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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2010 DIGILAW 446 (MP)

Chandrabhan Singh Rajput v. State of M. P.

2010-04-19

R.S.JHA

body2010
Judgment Heard on the question of admission. 2. The petitioner has filed this petition being aggrieved by order dated 22-8-1991 by which the petitioner's services as a teacher were dispensed with by the then Deputy Director Education, Narsinghpur. 3. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that in view of the new education policy now several posts of teacher have to be filled up and, therefore, the impugned order be set aside and the respondents be directed to reconsider his case for reinstatement. It is submitted that certain similarly placed persons had approached the M.P. Administration Tribunal immediately after passing of the impugned order which had been assailed by them and appropriate orders had been passed in the year 1999 and thereafter this Court had also entertained and decided W.P. No. 1015 of 2002 on 11-2-2003 and, therefore, the petitioner is entitled to similar treatment. It is submitted that in view of the aforesaid the petition filed by the petitioner be entertained and allowed in terms of the order passed by this Court in the case of similarly placed persons. 4. From a perusal of order dated 22-8-1991, it is apparent that the petitioner's services were dispensed with on account of irregularities and he did not take any proceeding for assailing dismissal from service and for seeking reinstatement for a period of nineteen years. It is also apparent that the petitioner has not filed any order passed by this Court or any order passed by the Tribunal along with the petition. 5. In a somewhat circumstances, the Supreme Court has observed in the case of U.P. Jal Nigam and another Vs. Jaswant Singh and another, (2006) 11 SCC 464 , that delay in filing the petition or approaching the Competent Court disqualifies a person from claiming similar relief granted to a person who was vigilant enough and had approached the Court in time in following terms :- "5. So far as the principal issue is concerned, that has been settled by this Court. Therefore, there is no quarrel over the legal proposition. But the only question is grant of relief to such other persons who were not vigilant and did not wake up to challenge their retirement and accepted the same but filed writ petitions after the judgment of this Court in Harwindra Kumar Vs. Therefore, there is no quarrel over the legal proposition. But the only question is grant of relief to such other persons who were not vigilant and did not wake up to challenge their retirement and accepted the same but filed writ petitions after the judgment of this Court in Harwindra Kumar Vs. Chief Engineer, Karmik, (2005) 13 SCC 300 = 2006 SCC (L & S) 1063. Whether they are entitled to same relief or not ? Therefore, a serious question that arises for consideration is whether the employees who did not wake up to challenge their retirement and accepted the same, collected their post-retirement benefits, can such persons be given the relief in the light of the subsequent decision delivered by this Court ? 6. *** *** *** 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants has invited our attention to various decisions to impress upon that persons who are guilty of such laches and acquiesced with the situation should not be granted any relief because it is going to cost the Nigam a heavy financial burden to the tune of Rs. 17,80,43,108. Therefore, relief should be confined to those persons who were continuing in service and filed their writ petitions in time but not to all and sundry who woke up to file the writ petitions much after their retirement. In this connection, our attention was invited to a decision of this Court in Rup Diamonds Vs. Union of India, (1989) 2 SCC 356 , wherein Their Lordships observed that those people who were sitting on the fence till somebody else took up the mater to the Court for refund of duty, cannot be given the benefit. In that context, Their Lordships held as follows :- (SCC pp. 356-57) "Petitioners are reagitating claims which they had not pursued for several years. Petitioners were not vigilant but were content to be dormant and chose to sit on the fence till somebody else's case came to be decided. Their case cannot be considered on the analogy of one where a law had been declared unconstitutional and void by a Court, so as to enable persons to recover monies paid under the compulsion of a law later so declared void. There is also an unexplained, inordinate delay in preferring the present writ petition which is brought after almost a year after the first rejection. As observed by the Court in Durga Prashad Vs. There is also an unexplained, inordinate delay in preferring the present writ petition which is brought after almost a year after the first rejection. As observed by the Court in Durga Prashad Vs. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, (1969) 1 SCC 185 , the exchange position of this country and the policy of the Government regarding international trade varies from year to year. In these matters, it is essential that persons who are aggrieved by orders of the Government should approach the High Court after exhausting the remedies provided by law, rule or order with utmost expedition. Therefore, these delays are sufficient to persuade the Court to decline to interfere. If a right of appeal is available, this order rejecting the writ petition shall not prejudice petitioners' case in any such appeal." 8. Our attention was also invited to a decision of this Court in State of Karnataka Vs. S.M. Kotrayya, (1996) 6 SCC 267 = 1996 SCC (L & S) 1488. In that case, the respondents woke up to claim the relief which was granted to their colleagues by the Tribunal with an application to condone the delay. The Tribunal condoned the delay. Therefore, the State approached this Court and this Court after considering the matter observed as under:- (SCC p. 268) "Although it is not necessary to give an explanation for the delay which occurred within the period mentioned in sub-sections (1) or (2) of Section 21, explanation should be given for the delay which occasioned after the expiry of the aforesaid respective period applicable to the appropriate case and the Tribunal should satisfy itself whether the explanation offered was proper. In the instant case, the explanation offered was that they came to know of the relief granted by the Tribunal in August, 1989 and that they filed the petition immediately thereafter. That is not a proper explanation at all. What was required of them to explain under sub-sections (1) and (2) was as to why they could not avail of the remedy of redressal of their grievances before the expiry of the period prescribed under sub-section (1) or (2). That was not the explanation given. Therefore, the Tribunal was wholly unjustified in condoning the delay." 9. Similarly in Jagdish Lal Vs. That was not the explanation given. Therefore, the Tribunal was wholly unjustified in condoning the delay." 9. Similarly in Jagdish Lal Vs. State of Haryana, (1997) 6 SCC 538 = 1997 SCC (L & S) 1550, this Court reaffirmed the rule if a person chose to sit over the matter and then woke up after the decision of the Court, then such person cannot stand to benefit. In that case, it was observed as follows :- (SCC p. 542) "The delay disentitles a party to discretionary relief under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. The appellants kept sleeping over their rights for long and woke up when they had the impetus from the Union of India Vs. Virpal Singh Chauhan, (1995) 6 SCC 684 = 1996 SCC (L & S) 1 = (1995) 31 ATC 13. The appellants' desperate attempt to redo the seniority is not amenable to judicial review at this belated stage." 10. In Union of India Vs. C.K. Dhamgupta, (1997) 3 SCC 395 = 1997 SCC (L & S) 821- it was observed as follows:- (SCC p. 398, Para 9) "9. We, however, clarify that in view of our finding that the judgment of the Tribunal in R.P. Joshi Vs. Union of India, O.A. No. 497 of 1986, decided on 17-3-1987 gives relief only to Joshi, the benefit of the said judgment of the Tribunal cannot be extended to any other person. The respondent C.K. Dharagupta (since retired) is seeking benefit of Joshi case. In view of our finding that the benefit of the judgment of the Tribunal dated 17-3-1987 could only be given to Joshi and nobody else, even Dharagupta is not entitled to any relief." 11. In Govt. of W.B. Vs. Tarun K. Roy, (2004) 1 SCC 347 = 2004 SCC (L & S) 225- Their Lordships considered delay as serious factor and have not granted relief. Therein it was observed as follows :- (SCC pp. 359-60, Para 34) "34. The respondents furthermore are not even entitled to any relief on the ground of gross delay and laches on their part in filing the writ petition. The first two writ petitions were filed in the year 1976 wherein the respondents herein approached the High Court in 1992. Therein it was observed as follows :- (SCC pp. 359-60, Para 34) "34. The respondents furthermore are not even entitled to any relief on the ground of gross delay and laches on their part in filing the writ petition. The first two writ petitions were filed in the year 1976 wherein the respondents herein approached the High Court in 1992. In between 1976 and 1992 not only two writ petitions had been decided, but one way or the other, even the matter had been considered by this Court in State of W.B. Vs. Debdas Kumar, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 138 = 1991 SCC (L & S) 841 = (1991) 17 ATC 261. The plea of delay, which Mr. Krishnamani states, should be a ground for denying the relief to the other persons similarly situated would operate against the respondents. Furthermore, the other employees not being before this Court although they are ventilating their grievances before Appropriate Courts of law, no order should be passed which would prejudice their cause. In such a situation, we are not prepared to make any observation only for the purpose of grant of some relief to the respondents to which they are not legally entitled to so as to deprive others therefrom who may be found to be entitled thereto by a Court of law." 12. The statement of law has also been summarised in Halsbury's Laws of England, Para 911, p. 395 as follows:- "In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are:- (i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and (ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's part. Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation has been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or where, by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches." 6. Similar view has also been taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Bhoop Singh Vs. Union of India and others, (1992) 3 SCC 136 . 7. In the circumstances, the petition filed by the petitioner being suffered from delay and laches is accordingly dismissed.