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2010 DIGILAW 471 (CAL)

Swapan Kumar Chatterjee v. National Jute Manufacturers Corporation Ltd

2010-05-04

JAYANTA KUMAR BISWAS

body2010
JUDGMENT: The Court:- The petitioner in this art 226 petition dated November 14, 2005 is questioning the decision of the Assistant General Manager (P) of National Jute Manufacturers Corporation Ltd. (a Government of India Undertaking) dated June 9, 2005, Annexure P13 at p.55, that he was not entitled to the Code 9 scale of pay introduced in the year 1983. The petitioner joined the corporation in 1980. NJMC Service Rules & Regulations, 1982 were applicable to him. For bringing in uniformity in the pay scales of employees, in 1983 the corporation offered all its supervisory and managerial cadre employees altered terms and conditions of service with option either to remain on the pre-existing scale or to accept the altered pay scale. The petitioner, designated as senior supervisory assistant, accepted the altered terms and conditions on June 16, 1983 without any protest and accordingly was assigned the Code 10 scale of Rs.750-35-1205. In 1986 the petitioner submitted a representation dated April 22, 1986, Annexure P1 at p.35, stating these. Some of his colleagues were given the scale of Rs.900-40-1100 EB 40-1300-50-1500 as up-gradation benefit with the designation assistant officer. He was of the impression that he had not been given the benefit of up-gradation as he was not a graduate. In 1984 he obtained a bachelor’s degree doing a three-year course. Hence the corporation should consider his case for up-gradation to the post of assistant officer on merits. In 1996 the corporation issued a circular dated April 25, 1996, Annexure P2 at p.36, giving the officers of the corporation an opportunity of submitting, filling in the proforma to be used for the purpose, their grievances, if any, against the fitment at the time of conversion with effect from April 1, 1983. The petitioner submitted a representation dated May 16, 1996, Annexure P3 at p.38, stating as follows: “That I was appointed in the year 1980 as Supervisor (Shipping) with the salary of Rs.600/- in the scale of pay Rs.450-30-600-EB-50-1000/- + 20% on pay as House Rent Allowance per month. But unfortunately during the fixation of scale under NJMC’s Rule in the year 1983 I was posted with a designation as Senior Supervisory Assistant (Shipping & Dispatch) under category Code No.10 while rest of my contemporary officers were posted in Code No.09 and some of them even joined the Corporation well after me. But unfortunately during the fixation of scale under NJMC’s Rule in the year 1983 I was posted with a designation as Senior Supervisory Assistant (Shipping & Dispatch) under category Code No.10 while rest of my contemporary officers were posted in Code No.09 and some of them even joined the Corporation well after me. This designation actually denoted me from a full fledged Supervisor to a mere Supervisory Asstt., while others were designated as Assistant Officers in their respective departments. Even the then Director (Marketing) and Executive Director had assured me that I will be placed under proper designation and scale of pay as soon as NJMCs Scale will be implemented." Alleging inaction on the part of the corporation the petitioner then moved W.P. No.1755 of 2004 under art. 226. By an order dated October 5, 2004 the petition was disposed of directing the assistant general manager (personnel) of the corporation to settle all the matters connected with the anomalies in the fixation of the petitioner’s pay. Accordingly, the assistant general manager gave the impugned decision. The assistant general manager held that the petitioner, accepting the altered terms and condition on June 16, 1983 without protest and thus placed in the Code 10 scale meant for the supervisory posts, had no right to claim the Code 9 scale meant for the managerial cadre; and that recommendation of the petitioner’s case by some officials of the corporation could not create his right to get the Code 9 scale. Mr Roy chowdhury, counsel for the petitioner, has strenuously argued that when quite a few officials of the corporation recommended that anomalies in the fixation of the petitioner’s pay needed rectification for removing the disparity, the assistant general manager could not refuse the petitioner the benefit of the Code 9 scale, especially when in his representations filed in 1986 and 1996 the petitioner alleged that similarly situated persons were given the Code 9 scale. Mr. Basu, counsel for the corporation, has said that by filing opposition the corporation has stated a categorical case that in law the petitioner was never entitled to the Code 9 scale that was meant for the managerial cadre; for the petitioner belonged to the supervisory cadre holding a supervisory post. He has pointed out that the petitioner has not disputed that he accepted the altered terms and conditions on June 16, 1983 without any protest. He has pointed out that the petitioner has not disputed that he accepted the altered terms and conditions on June 16, 1983 without any protest. The question is whether the petitioner was entitled to the Code 9 scale introduced by the corporation in 1983. It is evident from the petitioner’s own representation dated April 22, 1986 that he did not claim the Code 9 scale as of right. He rather claimed that having acquired the requisite educational qualification he deserved a consideration on merit for the benefit of up-gradation of his post, especially when his colleagues had been given the benefit of up-gradation because they possessed the requisite educational qualification. In the 1996 representation the petitioner did not assert that though in law he was entitled to the Code 9 scale, the corporation wrongfully fixed his pay assigning the Code 10 scale. He contended that since his contemporary officers and even some of the officers who joined the corporation after him were given the benefit of the Code 9 scale, he should be given the benefit. The allegations were vague. He did not give any particulars of the similarly situated officers who were given the benefit. In the previous petition the petitioner alleged that the corporation did not take steps for removal of anomaly in the fixation of his pay. In view of the impugned decision now it is evident that it was never a case of anomaly in fixation of pay. The petitioner claimed the benefit of the Code 9 scale by up-gradation of his post, though no law created his right to claim the benefit. The official giving the impugned decision rightly held that recommendation of the petitioner’s case by some officials of the corporation could not create the petitioner’s right to get the Code 9 scale, when in law he was not entitled to the scale. No amount of recommendation can be a substitute for a legal right. If the law does not create a right, no recommendation can create it. I find no merit in the argument that in para.20 of the petition names of the similarly situated persons have now been given. In its opposition the corporation has categorically denied the correctness of the allegations made in para.20. If the law does not create a right, no recommendation can create it. I find no merit in the argument that in para.20 of the petition names of the similarly situated persons have now been given. In its opposition the corporation has categorically denied the correctness of the allegations made in para.20. Besides, I am of the view that facts stated in the para cannot be made the basis by the writ court to set aside the decision of the official who was not invited to investigate whether the persons now named were similarly situated. A matter attaining finality in 1983 could not be re-opened in the manner in which it got reopened. For these reasons, the petition is dismissed. No costs. Certified xerox.