JUDGMENT A.C. Upadhyay, J. 1. This appeal filed by the Defendants/Appellants (hereinafter referred to as 'Defendants'), under Sub-section 2 of Section 17 of the Mizoram Civil Court Act, 2005, read with Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is directed against the judgment and order dated 17.12.2008 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Aizawl, in C.S. No. 05 of 2003, whereby the suit for declaration of ownership over the suit land and for cancellation of allotment to the Defendant No. 8 and eviction there from and also for payment of rental charges/compensation, filed by the Plaintiffs, was decreed. 2. The facts, leading to the filing of this appeal, may be summarized, in brief, as follows: The Plaintiffs/Respondents' (hereinafter referred to as 'Plaintiffs') claim over the suit land occupied by the Assam Rifles at Serchhip, is on the basis of allotment of house site passes/land passes', by the Village Council of Serchhip, sometime in the year 1963 to 1966. The Plaintiffs stated that after having been allotted the 'house site passes/land passes, they had constructed their houses thereon and came to occupy the same. However, in the year 1966, when insurgency broke out in the State of Mizoram, the Plaintiffs with other allottees, were directed by the Assistant Commissioner, Serchhip to vacate their respective house site/land passes' (in short, here in after 'land passes'), in order to accommodate the personnel of the 19th Assam Rifles. The Plaintiffs further stated that since they were forcefully deprived of the enjoyment of their landed properties, the Government of Mizoram initiated a process for payment of rental charges to them and accordingly, after spot verification and after having been satisfied with the fact of their possession of the land, the Plaintiff Nos. 1 to 25 were given rental compensation/charge, for the period between August, 1996 to August, 1986, as per the assessment made by the District Collector-in-charge Revenue, Aizawl. It is, however, stated by the Plaintiffs that at the time of said payment of rental charges, the Plaintiffs Nos. 26 to 32 were illegally excluded and accordingly, they were not paid such charges, for the said lands till date. It is alleged by the Plaintiffs that the Defendant-Assam Rifles forcefully occupied the landed property of the Plaintiffs with effect from 1966. It is also stated that the Secretary (Revenue), Govt. 26 to 32 were illegally excluded and accordingly, they were not paid such charges, for the said lands till date. It is alleged by the Plaintiffs that the Defendant-Assam Rifles forcefully occupied the landed property of the Plaintiffs with effect from 1966. It is also stated that the Secretary (Revenue), Govt. of Mizoram, vide its Memo No. LRR15/73/8 dated 15.10.1993, under Pass No. DPL No. 5/74, had allotted the suit land belonging to the Plaintiffs, without their knowledge and consent, to the 19th Assam Rifles, for establishing their Battalion Headquarters. The Plaintiffs further stated that they came to know from the correspondence between the Director, Land Revenue and Settlement Department, Mizoram and the BDO Serchhip, RD Block that their landed properties were allotted by the State Government to the Defendant Assam Rifles. 3. The Defendants-State Government and the Assam Rifles contested the suit by submitting written statement by stating therein, inter alia, that the suit was barred by limitation as it was filed after more than 37 years from the date of alleged cause of action; that no person made any claim in respect of the Assam Rifles land at Serchhip until the legal notice under Section 80 Code of Civil Procedure was served upon the Union of India in 2002; that the Plaintiffs had no documents to show that they were the owners of the land in question either on allotment by the Government or by way of possession; that by issuing letter Memo No. 9/AC/3/15 dated 12.07.1966, the Assistant Commissioner, Serchhip made it abundantly clear that the 19th Assam Rifles was allotted the land on the ground of security; and at that time only one resident in the said land was residing, he was Sri Lalrinliana, who is Plaintiff No. 3. 4. In fact, by issuing notice Exbt. 2 dated 12.07.66 Plaintiff No. 3 was also directed by the Defendant-State Government to vacate his possession in the area by dismantling any such construction that was available. The Defendant No. 8 further clarified in the written statement that in the year 1973, the Revenue Department, Govt. of Mizoram vide Order No. 15/73/8 dated 15.10.1973, re-allotted the suit land to the answering Respondents. A copy of which was also issued to the President of Village Council, Serchhip village. The Defendant No. 8 further clarified in the written statement that in the year 1973, the Revenue Department, Govt. of Mizoram vide Order No. 15/73/8 dated 15.10.1973, re-allotted the suit land to the answering Respondents. A copy of which was also issued to the President of Village Council, Serchhip village. The Defendants had taken the stand in their written statement that they are in continuous legal occupation of the suit land within the knowledge of the Plaintiffs, for more than 37 years, which in fact, legally disentitled the Plaintiffs from raising an issue of dispossession in view of the bar created by the Limitation Act, 1963. The Defendants further stated that the Plaintiffs could not submit a single piece of document to show that they are the owners of the land as per the land Laws of Mizoram. The State of Mizoram, in their written statement denied the assertion of the Plaintiffs that the suit land was ever allotted to the Plaintiffs or any rental charges were ever paid to them, except payment of Rambuai compensation. 5. The learned Court below, on perusal of the pleadings of the parties, framed the following issues for just decision of the suit: (i) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form and style? (ii) Whether the suit is hit/barred by limitation? (iii) Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to the reliefs claimed? If so, to what extent? (iv) Whether the lands belonging to the Plaintiffs were forcibly occupied by the Defendants No. 6 and 7 from 1966 till date? 6. The Plaintiffs examined in all two witnesses and also exhibited a few documents to prove the facts stated in the plaint. The witnesses adduced by the Plaintiffs were duly cross-examined by the Defendants' counsel. However, the Defendants examined Maj. N. Sailo as the sole witness to support the defence stand. Learned Court below on conclusion of hearing, decreed the suit of the Plaintiffs, as prayed for, giving rise to this appeal. 7. I have heard Mr. M. Zothankhuma, learned Counsel for the Defendants/Assam Rifles-Appellants herein. Also heard Mr. C. Lalramzauva, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent Nos. 1 to 32 and Mrs. Dinari T. Azyu, learned Government Advocate appearing for the State-Respondent Nos. 33 to 37. 8. 7. I have heard Mr. M. Zothankhuma, learned Counsel for the Defendants/Assam Rifles-Appellants herein. Also heard Mr. C. Lalramzauva, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent Nos. 1 to 32 and Mrs. Dinari T. Azyu, learned Government Advocate appearing for the State-Respondent Nos. 33 to 37. 8. The questions of law as well as facts which have arisen in this appeal for discussion and decision are whether the suit is barred by limitation and whether the suit land in question was forcibly occupied by the Defendants. Before proceeding to discuss other issues raised in this appeal, it would be more appropriate to discuss as to whether the suit filed by the Plaintiffs is barred by limitation? 9. In deciding an issue relating to the period of limitation in a suit for recovery of possession in respect of immovable property in question, on the basis of previous possession, the date of dispossession of the property in question is an important factor to be taken into consideration. The Plaintiff-witness Shri Dengsailova, P.W. 1, in order to establish rights and previous possession of the suit land in question, in his examination in chief stated that documents Exbt. P-11 to P-42, which are the certified copies of 'land passes' dating back to 1966, were issued in favour of the Plaintiffs in respect of their land. However, in his cross-examination, this witness stated that documents Exbt. P-11 to P-42 were issued on 17.10.2002, P.W. 1 further admitted in his cross-examination that the Village Council issued no passes in the name of the Plaintiffs in the year 1963, 1964, 1965 and 1966. He further stated in his cross-examination that the land allotment was made and possession was handed over to the Plaintiffs by the Village Council by pointing out the land by hand and land passes aforesaid were not issued by the Village Council at the relevant point of time. The Plaintiffs could not produce the original copies of the land allotment certificate issued by the Village Council, neither they could ascertain the boundary description of the lands, which were allotted to them. The documents Exbt. P-11 to P-42, were stated to be issued on the basis of Village Council Minute Book (Register) by P.W. 2; however, Village Council Minute Book (Register) was not produced before the Court for perusal and authentication. 10. The documents Exbt. P-11 to P-42, were stated to be issued on the basis of Village Council Minute Book (Register) by P.W. 2; however, Village Council Minute Book (Register) was not produced before the Court for perusal and authentication. 10. The witness Shri Lianbuanga Sailo, P.W. 2, who is a cultivator by occupation, was an elected member of the Serchhip Village Council in the year 2002. In his deposition P.W. 2 stated that though he issued the land allotment certificates, documents Exbt. P-11 to P-42, in fact, he did not know as to who allotted the land in occupation of the Assam Rifles to the Plaintiffs. He further stated in his deposition that when the Plaintiffs came to him they told him that the 19th Assam Rifles occupied their lands and accordingly they requested him to sign documents Exbt. P-11 to P-42, so as to enable them to prove their land has been occupied by the 19th Assam Rifles. P.W. 2 further clarified that each of the Plaintiffs brought one copy of the documents from Exbt. P-11 to P-42, for obtaining his signatures. These documents, i.e., Exbt. P-11 to P-42, admittedly were obtained in the year 2002. Apparently, the 'land passes' aforesaid were issued to the Plaintiffs, without valid supporting documents in proof of allotment of land. Virtually as it appears from the evidence of P.W. 2 is that the documents P-11 to P-42 were signed by P.W. 2 on request and not on the basis of any record of rights maintained in the office. P.W. 2 further clarified in his cross-examination that the documents Exbt. P-11 to P-42 were neither prepared by him nor did he know who prepared the contents of the said documents. On the face of the contradictory and uninspiring evidence of P.W. 2, it would not be prudent on the part of the Court to rely on the authenticity of the documents Exbt. P-11 to P-42, which were prepared on the request of the Plaintiffs. It would be pertinent to reproduce the relevant extract of the cross-examinations of P.W. 2, which read as follows: I was born on 1.6.55. I passed my class-VIII examination in the year 1971. I studied in Chhuahuang H/S. I used to stay in my relative's house in Chhiahtlang during the school session. I became the VCP of Serchhip in the year 2002. I passed my class-VIII examination in the year 1971. I studied in Chhuahuang H/S. I used to stay in my relative's house in Chhiahtlang during the school session. I became the VCP of Serchhip in the year 2002. The Plaintiffs met me in the year 2002 stating that they wanted documents saying that the land which was occupied by the 19th Assam Rifles was their lands. I just know that the Plaintiffs have their lands occupied by the 19th Assam Rifles. I do not know who is the person who gave lands to the Plaintiffs occupied by the 19th Assam Rifles. It is denied that no person gave any land to the Plaintiffs occupied by the 19th Assam Rifles. In the V/C Records there is mention of giving lands to the Plaintiffs. However, the records are not complete. I am not sure whether all the Plaintiffs name were mentioned in the V/C Records at this stage. I am sure of the names of Sh. Dengsailova, Sh. Lalrinliana, Sh. R. Zangurabeing mentioned in the V/C Records. It is not a fact that the V/C Records do not have any mention of the giving of the lands to the Plaintiffs now occupied by the 19th Assam Rifles. It is a fact that I have not brought the V/C Records. I do not know the whereabout of the V/C Records. Infact when I saw the records, it was in a very deteriorated state. It is not a fact that I have not seen the V/C Record. I have seen Sh. Thangohuanga's signature. However, I do not know if the originals of Exts. P-11-P-42 carried the signature of Sh. Thangchaunga. When the Plaintiffs came to me, they told me that their lands have been occupied by the 19th Assam Rifles. They asked me to sign the documents, i.e. Exts. P-11-P-42 so as to prove that their lands have been occupied by the 19th Assam Rifles. They each brought one copy of the documents Exts. P-11-P-42 which I signed. They did not bring any other copy of Exts. P-11-P-42. They did not bring any document bearing Sh. Thangchuana's signature pertaining to Exts. P-11-P-42. It is not a fact that I have conspired with the Plaintiffs for fabricating a case for illegal gain. It is a fact that there is no boundary description in Exts. P-11-P-42. P-11-P-42 which I signed. They did not bring any other copy of Exts. P-11-P-42. They did not bring any document bearing Sh. Thangchuana's signature pertaining to Exts. P-11-P-42. It is not a fact that I have conspired with the Plaintiffs for fabricating a case for illegal gain. It is a fact that there is no boundary description in Exts. P-11-P-42. It is not a fact that this case is a made up case. It is a fact that I did not make or write the contents of Ext P-11-P-42. I do not know who made or wrote the contents of Exts. P-11-P-42. I do not know if there is overlapping of land of the Plaintiffs. I do not know who evicted the Plaintiffs from their lands. Sh. Dengsailova and Sh. R. Zangura had constructed houses on their land which I saw. The Assam Rifles entered the said land sometime in the year 1966. I do not know if Pu Dengsailova and Pu. R. Zangura's buildings were destroyed at the time of the Assam Rifles entering upon the said land. After the Assam Rifles moved into the land, I did not see Pu Dengsailova's and Pu. Zangura's building. It is not a fact that I am deposing falsely before the Court today. 11. The sole witness of the Defendants, Maj. N. Sailo deposed that the suit land was allotted to 19th Assam Rifles on 12.07.1966 for the purpose of establishment of the Unit and since then, the 19th Assam Rifles, which is a unit of DGAR (Director General of Assam Rifles), occupied the suit land and established its Battalion Headquarters therein. D.W. 1, Maj. N. Sailo, in his deposition further clarified that the land in question was re-allotted to the Defendant-Assam Rifles in the year 1973. An area of 1695 bigha was allotted at Serchhip to the Defendant-19th Assam Rifles Department in the year 1966, for the purpose of establishment of their Battalion Headquarters. The suit land was re-allotted by the Government in the year 1973. The allotment certificate reads as follows: Government of Mizoram Revenue Department Pass No. DPL 3 of 1974 Dated Aizawl the 15th Oct. 1973 A plot of lands described below is hereby allotted to the 19th Bn. Assam Rifles, Department for the purpose of establishing their BN. The suit land was re-allotted by the Government in the year 1973. The allotment certificate reads as follows: Government of Mizoram Revenue Department Pass No. DPL 3 of 1974 Dated Aizawl the 15th Oct. 1973 A plot of lands described below is hereby allotted to the 19th Bn. Assam Rifles, Department for the purpose of establishing their BN. Head Quarters on the following conditions- Description of Land 1) Location: At Serchhip 2) Area in bigha/1695 (one thousand six hundred ninety five) 3) Description of Boundary: As per attached Annexure. Conditions 1) The land may be utilized for the purpose for which it is allotted and not for other purpose/purposes. 2) The land shall be withdrawn by the allotting authority if the Department fails to utilize for the said purpose within two consecutive financial year. OR When the Department concerned no longer require it. 3) This allotment order does not authorize the Department concerned to dispose of the valuable forest produce within the allotted land. 4) The allotment is also subject to the Rules in forest at present and subsequent amendments thereof from time to time. New Rules that may be framed by the Government. 5) The land thus allotted should not be sub-allotted to any individual person or society etc. Sd/- Lalkhama Secretary (Revenue) 12. The Plaintiffs claimed that the suit land was allotted to them in the year 1963 to 1966 under the powers conferred under Section 3(1) of the Lusai Hills District (House Sites) Act, 1953, but the Plaintiffs could not substantiate the fact of such allotment, by adducing cogent and reliable evidence. The documents Ext. P-11 to P-42 produced by the Plaintiffs are neither reliable nor authentic and such documents, which were prepared by the Plaintiffs themselves and signatures on which were obtained on request, cannot be relied on to decide the issue in question. Though the Plaintiffs asserted that they were paid rental charges in respect of the lands allotted to them by the Government from 1966-1986, but such facts could not be established or proved by adducing cogent and reliable evidence and/or by producing any supporting documents. Though the Plaintiffs asserted allotment of the suit land to them, but the evidence of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 could not prove the fact of existence of any proprietary title or possessory right over the suit land in question, within the statutory period of 12 years. 13. Though the Plaintiffs asserted allotment of the suit land to them, but the evidence of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 could not prove the fact of existence of any proprietary title or possessory right over the suit land in question, within the statutory period of 12 years. 13. The learned Court below held that the Plaintiffs were not informed of the allotment of lands in favour of the Defendant No. 8, until it was highlighted by the BDO (Block Development Officer), Serchhip vide letter dated 11.02.1998, issued by the Deputy Director of Survey. The Ext. P-6 reveals that the Deputy Director of Survey Land Revenue and Settlement, Mizoram, forwarded a duplicate copy of the DPL No. 3 of 1974 to the BDO (Block Development Officer), Serchhip, with reference to his letter No. R11011/1/97-BDO, dated 28.11.97. Apparently, it appears that the copy of the said document was requested to be sent by the BDO, Serchhip and accordingly, such a copy of DPL No. 3 of 1974 relating to allotment of the suit land to 19th Assam Rifles was forwarded. It has been reflected in the impugned judgment by the learned Court below that the Plaintiffs took necessary steps to submit their representation on 14.10.1999 after having come to know that the suit land in question was allotted to the Defendant Assam Rifles. 14. In the above context, in the facts and circumstances discussed above, it would be pertinent to examine documents Exbt. P-2 and Exbt. P-3 and other materials on record to verify whether in truth the Plaintiffs had no knowledge regarding allotment of suit land to the Defendant-Assam Rifles prior to the year 1999. Ext. P-2 is an order issued by the Assistant Commissioner, Serchhip, Mizo District on 12.07.1966, in the capacity of the Administrator of the Districts, which may be reproduced here in below: Office of the Assistant Commissioner, Serchhip Mizo District Order Whereas I am satisfied that on grounds of security, it is necessary for the 19th Assam Rifles to occupy the hill-feature opposite the Serchhip Block Development Office, I, Shri N. Mukherjee, Assistant Commissioner, and Magistrate, Serchhip do hereby order Shri Lalrinliana, Senior Gram Sevak to dismantle structure which has been used on his dwelling house which is situated on the above mentioned feature and to set up at any suitable location in Serchhip Village. 12.7.66 Sd/- N. Mukherjee Assistant Commissioner Serchhip Mizo District. 12.7.66 Sd/- N. Mukherjee Assistant Commissioner Serchhip Mizo District. Memo No. S/AC/3/15 Dated, Serchhip, the 12th July, 1966 Copy to: 1) The Commandant, 19 Assam Rifles, C/O 99 APO. 2) Shri Lalrinliana, Senior Gram Sevak, Serchhip. Sd/- N. Mukherjee Assistant Commissioner Serchhip Mizo District. 15. The above order obviously directs one of the Plaintiffs, namely, Mr. Lalrinliana to remove structures of his house situated in the area in question. The order aforesaid at Exbt. P-2 did not indicate that Plaintiff, Mr. Lalrinliana, had any other status other than that of a trespasser in the Government land, i.e. suit land. On the other hand, perusal of the document Ext. P-3, i.e., the representation filed by the Plaintiffs for compensation, revealed that the Plaintiffs' alleged dispossession of their land for establishment of military personnel in 1966 and prayer to the Deputy Commissioner, Aizawl District, Aizawl, for awarding adequate compensation. It would be pertinent to extract the letter Ext. P-3 dated 15.10.1987 written by the Plaintiffs to the Deputy Commissioner, Aizawl, which reads as follows: To The Deputy Commissioner Aizawl District, Aizawl, Through The Block Development Officer, Serchhip CD Block, Serchhip, Subject: Compensation - Claim of. Sir, With due respect and humble submission, we, the undersigned, on behalf of personnel of Serchhip, list attached herewith, have the honour to apply to you for grant of compensation for the following reasons: That (a) our house site areas at Serchhip was vacated for establishment of Military personnel in 1966 by order of military authority. (b) Out buildings were dismantled and the materials were disposed of by the military personnel. (c) The sites including compounds and kitchen gardens were occupied by those permanently and that the owners concerned have to accommodate themselves in any other possible means. (d) Commercial fruit plants, some were bearing fruits, were destroyed and that the areas were occupied for settlement by military personnel. It may further be mentioned that despite of repeated requests for compensation of the same, no action appears to have been taken on the matter by the authority upon this date. In the circumstances mentioned above, we earnestly request you kindly to look into the matter personally and arrange early settlement of the long outstanding case. For which act of kindness we shall remain ever grateful to you. Yours faithfully, Dated, Serchhip Sd/- 15/10 The 15.10.87 1. (Lalrinliana) Sd/- 15/10 2. (Dengsailova) Sd/- 15/10 3. (Lalhmingliana Chawangthu) 16. In the circumstances mentioned above, we earnestly request you kindly to look into the matter personally and arrange early settlement of the long outstanding case. For which act of kindness we shall remain ever grateful to you. Yours faithfully, Dated, Serchhip Sd/- 15/10 The 15.10.87 1. (Lalrinliana) Sd/- 15/10 2. (Dengsailova) Sd/- 15/10 3. (Lalhmingliana Chawangthu) 16. It is apparent from the evidence on record as reflected above that Plaintiffs had knowledge of allotment and occupation of the suit land by the Defendant-Assam Rifles since 1966. Apparently, the Plaintiffs were dispossessed from their land by the Defendants in the year 1966, when the suit land in question, a huge plot of land measuring 1695 bighas, was allotted to the Defendants-Assam Rifles. After having been disturbed and dispossessed from their hearth and home, the Plaintiffs maintained deep slumber till 1987, i.e., for almost 21 years. The above documents Ext. P-2 and P-3 clearly divulged that Plaintiffs were admittedly dispossessed by the Defendant-Assam Rifles from the possession over the land in question by dismantling the dwelling houses situated thereon. 17. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs strenuously contended that the law of limitation is not strictly applicable within the State of Mizoram in view of the Notification dated 14.03.1966, by which the Governor of Assam was pleased to direct that the Limitation Act, 1963, shall not apply to the tribal areas of the erstwhile Assam specified in Part-A of the table, appended to paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India w.e.f. 01.01.1964. Learned Counsel further submitted that the applicability or otherwise of the said Limitation Act, 1963 is still before the Apex Court in connection with the SLP (Civil) No. 3325 of 2006: Sh. J. Thansiama v. State of Mizoram and Ors. 18. Per contra, Mr. Zothankhuma, learned Counsel for the Defendants submitted that the question of applicability of Limitation Act, 1963 has already been decided by a Single Bench of this Court, which is binding until the said decision of the co-ordinate Bench is either reserved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court or by any larger Bench of this High Court. Referring to the said decision of this Court in RFA No. 02 of 2003: State of Mizoram v. Sh. J. Thansiama and Ors., learned Counsel submitted that the Limitation Act, 1963 is very much applicable in the State of Mizoram. Referring to the said decision of this Court in RFA No. 02 of 2003: State of Mizoram v. Sh. J. Thansiama and Ors., learned Counsel submitted that the Limitation Act, 1963 is very much applicable in the State of Mizoram. The relevant observations made by the learned Single Judge in this context read as follows: 37. A word of caution in the above vein was sounded in Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu and Ors. (2001) 7 SCC 71 in the following words: The settled principles of interpretation are that the Court must proceed on the assumption that the legislature did not make a mistake and that it did what it intended to do. The Court must, as far as possible, adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature. Undoubtedly, if there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the Court would not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. The Court could not add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there, especially when the literal regarding produces an intelligible result. The Court cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, or add and mend, and, by construction, make up deficiencies which are there. 38. That when the words of a statute are clear, the Court ought not to take up on itself the role of a law maker was highlighted by the Apex Court in J.P. Ransal v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. (2003) 5 SCC 134 . The relevant excerpts are extracted herein below. It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statute is to gather the mens or sentential legis of the legislature,.... Where, however, the words were clear, there is no obscurity, there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the Court to innovate or take upon itself the task of amending or altering the statutory provisions. In that situation the Judges should not proclaim that they are playing the role of a law-maker merely for an exhibition of judicial valour. They have to remember that there is a line, though thin, which separates adjudication from legislation. That line should not be crossed or erased. 39. In that situation the Judges should not proclaim that they are playing the role of a law-maker merely for an exhibition of judicial valour. They have to remember that there is a line, though thin, which separates adjudication from legislation. That line should not be crossed or erased. 39. Having regard to the determinate unambiguous and unequivocal language employed in the extent clause of the 1963 Act, in my view, there is no scope what so ever to suppose that the interdiction on the applicability thereof occasioned by the 1966 notification was intended to be continued in the territories comprising the Union territory of Mizoram and now the State of Mizoram. In my considered view, therefore, with the elevation of the Mizo District to the Union Territory of Mizoram, the 1966 notification ceased to have any force vis-a-vis the areas comprising the erstwhile Mizo District and the 1963 Act being a Central Legislation in absence of any other impediment as conceived of in the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India or otherwise applied proprio vigore without any reservation to the areas now forming the State of Mizoram. In other words, the 1963 Act thus became enforceable in the territories constituting the erstwhile Mizo District and now the State of Mizoram. The non-inclusion of the 1963 Act in the list of Central Acts applicable to the State of Mizoram and the inclusion thereof in the list of such Acts, applications whereof are barred, being traceable only to the 1966 notification are inconsequential in the face of the constitutional and historical background of the relevant legislations noticed hereinabove. The enactment of the 1963 Act is an exercise of the legislative powers vested in the parliament and having regard to the extent of its application any fetter on its applicability in the State of Mizoram in absence of any restriction as conceived of under the Sixth Schedule or otherwise would amount to unauthorized truncation of such constitutional empowerment. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellant based on the Explanation of "tribal areas" appearing under Section 1(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure is of no consequence as the same is in the context of defining the limits of the applicability of the code and no analogy can be drawn for resolving the issue in hand. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellant based on the Explanation of "tribal areas" appearing under Section 1(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure is of no consequence as the same is in the context of defining the limits of the applicability of the code and no analogy can be drawn for resolving the issue in hand. Similarly reference to Section 10(26)of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is also of no relevance vis-a-vis the question posed. The embargo contained in Article 371G vis-a-vis the State of Mizoram is also not attracted qua the 1963 Act in view of the subject matter of the stature as well as the contextual facts. 40. This Court in State of Meghalaya v. U. William Mynsong (supra), held against the application of the 1963 Act to the tribal areas of the State of Meghalaya accepting the contention based on the 1966 notification. In the fact situation of that case it was held that the notification continued to apply to the State of Meghalaya and by virtue of Sections 77 and 79 of the North-Eastern Areas Reorganization Act, 1971, the notification continued to be in force barring the application of the 1963 Act to the tribal areas of the State of Meghalaya. With utmost respect, I cannot persuade myself with the line of reasoning recorded in the said decision. The 1966 notification in my considered view cannot be construed to be a law in force as visualized by Section 79 of the 1971 Act to be continued as provided thereunder. The 1966 notification, however, did not present itself to be considered by this Court in Temjankaba and Ors. v. Temjanwati and Ors. (1991) 2 GLR 200, where the question of applicability of the 1963 Act to the State of Nagaland fell for consideration. This Court, having regard to the extent clause of the 1963 Act answered it in the affirmative observing that the State of Nagaland being part of India, the Act was enforceable there. This Court in Lalchawimawia and Ors. (supra), had an occasion to dwell on the same topic. Negating the contention against the applicability of the 1963 Act based on the 1966 notification, this Court returned a finding that in absence of a specific notification issued by the Government of Mizoram, the law of limitation was applicable. This Court in Lalchawimawia and Ors. (supra), had an occasion to dwell on the same topic. Negating the contention against the applicability of the 1963 Act based on the 1966 notification, this Court returned a finding that in absence of a specific notification issued by the Government of Mizoram, the law of limitation was applicable. I respectfully concur with the said view however for the reasons enumerated hereinabove in addition. 41. In view of the determination on the question of applicability of the 1963 Act rendering the suit barred by time, I do not consider it necessary to deal with the rival contentions on the merits vis-a-vis the pleadings and evidence on record. In view of the above decision regarding applicability of the limitation Act, 1963 in the State of Mizoram, unless the above decision by the single Bench is reversed or modified in the appeal stated to be pending before the Apex Court, this Court would adopt the view expressed in the judgment of the learned Single Bench in RFA No. 02 of 2003 (supra). 19. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs further submitted that even if the Limitation Act, 1963, is made applicable, since the Plaintiffs having been paid rental charges/compensation by the Defendants for the period from 1966-1986, with the information that rental charges for the subsequent period in respect of their lands were being assessed, there is no question of adverse possession in respect of the suit land. In reply to the above contention, learned Counsel for the State-Defendants submitted that the Plaintiffs were paid Rambuai compensation by the State-Government, to all those occupants, who suffered during the disturbance in Mizoram and no rental charges as claimed were ever paid. The Plaintiffs also could not prima facie prove payment of such rental charges to the Plaintiffs by the Government, for the aforesaid period. 20. In this context written statement submitted on behalf of the Defendant-State Government would be relevant to ascertain the stand of the State Government in this regard. The relevant extract of the written statement of the State is reproduced herein below: 9. That with regards to the contents of para No. 3 of the plaint, the answering Defendant would like to submit that alternative vacant site had already been allotted to them by the Government and all the claimants were granted sufficient compensation known as Rambuai compensation sometimes in the year 1995. 10. That with regards to the contents of para No. 3 of the plaint, the answering Defendant would like to submit that alternative vacant site had already been allotted to them by the Government and all the claimants were granted sufficient compensation known as Rambuai compensation sometimes in the year 1995. 10. That the contents of para No. 4 of the plaint is not admitted. Even though the Plaintiffs had occupied the suit land, they did not hold any valid pass and they do not pay any land revenue. As such, they have no right to claim the land as per Section 4 of the Mizo District (Land and Revenue) Act, 1956 which runs thus, "No person shall acquire by length of possession or otherwise any right over land disposal of, allotted or occupied before the commencement of this Act, unless such land had been recorded and registered either in D.C.'s office or District Council's Office. Further, even after the enforcement of this Act, a Pass-holder shall have no right in the soil beyond a right of user for the period for which it is given, and shall have no right of transfer, or of inheritance beyond the period of the pass or of subletting Vide Section 5 of the Act. As such, the claims of the Plaintiffs are false and without any basis. 11. That with reference to the contents of para No. 5 of the plaint, the answering Defendant would like to reiterate that since the Plaintiffs do not have any legal right over the suit land, they do not have any legal claim on the disputed land. As such, allotment of the land to the Assam Rifles by the State Government is absolutely within the right of the State and it is legally sustainable. Moreover, the Plaintiffs have not made any claims during the pass few decades and the instant suit is hopelessly barred by limitation. 21. Though the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff by drawing the attention of this Court to various documents submitted on behalf of the Plaintiffs, tried to establish that in fact the Plaintiffs were treated as landlords in respect of the suit land by the State Government. However, the documents which pertain to allotment of the suit land in question to the Defendant-19th Assam Rifles, clearly reflects that such was not the intention of the State-Government. The Office Order (Ext. However, the documents which pertain to allotment of the suit land in question to the Defendant-19th Assam Rifles, clearly reflects that such was not the intention of the State-Government. The Office Order (Ext. P-2), issued by the then Assistant Commissioner, Serchhip Mizo District, Mr. N. Mukherjee dated 12.07.1966, clearly reflects that the Plaintiff No. 3 was issued with a copy of the letter aforesaid to remove and dismantle his structure, which was situated within the land allotted to the Defendant-19th Assam Rifles. The Plaintiff No. 3 was further directed to set up any construction at any other suitable location in Serchhip Village. The letter so written clearly reflects that the Plaintiffs were dispossessed from the existing occupation of land in question by the authority of the Government. The question of continuance of possession and payment of rental charges by the State-Government to the Plaintiffs appears to be imaginary situation in the facts and circumstances discussed above. As a matter of fact imaginary possession would not bestow any right upon the Plaintiffs, when dispossession was admittedly effected. This suit for recovery of possession has been filed after 37 years of dispossession from the suit land. 22. Learned Counsel for the Defendants has submitted that total area of land, which has been in occupation of the Defendant-19th Assam Rifles since 1966, is 1650 bighas, in terms of the allotment made by the Government and the documents submitted by the Plaintiffs if taken to be true, the land comprising in the house passes issued to the Plaintiffs, in total measured only 12 bighas, therefore, learned Counsel for the Defendants further contended that the suit being not properly constituted, no relief as prayed for may be awarded. 23. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs strenuously urged that the question of adverse possession in respect of the suit land would not arise in this case since there was no claim for adverse possession by the Defendants. Admittedly, the Plaintiffs were dispossessed from the suit land in the year 1966, for establishment of 19th Assam Rifles Unit in Serchhip Village. In fact, Plaintiffs had no proprietary rights over the suit lands after having been dispossessed by the Defendants from the plot of lands, which the Plaintiffs allegedly possessed on the strength of so called 'land passes' issued by the village council. The Plaintiff also submitted representation before the appropriate authority for adequate compensation for alleged illegal dispossession. In fact, Plaintiffs had no proprietary rights over the suit lands after having been dispossessed by the Defendants from the plot of lands, which the Plaintiffs allegedly possessed on the strength of so called 'land passes' issued by the village council. The Plaintiff also submitted representation before the appropriate authority for adequate compensation for alleged illegal dispossession. 24. When the relief is claimed by the Plaintiff on the strength of proprietary as well as possessory title, the onus is on the Plaintiff to prove such title. When a suit is filed for recovery of possession of immovable property and is based on previous possession, and not on title, Article 64 would apply, and when the suit is for possession of immovable property based on title then Article 65 of the Limitation Act would apply. Article 64 of the Limitation Act, 1963 allows a suit within 12 years from the date of dispossession, for possession of immovable property based on possession and not on title, when the Plaintiff, while in possession of the property, has been dispossessed. Article 65 is for possession of immovable property or any interest thereon based on title, and here also the period of limitation prescribed is 12 years. 25. While differentiating between Article 64, Article 65, Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramaiah v. N. Narayana Reddy AIR 2004 SC 4261 , held that, Article 64 of Limitation Act is restricted to suits for possession or discontinuance of possession. The relevant extract of the decision is reproduced herein below: 9. ...Article 64 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Article 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908) is restricted to suits for possession on dispossession or discontinuance of possession. In order to bring a suit within the purview of that article, it must be shown that the suit is in terms as well as in substance based on the allegation of the Plaintiff having been in possession and having subsequently lost the possession either by dispossession or by discontinuance. Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Article 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908) on the other hand is a residuary article applying to suits for possession not otherwise provided for. Suits based on Plaintiffs title in which there is no allegation of prior possession and subsequent dispossession alone can fall within Article 65. Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Article 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908) on the other hand is a residuary article applying to suits for possession not otherwise provided for. Suits based on Plaintiffs title in which there is no allegation of prior possession and subsequent dispossession alone can fall within Article 65. The question whether the article of limitation applicable to a particular suit is Article 64 or Article 65 has to be decided by reference to pleadings. The Plaintiff cannot invoke Article 65 by suppressing material facts. In the present case, in suit No. 357/60 instituted by N. Narayana Reddy in the Court of Principal Munsiff, Bangalore, evidence of the Appellant herein was recorded. In that suit, as stated above, the Appellant was the Defendant. In his evidence, Appellant had admitted that he was in possession of the suit property up to 1971. This admission of the Appellant in that suit indicates ouster from possession of the Appellant herein. In the present suit instituted by the Appellant, he has glossed over this fact. In the circumstances, both the Courts below were right in coming to the conclusion that the present suit was barred by limitation. The Appellant was ousted in 1971. The Appellant had instituted the present suit only on 8.5.1984. Consequently, the suit has been rightly dismissed by both the Courts be low as barred by limitation. 10. In the case of Ram Surat Singh and Ors. v. Badri Narain Singh reported in AIR 1927 All 799, it has been held that if the suit is for possession by a Plaintiff who says that while he was in possession of the property he was dispossessed, then he must show possession within 12 years under Article 142 (now Article 64) of the Limitation Act. To the same effect is the ratio of the judgment in the case of Mohammad Mahmud v. Muhammad Afaq and Ors. reported in AIR 1934 Oudh 21. In the commentary on the Limitation Act by Sanjiva Row [Ninth Edition-IInd Volume page 549] it has been stated that the question as to which of the two articles would apply to a particular case should be decided by reference to pleadings, though the Plaintiff cannot be allowed by skilful pleadings to avoid the inconvenient article. On facts of the case, we find that the Article 64 is applicable to the present suit. On facts of the case, we find that the Article 64 is applicable to the present suit. Consequently, the suit has been rightly dismissed by both the Courts below. 26. A suit for recovery of possession on the basis of previous possession would fall within the purview of Article 64 of the Limitation Act, when it is shown that the suit is in terms as well as in substance based on the allegation of the Plaintiffs having been in possession and having subsequently lost such possession, either by dispossession or by discontinuance. 27. Apparently, the Plaintiffs have filed the present suit after 37 years from the admitted date of dispossession. Therefore, by operation law of limitation, the suit filed by the Plaintiff is hopelessly barred by limitation. The learned Court below arrived at a conclusion on the issue of limitation that the cause of action survived and the suit cannot be barred by limitation. The reasons for returning such a conclusion as aforesaid, on the point of limitation by the learned Court below is neither backed by sound reasoning nor by any legal principle. If the suit is barred by limitation, no relief whatsoever would be available to the Plaintiff. 28. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs submitted that the Plaintiffs were forcefully dispossessed from the suit lands allotted to them. In such a situation, since there was admittedly forceful dispossession of the Plaintiffs by the Defendants, instead of waiting for 37 years, the Plaintiffs should have approached appropriate forum for suitable relief well within the time limit prescribed by the laws of limitation for securing such relief. However, in a suit for declaration of rights and recovery of possession, the Plaintiffs cannot escape and exclude period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963. 29. The State Government has categorically denied to have issued any 'land passes' to the Plaintiffs in the year 1963-64. The documents Ext. P-11 to Ext. P-42 pertaining to the land passes issued in the name of the Plaintiffs in the year 2002, for the first time, could not be proved to be genuine, authentic and reliable documents. Therefore, the Plaintiffs are not entitled to be given any benefit on the basis of such documents. The documents Ext. P-11 to Ext. P-42 pertaining to the land passes issued in the name of the Plaintiffs in the year 2002, for the first time, could not be proved to be genuine, authentic and reliable documents. Therefore, the Plaintiffs are not entitled to be given any benefit on the basis of such documents. Learned Counsel for the Defendants drawing the attention of this Court to the Lushai Hills District (House sites) Act, 1953, submitted that allotment of plots and eviction there from is carried out in terms of the provisions of the aforesaid Act. The Plaintiffs after having received the notice of eviction with direction to dismantle the structures thereon, did not approach the competent Civil Court of appropriate jurisdiction against such orders since such orders are deemed to be decree passed by a competent Civil Court. The provisions of Section 3 of the Lushai Hills District (House sites) Act, 1953, are reproduced herein below: 3. Allotment of sites: (1) Subject to the provisions of Sub-section (2) of this section, a Village Council shall be competent to allot sites within its jurisdiction for residential and other non-agricultural purposes with the exception of shops and stalls which include hotels and other business houses of the same nature. Notwithstanding anything contained in this act, the Administrator shall have the power to intervene in all cases of disputes over any sites within the village, and the decision of the Administrator shall be final. Provided that the Administrator may, at any time by notification, declare that any village or a particular locality is a protected area where allotment of sites shall be done by Village Council only with the previous approval of the Administrator. (2) The Administrator or any person or body authorized in that behalf by the Administrator shall allot sites for residential and other non-agricultural purposes in Aizawl, Lunglei, Demagiri, Sairang, Kolasib, Champhai and N. Vanlaiphai and also sites for shops and stalls which may include hotels and other business houses of the like nature in places other than the said stations. (2) The Administrator or any person or body authorized in that behalf by the Administrator shall allot sites for residential and other non-agricultural purposes in Aizawl, Lunglei, Demagiri, Sairang, Kolasib, Champhai and N. Vanlaiphai and also sites for shops and stalls which may include hotels and other business houses of the like nature in places other than the said stations. (3) The Village Council, when site is allotted under Sub-section (1) and the Administrator or any other person or body, authorized in that behalf by the Administrator when the site is allotted under Sub-section (2) shall issue a patta and may incorporate therein in writing such conditions as may be reasonable in the interest of general public or a Scheduled Tribe. (4) The authority issuing the patta on being satisfied on proof that any such condition or conditions incorporated in the Patta have been violated may cancel the Patta. Provided that such authority instead of cancelling the Patta may impose a find, when such authority is a Village Council, not exceeding Rs. 50/- and when the authority is the Administrator or any other person or body authorised in that behalf by the Administrator, not exceeding Rs. 100/-. (5) No person shall occupy any site without obtaining a Patta from; competent authority as prescribed in Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) as the case may be. (6) The Village Council when the site is allotted under Sub-section (1) the Administrator or any other person or body authorized in that behalf by the Administrator when it is allotted under Sub-section (2) may evict any person having in occupation of unauthorized site after service on such unauthorized occupant of a notice to vacate the site within a period of not less than 7 days. (7) On failure of such unauthorized occupant to vacate the site within the time fixed in the notice Village Council or Administrator or any other person or body authorized by the Administrator in that behalf, may order for demolition of the building or impose a fine not exceeding Rs. 5/- per day for the unauthorized occupation after the service of the notice. (8) The order of the Administrator of a Village Council as the case may be, passed under Clauses (6) and (7) above shall be deemed to be a decree of a competent Civil Court to which this Act applies. 30. 5/- per day for the unauthorized occupation after the service of the notice. (8) The order of the Administrator of a Village Council as the case may be, passed under Clauses (6) and (7) above shall be deemed to be a decree of a competent Civil Court to which this Act applies. 30. As pointed out by the learned Counsel for the Defendants, I do not propose to decide as to whether Ext. P-2, i.e. an order dated 12.07.1966, passed by the authority concerned (Assistant Commissioner, Serchhip, Mizo District) in this case for eviction of the Plaintiffs, shall be deemed to be a decree of a competent Civil Court or not. Since this issue is not relevant in the present context. However, fact remains, the Plaintiffs did not approach a competent forum of appropriate jurisdiction for relief against the above order, well in time. Apparently, no such steps appear to have been taken by the Plaintiffs for recovery of such possession. 31. The claims of the Plaintiffs of having valid land pass issued by the then Village Council under Section 3(1) of the Lushai Hills District (House Site) Act, 1953 could not be substantiated by adducing admissible and acceptable evidence on record. The State Government in its written statement made it clear that alternative vacant sites had already been allotted to the Plaintiffs by the Government and all the claimants were granted sufficient compensation known as Rambuai compensation. Even though the Plaintiffs had occupied the said land, they did not hold any valid pass and they do not pay land revenue. Apparently, they had no right to claim the land as per Section 4 of the Mizo District (Land and Revenue) Act, 1956 which provides that no person shall acquire by length of possession or otherwise any right over the land disposed of, allotted or occupied before the commencement of this Act, unless such land had been recorded and registered either in D.C.'s Office or District Council's Office. The Plaintiffs had none of them. Further, even after the enforcement of this Act, a Pass-holder shall have no right in the soil beyond a right of user for the period for which it is given, and shall have no right of transfer, or of inheritance beyond the period of the pass or of subletting Vide Section 5 of the Act. As such, the claims of the Plaintiffs are without any basis. As such, the claims of the Plaintiffs are without any basis. 32. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs submitted that the suit land in question was allotted by the State Government to the Defendant-Assam Rifles without any authority of law, therefore, such allotment cannot be treated to be regular allotment to the Defendants. In support of his submission, learned Counsel referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India and Anr. v. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 SCC 398 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court while discussing the power of a particular officer to act as a disciplinary authority and to dispense with the inquiry in terms of service rules, held that there cannot be an exercise of a power by an authority unless such power exists in law. If such power does not exist in law, the purported exercise of it would be an exercise of a non-existent power and would be void. The exercise of a power is, therefore, always referable to the source of such power and must be considered in conjunction with it. 33. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs referred to yet another decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 1995 Supp (3) SCC 249: State of Orissa and Ors. v. Brundaban Sharma and Anr. wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court analyzing the discretionary jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue under Section 38B of the Act Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951, held that the Board of Revenue rightly exercised the jurisdiction, to set aside the order passed without confirmation by the Board of Revenue in violation of the provision of law. In this context Hon'ble Supreme Court held that an order which is non est is a void order and it confers no title and its validity can be questioned or invalidity be set up in any proceeding or at any stage. In any view of the matter, fact remains that the land in question was legally and validly allotted to the Defendants-Assam Rifles by the State Government and accordingly the Defendants continued to occupy the same without any interruption whatsoever and such occupation continued for nearly 37 years i.e. till the date of filing of the suit by the Plaintiffs for recovery of possession etc. 34. 34. The law of limitation provides a time limit for filing a suit for recovery of possession of any immovable property, on the strength of previous possession, and when the Plaintiffs have been admittedly dispossessed from the suit land nearly 37 years age; there is no escape route to avail the time so prescribed by the law of limitation. No doubt, validity of an order, which is non-est in the eye of law, can be questioned at any time in any proceeding as observed by the Apex Court, i.e. in the aforesaid decision, however, the factual matrix leading to the filing of the present suit by the Plaintiffs are not akin to the facts discussed in the above cited decisions reported in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (supra) and Brundaban Sharma (supra). Therefore, the context in which the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was rendered in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (supra) and Brundaban Sharma (supra) are clearly distinguishable and accordingly, in my respectful view, the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions, may not be applicable in this case. 35. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs further contended that the Plaintiffs could not prove certain facts relating to payment of rental charges to the Plaintiffs by adducing cogent and dependable evidence at the trial Court, as such, prayed for remand of the suit to the learned Court below for retrial. In support of his contention, learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2005) 6 SCC 725 : Rani Kusum (Smt.) v. Kanchan Devi (Smt.) and Ors., wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. Procedural prescriptions are the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the administration of justice. 36. On careful scrutiny of the materials on record, I am of the considered view that no useful purpose would be served by remanding the suit for retrial, as because the Plaintiffs could not bring forward and substantiate any good ground to show that they were materially prejudiced, for want of proper trial by reason of any error, omission or irregularity warranting remand of the case for retrial. Upon close scrutiny of the materials on record this Court did not find that the learned Court below omitted to frame any vital issue or there was any aberration in determining any essential question of fact requiring a retrial. In my considered view, remand of the suit for retrial would only revive similar issues for consideration, which have been already considered and decided during trial. Remand without valid reasons would only extend fresh opportunities to the parties to litigate, which is not permissible under the law. 37. The Defendant-Assam Rifles came into possession of the suit land in question on being allotted by the State Government. The State Government which has the authority under the statute to allot the land in question and also to issue such 'land passes' or 'land allotment certificates' to respective owners of the land, categorically stated in its written statement that suit land in question was never ever allotted to the Plaintiffs as claimed. Over and above, the Plaintiffs also failed to substantiate their claim of having 'land passes' or having paid the rental charges as claimed by them, in respect of the suit land, by adducing cogent and reliable evidence. Evidence laid by the star witness of the Plaintiff i.e. P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 failed to inspire confidence. All important documents Exbt. P-11 to P-42, produced by the Plaintiffs in support of their claim of allotment of 'land passes', prima facie, failed to generate and ensure confidence of the Court. The evidence on record also failed to stimulate assurance to the Court that such documents have emanated from a legally valid source worth reposing confidence. Finally, the last remiss in the debacle was the delay of almost four decades in reaching the Courts seeking redressal of their grievances, when such right, if any, had already extinguished. 38. On careful consideration of the entire facts and circumstances and also on consideration of the judgment delivered by the learned Court below, this Court is of the opinion that the judgment and decree passed by the learned Court below warrants interference. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. Consequently, the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Aizawl, in C.S. No. 05 of 2003 is set aside and quashed. Appeal allowed