Judgment :- 1. This Original Petition is filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for brevity, “the Act”) to set aside the award of the sole Arbitrator, viz., the Second Respondent dated 20.7.2007, by which the Petitioner, who was the Respondent before the Arbitrator, has been directed to pay to the First Respondent an amount of Rs.4 Lkhs with interest at the rate of 18% per annum from the date of the Arbitral Award to the date of Fixed Deposit Receipt to be made out by the Petitioner for a period of not less than 91 days from the Clearing Bank and rejecting the counter claim of Rs.19,485.85 made by the Petitioner. 2. Application No.708 of 2010 has been filed by the First Respondent in the Original Petition, who was the Claimant before the Arbitrator, to reject the Original Petition. 3.1. The First Respondent, who is the Applicant before the Arbitrator, is a constituent of the Petitioner, which is a Trading Member and registered Stock Broker of the National Stock Exchange of India Limited, having its office at Mumbai and registered with SEBI. 3.2. It was the case of the First Respondent before the Arbitrator that in March, 2006, the First Respondent has entered into a Stock Broking Agreement and thereby has become a regular broking client of the Petitioner having executed a Member Client Agreement on 14.3.2006. The First Respondent has paid an amount of Rs.4 Lakhs by way of deposit towards the margin for trading. However, it has been the case of the First Respondent that the deposit amount of Rs.4 Lakhs would be utilised for delivery based transactions subject to her order and prior consent on case to case basis. 3.3. It has been her case that she got confirmation Memos for purchase and sale, for which no consent or prior permission has been obtained from her and that unilateral transaction was objected to and according to her, by such conduct of the Petitioner she had incurred loss to the extent of Rs.4,29,712/-as against her investment of Rs.4 Lakhs and therefore, she has claimed a compensation of Rs.4,69,000/-. 4.1. 4.1. The Petitioner, in the Written Statement, has stated that the First Respondent has become a constituent member by entering into a Member Constituent Agreement dated 14.3.2006 and she not opened Portfolio Management Services account, since, as per the SEBI Regulations, such account cannot be opened unless there is a minimum portfolio of Rs.5 Lakhs. 4.2. It was the further case of the Petitioner before the Arbitrator that they have been sending regularly the contract notes to the First Respondent and also posted the same on the website of the Company. As far as the brokerage is concerned, it was stated that the same is payable regardless of profit or loss and even if the First Respondent has any Complaint or dispute, the same should have been raised within 24 hours of the receipt of the contract note, which has not been done. 4.3. It was the further case – that the square off has been done after 42 days when there was a shortage of the margin money requirement of the First Respondent constituent. Since the margin money deposit has not been received, there was no alternative but to square off. It is also stated by the Petitioner that as a broker it cannot place stop loss order on behalf of the First Respondent without specific instruction and there is an amount of Rs.19,485.85 due from her. 5. Therefore, before the Arbitrator, while the Petitioner has made a counter claim of Rs.19,485.85, the First Respondent has made a claim of Rs.4,69,000/-towards the damages, which includes the deposit amount of Rs.4 Lakhs, Rs.26,000/-towards 40% assured return on the investment, Rs.38,000/-being interest @ 12% per annum from 1.1.2006 till date and Rs.5,000/-towards miscellaneous expenses. 6.1. The Arbitrator, after elaborate enquiry and on perusing the documents and considering the oral and written submissions made by both the parties, has found that the First Respondent was buying and selling shares in a different Broking Company and she was lured by the employee of the Petitioner, namely Pavithra, with an assurance of 40% return on the investment of Rs.4Lakhs and in those circumstances, the First Respondent might have signed all the dotted lines keeping quiet for profit to come. 6.2 The Arbitrator also viewed that the representative of the Petitioner, who brought the clientele, had been placing orders on behalf of the First Respondent and sending the confirmation memos. 6.2 The Arbitrator also viewed that the representative of the Petitioner, who brought the clientele, had been placing orders on behalf of the First Respondent and sending the confirmation memos. When the matter was taken up with the said Pavithra, no action was taken by the Petitioner which has resulted in the debit balance in the account of the First Respondent. The Arbitrator has also found that the Petitioner has failed to send the Account Statements showing ledger balances and that the trades in quick succession without stop loss has lead to losses in the falling market in May, 2006. 6.3. The Arbitrator has held that the Petitioner is responsible for promotional assurance made by its employees to lure the Clients; for not even receiving the Complaint from the dealer; for not furnishing the account statements; and for trading without orders fro the constituents. The Arbitrator has also stated that for the first time he has come across such a Complaint against the Petitioner and the fault is due to the employees of the Petitioner. Simultaneously, finding that the First Respondent should have also exercised reasonable care in not leaving a huge amount of Rs.4 Lakhs and not watching for the statements, the Arbitrator rejected the further claim of Rs.69,000/-made by the First Respondent and directed the Petitioner to pay Rs.4 Lakhs, as stated above, and also rejected its Counter Claim. 7. The Petitioner has challenged the award on various grounds, including that the award is not fair; that the same is illegal and opposed to public policy; that the award is passed in violation of Principles of Natural Justice and fairness; that the Arbitrator have given a go-by to the evidence that an aspersion has been cast on the Petitioner, which is stated to be a leading stock broker; that the Arbitrator is biased in passing the award; and that the rejection of the Counter claim is unlawful. 8. The First Respondent has raised the issue of jurisdiction of filing of the Original Petition before this Court. According to the First Respondent, the entire cause of action regarding the Arbitral dispute has arisen within the jurisdiction of the Courts at Bangalore, since the agreement was entered on 14.3.2006, signed and executed at Bangalore. 8. The First Respondent has raised the issue of jurisdiction of filing of the Original Petition before this Court. According to the First Respondent, the entire cause of action regarding the Arbitral dispute has arisen within the jurisdiction of the Courts at Bangalore, since the agreement was entered on 14.3.2006, signed and executed at Bangalore. However, it was only the venue of arbitration that was fixed at Chennai for the convenience of the Arbitrator and therefore, according to the First Respondent, this Court has no jurisdiction. It is also stated that even in paragraph (14) of the Petition filed by the Petitioner, it is admitted that only the Arbitrator proceedings were conducted at Chennai and the award was passed at Chennai. Therefore, it is the contention of the learned Counsel for the First Respondent that the mere passing of award or venue of arbitration does not confer any jurisdiction to set aside such award within the meaning of Section 2(1)(e) of the Act. Reliance is also placed on the following decisions, viz., M. Venkatasamiappa v. Srinidhi Ltd., 1950 (1) MLJ 709 ; Sushil Ansal v. Union of India, AIR 1980 Del. 43 ; Vissamseth Chandra Narasimham v. Ramdayal Rameswaralal and others, AIR 1966 A.P. 134 ; and Gulati Construction Co., Jhansi v. Betwa River Board, AIR 1984 Del. 299 . It is with that pleading Application No. 708 of 2010 has been filed to reject the Original Petition on the ground of jurisdiction. 9.1. On the other hand, it is the case of the Petitioner in the Original Petition that when the arbitration took place at Chennai and award is passed at Chennai, a part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court and by applying Section 2(1)(e) of the Act, this Court will have jurisdiction. 9.2. It is also stated that the Petitioner is having a regional centre at Chennai and the First Respondent has voluntarily chosen to raise the dispute at the National Stock Exchange, Chennai and filed her claim at Chennai. Therefore, according to the Petitioner, since a part of the cause of action has arisen in Chennai, this Court has jurisdiction. 9.3. 9.2. It is also stated that the Petitioner is having a regional centre at Chennai and the First Respondent has voluntarily chosen to raise the dispute at the National Stock Exchange, Chennai and filed her claim at Chennai. Therefore, according to the Petitioner, since a part of the cause of action has arisen in Chennai, this Court has jurisdiction. 9.3. It is the contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that it is only the act of the Arbitrator that alone is complained for the purpose of setting aside the award and the Arbitrator is situated in Chennai and therefore, the Petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of jurisdiction, by relying upon the judgment reported in Paramita Constructions Private Ltd. v. UE Development India (P) Limited, 2008 (3) Arb. LR 522 (A.P) 10.1. In addition to the ground of jurisdiction raised by the First Respondent, on the merits of the case, the First Respondent has filed a Counter Affidavit stating that the Petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground that the correctness or otherwise of the award cannot be looked into by this Court by sitting as an Appellate Authority, especially when the award is a speaking one, and the supervisory control of the Courts in Arbitration proceedings is limited. It is also stated that the grounds on the basis of which the arbitration award is sought to be set aside are very vague, general and without specification. 10.2. It is also stated that the signature of the First Respondent was obtained on the assurance of 40% return per annum on the investment and in fact, the deposit of Rs.4 lakhs was handed over by the First Respondent to the representative of the Petitioner-Company on 14.3.2006, even before the commencement of the broker-client relation and that has been in detail considered by the Arbitrator. It is also stated by the First Respondent that it was on the basis of the assurance given by the representative of the Petitioner, thinking that the profit will automatically come to her, she kept quiet, since it was noted that the Petitioner would take care of the investment under portfolio management and the First Respondent has been kept in dark. It is stated that the First Respondent has deposited the money with the Petitioner by borrowing the same from Allahabad Bank and therefore, there was no question of engaging in speculation or reckless trading by the First Respondent. 10.3 It is also stated that the award is a reasoned one and no motive can be attributable to the Arbitrator and any reference made about the conduct of the representatives of the Petitioner in alluring the constituents like that of the First Respondent was only advisory in nature and that cannot be a ground to impute any mala fide on the part of the Arbitrator. 11. Before going into the merits of the award passed by the Arbitrator, since the First Respondent, who has made the Application before the Arbitrator, has raised the issue regarding the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the Petition under Section 34 of the Act, it is relevant to examine the said aspect in the first instance. 12. The fact that the Stock Broker and Client Agreement was entered between he Petitioner and the First Respondent on 14.3.2006 at Bangalore is not in dispute and the same is available on record and it is also not in dispute that the First Respondent is a resident of Bangalore and the registered office of the Petitioner, who is a Stock Exchange Broker, is at Mumbai, even though it has got its regional offices at various places, including Chennai. As per the clause in the agreement in respect of jurisdiction, it is clearly stated in Clause 9 that “the parties hereto agree to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts in Mumbai”. 13. Even in all the reports relating to the bills filed as documents, the Petitioner has communicated with the First Respondent to her address at Bangalore and the adjustment of various amounts in the accounts of the Petitioner has been made only at Bangalore and no one of the transactions between the Petitioner and the First Respondent has ever taken place within the jurisdiction of Chennai. The amounts credited and debited in respect of the transactions were in the Savings Bank Account of the First Respondent with the Allahabad Bank at Bangalore. 14. The amounts credited and debited in respect of the transactions were in the Savings Bank Account of the First Respondent with the Allahabad Bank at Bangalore. 14. The First Respondent has raised a dispute making a claim of Rs.5,26,000/-, which of course included an amount of Rs.1 Lakh towards mental shock over the announcement of wiping out of her capital plus, from Bangalore on 24.7.2006 and that was replied by the Petitioner through its authorised signatory to the First Respondent to her Bangalore address. It was thereafter the First Respondent has made a Complaint to the Investors Grievance Cell of the Security Exchange Board of India, Mumbai, by deputing her husband Sri H.B. Damodar for a discussion with the representative of the Petitioner. Such Complaint was also made by the First Respondent to the Bombay Stock Exchange Limited. The National Stock Exchange of India Limited, Chennai, to whom also a Complaint was made by the First Respondent on 6.11.2006, by communication dated 13.11.2006 addressed to the Petitioner, required the Petitioner to produce various documents. 15. The First Respondent had to complain to the National Stock Exchange of India Limited at its Chennai Office, as it is the regional office of the National Stock Exchange of India Limited for regions consisting of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andaman and Nicobar, Lakshadweep and Pondicherry. Therefore, by writing such a Complaint to the National Stock Exchange of India Limited to its regional office at Chennai by the First Respondent, it does not mean that any cause of action in respect of the dispute has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court. Such Complaint has been given to the National Stock Exchange of India Limited at Chennai, being its regional office for the said regions, which included Tamil Nadu as well as Karnataka. 16. The communication of the National Stock Exchange of India Limited relating to this dispute also shows that the Petitioner was represented by Pavithra and ultimately, it is found that the matter has been referred to the Arbitration Department of the Regional Office of the National Stock Exchange of India Limited at Chennai. 16. The communication of the National Stock Exchange of India Limited relating to this dispute also shows that the Petitioner was represented by Pavithra and ultimately, it is found that the matter has been referred to the Arbitration Department of the Regional Office of the National Stock Exchange of India Limited at Chennai. Therefore, on the narration of the entire facts borne out of record, as stated by the Petitioner in the Original Petition, I have no hesitation to conclude that except the place of arbitration and the place of award, no one of the transactions or disputes between the Petitioner and the First Respondent has ever arisen in Chennai within the jurisdiction of this Court. 17. Section 2(1)(e) of the Act, which defines the word “Court”, states as follows: “Section 2(1)(e): “Court” means, the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary Original Civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a Suit, but does not include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such Principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes”. thereby making it clear that the Court for the purpose of the Act should be a Civil Court having Original jurisdiction to decide about the dispute which was the subject matter of arbitration, if the same has been made as a subject matter of a Suit. By applying the definition as such, it is clear that in the absence of a reference to arbitration of the dispute between the First Respondent and the Petitioner, the competent Court of Civil jurisdiction which can decide the subject matter by way of a Suit can never be at Chennai. 18. Section 42 of the Act, while explaining about the jurisdiction of the Court, in a non obstante clause states as follows: “Section 42: Jurisdiction.-Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Part or in any other law for the time being in force, where with respect to an Arbitration Agreement any Application under this Part has been made in a Court, that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the Arbitral proceedings and all subsequent Applications arising out of that agreement and the Arbitral proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court”. The sweeping power of jurisdiction cannot be, in my considered view, conferred on a Court within whose jurisdiction no part of cause of action regarding the arbitrable dispute has ever arisen, simply because after the award passed a Petition is made before this Court under Section 34 of the Act to set aside the same. 19. In any event, the award passed by the Arbitrator is being questioned in the present Original Petition by the Petitioner and the issue of jurisdiction has been raised by the First Respondent and therefore, by applying Section 42 of the Act, it cannot be contended by the Petitioner that the Petitioner has filed an Application under Section 34 of the Act to set aside the award before this Court and therefore, this Court should be construed as a Court of jurisdiction for deciding about the correctness or otherwise of the award. The Applications, which are to be made as per Section 42 of the Act, in my considered view, cannot be applicable to an Application made under Section 34 of the Act to set aside an award, in which a point has been raised about the jurisdiction of this Court. The term “application” regarding Arbitration Agreement under Section 42 of the Act may, in such circumstances, relate to various Applications like one filed under Sections 8, 9, etc. 20. Under the Act, the “Arbitration Agreement” as defined under Section 7 is the basis for a cause of action to refer the dispute to the arbitration and such dispute can be referred only by a party to the Arbitration Agreement The raising of a dispute under the agreement between the parties is the cause of action for referring it to the Arbitrator for arbitration, in which the judicial intervention is restricted, as it is explicitly stated in Section 5 of the Act. 21. In fact, the jurisdiction issue which is found under Section 42 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is similar to the one under Section 31(4) of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The concept which is explained under Section 42 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which was incorporated earlier in the Arbitration Act, 1940 under Section 31(4), was aptly explained by a Division Bench of this Court in the earliest judgment in M. Venkatasamlappa v. Srinidhi Ltd., 1950 (1) MLJ 709 . The concept which is explained under Section 42 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which was incorporated earlier in the Arbitration Act, 1940 under Section 31(4), was aptly explained by a Division Bench of this Court in the earliest judgment in M. Venkatasamlappa v. Srinidhi Ltd., 1950 (1) MLJ 709 . In that case the Respondent-Company was having its office at Madras, with a subsidiary office at Bangalore, carrying out various works at Bangalore for the Public Works Department of the Government of India. The Applicant before the High Court under Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 to receive the award and pass a decree in terms of the award was a resident of Bangalore and a sub-contractor supplying labour and materials and the works were executed in Bangalore. A claim of Rs.36,000/-was made by the Applicant/sub-contractor which was denied by the Respondent/Company and thereafter, by an agreement between the parties executed at Madras, the disputes were referred to Arbitrators who were residing at Madras and award was passed and the Application was filed before the Original Side of this Court for receiving the award and passing a decree in terms of the award. It was in those circumstances, the Division Bench has held that inasmuch as no one of the cause of action relating to dispute arose between the parties within the jurisdiction of Madras and the work has been executed at Bangalore and supplies have been made at Bangalore, by making analogy of the provisions of the Act that in such event if the parties were to resort for recovery of amount under the contract they should have only gone to a Court of jurisdiction at Bangalore, held that an Application under Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 cannot be filed in the High Court of Madras. On a reference to the provisions of the Act, it was held that the Court, having jurisdiction, should relate to the matter to which the reference is made and not Court having jurisdiction to the matter which the agreement relates. Balakrishna Ayyar, J., in the said judgment, has held as follows: “In order to determine which is the Court having jurisdiction in the matter, you should first of all ascertain what the questions are, which form the subject-matter of the reference to arbitration. Balakrishna Ayyar, J., in the said judgment, has held as follows: “In order to determine which is the Court having jurisdiction in the matter, you should first of all ascertain what the questions are, which form the subject-matter of the reference to arbitration. You then proceed to ask; supposing these questions had arisen in a Suit, which is the Court which would have jurisdiction to entertain the Suit. That Court would be the court having jurisdiction under the Arbitration Act also. It was admitted before us that in the present case the contract between the Appellant and the Respondent was entered into in Bangalore. The Appellant supplied the labour and the materials in Bangalore; the Respondent had also a subsidiary office in Bangalore and the payments made were also at Bangalore. The questions between the parties arose out of this contract and what the Arbitrators had to determine was how much on a settlement of the accounts was due to one side or the other. Obviously, if these questions had arisen in a Suit, the Court which would ordinarily have had jurisdiction in the matter is not this Court; but the Court of Bangalore. That result cannot be avoided if the jurisdiction of the Court were made dependent on the subject-matter of the action. Prima facie, therefore, it would seem that this Court has no jurisdiction in the matter.” It was further observed as follows: “..Besides, according to Section 2(c) and Section 31(1) the Court which would have jurisdiction would be, not the Court or the place in which the agreement was entered into, but the Court which would have jurisdiction in respect of the questions forming the subject-matter of the reference.” Therefore, ultimately it was held that even though the parties have agreed by an agreement entered at Madras to refer the dispute to the Arbitrators at Madras, inasmuch as the original agreement in respect of the subject matter of contract for carrying out the work for PWD was to be carried out at Bangalore, the mere agreement for referring the dispute for arbitration does not confer the jurisdiction to a Court where the Arbitrators were appointed. 22. 22. Of course, on the facts of the present case, the original contract was entered and all transactions took place only at Bangalore and no one of the cause of action has ever arisen at Chennai, except that the National Stock Exchange of India Limited, which is having its regional office at Chennai in respect of four southern States, has referred, the dispute at Chennai and therefore, by applying Section 42 of the Act, I am of the of the considered view that this Court cannot have jurisdiction in respect of the subject matter of dispute which has given cause of action for arbitration. 23. Again, while referring to, the Arbitration act, 1940, especially Sections 2(c) and 31(1), by following the above said judgment of the Madras High Court in M. Venkatasamiappa v. Srinidhi Ltd. case, the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Vissamseth Chandra Narasimham v. Ramdayal Rameswaralal and others, AIR 1966 A.P. 134 , held that when an award is to be presented before the Court of jurisdiction, the parties by an agreement cannot confer jurisdiction to some other Court, which would be opposed to the statutory principles, by eliciting Sections 2(c) and 31 (1) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, which are as follows: “Section 2(c): “Court” means Civil Court having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the reference if the same had been the subject-matter of the Suit…” Section 31(1): “Subject to the provisions of this Act, an may be filed in any Court having jurisdiction in the matter to which the reference relates.” The Andhra Pradesh High Court has ultimately held as follows: “14. The intendment of this provision is explicit and is consistent with the definitions heretofore stated. That is to say, an award has to be filed in the Court in which a Suit would lie with regard to the subject matter of reference. This is a statutory requirement and cannot possibly be circumvented by any agreement between the parties. In other words, if there was an agreement that would be against the statute and cannot be given effect to. So, the plea that the parties had an agreement stipulated for the award being filed before the High Court of Calcutta would not avail. The circumstance that in fact the agreement had been acted upon would not also avail, as there cannot be an estoppel against statute.” 24. So, the plea that the parties had an agreement stipulated for the award being filed before the High Court of Calcutta would not avail. The circumstance that in fact the agreement had been acted upon would not also avail, as there cannot be an estoppel against statute.” 24. That was also the view of the Delhi High Court in Sushil Ansa v. Union of India, AIR 1980 Del. 43. That was a case where in respect of a contract with the Union of India for carrying out flooring in certain buildings at Kanpur, an agreement was accepted at Lucknow. When the dispute arose between the parties regarding the payment of compensation, refund of excess recovery, payment for work done, etc., including payment of final bill for contract performed at Kanpur, it was held that the Delhi High Court can have no jurisdiction, notwithstanding the fact that the Arbitrator was appointed at Delhi and the award was made at Delhi, holding that no part of cause of action arose at Delhi. The Delhi High Court has held as follows: “3. …The questions forming subject matter of the reference to arbitration are the various questions which were raised before the Arbitrator. All such questions and claims before Arbitrator related to compensation, refund of excess recovery, payment for work done, cost of Arbitration proceedings, and amount of final bill, for the contract performed at Kanpur. All these questions thus arose at Kanpur only as the work under the contract was done at Kanpur. The contract in question was accepted at Lucknow and the place of performance of the work was at Kanpur. If the Suit is to be filed on the basis of these questions, it cannot be filed under Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure in the Court at Delhi. The matters, as alleged by the Petitioner, relating to appointment of Arbitrator at New Delhi, making of award by him at New Delhi and the Union of India having its headquarters at New Delhi are not the questions forming the subject matter of reference and therefore, do not confer jurisdiction.” 25. The matters, as alleged by the Petitioner, relating to appointment of Arbitrator at New Delhi, making of award by him at New Delhi and the Union of India having its headquarters at New Delhi are not the questions forming the subject matter of reference and therefore, do not confer jurisdiction.” 25. That was also followed by the Delhi High Court in Gulati Construction Co., Jhansi v. Betwa River Board, AIR 1984 Delhi 299, wherein it was reiterated that as per the Arbitration Act, 1940, merely because the Arbitrator chooses to hold proceedings in a place where no Suit could be instituted and chooses to make award at that place, it would not give the Court of that place territorial jurisdiction. 26. On the facts of the case, it is clear, as it is seen in the Regulations relating to “the National Stock Exchange of India Limited” that the seat of arbitration has been fixed region wise with four arbitration centres in Delhi, Kolkata, Chennai and Mumbai, each consisting of various States, which is as follows: “5.2. Seat of Arbitration (a) The Relevant Authority may provide for different seats of arbitration for different regions of the country either generally or specifically and in such an event the seat of arbitration shall be the place so provided by the Relevant Authority. Save as otherwise specified by the Relevant Authority the seat of arbitration for different regions shall be as follows: Seats of Arbitration-States covered by the RAC Regional Arbitration Centres (RACs) Delhi Delhi, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Uttaranchal, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir, Chandigarh, Rajasthan Kolkata West Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Manipur, Sikkim, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Tripura, Chattisgarh Chennai Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhaman and Nicohar, Lakshadweep, Pondicherry Mumbai Maharashtra, Gujarat, Goa, Daman, Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Madhya Pradesh (b) The premises/location where arbitration shall take place shall be such place as may be identified by the Exchange from time to time and intimated to the Arbitrator and the parties to the dispute accordingly.” 27. A reference made by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner to a judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Paramita Constructions Private Limited v. UE Development India (P) Limited, 2008 (3) Arb. A reference made by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner to a judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Paramita Constructions Private Limited v. UE Development India (P) Limited, 2008 (3) Arb. LR 522 (Andhra Pradesh), to substantiate the contention of the Petitioner about the maintainability of the present Petition before this Court, in my considered view, is not helpful to the Petitioner at all. In that case, the learned Judge has in an unimpeachable manner held that the place of arbitration and the subject of arbitration are not one and the same in the following paragraph: “13. There is no dispute or denial that parties are at liberty to agree on the place of arbitration in the absence of which it is for Arbitral Tribunal to determine the place of arbitration. Is it always necessary for the parties to agree on the place of arbitration by indicating in the agreement or can it be derived from other clauses of agreement? The place of arbitration and subject matter of arbitration are not one and the same.” However, the learned Judge has made an observation about the significance of the parties in choosing the place or seat of arbitration as a vital issue for moving the Chief Justice of the High Court for making appointment of Arbitrators under Section 11 of the Act. It was in that context an observation was made regarding the importance of the parties in choosing the place and seat of arbitration and, in my considered view, the finding has no bearing to the facts of the present case at all. 28. Therefore, on the unassailable facts which are spelt out above, I am of the considered view_that this Court cannot have jurisdiction to entertain the Petition under Section 34 of the Act filed by the Petitioner, who was the Respondent before the Arbitral Tribunal. 29. That apart, even on the merits of the matter, law is well settled that the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 34 of the Act in deciding about the validity or otherwise of the award in order to set aside the same is restricted only under the circumstances contemplated under Section 34(2) of the Act, which are as follows: 34. Application for setting aside Arbitral Award.- (1)….. Application for setting aside Arbitral Award.- (1)….. (2) An Arbitral Award may be set aside by the Court only if – (a) the party making the Application furnishes proof that- (i) a party was under some incapacity, or (ii) the Arbitration Agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or (iii) the party making the Application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an Arbitrator or of the rbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or (iv) the Arbitral Award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not tailing within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matter beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration: Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the Arbitral Award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or (v) the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal or the Arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Part from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Part; or (b) the Court finds that- (i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or (ii) the Arbitral Award is in conflict with the public policy of India. Explanation.-Without prejudice to the generality of sub-clause (ii) of clause (b), it is hereby declared, for the avoidance of any doubt, that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India if the making of the award was induced ofraffected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of Section 75 or Section 81.” A reading of the said Section would show that it is not the correctness of the decision which can be analyzed by this Court under Section 34 of the Act by sitting on Appeal over the decision of the Arbitrator, but the jurisdiction of this Court is to decide the manner in which the award has been passed, like cases where there is a violation of Principles of Natural Justice; absence of proper notice to the parties; inability of the parties to be present during the time of arbitration enquiry; consideration by the Arbitrator of an issue which was never contemplated by the parties and not falling within the terms of reference of dispute; the composition of the Tribunal is not in accordance with the Arbitration Agreement; or the matters which are opposed to public policy. That apart, there is no jurisdiction for this Court to analyse the correctness of the decision arrived at by the Arbitrator. 30. In any event, on a reference to the award passed by the Arbitrator in the present case, it is clear that the Arbitrator, to arrive at conclusion, has given a proper and cogent reasoning, which, in my considered opinion, can never be assailed under any one of the grounds under Section 34(2) of the Act, even as a misconduct merely because an observation has been made by the Arbitrator that the employees of the Petitioner, which is no doubt a reputed Stock Broking Company, have lured the constituents so as to make them as parties to the transactions by depositing the amount. That observation has been made in the context of the facts examined by the Arbitrator in detail and cannot be said to be either extraneous or misconduct on the part of the Arbitrator. In such view of the matter, both on the issue of maintainability of the Petition under Section 34 of the Act and even on the merits of the matter, I see no reason to interfere with the award of the Arbitrator. In such view of the matter, both on the issue of maintainability of the Petition under Section 34 of the Act and even on the merits of the matter, I see no reason to interfere with the award of the Arbitrator. Accordingly, Original Petition No.106 of 2008 stands dismissed and Application No.708 of 2010 stands allowed.