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2010 DIGILAW 454 (ALL)

Pandit Sukhraj Raghunathi Institute of Education Technology v. National Council For Teacher Education, Wing-Ii

2010-02-03

ANIL KUMAR

body2010
Anil Kumar, J.;—Heard Sri Pt. S. Chandra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Vinay Bhushan, learned counsel for the respondents.2. In brief the facts as stated by learned counsel for the petitioner are that the Pandit Sukhraj Raghunathi Institute of Education Technology Ranjeetpur, which is situated at Chilbila Pratapgarh had applied for B.Ed. Course with the respondents and the said application of the petitioner was rejected by the order dated 10.7.2009 passed by Regional Director of National Council for Teacher Education New Delhi (annexure no.2).3. Aggrieved by the order dated 10.7.2009 the petitioner filed an appeal before the appellate authority. The appellate authority by means of order dated 11.12.2009 had rejected the petitioner's appeal on the ground that the same was filed at a belated stage i.e. after expiry of period of two months four days, hence the present writ petition.4. Learned counsel for the petitioner Pt. S. Chandra submits that the order dated 11.12.2009 passed by the respondent no.1 thereby rejecting the petitioner's appeal on the ground of delay is totally arbitrary and in-contravention to the principle of natural justice. He further submits that the delay in filing the appeal should be condoned and the matter should be decided on merit.5. Sri Vinay Bhushan, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the order dated 10.7.2009 has been passed by the Regional Direction, National Council for Teacher Education, New Delhi under Section 14(1) of the N.C.E.T.Act, 1993 taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, however he does not disputed that the appeal filed by the petitioner has been rejected only on the ground of delay by order dated 11.12.2009.6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.7. From perusal of the record, it is clear that the appeal filed by the petitioner has been rejected only on the ground of delay.8. It has been the constant view of Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court that the principles of natural justice must be followed and nobody should be condemned unheard as such the submission made by the counsel for the petitioner that the impugned action on the part of respondent no.1 rejecting the petitioner's appeal only on the ground of delay is an action arbitrary in nature has got force.9. Further in the matter of condonation of delay, the Apex Court has consistently held that pragmatic view should be taken.10. Further in the matter of condonation of delay, the Apex Court has consistently held that pragmatic view should be taken.10. In the case of Collector Land Acquisition Vs. Mst. Kati Ji and others,1987(13) ALR 306 (SC) Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:-"The legislator has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable th Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matter on "merits". The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the Legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice - that being the life - purpose of the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy.And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:1. Ordinarily , a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this; when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would he decided on merit after hearing the parties.3. "Every " day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational, common sense and pragmatic manner.4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side can not claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on accout of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk.6. It must be grapped that the judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injsutice and is expected to do so."11. In N. Balakrishnan Vs. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk.6. It must be grapped that the judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injsutice and is expected to do so."11. In N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy,(1998) 7 SCC 133 the Apex Court explained the scope of limitation and condonatin of delay, observing as under :-" The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time- limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties . They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy."12. In Smt. Prabha Vs. Ram Praskash Kalra, 1987 (Suppl.) SCC 338 the Supreme Court took the view that the Court should not adopt an injustice- oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay.13. In Vedabai alias Vaijayanatabai Baburao Patil Vs. Shantaram Baburao Patil and others, 2001 (44) ALR 577 (SC) the Apex Court made a distinction in delay and inordinate delay observing as under:-" In exercising discretion under section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts should adopt a pragmatic approach. A distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. Whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the otherwise will be a relevant factor so the case calls for a more cautious approach....."14. In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Shanti Misra, AIR 1976 SC 237 Hon'ble Supreme Court held that discretion given by section 5 should not be defined or crystallized so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The expression" sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction.15. In Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs. In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Shanti Misra, AIR 1976 SC 237 Hon'ble Supreme Court held that discretion given by section 5 should not be defined or crystallized so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The expression" sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction.15. In Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs. Kuntal Kumari, AIR 1969 SC 575 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that unless want bona fides of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the protection of section 5 is proved, the application must not be thrown out of any delay cannot be refused to be condoned.16. In O.P. Kathpalia Vs Lakhmir Singh, AIR 1984 SC 1744 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that if the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay.17. For the foregoing reasons, writ petition is allowed. The order dated 11.12.2009 passed by respondent no.1 is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the respondent no.1 to decide the same in accordance with law after hearing the parties concerned expeditiously say within a period of four months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order._____________