JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. This application, made under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, puts to challenge the order, dated 25.11.2009, passed by the learned Civil Judge No. 2, Kamrup, Guwahati, in Misc.(J) Case No. 245/2009, arising out of Title Suit No. 171/2006, whereby the defendant-petitioners' petition for amendment of their written statement has been rejected. 2. I have heard Mr. G.N. Sahewalla, learned senior counsel, for the ' defendant-petitioners, and Mr. S. Ali, learned Counsel, for the plaintiff-opposite party. 3. It may be pointed out, at the very outset, that according to the plaint, the plaintiff-opposite party purchased as many as three pieces of land on different dates, one of such pieces of land having been purchased by the plaintiff from its owner, Gaur Mohan Das (since deceased). The said pieces of land, being adjacent to each other, form a compact plot with common boundaries described in Schedule A to the plaint. The plaintiff, upon purchase of the land by registered sale deeds, took possession of the purchased land, which measures about 1 bigha and 2 kathas out of the total land covered by the same patta. Alleging, inter alia, that the plaintiff had been ousted from a part of the land, described in Schedules B and C to the plaint, the plaintiff sought for a decree of, inter alia declaration of his rights, title and interest over the land described in Schedule A to the plaint and for recovery of possession of the land described in Schedules B and C including the Assam Type house standing thereon. 4. It may also be pointed out that the defendant-petitioners, on receipt of summons of the suit, appeared and contested the suit by filling their written statement on 22.11.2006. In paragraph 8 of their written statement, the defendants alleged that the sale deed, being No. 1834/1997, dated 3.4.1997, on which rested the plaintiff's claim of having purchased the land from Gaur Mohan Das (since dead), was a fraudulent document as Gaur Mohan Das, the original pattadar, died before execution of the said sale deed. 5. In paragraph 8 of their written statement, the defendants alleged that the sale deed, being No. 1834/1997, dated 3.4.1997, on which rested the plaintiff's claim of having purchased the land from Gaur Mohan Das (since dead), was a fraudulent document as Gaur Mohan Das, the original pattadar, died before execution of the said sale deed. 5. However, after the evidence, adduced by both sides, stood recorded, the defendants took adjournments for presenting arguments and, having, thus taken time for offering their arguments, the defendant-petitioners filed a petition, seeking amendment of their written statement by contending to the effect that they had recently-obtained certified copies of two sale deeds, being sale deed No. 7461/1983, dated 30.9.1983, and sale deed No: 7462/1983, dated 30.9.1983, executed in favour of N. Ibotombi Singh and Lais Ram Nanda Kumar Singh respectively and, thus, the said Gaur Mohan Das had sold his land long before the alleged fraudulent sale deed, dated 3.4.1997, in respect of the suit land, whereby the plaintiff claims to have purchased the suit land, and, hence, necessary amendments need to be incorporated in paragraph 8 of the written statement, the amendments, sought for, being as under: It is further stated that Gaur Mohan Das sold his said suit land by two sale deeds being 7461/1983 dated 30.9.1983 and 7462/1983 dated 30.9.1983 claimed by the plaintiff and as such how he (Gaur Mohan Das) could have sold the same land to the plaintiff? 6. In their above petition made under Order VI, Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking amendment, the defendant-petitioners further stated that the proposed amendment will, in no way, change the nature and character of the suit and the plaintiff would not be prejudiced in any manner if the amendment, sought for, is allowed. 7. Resisting the above petition for amendment, the plaintiff-petitioner filed his objection, wherein a specific averment was made, in para 5, that the facts, sought to be incorporated by the defendant-petitioners by way of their amendment, were within the knowledge of the defendants long before filing of their written statement and that the amendment petition suffers from mala fide and is intended to delay the proceeding. 8. 8. At no stage, the defendant-petitioners denied that the plaintiff-opponents party's assertion that the facts, which the defendants had sought to incorporate by way of amendment, were within their knowledge before they had obtained the certified copies of the said two sale deeds. In the face of absolute silence of the defendants in this regard, it logically follows that even before filing of their written statement, it was within the knowledge of the defendants that the said Gaur Mohan Das had executed the said two sale deeds, in respect of the said land, in favour of the vendees aforementioned. Whether, as a matter of fact, Gaur Mohan Das had executed the said sale deeds and/ or sold the said land are questions, which are not to be decided in this revision. What is important to note is that apart from the fact that the defendants, nowhere, asserted in their petition, seeking amendment, that they were not aware of existence or execution of the two sale deeds or about the factum of sales of the land, in favour of the vendees aforementioned, by Gaur Mohan Das, long before they filed their written statement, it is also not the case of the defendants that they had come to know only upon receiving the certified copies of the said two sale deeds about the sales of the land by Gaur Mohan Das. Furthermore, and as rightly pointed out, on behalf of the plaintiff, that the land, owned by Gaur Mohan Das and covered by the relevant dag and patta, was, admittedly, more than what the plaintiff claimed to have purchased. 9. It is also worth noticing that the suit was instituted on 22.8.2006 and the written statement was filed on 22.11.2006 issues were framed on 15.2.2007. After evidence from both sides stood closed and the case was fixed for argument, the defendants obtained adjournment, for offering their arguments on 26.8.2009 and 28.10.2009 and, having so obtained adjournment on 28.10.2009, they, admittedly, applied for certified copies of the said two sale deeds on 28.10.2009 and they obtained certified copies on 30.10.2009 and it was on 4.11.2009 that they filed their petition seeking to make amendment in their written statement. 10. 10. In the amendment petition, apart from the fact, as already indicated above, that the plaintiffs had not contended that at the time, when they had filed their written statement, they were not aware of the facts, which they, now, seek to incorporate, with the help of amendment, in their written statement, there was not even an attempt, in their petition for amendment, to explain as to why they had not applied for amendment earlier. It was in such circumstances that the learned trial court' has rejected the petition for amendment. The relevant observations, made by the learned trial court, read as under: That apart, no satisfactory grounds raised in the amendment application to contend that despite due diligence the said matter could not be raised by the applicant. Merely stating said defendants recently obtained certified copy of two sale deeds being No. 7461/1983 dated 30.9.1983 and 7462/1983 dated 30.9.2008 in respect of the suit land claimed by the plaintiff is without supporting particulars that the amendment application could not be submitted before the commencement of the trial in spite of taking utmost care. I think is not sufficient, grounds for amendment of the written statement. 11. As the controversy, raised in this revision, relates to Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil procedure, which embodies provisions as regard amendment, it is appropriate to take note of the provisions embodied therein. Order VI, Rule 17 is, therefore, reproduced hereinbelow: 17. Amendment of pleadings. - The court may, at any stage of the proceedings, allow either party to alter or amend his pleading in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall he made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties: Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial. 12. 12. There is no dispute that an amendment of pleadings can be allowed if the amendment, sought for, does not change the nature or character of the proceedings in a given case and/or the amendment, sought for, would help in the resolution of the real controversy in a suit; When, however, hearing of a suit has already commenced and an amendment, sought for, is of such a nature that it would, if allowed, not change the nature or character of the suit or even when amendment is found to be necessary for determination of the real controversy in a suit, the legislative intent, as reflected by the proviso to Rule 17, is that such an amendment shall not be allowed unless the court comes to a conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party, seeking amendment, could not have sought for the amendment before the trial commenced. In other words, after a trial commences, no amendment, even if necessary for resolution of a controversy in a suit, can be allowed by a court unless it comes to a finding that in spite of due diligence, the party, which has applied for amendment, could not have raised the matter before commencement of the trial. 13. In order to appreciate the legislative intent behind the presently amended Order 6, Rule 17, a survey of the legislative history behind the amendments, which Order 6, Rule 17 have undergone, is necessary. It is pertinent to note in this regard that the Justice Malimath Committee's recommendations reflected that the provisions, contained in Order 6, Rule 17, allowing amendments, were delaying disposal of suits. With a view to deal with this situation, the Legislature, while enacting the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1999, deleted Rule 17 of the Code in its entirety. 14. With the deletion of Rule 17 as mentioned above, no amendment of any pleading, at any stage of the suit, became legal or feasible. This was followed by serious resistance by men in law all over the country. Responding to the agitation against complete deletion of the provisions of Rule 17, the Legislature, with the help of Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002, restored Order 17 by re-recognizing power of the courts to grant amendment, but exercise of this power was restricted by adding a new proviso. Responding to the agitation against complete deletion of the provisions of Rule 17, the Legislature, with the help of Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002, restored Order 17 by re-recognizing power of the courts to grant amendment, but exercise of this power was restricted by adding a new proviso. This legislative intent in adding the proviso to Rule 17 is more than transparent, the intent being that after the trial commences, no amendment shall be allowed even if such an amendment is necessary for resolution of the real controversy in the suit or even if the amendment is such, which would not change the nature or character of the proceeding, unless the person, who applies for such an amendment, convinces the court- before it (court) considers the nature of the amendments sought for - that in spite of due diligence, he could not have sought for the amendments earlier. A reference, in this regard, may be made to the case of Ajendraprasadji N. Pandey and Ors. v. Swami Keshavprakeshdasji N. and Ors. (2006) 12 SCC 1 , wherein the Apex Court has observed as under: 42. It is to be noted that the provisions of Order 6, Rule 17 CPC have been substantially amended by the CPC (Amendment) Act, 2002. 43. Under the proviso, no application for amendment shall he allowed after the trial has commenced unless in spite of due diligence, the matter could not be raised before the commencement of the trial. It is submitted that after the trial of the case has commenced, no application of pleading shall he allowed unless the above requirement is satisfied. The amended Order 6, Rule 17 was due to the recommendation of the Law Commission since Order 17, as it existed prior to the amendment, was invoked by parties interested in delaying the trial. That to shorten the litigation and speed up disposal of suits, amendment Was made by the amending Act, 1999, deleting Rule 17 from the Code. This evoked much controversy/hesitation all over the country and also leading to boycott of courts and, therefore, by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 2002 provision has been restored by recognizing the power of the court to grant amendment; however, with certain limitation, which is contained in the new proviso added to the rule. This evoked much controversy/hesitation all over the country and also leading to boycott of courts and, therefore, by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 2002 provision has been restored by recognizing the power of the court to grant amendment; however, with certain limitation, which is contained in the new proviso added to the rule. The details furnished below will go to show as to how the facts of the present case show that the matters which are sought to be raised by way of amendment by the appellants were well within their knowledge on their court case and manifests the absence of due diligence on the part of the appellants disentitling them to relief. 15. In Ajendraprasadji N. Pandey and Ors. (supra), the Apex Court has observed at para 58, thus: 58. The judgment of the High Court recording concession by counsel for the defendant reads, thus: 22. However, when one examines the facts of the case, and applies (sic) that the conduct of the defendants goes to show that the exercise, namely, filing of application, Ext. 95, is directly in conflict with the object of the amendment, i.e., to adopt a dilatory tactic. It is admitted by learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of the defendants that all the issues raised by way of proposed amendment in the written statement were taken before this Court in the appeal from order filed by the present defendant in the civil appeal filed before the Apex Court, in the appeal from order in the second round before this Court and again in a special leave petition filed before the Apex Court in the second round. Hence, the defendants cannot plead absence of knowledge after exercise of due diligence. If this be the position the approach adopted by the trial court cannot be stated to suffer from any infirmity so as to call for intervention at the hands of this Court in a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 16. Hence, the defendants cannot plead absence of knowledge after exercise of due diligence. If this be the position the approach adopted by the trial court cannot be stated to suffer from any infirmity so as to call for intervention at the hands of this Court in a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 16. At yet another place, at para 60, taking note of the fact that the amendment was sought to be made after hearing of the suit had already commenced and there was not even a plea that despite due diligence, amendments sought to be incorporated, could not be made earlier, the Apex Court observed: The above averment, in our opinion, does not satisfy the requirement of order VI, Rule 17 without giving the particulars which would, satisfy the requirement of law that the matters now sought to be introduced by the amendment could not have been raised, earlier in respect of due diligence. As held by this Court in Kailash v. Nankhu and Ors. (supra), the trial is deemed to commence when the issues are settled and the case is set down for recording of evidence. 17. What emerges from the above discussion is that the proviso to Order 6, Rule 17 clearly shows that no application for amendment can be allowed by any court after the trial has commenced unless the court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party, which applies for amendment, could not have pressed for the amendment before the trial commenced. If the amendment, which a party seeks to introduce, will change the nature or character of the proceeding, such an amendment, it is not in dispute, cannot be allowed at all. Similarly, if the amendment, which a party seeks to introduce, is not necessary for determination of the real controversy in the suit, such an amendment too may not be allowed. This clearly shows that the proviso, in question, would come into play even if a person makes out a case that the amendment, which is sought to be introduced, will not change the nature or character of the proceeding and/or that the amendment is necessary for resolving the real controversy in the suit between the parties concerned. It is not in dispute that trial or a suit commences when the issues, in a suit, are settled and the suit is fixed for hearing. It is not in dispute that trial or a suit commences when the issues, in a suit, are settled and the suit is fixed for hearing. [See Kailash v. Nanhku (2005) 4 SCC 480 ), In the present case, the evidence of the parties already stands recorded. 18. The question, now, is as to whether it is possible to allow an amendment, even after commencement of a suit, by taking resort to the inherent power of the courts as contained in Section 151 of the Code. It needs to be noted in this regard that the inherent powers, as contained in Section 151 of the Code, can be exercised by a court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court and not when exercise of such a power is prohibited by the Legislature. The proviso to Rule 17 clearly shows that the legislative intent is that after hearing of a suit commences, no amendment of pleadings shall be allowed, however, necessary such an amendment may be, unless the party, which seeks to make amendment, satisfies the court that he could not have earlier applied for such an amendment. By taking recourse to its inherent powers, a court cannot defeat this legislative intent inasmuch as the inherent power has to be exercised to enforce the object of a legislation and not to defeat the same. 19. I have carefully gone through the application seeking amendment and I notice that the defendants did not give even faintest of indication, in their petition for amendment, as to why they had not incorporated in their written statement what they have, now, sought to introduce, by way of amendment, to their written statement, particularly, when the plaintiff-opposite party has resisted the amendment petition by asserting that the amendments, sought to be introduced, were within the knowledge of the defendants long before the written statement was filed. 20. Mr. Sahewalla has placed reliance on two decisions of the Supreme Court in support of his submission that since the amendments, sought for, are necessary for determination of the real issues in the suit, the amendments ought to have been allowed, the two decisions being Revajeetu Builders and Developers v. Narayanaswamy and Sons and Ors. (2009) 10 SCC 84 and Surender Kumar Sharma v. Makhan Singh (2009) 10 SCC 626 . 21. (2009) 10 SCC 84 and Surender Kumar Sharma v. Makhan Singh (2009) 10 SCC 626 . 21. Let me, first, deal with Revajeetu Builders and Developers (supra). While considering the case of Revajeetu Builders and Developers (supra), what needs to be noted that there is no observation at all, in Revajeetu Builders and Developers (supra) that the amendments were sought to be made after hearing of the suit had already commenced. It is, therefore, clear that the decision, in Revajeetu Builders and Developers (supra), has no application to the facts of the present case, when the case at hand is one, wherein the amendments have been sought to be introduced after evidence of the parties to the suit already stands recorded. The observations of the Apex Court, in Revajeetu Builders and Developers (supra), at para 35, need to be read in the context of the facts of the said case, wherein the Apex Court has held that the general principle is that courts at any stage of the proceedings may allow either party to alter or amend the pleadings in such a manner and on such terms as may be just and all those amendments must be allowed which are imperative for determining the real question in controversy between the parties and that these basic principles of grant or refusal of amendment, articulated almost 125 years ago, are still considered to be correct statement of law and our courts have been following the basic principles laid down in those cases, but the said case was one, as indicated hereinbefore, wherein amendments were sought to be introduced before commencement of the suit and not after the evidence of both sides stood recorded. 22. The Apex Court had pointed out, in Revajeetu Builders and Developers (supra), the factors, which shall be taken into consideration, while dealing with an application for amendment. The relevant observations, made in this regard, Revajeetu Builders and Developers (supra), read as under: 63. 22. The Apex Court had pointed out, in Revajeetu Builders and Developers (supra), the factors, which shall be taken into consideration, while dealing with an application for amendment. The relevant observations, made in this regard, Revajeetu Builders and Developers (supra), read as under: 63. On critically analyzing both the English and Indian, cases, some basic principles emerge which ought to be taken into consideration while allowing or rejecting the application for amendment: (1) whether the amendment sought is imperative for proper and effective adjudication of the case; (2) whether the application for amendment is bona fide or mala fide; (3) the amendment should not cause such prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated adequately in terms of money; (4) refusing amendment would in fact lead to injustice or lead to multiple litigation; (5) whether the proposed amendment constitutionally or fundamentally changes the nature and character of the case; and (6) as a general rule, the court should decline amendments if a fresh suit on the amended, claims would be barred by limitation on the date of application. These are some of the important factors which may be kept in mind while dealing application under Order 6, Rule 17. These are only illustrative and not exhaustive. 23. Though the factors, which the Apex Court has enumerated in Revajeetu Builders and Developers (supra), are illustrative and not exhaustive, the fact remains that the factors, which have been enumerated by the Apex Court, do not make any reference to the proviso to order VI, Rule 17 read with Section 151, CPC, the reason being that the amendment, in Revajeetu Builders and Developers (supra), had not been sought after hearing of the suit had commenced and the proviso to order VI, Rule 17 read with Section 151, CPC had come into play. To the facts of the case, therefore, the decision, in Revajeetu Builders and Developers (supra), has, if I may reiterate, no application. 24. Coming to the case of Surender Kumar Sharma (supra), it needs to be noted that even in this case, the Apex Court has not dealt with the proviso to order VI, Rule 17 read with Section 151, CPC. There is also no indication that the amendment had been sought after the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002, had already come into force and the proviso to order VI, Rule17 already stood enacted. There is also no indication that the amendment had been sought after the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002, had already come into force and the proviso to order VI, Rule17 already stood enacted. This apart, the Apex Court, while considering the case of amendment, pointed out that even if the amendment, sought for, is belated, the court must bear, while considering such belated amendment, that it must allow amendment if amendment sought for will do full and complete justice to the case and the party, against whom the amendment is sought for, can be compensated by cost or otherwise. It is also pertinent to point out that while referring to the position of law that amendment shall be allowed if the amendment, sought for, will do full and complete justice to the case and the party, against whom the amendment is sought for, can be compensated by cost or otherwise, the Apex Court relied upon B.K. Narayana Pillai v. Parameswaran Pillai (2000) 1 SCC 712 . Admittedly, the case of B.K. Narayana Pillai (supra) was a case decided before the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002, had come into force. There is absolutely no indication in the decision, in Surender Kumar Sharma (supra), that even if a person seeks amendment of plaint or written statement after the evidence, in the suit, already stands recorded, he has no responsibility of satisfying the court that the facts, which he seeks to incorporate by way of amendment were not within his knowledge at the time, when he had filed his plaint or written statement, as the case may be, or that despite due diligence, he could not incorporate the facts, which he seeks to make by way of amendment, after hearing of the suit has already commenced. In such circumstances, the decision, in Surender Kumar Sharma (supra), cannot be applied to the facts of the present case. 25. It is trite that a decision is an authority for what it has actually decided and not what can be deduced from it. Though even obiter dictum of the Supreme Court is binding on all the courts, the fact remains that to be a binding authority on any specific issue, the issue must be, at least, raised and answered indirectly or by implication. Though even obiter dictum of the Supreme Court is binding on all the courts, the fact remains that to be a binding authority on any specific issue, the issue must be, at least, raised and answered indirectly or by implication. Reference may be made to Haryana Financial Corporation v. Jagadamba Oil Mills (2002) 3 SCC 496 , wherein the Apex Court has observed, "courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of courts are not to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear". Reference may also be made to Padma Sundara Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu (2002) 3 SCC 533 , wherein the court has laid down, "courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed." The Apex Court has explained the doctrine of precedent in Krishna Kumar v. Union of India (1990) 4 SCC 207 , thus, "the doctrine of judicial precedent, that is being bound by a previous decision, is limited to the decision itself and as to what is necessarily involved in it." Clarifying the doctrine of state decisis, the Apex Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Sun Engineering Works (P.) Ltd. AIR 1993 SC 43 , held, "it is neither desirable nor permissible to pick out a word or a sentence from the judgment of this Court, divorced from the context of the question under consideration and treat it to be the complete 'law' declared by this Court. The judgment must be read as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in the light of the questions which were before this Court. A decision of this Court takes its colour from the questions involved in the case in which it is rendered and while applying the decision to a later case, the courts must carefully try to ascertain the true principle laid down by the decision of this Court and not to pick out words or sentences from the judgment, divorced from the context of the. questions under consideration by this Court, to support their reasonings. questions under consideration by this Court, to support their reasonings. In Madhav Rao Siwaji Rao Scindia Bahadur v. Union of India, (1971) 3 SCR 9 : AIR 1971 SL 530 at p. 578, this Court cautioned: "it is not proper to regard a word, a clause or a sentence occurring in a judgment of the Supreme Court, divorced from its context, as containing a full exposition of the law on a question when the question did not even fall to be answered in that judgment." 26. In the backdrop of the position of law as discussed above, it becomes clear that when the issues, raised in the present case, were not the issues in Revajeetu Builders and Developers (supra) and Surender Kumar Sharma (supra), which Mr. Sahewalla relies upon, the decisions, rendered therein, do not advance the case of the present petitioners. 27. As regards the case of Eastern Business (P.) Ltd. v. Manika Dhar and Ors. 2009 (2) GLT 785, which too is relied on by Mr. Sahewalla, suffice it to point out that there were specific averments in the application for amendment, which had been considered in Eastern Business (P.) Ltd. (supra), as to why no application for amendment could be made earlier. The court accepted the reasons assigned, in this regard, by the party, who had sought for amendment. On this aspect of the case, the court observed, ...The pleadings in the said application filed under Order 6, Rule 17, as reproduced above, do demonstrate that the petitioners/ plaintiffs in spite of due diligence could not file the application seeking amendment of the pleadings in the written statement against the counterclaim before commencement of the trial. Moreover, the suit is at the very early stage of the trial as only the issues have been framed and the parties are yet to file the evidence on affidavit. Hence, the amendment, which is necessary to decide the real questions in controversy between the parties effectively and completely, if allowed it would not cause serious injustice or irreparable loss to the defendants and they can be compensated by awarding cost for causing little delay in disposal of the suit. Hence, the amendment, which is necessary to decide the real questions in controversy between the parties effectively and completely, if allowed it would not cause serious injustice or irreparable loss to the defendants and they can be compensated by awarding cost for causing little delay in disposal of the suit. To the facts of the case at hand, the decision, in Eastern Business (P.) Ltd. (supra), too has no application inasmuch as there is not even a whisper, in the present case, that the petitioners did not know about the facts, which they were, now, seeking to incorporate and/or that despite due diligence, they could not obtain certified copies of the two sale deeds aforementioned earlier. In fact, as already indicated above, they applied for the certified copies on 29.10.2009 and, on that very day, certified copies were made available to them. The question remains unanswered is as to why the petitioners had not obtained the certified copies earlier. 28. What crystallizes from the above discussion is that in the case at hand, in the face of the specific assertion of the plaintiff that the amendments, which the defendants have sought to introduce, were within the knowledge of the defendants long before they had filed their written statement and when the defendants have not denied this assertion and when the evidence, adduced by both sides, have already been recorded and when the defendants have not even attempted to offer as to why they had not applied for the amendment before the commencement of the hearing of the suit and when neither the pleadings on record nor any other material placed on record show that despite due diligence, the defendants could not have applied for the amendments, which they have, now, sought to make, the learned trial court was wholly justified in not acceding to the defendants' prayer for allowing them to make amendments in their written statements. 29. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this Court does not find any merit in this revision. The revision is, therefore, not admitted and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed. 30. With the above observations and directions, this revision stands disposed of. 31. No order as to costs.