mahila Ayog visited the establishment of the respondent and it is thereafter the respondent authority initiated proceedings against her by issuing the impugned order of suspension and the charge- sheet. 4. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the issuance of order of suspension and the charge-sheet both deserve to be quashed as the same have been issued against the petitioner only on account of her approaching the Rajya Mahila Ayog. It is submitted that such proceedings cannot be initiated by the respondent authority as the petitioner has the right to approach the Rajya Mahila Ayog or the Competent Court of law in case of violation of her right and, therefore, the impugned order of suspension and charge-sheet deserve to be quashed. It is further alleged that the charges against the petitioner in the charge-sheet are also unsustainable and suffer from malafide in view of the fact that the petitioner has levelled specific allegations against the Principal regarding harassment at the place of work and trying to force her into a relationship with him and, therefore, the charge-sheet deserves to be quashed as it amounts to intimidation and victimization. 5. I have heard learned Counsel for the petitioner at length. From a perusal of the charge-sheet, it is clear that the charges levelled against the petitioner are in respect of violation of the provisions of the Rules governing the petitioner's service regarding filing of false complaint, bringing disrepute to the establishment and showing disrespect for higher authorities. 5. I have heard learned Counsel for the petitioner at length. From a perusal of the charge-sheet, it is clear that the charges levelled against the petitioner are in respect of violation of the provisions of the Rules governing the petitioner's service regarding filing of false complaint, bringing disrepute to the establishment and showing disrespect for higher authorities. In the circumstances, the contention of the petitioner that the charges have been levelled against the petitioner only on account of the petitioner having approached the Rajya Mahila Ayog prima facie appear to be unsubstantiated. 6. It is also undisputed that the petitioner has an alternative remedy of filing an appeal against the order of suspension dated 19-3-2003 before the Higher Authority. 7. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, I find no ground for interfering with the impugned order of suspension or the charge-sheet at this stage specifically in view of the settled law as laid down in the case of Union of India and Anr. v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana (2006) 12 SCC 28 , wherein it has been held that in such cases no cause of action arises and that the High Court is not required to judge the correctness of the charges in a writ petition nor does it sit as Disciplinary Authority. 8. The Supreme Court in the aforementioned case has held as under: 13. It is well settled by a series of decisions of this Court that ordinarily no writ lies against a charge-sheet or show-cause notice vide Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board v. Ramesh Kumar Singh, Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse, Ulagappa v. Divisional Commr., Mysore, State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma, etc. 14. The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not be entertained against a mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet is that at that stage the writ petition may be held to be premature. A mere charge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is well settled that a writ petition lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of anyone. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance. 15. Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence such discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show-cause notice or charge-sheet. 16. No doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a charge-sheet or show-cause notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal. However, ordinarily the High Court should not interfere in such a matter. 9. In the case of State of Punjab and Ors. v. Ajit Singh (1997) 11 SCC 368 , the Supreme Court while setting aside the order of the High Court, wherein it had quashed the charge-sheet, has gone on to observe that the High Court cannot go into the merits of the allegations on the basis of which the charge-sheet has been issued and record a finding that there is no merit in the charges levelled against the person specifically in cases where documents have to be produced as evidence to establish the charges in the disciplinary proceedings and has held as under: 3...We are, however, of the view that the High Court was in error in setting aside the charge-sheet that was served on the respondent in the disciplinary proceedings. In doing so, the High Court has gone into the merits of the allegations on which the charge-sheet was based and even though the charges had yet to be proved by evidence to be adduced in the disciplinary proceedings. The High Court, accepting the explanation offered by the respondent, has proceeded on the basis that there was no merit in the charges levelled against the respondent. We are unable to uphold this approach of the High Court. The allegations are based on documents which would have been produced as evidence to prove the charges in the disciplinary proceedings. The High Court, accepting the explanation offered by the respondent, has proceeded on the basis that there was no merit in the charges levelled against the respondent. We are unable to uphold this approach of the High Court. The allegations are based on documents which would have been produced as evidence to prove the charges in the disciplinary proceedings. Till such evidence was produced it could not be said that the charges contained in the charge-sheet were without any basis whatsoever. 10. The Supreme Court has further held that the scope of interference of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in orders of suspension specially in cases where statutory alternative remedy is available, is limited to cases of lack of jurisdiction, malafides or perversity and it has been further held that the question as to whether charges are malicious, baseless or vindictive cannot be decided at the stage of issuance of the order of suspension and it is always advisable to allow the disciplinary proceedings to go on unhindered. It has also been observed that whether or not the employee should or should not continue in service during enquiry is a matter to be assessed by the authorities concerned and ordinarily, the Court should not interfere in orders of suspension [See : U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad and Ors. v. Sanjiv Rajan 1993 Supp. (3) SCC 483]. 11. Similar view has also been taken by the Supreme Court in the cases of Dy. Inspector General of Police v. K.S. Swaminathan (1996) 11 SCC 498 and Union of India and Anr. v. Ashok Kacker (1995) Supp. (1) SCC 180. 12. In the present case, it needs no emphasis to state that the petitioner would get full opportunity to raise all issues in her defence in the departmental proceedings and that the authority would be required to address itself to each of them and pass reasoned orders in that respect while proceeding with the Departmental Enquiry in accordance with the Rules. 13. The petitioner submits that the respondents be directed to supply all the relevant documents on the basis of which the charge-sheet has been issued. 14. 13. The petitioner submits that the respondents be directed to supply all the relevant documents on the basis of which the charge-sheet has been issued. 14. In response, Smt. Kanak Gaharwar, learned Counsel who has entered appearance on behalf of the respondents submits that those documents that can be supplied, shall be supplied and the others may be inspected by the petitioner in the office of the respondent and photocopy thereof may be obtained on payment of cost. 15. In view of the statement of the learned Counsel for the respondents as the respondents are willing to supply the copy of the relevant documents, no order from this Court is necessary. 16. In view of above, the petition deserves to be and is hereby dismissed.