Order The present petition has been preferred mainly against the order passed by the Regional Director, Jharkhand Agricultural Marketing Board dated 27th July, 2007 (Annexure-B) whereby the delay condonation in preferring the appeal was dismissed and also against the order passed by the Managing Director of the Board dated 12th June, 2008 (communicated on 18th July, 2008) at Annexure-11 to the memo of petition whereby delay in preferring the revision application has also not been condoned. 2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that initially a writ petition bearing W.P.(C) No. 602 of 2005 was preferred by the petitioner before this Court and it has been decided by this Court vide order dated 14th February, 2005 that as the appeal has been provided under the Jharkhand Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act), the petitioner shall prefer an appeal. The relevant part of the said order reads as under:- "Let it be clarified that the dismissal of the writ petition will not in any way prejudice the case of the petitioner, in the event the appeal is filed, the appellate authority shall decide the appeal in its own merit, It is also observed that the respondents shall supply certified copies of all the documents that have been asked for by the petitioner." (Emphasis supplied) Thus, it was directed by this Court that appeal shall be decided on merits Though, delay condonation application was preferred in appeal, the Regional Director, Jharkhand Agricultural Marketing Board, Ranchi has observed in the impugned order dated 27th July, 2007 at Annexure-8 that there are no papers for delay condonation and, hence, the delay’s not condoned and it is vehemently submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that several reasons had been given for condonation of delay. Initially, a writ petition was preferred, thereafter, letters patent appeal was also preferred and some time has been consumed in the High Court• and there was illness of the appellant also, who resides at Jamshedpur. Though, several reasons were given and despite the direction was given to decide the dispute on merits. delay has not been condoned and that too by thoroughly a non-speaking order, the whole appeal has been brushed aside by the concerned respondent authorities. Though, several reasons were given and despite the direction was given to decide the dispute on merits. delay has not been condoned and that too by thoroughly a non-speaking order, the whole appeal has been brushed aside by the concerned respondent authorities. It is also submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the order passed by the Regional Director of the Board dated 27th July, 2007 was never received till 10th September, 2007 and, therefore, revision application was not preferred within time. The revision application was preferred on 5th November, 2007. Thus, it was within 45 days as per Section 27 -C of the Act, 1960. This aspect of the matter is especially rejected in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of the delay condonation application. Revision Application No. 4 of 2007 has also not been appreciated at all by the Managing Director of the Board and he has also dismissed the revision application vide order dated 12th June, 2008, which was communicated on 18th July, 2008 and, therefore, both these orders deserve to be quashed and set aside. Delay in preferring Appeal No. 4 of 2006 may be condoned and respondent authorities may be directed to hear the appeal on merits. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag vs. Katiji reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 . 3. I have heard learned counsel for the respondents, who has submitted that as the petitioner has not submitted any evidence for condonation of delay,' therefore, the delay' has not been condoned in preferring the Appeal No. 4 of 2006. Likewise, no evidence was given for condonation of delay in revision also, therefore, the same has also been dismissed and, therefore, both the impugned orders are true, correct, legal and in consonance with the facts of law and, therefore, the present petition deserves to be dismissed. 4. Likewise, no evidence was given for condonation of delay in revision also, therefore, the same has also been dismissed and, therefore, both the impugned orders are true, correct, legal and in consonance with the facts of law and, therefore, the present petition deserves to be dismissed. 4. Having heard learned counsel for both the sides and looking to the impugned orders dated 27th July, 2007 as well as dated 12th June, 2008 (Annexure-8 as well as Annexure-11), it appears that:- (i) The present petitioner had challenged the action of the respondents initially before this Court by way of a writ petition bearing W.P.(C) No. 602 of 2005, which was disposed of by this Court on 14th February, 2005 and the relevant portion of the said order is quoted hereinabove. Thus, the appeal was directed to decide on merits because there was provision for statutory appeal under Section 27 -B of the Act, 1960. (ii) It appears that, thereafter, Appeal No.4 of 2006 was instituted by the petitioner alongwith delay condonation application. The said delay condonation application is at Annexure-10 to the memo of this petition. Several reasons have been given including the sickness of the present petitioner and filing of the writ petition as well as letters patent appeal and the time consumed therein. None of these aspects have been considered by the Regional Director, Jharkhand Agricultural Marketing Board while passing the impugned order dated 27th July, 2007 (Annexure-8). On the contrary, it has been stated in the impugned order that there are no papers for condonation of delay and, therefore, delay is not condoned. A lengthy application preferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been brushed aside by one sentence only. This is thoroughly a non-application of mind and a non-speaking order has been passed. Looking to the reasons stated in the delay condonation application, delay deserves to be condoned in preferring Appeal No. 4 of 2006. (iii) It also appears that the impugned order at Annexure-8 was communicated on 10th September, 2007 to the petitioner and revision application was preferred on 5th November, 2007. This revision application was preferred on 37th day i.e. within 45 days limitation period and then revision application was also dismissed without giving any reasons on the ground that there is delay and the delay is not condoned. This revision application was preferred on 37th day i.e. within 45 days limitation period and then revision application was also dismissed without giving any reasons on the ground that there is delay and the delay is not condoned. No care has been taken by the Managing Director of the Board to read paragraph 9 of the delay condonation application, preferred in Revision Application No.4 of 2007. It appears that the Managing Director of the Board has also lost sight of the fact that in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11, there are enough averment for condonation of delay in revision application also. Looking to the order at Annexure-11 dated 12th June. 2008, which was also communicated on 18th July. 2008, is a non-speaking order. (iv) It has also been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag vs. Katiji reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 in paragraph 3 as under:- "3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Sec. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters, instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:- (1) Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. (2) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. (3) "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. (3) "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. (4) When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. (5) There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact tie runs a serious risk. (6) It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the 'State', which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an evenhanded manner. There is no warrant for according a step motherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to• be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing on the buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant non grata status. The Courts therefore have to informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do evenhanded justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do evenhanded justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time barred, is therefore, set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides." 5. In view of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncement, I hereby, quash and set aside both the orders at Annexure-8 as well as at Annexure-11 and I hereby, condone the delay in preferring the Appeal No.4 of 2006 by the petitioner and I hereby, direct the Regional Director, Jharkhand Agricultural Marketing Board to hear and decide Appeal No. 4 of 2006 on its own merit and on the basis of the evidences on record and in accordance with law, rules, regulations, policy and Government enforceable orders, as expeditiously as possible and practicable, preferably within a period of sixteen weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the order of this Court. 6. The petition is, hereby, allowed and disposed of, in view of the aforesaid directions.