Judgment : The defendant is the appellant herein. The plaintiff, who is the respondent filed the suit in O.S. No. 193 of 1999 praying for recovery of possession of 3 acres of land in S. No. 8/2A1 in Thular Village, Kudavasal Taluk. The very same plaintiff filed the suit in O.S. No. 77 of 2000, praying for damages for use and occupation. The trial Court non-suited the plaintiff in both the suits. The plaintiff preferred two separate appeals, aggrieved by the judgment of the trial Court, before the first appellate Court. The first appellate Court accepted the contention of the plaintiff and decreed both the suits. As against which, these two appeals have been preferred by the defendant. 2. The plaintiff has contended that he agreed to sell the suit property in S. No. 8/2A1 measuring 3 acres along with the bore pump set to the defendant for a total consideration of ` 1,16,000/-. An agreement of sale was entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant on 30.7.1992. A sum of ` 40,000/-was paid as a sale advance and the defendant paid later a sum of ` 7,750/-. As the remaining balance amount was not paid and the bank debt payable by the plaintiff was not also discharged within one year from the date of agreement by the defendant as per the agreement, the plaintiff cancelled the agreement. The defendant is getting income from the suit property. Therefore, the advance amount paid by the defendant remained adjusted it. The plaintiff has proposed to lay a separate suit for damages for use and occupation following the failure on the part of the defendant to discharge the bank debt. The suit in O.S. No. 193 of 1999 was filed, praying for recovery of possession. Contending that the defendant was liable to pay damages for use and occupation, the subsequent suit in O.S. No. 77 of 2000 was filed by the plaintiff, praying for damages for use and occupation. 3. The defendant would contend in the written statement that the defendant, who is in possession and enjoyment of the suit property by virtue of the agreement of sale entered Into between the plaintiff and the defendant, is entitled to protect his possession as per Section 53(A) of the Transfer of Property Act. 3. The defendant would contend in the written statement that the defendant, who is in possession and enjoyment of the suit property by virtue of the agreement of sale entered Into between the plaintiff and the defendant, is entitled to protect his possession as per Section 53(A) of the Transfer of Property Act. The defendant had subsequently, paid a sum of ` 7,550/-on various occasions to the plaintiff and due endorsement was also made by the plaintiff on 27.12.1992. It is further contended that the defendant was ever ready and willing to perform his part of contract. The plaintiff failed to mention the interest portion payable by the defendant to the bank. The plaintiff received a sum of ` 16,690/-on 1.3.1995 and subsequently, a sum of ` 27,500/-and the plaintiff informed the defendant that he would discharge the bank loans. It is also submitted that the plaintiff has chosen to borrow a sum of ` 20,000/-and execute a Mortgage deed in favour of the Primary Agricultural Cooperative Bank on 16.10.1992. Alleging that the defendant could not perform his part of contract on account of the dilatory tactics adopted by the plaintiff, the defendant has sought for dismissal of the suit filed by the plaintiff for recovery of possession. As regards the other suit filed for damages for use and occupation, the defendant would contend that the plaintiff is not entitled, to claim any damages, as the defendant has been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property pursuant to the agreement of sale entered into between the parties, exercising his right under Section 53(A) of the Transfer of Property Act. 4. The trial Court emphatically held that the defendant, who was put in possession and enjoyment of the suit property is entitled to protect his possession under Section 53(A) of the Transfer of Property Act, as he was ever ready and willing to perform his part of contract. As a result of such a finding, the trial Court chose to dismiss both the suit filed by the plaintiff. But the first appellate Court having observed that the defendant has not chosen to issue even a notice prior to the lapse of one year period contemplated under the agreement held that the defendant was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract. Therefore, he has to lose the protection provided under Section 53(A) of the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore, he has to lose the protection provided under Section 53(A) of the Transfer of Property Act. Consequently, the findings rendered by the trial Court were set aside and both the appeals preferred by the plaintiff were allowed. 5. The following substantial questions of law were formulated at the time of admission of both the second appeals: “1. When the defendant admittedly paid an advance of ` 40,000/-and further, paid under Exhibits B3 to B-7 and he was put in possession of the suit property by the plaintiff. Whether the lower appellate Court Is right in law in holding that the defendant is not entitled to protection under Section 53(A) of the Transfer of Property Act? 2. When the plaintiff had created encumbrance in the suit property by raising a loan of ` 20,000/-from the bank and executed a mortgage deed in favour of it on 16.10.1992 within 2½ months from Exhibit B-1 = Exhibit B-7 and suppressed the same, whether the lower appellate Court erred in law in not considering the same?” 6. Learned counsel for the appellant/defendant would submit that on the very same cause of action, the suit for damages also has been filed. Though the respondent/plaintiff had proposed to file a separate suit for damages as per the averment found in the earlier suit for recovery of possession, no leave was obtained from the Court. Therefore, it is submitted that the suit for damages is hit by the embargo under Order 2 Rule 2 of Code of Civil Procedure. 7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff would submit that the subsequent suit has been filed only for claiming damages for the profits accrued to the defendant, on account of the enjoyment of the property entrusted to him pursuant to the agreement for sale. Therefore, it is submitted that the second suit has been laid absolutely on a different cause of action. 8. As per Order 2 Rule 2 of Code of Civil Procedure where the plaintiff omits to sue in respect of any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion of such claim so omitted. Order 2 Rule 3 mandates that a person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action cannot sue afterwards for any relief omitted earlier, unless leave of the Court was obtained. 9. Order 2 Rule 3 mandates that a person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action cannot sue afterwards for any relief omitted earlier, unless leave of the Court was obtained. 9. The fact remains that though the respondent/plaintiff had given details of the damages, he had sustained, on account of the profits enjoyed by the defendant/appellant, he had not sought for a leave from the Court and leave also was granted by the Court to reserve his right to file a separate suit. 10. It is seen that the first suit was filed for recovery of possession based on the agreement of sale entered into between the parties, the possession given to the defendant by the plaintiff pursuant to such agreement and the termination of agreement by issuing legal notice. In other words, the first suit was filed for recovery of possession based on the possession given to the defendant by the plaintiff pursuant to the agreement of sale entered into between the parties. But, the second suit for recovery of damages has arisen based on the enjoyment of the property entrusted to him in possession pursuant to the agreement of sale. There may be a case where the property given in possession to a person might not have been put to effective use. If no cultivation had been undertaken by the person in possession, the question of payment of damages on account of use and occupation would not arise. Therefore, the second suit has been filed based on the actual enjoyment of the property by putting to use the property entrusted in possession-pursuant to the agreement for sale. The enjoyment of the property by the defendant invites totally a different cause of action. 11. The basic principle flowed from Order 2 Rule 2 sub rule 3 is that the cause of action in the earlier suit must be the same on which a subsequent suit was laid. Unless, there is identity of cause of action in both the suits, the bar under Order 2 Rule 2 sub rule 3 would not get attracted in AIR 1997 SC 1398 : (1997) 1 SCC 99 . 12. Unless, there is identity of cause of action in both the suits, the bar under Order 2 Rule 2 sub rule 3 would not get attracted in AIR 1997 SC 1398 : (1997) 1 SCC 99 . 12. Learned counsel appearing for the defendant/appellant cited a decision of this Court in (1994) 1 MLJ 30 wherein it has been held in paragraph 10 as follows at p. 33 of MLJ: “There is the other rule of procedure as wall as of substance in 0.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which says that a person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action, may sue for all or any of such reliefs, but if he omits, except with the leave of the Court to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted for, if a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. In other words, every suit must include the whole of the claim, which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action.” It has been laid down that the whole of the claim in respect of a particular cause of action shown in the plaint should have been included in the plaint. Relinquishment of the portion of the claim based on the same cause of action would pose a bar for filing a separate suit in respect of a remaining claim concerning the very same cause of action. 13. In the instant case, it is found that the suit for recovery of possession has been filed by the respondent/plaintiff based on the possession entrusted to the defendant/appellant pursuant to the agreement for sale. The first suit for recovery of possession was not laid based on the enjoyment of the property by the defendant whereas the subsequent suit has been filed based on the effective enjoyment of the property and the profits accrued to the defendant. Further, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff, the enjoyment of the property for each and every fasli gives a different cause of action. Further, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff, the enjoyment of the property for each and every fasli gives a different cause of action. In case, the plaintiff had filed earlier suit for damages with respect to the later fasli he cannot file a separate suit subsequently, with respect to the profit enjoyed by the defendant during earlier fasli. 14. As it is found that both the suits have been laid on the footing of different cause of action, the Court finds that Order 2 Rule 2 does not pose an impediment for the plaintiff to maintain the subsequent suit for damages. 15. Learned counsel for the appellant would further contend that the agreement for sale is found to be blank with respect of the interest component of the loan to be discharged by the defendant on behalf of the plaintiff. The bank particulars also were not furnished in the agreement for sale. When the total due payable by the plaintiff to the banks were not given in the agreement for sale, the defendant could not pay the dues to the bank on behalf of the plaintiff, it is submitted. 16. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff would submit that it is an admitted case that the defendant paid a sum of ` 1,000/-to the Corporation Bank towards the dues payable by the plaintiff to the said bank. Therefore/he would submit that the above conduct would disclose that subsequent to the agreement for sale entered into between the parties, the amount due to the plaintiff was arrived at and the Banks to which the plaintiff was liable to make payment were also informed to the defendant. 17. The very fact that a small part of the amount payable by the plaintiff to Corporation Bank was discharged by the defendant would go to show that there had been consensus ad idem as regards the total loan amount including the interest payable by the plaintiff to various banks. Unless, the defendant was informed of the amount payable by him to the plaintiff, there would have been no occasion for the defendant to make payment of a sum of ` 1,000 to Corporation Bank. It is true that the interest component of the loan amount raised by the plaintiff with various banks did not find a place in the agreement. It is true that the interest component of the loan amount raised by the plaintiff with various banks did not find a place in the agreement. But, the subsequent conduct of the defendant would go to show that he was duly informed of the amount payable by the plaintiff to the banks. 18. It is further contended by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that the property was encumbered within about 2½ months from the date of execution of the agreement for sale, Exhibit B-1. The said fact was completely suppressed in the suit laid for recovery of possession. He also cited a decision of the Supreme Court to impress the Court that a person, who is supposed to disclose the material facts cannot withhold the material facts and suppress the same in order to derive benefit out of it. 19. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff would submit that there was no suppression of material facts inasmuch as a very meagre part of the suit property alone was mortgaged to the bank out of necessity. As a larger extent of property was available with the plaintiff in the very same serial number and the property agreed to be sold to the plaintiff was not dealt under the mortgage, the plaintiff cannot be attributed with suppression of material facts, he would further submit. 20. The Supreme Court in a classic case in AIR 1994 SC 853 : (1994) 1 SCC 1 has held as follows: “One who comes to the Court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the Court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the Court-process a convenient lever to retain the illegal gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, whose (sic) case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. … … … … A litigant, who approaches the Court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in orders to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the Court as well as on the opposite party.” 21. … … … … A litigant, who approaches the Court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in orders to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the Court as well as on the opposite party.” 21. The Supreme Court has come down very heavily on the plaintiff, who approached the Court with pack of lies and falsehood. Such a plaintiff should be turned out of the litigation, it has been declared by the Supreme Court. A party cannot be permitted to gain advantage by withholding vital document, it has been held. 22. In the instant case, the plaintiff has demonstrated that he purchased under Exhibit A-1, an extent of 5.50 acres. But under Exhibit B-2, he agreed to sell to the defendant only 3 acres of land. But, the mortgage was reflected in the Encumbrance Certificate Exhibit B-8 only with respect to 1.5 acres of land. It is true that in all the above documents, the same boundaries have been given as though the above referred to 5.5 acres, 3 acres and 1.5 acres fall within the same four boundaries. Factually, that cannot be correct inasmuch as under Exhibit A-1. totally 5.50 acres had been conveyed by the predecessors in title of plaintiff. Under the agreement Exhibit B-2, only 3 acre was proposed to be sold by the plaintiff to the defendant and under the mortgage as shown in Encumbrance Certificate, Exhibit B-8 only 1.5 acres was given as security to the Corporation Bank, it is also true that the plaintiff has admitted during the course of evidence that the suit property was mortgaged to the Bank. But, considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case, I find that what the plaintiff has meant was only the execution of the mortgage of the property covered under the very same serial number. 23. When a smaller extent of 1.50 acre alone was mortgaged as shown in Exhibit B-8, there is no reason for the defendant to complain that the property agreed to be sold under Exhibit B-2 was mortgaged and the same was intentionally suppressed by the plaintiff. 24. It is an admitted fact that Exhibit B-8 was obtained by the defendant only on 4.2.2000. 24. It is an admitted fact that Exhibit B-8 was obtained by the defendant only on 4.2.2000. He was not aware of the mortgage created by the plaintiff prior there to. There was no reason for him to ignore the time frame fixed under the agreement for sate, Exhibit B-1 which was executed as early as on 30.7.1992. Even after the notice was given by the plaintiff under Exhibit A-2 dated 25.6.1998, it appears that the defendant has not chosen to give any reply. The plaintiff had to file a suit for recovery of possession on 25.2.1999. The fact remains that the entire loan amount agreed to be discharged to various banks by the defendant had not been paid as per the terms and conditions of the agreement for sale Exhibit B-1. 25. Two main conditions will have to be fulfilled to invoke the protection under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. The transferee must in part performance of the contract take possession of the property. Further, the transferee must have performed or must be willing to perform his part of the contract. In the instant case, though the defendant has taken possession of the property pursuant to Exhibit B-1, he has not fully performed his part of the contract. His unwillingness to perform his part of the contract is writ large in the facts and circumstances of the case. In (2010) 3 MLJ 1311 : 2010-1-L.W.687 it is observed as follows at p. 1317 of MLJ: 27. In the very same decision of the Supreme Court ( (2002) 3 SCC 676 : (2002) 2 MLJ 115, it has been further held as follows at p. 119 of MLJ: “But there are certain conditions which are required to be fulfilled if a transferee wants to defend or protect his possession under Section 53-A of the Act. In the very same decision of the Supreme Court ( (2002) 3 SCC 676 : (2002) 2 MLJ 115, it has been further held as follows at p. 119 of MLJ: “But there are certain conditions which are required to be fulfilled if a transferee wants to defend or protect his possession under Section 53-A of the Act. The necessary conditions are: (1) there must be a contract to transfer; for consideration of any immovable property; (2) the contract must be in writing, signed by the transferor, or by someone on his behalf; (3) the writing must be in such words from which the terms necessary to construe the transfer can be ascertained; (4) the transferee must in part-performance of the contract take possession of the property, or of any part thereof; (5) the transferee must have done some act in furtherance of the contract; and (6) the transferee must have performed or be willing to perform his part of the contract.” 26. In the light of the dictum, the defendant cannot seek protection under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore, it is held that the lower Appellate Court has correctly held that the defendant is not entitled to protection under Section 53-A of Transfer of Property Act and that there was also no suppression of material facts. Both the substantial questions of law formulated by this Court are answered accordingly. 27. In view of the above, the appeal fails and therefore it stands dismissed. The appellant is directed to deliver possession of the suit property to the respondent within three months from the date of judgment. There is no order as to costs.