O r d e r:- This writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking an order in the nature of writ of certiorari fied mandamus calling for the records relating to the first respondent made in Proceeding, dated 05.05.2005 made in Na.Ka.No.43910/01/E1 confirming the findings and enhancing the punishment awarded by proceedings, dated 24.03.2004 of the second respondent in Na.Ka.No.7341/2001/A5 and to quash the same directing the respondents to reinstate the petitioner as Village Administrative Officer with effect from 05.05.2005. 2. The petitioner herein had joined service as Village Administrative Officer (herein after referred to as V.A.O) in Vadamalaipalayam, Tirupur Taluk. While he was working as V.A.O, a memorandum of charges was issued against the petitioner by the second respondent herein by proceedings, dated 24.03.2004, alleging that he had not submitted the daily notes once in 15 days through the Deputy Tahsildar to the Tahsildar, Palladam, while he was working as V.A.O, Samalapuram, as per G.O.Ms.No.212, Revenue Department and not issued receipt for a sum of Rs.500/- received from one Ramasamy, violating the Government Rules and thereby caused loss to the Government. With the above charges, the petitioner had been called upon to show-cause why action should not be taken against him for the same. 3. According to the petitioner, he submitted his explanations that one Ramasamy had arrears of tax and after heavy pressure, he paid Rs.500/- towards the tax and he told that he would come and collect the receipt in the evening on the same day, however, in the evening on the same day, as another person had given a false complaint, as if I had demanded bribe for issuing legal heir certificate, the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Officer came to the village and seized the money from the petitioner, as he had not issued receipt for the said amount Rs.500/-, which was collected towards tax. According to the petitioner, he is an innocent person and he has not committed any offence, as alleged by the respondents. However, the second respondent having not satisfied with the explanation submitted by the petitioner, appointed an enquiry officer. 4. Even without furnishing copies of the documents relied on by the respondents, it was held by the Enquiry Officer that the petitioner was guilty of the charges framed against him. However, the second respondent having not satisfied with the explanation submitted by the petitioner, appointed an enquiry officer. 4. Even without furnishing copies of the documents relied on by the respondents, it was held by the Enquiry Officer that the petitioner was guilty of the charges framed against him. Based on the report of the Enquiry Officer, the second respondent found the petitioner guilty of the charges framed against him and by proceedings, dated 24.03.2004 awarded punishment of stoppage of increment of three years with cumulative effect. Aggrieved by the said order of punishment, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the first respondent herein, who without affording the petitioner any opportunity of hearing and even without issuing notice, unilaterally enhanced the punishment from stoppage of increment to removal of the petitioner from service, by his proceedings dated 05.05.2005. 5. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order passed by the first respondent, enhancing the punishment, without even issuing notice to the petitioner and without affording opportunity is arbitrary and unsustainable in law. 6. Based on the aforesaid grounds, this writ petition has been filed. It is seen that no counter affidavit has been filed by the respondents. 7. Mr.K.Doraisami, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the order passed by the respondents are unsustainable in law, since there was no reasonable opportunity provided to the petitioner. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the order passed by the second respondent is against the principles of natural justice, as all the copies of the documents relied on by the respondents were not furnished and no opportunity was given to the petitioner for submitting his defence. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that though the appeal was preferred only by the petitioner herein, against the order passed by the second respondent, imposing punishment of stoppage of increment for three years with cumulative effect, strangely, the first respondent instead of allowing the appeal had simply enhanced the punishment, which is against law. 8. Mrs.C.K.Vishnu Priya, learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the respondents submitted that the first respondent, District Revenue Officer, being the appellate authority is empowered to enhance the punishment, if the same is warranted. 9. 8. Mrs.C.K.Vishnu Priya, learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the respondents submitted that the first respondent, District Revenue Officer, being the appellate authority is empowered to enhance the punishment, if the same is warranted. 9. It cannot be disputed that the first respondent, appellate authority has power to enhance the punishment, in case of necessity, which warrants enhancement of punishment, however, it is mandatory on the part of the appellate authority to follow the mandatory procedures known to law and also principles of natural justice, while enhancing the punishment. Merely because the first respondent is the appellate authority, he cannot simply enhance the punishment imposed on the petitioner, when there is no appeal preferred by the original authority, who initiated action against the petitioner herein and without providing reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to establish his defence, the impugned order has been passed by the first respondent. 10. In support of his contention, learned Senior Counsel relied on the following decisions : 1. Harbanslal Sahnia vs. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., AIR 2003 SC 2120 2. Sanjana M.Wig vs. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd., 2005 (8) SCC 242 3. Satwati Deswal vs. State of Haryana, 2009 (8) MLJ 988 (SC) 4. Parvathy Antherjanam vs. L.I.C of India, AIR 1982 Kerala 366 5. Ramachandra Rexins Private Ltd., vs. Sustoms, 2009 (4) MLJ 417 6. Unreported Judgment rendered by this Court in W.P.No.11308 of 2006, dated 02.01.2008. 11. Learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the respondents relied on the following decisions : 1. Union of India vs. S.J.Thanawalla, 1996 (8) SCC 469 2. K.S.Rashid and son vs. Income-tax Investigation Commission and others, AIR 1954 SC 207 3. BMRDA vs. Gokak Patel Volkart, 1995 (1) SCC 642 4. Jai Singh vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1977 SC 898 12. Learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the respondents further contended that the writ petition is not legally sustainable, in view of alternative remedy available to the petitioner. According to the learned Additional Government Pleader, if any alternative remedy is available, the petitioner cannot directly file this writ petition, without availing the alternative remedy. 13. In BMRDA vs. Gokak Patel Volkart, reported in 1995 (1) SCC 642 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that writ petition filed during pendency of the petitioners appeal before statutory authority is not maintainable. 14. 13. In BMRDA vs. Gokak Patel Volkart, reported in 1995 (1) SCC 642 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that writ petition filed during pendency of the petitioners appeal before statutory authority is not maintainable. 14. In Jai Singh vs. Union of India and others, reported in AIR 1977 SC 898 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows : "4...It has also been brought to our notice that after the dismissal of the writ petition by the High Court, the appellant has failed a suit, in which he has agitated the same question which is the subject-matter of the writ petition. In our opinion, the appellant cannot pursue two parallel remedies in respect of the same matter at the same time." 15. In Harbanslal Sahnia vs. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., reported in AIR 2003 SC 2120 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows : "In an appropriate case, in spite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three contingencies : (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act and is challenged." It has been further held as follows : "Moreover, as noted, the petitioners' dealership, which is their bread and butter came to be terminated for an irrelevant and non-existent cause. In such circumstances, we feel that the appellants should have been allowed relief by the High Court itself instead of driving them to the need of initiating arbitration proceedings." 16. In Sanjana M.Wig vs. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. In such circumstances, we feel that the appellants should have been allowed relief by the High Court itself instead of driving them to the need of initiating arbitration proceedings." 16. In Sanjana M.Wig vs. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd., reported in 2005 (8) SCC 242 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as follows : "15.In Harbanslal Sahnia, Lahoti, J. (as His Lordship then was), relied upon Whirlpool Corpn vs. Registrar of Trade Marks observing that in an appropriate case, in spite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three contingencies; (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged." It has been further held in the said Judgment as follows : "17. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Gujarat Ambjua Cements Ltd., referring to Harbanslal Sahnia held : (SCC pp.517-18, paras 22-23) "22.[24]...There are two well-recognised exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of statutory remedies. First is when the proceedings are taken before the forum under a provision of law which is ultra vires, it is open to a party aggrieved thereby to move the High Court for quashing the proceedings on the ground that they are incompetent without a party being obliged to wait until those proceedings run their full course. Secondly, the doctrine has no application when the impugned order has been made in violation of principles of natural justice..." 17. It has been ruled by the Hon'ble Apex Court that when the proceeding initiated by the authority itself is an abuse of process of law, High Court in appropriate cases can entertain writ petition. According to the learned Senior Counsel, though the appeal was preferred by the petitioner herein, the first respondent, the appellate authority, without considering the same on merits, has simply enhanced the punishment, terminating the petitioner from service without any basis and therefore, the aforesaid decision is squarely applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case and accordingly, the writ petition is maintainable. 18. In Satwati Deswal vs. State of Haryana, reported in 2009 (8) MLJ 988 (SC), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as follows : "5. 18. In Satwati Deswal vs. State of Haryana, reported in 2009 (8) MLJ 988 (SC), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as follows : "5. In our view, the High Court had fallen in grave error in rejecting the writ petition on the aforesaid ground. First, such an order of termination was passed without issuing any show cause notice to the appellant and without initiating any disciplinary proceedings by the authorities and without affording any opportunity of hearing. It is well settled that a writ petition can be held to be maintainable even if an alternative remedy is available to an aggrieved party where the Court or the Tribunal lacks inherent jurisdiction or for enforcement of a fundamental right; or if there had been a violation of a principle of natural justice; or where vires of the act were in question." 19. In A.V.Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay vs. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani and Another, reported in AIR 1961 SC 1506 , a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court laid down the principles of the above exceptions as to when writ petition could be entertained even if an alternative remedy is available to an aggrieved party. 20. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramachandra Rexins Private Ltd., vs Customs reported in 2009 (4) MLJ 417 , following various decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the question of alternative remedy cannot be raised at the time of final hearing of the case, that too after a period of ten years. It is well settled principle of law that the question of alternative remedy cannot be raised at the time of final hearing, when the parties have spent considerable amount of time and when the issue raised being a question of law regarding the alleged violation of principles of natural justice, accordingly, the Division Bench of this Court held that the writ petition was maintainable. 21. A similar view was taken by the learned single Judge in an unreported Judgment made in W.P.No.11308 of 2005 dated 02.01.2008 referred to by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner. 22. In the instant case, admittedly, the respondents has raised a plea that there is alternative remedy available to the petitioner, even without filing counter affidavit, though the writ petition was filed in the year 2005 and the alleged occurrence had taken place in the year 2003. 23. 22. In the instant case, admittedly, the respondents has raised a plea that there is alternative remedy available to the petitioner, even without filing counter affidavit, though the writ petition was filed in the year 2005 and the alleged occurrence had taken place in the year 2003. 23. The decision referred to by the learned Additional Government Pleader are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision reported in AIR 1961 SC 1506 (cited supra), this writ petition is legally sustainable, though there is alternative remedy available. 24. In the light of the various decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court and this Court, since the grounds raised by the learned Senior Counsel is mainly on the question of law and the justification raised by the respondents is only on the ground of alternative remedy, after a period of 7 years, only at the stage of final hearing of the writ petition, I am of the view that the writ petition is legally sustainable. 25. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner was V.A.O on the date of issuance of memorandum of charges, dated 21.09.2003. The charge is that the petitioner had not submitted his daily notes, once in 15 days through Deputy Tahsildar to the Tahsildar and on the date of surprise inspection, an excess amount of Rs.500/- was found with the petitioner. His reply was only the said Ramasamy paid the amount towards tax, who had informed him that he would receive the receipt in the evening of the day and that there was no error committed by him. However, the second respondent passed an order, based on the enquiry report and awarded punishment of stoppage of increment for three years with cumulative effect. It is an admitted fact that no complaint was given by the said Ramasamy against the petitioner. 26. According to the learned Senior Counsel, as it was only an appeal preferred by the petitioner herein, the first respondent, appellate authority, without issuing notice and calling for explanation and providing reasonable opportunity, has enhanced the punishment, whereby terminated the petitioner from service, though the second respondent had imposed punishment of stoppage of increment for three years with cumulative effect. It is not in dispute that the criminal case filed against the petitioner ended in acquittal and reached finality. It is not in dispute that the criminal case filed against the petitioner ended in acquittal and reached finality. Merely because the criminal case ended in acquittal, the departmental proceedings already initiated need not be dropped, as it is a settled proposition of law that a departmental proceeding is different from the criminal case. However for enhancing the punishment imposed on the petitioner, the first respondent could have followed the principles of natural justice by issuing notice and calling for further explanation for awarding the major punishment of terminating the petitioner from service. 27. It is not in dispute that the first respondent herein, without issuing any fresh notice to the petitioner and without passing a speaking order as to how the enhancement of punishment to terminate the petitioner was warranted, simply ordered termination of the petitioner from service, as contended by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, without following principles of natural justice. It is crystal clear that the first respondent has not followed the principles of natural justice by providing reasonable opportunity to the petitioner, while enhancing the punishment by awarding termination of service of the petitioner and therefore, the order passed by the first respondent is not legally sustainable and the same is liable to be set aside, accordingly, the impugned order passed by the first respondent, so far as it relates to the enhancement of punishment is concerned is set aside. 28. The order passed by the first respondent is enhancing the punishment imposed by the second respondent. The second respondent, by his order, dated 24.03.2004, had imposed only stoppage of increment for three years with cumulative effect, however, the first respondent has passed the order, as appellate authority, violating the mandatory procedure of giving reasonable opportunity to the petitioner, delinquent official, though he had enhanced the punishment, without following principles of natural justice. Therefore, the order passed by the first respondent is against law and not sustainable and accordingly, liable to be quashed. Hence, this writ petition is allowed and the order, dated 05.05.2005 by the first respondent is set aside. Therefore, the order passed by the first respondent is against law and not sustainable and accordingly, liable to be quashed. Hence, this writ petition is allowed and the order, dated 05.05.2005 by the first respondent is set aside. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner within eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and on the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I find it just and reasonable to direct the respondents to pay 50% of the backwages, since the termination of service of the petitioner is against law. The petitioner is also entitled to continuity of service and other benefits, except, stoppage of increments for three years with cumulative effect imposed by the second respondent. 29. This writ petition is disposed of with the above directions. However, there is no order as to costs.