Judgment :- 1. By mutual consent of both the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Additional Government Pleader, the main writ petition is taken up for final disposal. 2. The challenge in this writ petition is to the charge memo in PR.No.301/T.P.2[2]/2003 dated 11.08.2003 issued by the 2nd respondent. 3. The case of the petitioner is that [a] the petitioner was enlisted as Grade II PC on 20.02.1996 and he was promoted as Grade IPC in the year 1997 and thereafter, he was promoted as Head Constable on 22.07.2002. The petitioner is having unblemished record of service for more than 22 years and earned 20 rewards. [b] While the petitioner was working at CBCID, a charge memo dated 11.08.2003, was served on the petitioner on 15.09.2006, wherein two charges were framed against him which reads here under:- "Charge 1:- Reprehensible conduct by driving a Government vehicle – Two wheeler TN 07G 0852 [Motor cycle] on 24.02.1999 in the 100 Feet Road opposite to Rauthar films, Anna Nagar and causing death of a person who crossed the road, which the incident was registered in K-4 Anna Nagar Traffic P.S.Cr.No.92/AS/3/99 u/s.304-A IPC. Charge 2:- You are responsible for the payment of compensation of Rs.2,81,000/-by the Government to the concerned claimants as ordered by the Motor Vehicles Accident Claims Tribunal, Chennai by your rash and negligent driving. An accident took place on 24.02.1999 and after a thorough investigation by the Inspector of Police, Traffic, K-4 Anna Nagar Police Station, a final report was filed after obtaining legal opinion from the Additional Public Prosecutor to the effect that "There is no evidence to show that motorcycle rider was rash at the time of the accident." [c] Based on such report, further action in the criminal case in Cr.No.92/AS.3/99 u/s.304-A IPC as dropped by the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai as "Mistake of Fact". The respondent did not any departmental action based on the FIR registered on 24.02.1999. [d] In the year 1999, the legal heirs of the victim, viz., the wife and children have filed a petition in MACTOP.No.4078/99 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Small Causes Court, Chennai, against the Director General of Polcie and M. Mallma. In the said petition, the petitioner was not impleaded as one of the party and only the Director General of Police was impleaded as the 1st respondent. In the said petition, the petitioner was not impleaded as one of the party and only the Director General of Police was impleaded as the 1st respondent. A detailed counter in MACTOP.No.4078/1999 was filed before the Tribunal and in the said counter, the Director General of Police has specifically denied the allegation that the petitioner had driven the motor bike in a rash and negligent manner and as such, he cannot be held liable for causing the death of the victim. In spite of such counter filed by the Director General of Police, the Tribunal had given a finding that the petitioner was rash and negligent in driving the vehicle which resulted in the accident and directed the Director General of Police to pay the compensation to the tune of Rs.2.81 lakhs. [e] Thereafter, the Home Department has issued Government order pursuant to the award passed in MACTOP.No.4078/1999 in G.O.[2D] No 144 Home [Police XI] Department dated 05.05.2003 and the government directed the Director General of Police to release the amount and also directed to take action against the driver of the vehicle, viz., the petitioner herein. Accordingly, a charge memo u/s.3[b] was framed against the petitioner in the year 2003 but the same was served on the petitioner only on 15.09.2006. The petitioner made a representation to the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Motor Traffic, Chennai requesting him to furnish the copy of the said G.O. He also submitted his explanation and sought for the relief of dropping the action in the departmental enquiry on 15.04.2009. But no order is passed by the 1st respondent. The enquiry officer has issued Memo calling the petitioner to attend the enquiry on 30.04.2009. Under the said circumstances, being aggrieved by the charge memo, the petitioner has come forward with the above petition for the above said relief. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the Director General of Police having taken a definite stand before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal to the effect that the petitioner had not driven the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner, the question of issuing the impugned charge memo not at all arises. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the Director General of Police having taken a definite stand before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal to the effect that the petitioner had not driven the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner, the question of issuing the impugned charge memo not at all arises. It is contended that the respondents cannot take two different stands and the impugned charge memo was issued against the petitioner contrary to the definite stand taken by them before the Tribunal and as such, the impugned charge memo is liable to be quashed. Learned counsel, in support of his contention, would place reliance on the decision of this court in a similar matter in V.NATARAJAN Vs. THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER [AGRI.ENGG.] THIRUVARUR & ANOTHER reported in 5. Mr. V. Arun, the learned Additional Government Pleader would submit that there is illegality or infirmity in the impugned charge memo. It is contended the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal in MACTOP.No.4078/1999 has given a specific finding in its order dated 23.08.2002 to the effect that the petitioner was rash and negligent in driving the two wheeler. It is further contended that only pursuant to the specific finding given by the Tribunal, the impugned charge memo dated 11.03.2003 was issued to the petitioner. Therefore, it is contended that the impugned charge memo is not liable to be quashed and no ground is made out by the petitioner warranting interference of this court. 6. I have carefully considered the rival submissions made on either side and also perused the impugned charge memo dated 11.03.2003 and other materials available on record. 7. It is seen that the petitioner is working as Head Constable at the relevant point of time and the motor bike driven by the petitioner said to have met with an accident on 24.02.1999. The fact remains that the registration of the criminal case in Cr.No.92/AS.3/99 for an offence u/s.304-A IPC against the petitioner was ultimately dropped by the filing the final report to the effect of referring the case as "Mistake of Fact". It is clearly stated in the said report as here under:- "There is no evidence to show that motorcycle rider was rash at the time of the accident." The said final report submitted by the investigating agency was also recorded by the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai and the same reached finality. It is clearly stated in the said report as here under:- "There is no evidence to show that motorcycle rider was rash at the time of the accident." The said final report submitted by the investigating agency was also recorded by the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai and the same reached finality. Thereafter, the victims legal heirs, viz., the wife and children only filed petition in MACTOP.No.4078/1999 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Small Causes Court, Chennai wherein the petitioner is not a party to the said proceedings and only the Director General of Police was impleaded as the 1st respondent. It is pertinent to note that the Director General of Police filed a counter in the said petition and in the said counter, it is specifically stated by him as here under:- "6 The Additional Public Prosecutor opined that there is no other evidence to show that the motor cycle rider was rash and negligent at the time of accident. The other probabilities in this case also indicate that the accident was not due to the rash and negligent driving of the motor cycle driver and it was due to the sudden cross of the road by the deceased/pedastrian......." 8. It is seen that inspite of the specific stand taken by the Director General of Police, the Tribunal passed the order, awarding compensation by its Judgment dated 23.08.2002 and in the said Judgment, the Tribunal has given a finding that the petitioner was rash and negligent in driving the motor bike. Pursuant to the said Judgment of the Tribunal, the impugned charge memo dated 11.03.2003 was issued against the petitioner. At this juncture, it is relevant to note that the very same department officials, viz., the respondents herein cannot take two different stands, one at the tribunal and another in the departmental proceedings by issuing the impugned charge memo. 9. The crux of the allegation as per the impugned charge memo is to the effect that the petitioner was driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner at the time of the accident. Such allegation is directly contrary to the definite and specific stand taken by the Director General of Police as pointed out earlier. 9. The crux of the allegation as per the impugned charge memo is to the effect that the petitioner was driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner at the time of the accident. Such allegation is directly contrary to the definite and specific stand taken by the Director General of Police as pointed out earlier. It is also to be borne in mind that even the criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioner was dropped after the investigation holding that there is absolutely no evidence whatsoever available for implicating the petitioner to the effect that the petitioner was driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner. The said final report filed by the investigating agency has also reached its finality after recording the same by the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai and the same was not challenged either by the informant or by any other person. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner rightly placed reliance on the decision rendered by a learned Single Judge of this court by following the Division Bench judgment of this court in [V.Natarjan Vs. The Executive Engineer [Agri. Engg.], Thiruvarur and another]. In the said decision the learned Single Judge held as under:- "It is clear in cases where the Government Vehicles are involved in accident, even as per the Government Order, the proceedings can be initiated for recovery of a token amount only under Rule 17[a] of the Rules and the disciplinary proceedings under Rule 17[b] is not contemplated. Be that as it may, on the facts, which have been elicited, it is clear that the Government having taken a definite stand before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal that the petitioner was not negligent in driving the vehicle, has totally taken a different stand in the impugned charge memo to the effect that the petitioner, due to his negligence, has caused accident, resulting in financial loss to the Government. Certainly, this is totally a contradictory stand taken by the respondents and it is clear that the charge memo has to go. Certainly, this is totally a contradictory stand taken by the respondents and it is clear that the charge memo has to go. That apart, as stated above, it has been the policy of the Government through out as seen in the Government order elicited above that in such cases, the decision of the Government is also to recover a token amount from such Government drivers, who was involved in accident and therefore, on that score also, the impugned charge memo, which has been framed under Rule 17[b] is not maintainable." 11. The learned Single Judge also followed the Judgment of a Division Bench of this court in the TAMILNADU STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION [KUMBAMONAM Dn-II] LTD., REP.BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR, TIRUCHIRAPPALLI AND ANOTHER Vs. P.KARUPPUSAMY reported in 2008 [1] MLJ 694, wherein the Division Bench held as here under:- "24.The principles laid down in the aforesaid rulings are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. The appellate Corporation, having taken a plea that the driver of the bus was not responsible for the accident, could not turn around to say that he was responsible for the accident. As such, it is very much bound by the pleadings raised by it before the Tribunals and this court. The law is well settled as to the aspect that the standard of proof in both the proceedings before the criminal court and the domestic enquiry officer are entirely different. However, since the Corporation has consciously raised the contention in favour of the bus driver before the judicial for a, it is precluded from proceeding against him in departmental proceedings. though the extent of proof is sufficient to the commission of delinquency in the matter of departmental proceedings, the management could not lay its hands on the workman, detrimental to his interest, after defending him before various judicial for a and accepting the findings of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Karur. Further, in the dismissal order, dated 09.02.1998, it is mentioned that even though a scrutiny of the service records would show that the respondent was not at all penalised at any point of time, since he caused a fatal accident, it was proposed to dismiss him from service, which shows that the past records of the respondent were also clean." 12. The learned Single Judge also placed reliance on an unreported Judgment of the First Bench of this court in WP.No.11002/1999 dated 07.07.1999 in a similar circumstance holding that:- "In respect of a fatal accident caused by the 1st respondent, a driver employed by the petitioners, compensation was awarded in a sum of Rs.74,379/-. Petitioners had been impleaded in the proceedings for recovery of compensation along with the respondent No.1. Though the respondent No.1 may not have appeared in the proceedings to resist the claim, the petitioners had duly appeared and therefore, they could have legitimately resisted the claim. Petitioners have paid the aforesaid amount of compensation payable by respondent No.1, as also by the petitioners, who are the employers of respondent No.1. By present proceedings, the petitioners are seeking to recover the aforesaid amount from the respondent No.1. In our view, the claim made is wholly unsustainable as the petitioners in the capacity of the employers of respondent No.1 are duty bound in law to pay the compensation payable by respondent No.1. Present proceedings which have been initiated for recovery back the said amount from respondent No.1 in the circumstances, is misconceived. Present petition, in the circumstances, is therefore, summarily rejected." 13. The same view was also taken by another learned Single Judge of this court in K.DAKSHINAMOORTHY Vs. the CHIEF ENGINEER [GENERAL] T.N.HIGHWAYS DEPARTMENT reported in 2006 [3] mlj 452, wherein it was held that when both the criminal court as well as the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal has found that the employee was not responsible for the death of a passenger in an accident mere pendency of the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal cannot be a ground to issue the charge memo against the employee. 14. The views taken by this court in the decisions as cited supra are squarely applicable to the facts of the instant case. In the case on hand also, the respondents have taken a definite and specific stand earlier before the Tribunal to the effect that the petitioner was not rash and negligent while driving and thereafter, they are taking a contrary stand now by issuing charge memo to the effect that the petitioner drove the bike in a rash and negligent manner. It is needless to state that the respondents cannot go against their own stand as they have taken before the Tribunal by issuing the impugned charge memo by changing their stand. It is needless to state that the respondents cannot go against their own stand as they have taken before the Tribunal by issuing the impugned charge memo by changing their stand. In view of the Government orders referred to by the Division Bench of this court, the impugned charge memo is not maintainable and the same is liable to be quashed. 15. In view of the aforesaid reasons, the impugned charge memo issued by the 2nd respondent dated 11.03.2003 is hereby quashed and the writ petition is allowed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.