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2010 DIGILAW 474 (JHR)

Ratni Kamin v. The State of Jharkhand

2010-04-15

JAYA ROY, N.N.TIWARI

body2010
Order I.A. (Cr.) No. 611/2010 has been placed before this Court under the heading "For Orders". 2. We heard both the parties and also considered Cr. M.P. No. 193/2010 on merit with the consent of the parties. The petition for special leave to appeal has been filed against the judgment of acquittal whereby the opposite parties have been acquitted of the charge under Section 506 IPC. 3. The petitioner was the complainant before the first Court. The brief fact in complaint is that the complainant was an employee of the B.C.C.L. under Satabdi Project. She was allotted quarter at C.K Section. The said C.K Section was declared as fire zone area and the inmates of the said area were tr.i1nsferred to different localities. In that process, the complainant was also transferred in a different locality and was allotted a quarter in that locality. However, the same was not vacated by the previous occupant. The complainant, thus, could not occupy the said quarter. The accused-opposite party No.1, who is the controlling officer, put the petitioner under suspension for not vacating the previous quarter of the fire zone. A proceeding was initiated against the petitioner and a charge-sheet was served on her. For the said reasons, she alleged harassment and torture and filed complaint against the accused persons. Against the accused No.2, the grievance was, that he had allotted a quarter to other which was previously allotted to the petitioner, though the same was subsequently cancelled. 4. In course of trial the complainant did not come forward to support her complaint. Two witnesses were examined on her behalf. 5. The defence was that the complainant without vacating the previous quarter of the fire zone, had occupied the allotted quarter of the transferred locality and violated the official order. That amounted to misconduct and a charge-sheet was issued to her. She was also put under suspension. In reaction thereof the complainant filed the said frivolous complaint against the accused persons for discharging their official duties as the officer of the B.C.C.L. 6. Learned Trial Court considered the facts and evidences on record and found that no case of criminal intimidation was made out against the accused. The dispute between the complainant and the accused was regarding the allotment of quarter and the complainant without approaching the appropriate forum or her superior officer, hastened to file the complaint case. Learned Trial Court considered the facts and evidences on record and found that no case of criminal intimidation was made out against the accused. The dispute between the complainant and the accused was regarding the allotment of quarter and the complainant without approaching the appropriate forum or her superior officer, hastened to file the complaint case. She also did not come forward to support her own complaint. From the evidences of the witnesses, no offence of criminal intimidation was proved. Learned Trial Court, thus, acquitted the accused persons of the said charge. Against the said judgment of acquittal, the complainant filed the said Cr.M.P. seeking leave to appeal against the judgment of acquittal in which there is a delay of 24 days. 7. In the application for condonation of delay, it has been stated that the petitioner is a lady and she could not get the copy of the impugned judgment in time from her Pairavikar. When she came to know about the judgment, she applied for the certified copy of the judgment and after getting the copy of the judgment, she approached her counsel and filed the said Cr.M.P. for leave, but in the said process there was a delay of 24 days. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the delay was under the said circumstance and the same is fit to be condoned. 8. Learned A.P.P. opposed the interlocutory application and submitted that the petitioner herself was the complainant and there was no question of fighting the litigation through the Pairavikar. Moreover, there is no description of the dates as to when she came to know about the impugned judgment, when she applied for the copy of the impugned judgment, when she got the same. The grounds taken in the interlocutory application are hazy and vague and the same are not sufficient grounds for condonation of delay. 9. Moreover, there is no description of the dates as to when she came to know about the impugned judgment, when she applied for the copy of the impugned judgment, when she got the same. The grounds taken in the interlocutory application are hazy and vague and the same are not sufficient grounds for condonation of delay. 9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we find substance in the submissions of learned A.P.P. In the application for condonation of delay there is vague and perfunctory explanation that since the petitioner is a lady, she could not get the copy of the judgment in time from the Pairavikar and when she got the copy of the judgment, she approached her ,counsel and filed the said Cr.M.P. When she herself was the complainant and was actively participating in the litigation, there was no question of obtaining copy by other and not handing over to her. Who was the Pairavikar and when she got the copy of the judgment is also vague. The dates and other descriptions regarding the same have not been given in the interlocutory application. We find absolutely no explanation for the delay. 10. Though an application for condonation of delay is always liberally considered in order to do substantial justice to the parties, it would also create a bad precedent, if the delay is condoned on perfunctory and vague applications .or in absence of any cogent and acceptable explanation. 11. Moreover, on perusal of the impugned judgment we find that the same is well discussed and well considered. Even in the Cr.M.P, no ground has been made out for granting special leave to appeal. 12. Considering the above, we find no ground either for condoning the delay or entertaining the time barred Cr.M.P. No. 193/2010. I.A.(Cr.) No. 611/2010 is, thus, rejected and Cr. M. P. No. 193/2010 is dismissed.