JUDGMENT Hon’ble S.S. Tiwari, J.—The present petition has been preferred against the detention order dated 17.12.2008 passed by District Magistrate, Agra, district Agra (arrayed as respondent No. 3 in the instant petition). The reliefs sought herein are as under : (i) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of habeas corpus commanding the opposite parties to release the petitioner forthwith; (ii) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing impugned detention order dated 17.12.2008 passed by opposite party No. 3. 2. The brief facts giving rise to the present petition are that the petitioner has been slapped with detention order after he was falsely implicated in a criminal case under section 302, I.P.C. and 3 (2)(v) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act vide case Crime No. 926 of 2008 registered at P.S. Etmaddaula, Agra, pursuant to F.I.R. dated 18.12.2008. The informant Radhey Lal Jatav submitted a written report at police station Etmaddaula to the effect that on 2.3.2009 at about 6.00 p.m. the son of the informant Lokesh aIongwith his friend Praveen was• going to drop Praveen at his residence and when he reached near Tedhi Baghiya Bazar, he found Bolero vehicle No. UP-83L-5953 standing on the middle of the road with Shera and Sonu and two others. sitting inside the vehicle Lokesh asked Shera to remove the vehicle from the middle of the road, Shera was annoyed and •after casting aspersions by addressing the caste of his father refused to remove the vehicle from the middle of road. Lokesh and Praveen protested to it. Shera took out his country made pistol and threatened them. When Lokesh and Praveen started going back on their motorcycle, the person inside the Bolero vehicle hit that motorcycle on the 100 Ft. road with the result Lokesh and Praveen fell down on the road and they were repeatedly crushed down by the Bolero vehicle. In the meantime, one Ram Das and Suleman passed through that road and they were also hit by that vehicle. Consequently, Lokesh and Ram Das succumbed to the injuries and Praveen and Suleman were seriously injured. The respondents escaped away in that vehicle from the spot. The incident was seen by several persons of the locality. 3. In the meantime, one Ram Das and Suleman passed through that road and they were also hit by that vehicle. Consequently, Lokesh and Ram Das succumbed to the injuries and Praveen and Suleman were seriously injured. The respondents escaped away in that vehicle from the spot. The incident was seen by several persons of the locality. 3. We have also traversed upon the impugned order of detention in which it is stated that due to this incident the traffic was completely stopped due to fear of the accused persons and the persons of the locality hide themselves inside their houses. Drivers of the vehicles ran away leaving the vehicles on the road. Public order was fully disturbed. Additional police force was called on the spot. The public peace was fully disturbed and normalcy could be restored with great difficulty in that locality. 4. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and also the learned AGA. They have argued at length bandying their respective contentions. The arguments advanced across the bar in nut shell are that the petitioner has falsely been implicated in this case. The father of the deceased Radhey Lal Jatav is a local leader of ruling party and due to his influence the petitioner has been detained under Section 3/2 of the National Security Act. The petitioner has got no previous criminal history. He was still detained in jail and only on the basis of conjectures and sunrises he has been detained in this case. The Station Officer of Police Station concerned has submitted the report for detention of the petitioner in the aforesaid Act only under the political influence. The higher authorities including the respondent nO.3 did not apply their mind. They have passed the orders in a mechanical way and in a routine manner. However, the main brunt of the argument advanced across the bar is that there was inordinate delay in the disposal of representation dated 14.3.2009 which was decided on 14.5.2009 at the hand of the Union Government. 5. From the submissions advanced across the bar, it would crystalize that there was no unreasonable delay in disposing of the above representation on the part of the State Government. The main grievance of the petitioner pivots on inordinate delay in disposing of the representation by the Union Government. 6. 5. From the submissions advanced across the bar, it would crystalize that there was no unreasonable delay in disposing of the above representation on the part of the State Government. The main grievance of the petitioner pivots on inordinate delay in disposing of the representation by the Union Government. 6. We have scrutinised the counter affidavit filed by Sri L.P. Srivastava, Under Secretary, Ministry of Home ‘Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi. In paragraph-5 of the counter-affidayit it is averred that the representation of the detenue dated 14.3.2005 was received by the Central Government in the concerned Desk of Ministry of Home Affairs on 2.4.2009 through State of U.P. vide their letter No. 108/2/80/2009-CX-7 dated 24.3.2009. The same was considered together with report under section 3(5) of the National Security Act and the matter was processed at the level of Under Secretary and Joint Secretary and was placed before the Union Home Secretary on 13.5.2009 (who has been delegated with powers of the Central Government to decide such cases ). The Union Secretary, it is averred, considered the representation along with connected papers. The Union Home Secretary after careful consideration of the matter through the material on record including the grounds for the same, the representation of the detenue and the comments of the detaining authority thereon found that the detenue has been unable to. bring forth any material cause or grounds in his representation to justify revocation of the order by exercising of powers of the Central Government under Section 14 of the Act, and accordingly rejected the representation on 14.5.2009 ,and the file was sent for onward transmission of the order of Joint Secretary. The file reached the concerned Desk in the section on 15.5.2009. Accordingly, a wireless message No. II/15028/259/09 NSA dated 15.5.2009 was sent to the Home Secretary, Government of U.P. and Superintendent, District Jail, Agra informing that the representation of the detenue Sonu was considered and rejected by Union Government Home Secretary on 14.5.2009. It is further averred that the, matter could not be processed earlier, as the dealing hand concerned proceeded on medical leave and after his return he could put up the case only on 11.5.2009. The section had received large number of representations during the period especially from U.P. The work of the dealing hand could not be fully attended to due to non-availability of alternative arrangements. 7. The section had received large number of representations during the period especially from U.P. The work of the dealing hand could not be fully attended to due to non-availability of alternative arrangements. 7. Keeping in view that fresh cases continued to be received, there was resultant backlog of a large number of cases., hence, it took further 3-4 weeks time to clear the backlog. It would thus transpire that whatever has occurred is attributable to explanation that the dealing assistant had proceeded on long leave i.e. on medical ground and also that during that period large number of representations had been received and there was accumulation of work. Now the question remains whether the explanation offered for the delay is plausible one and was occasioned due to permissible reasons and unavoidable causes. 8. Under the constitutional scheme, the representation of the detenue has to be considered without any delay. Article 22 of the Constitution does not envisage any specific period constituting the delay. The phrase used in clause (5) of Article 55 is “as soon as may be” In Rajammal v. State of T.N. and another, 1999 SCC (Crl.) 93, the Apex Court observed that the “test is not the duration or range of the delay but how it is explained by the authority concerned.” In para 9 of the said decision the Apex Court recapitulating the facts of that case observed as under : “ In the present case, the representation was sent by the detenue on 13.1.1998 which reached the Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu on 5.2.1998. The Government which received remarks from different authorities submitted the relevant file before the under secretary for processing it on the next day. The under Secretary forwarded it to the Deputy Secretary on the next working day. Thereafter, the file was submitted before the Minister who received it while he was on tour. The Minister passed the order only on 14.2.1998. Though there is explanation for the delay till 9.2.1998 there is no explanation whatsoever as for the delay which occurred thereafter. Merely stating that the Minister was on tour and hence he could pass orders only on 14.2.1998 is not a justifiable explanation when the liberty of a citizen guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is involved. Though there is explanation for the delay till 9.2.1998 there is no explanation whatsoever as for the delay which occurred thereafter. Merely stating that the Minister was on tour and hence he could pass orders only on 14.2.1998 is not a justifiable explanation when the liberty of a citizen guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is involved. Absence of the Minister at the Headquarters is not sufficient to justify the delay since the file could be reached the Minister with utmost promptitude in cases involving the vitally important fundamental right of a citizen.” 9. Per contra, the decision cited is Union of India v. Laishram Lincola Singh, AIR 2008 SCW 2189. It is a decision of the Apex Court in which ratio of various other decisions have been noticed with approval. The first decision noticed is Senthamilselvi v. State of T.N. and another, 2006 .(5) SCC 676 in which it was substantially held “there can be no hard and fast rule as to the measure of reasonable time and each’case has to be considered from the facts of the case and if there is no negligence or callous inaction or avoidable red tapism on the facts of a case, the Court would not interfere.” The Apex Court further observed that “It needs no reiteration that it is the duty of the Court to see that the efficacy of the limited, yet crucial, safeguards provided in the laws of preventive detention is not lost in mechanical routine, dull casua1ness and chill indifference on the part of the authorities entrusted with their application. When there is remissness, indifference or avoidable delay on the part of the authority, the detention becomes vulnerable.” 10. Another decision noticed with approval is L.M.S. Unimju Saleema v. B.B. Gujarat, ( 1981(3) SCC 317 in which it was quintessentially held that there can be no doubt that the representation made by the detenue has to be considered by the detaining authority’ with the utmost expedition but as observed in Frances Coralie Mullin v. W.C. Khambra, ( 1980(2) SCC 275 “the time imperative can never be absolute or obsessive. Likewise other decisions relied upon are Kamarunnissa v. Union of India (1991) (1) SCC 128, Birendra Kumar Rai v. Union of India, ( 1993(1) SCC 272 ) etc. 11. Likewise other decisions relied upon are Kamarunnissa v. Union of India (1991) (1) SCC 128, Birendra Kumar Rai v. Union of India, ( 1993(1) SCC 272 ) etc. 11. A brief survey of all the decided cases considered in judicial crucible yield the conclusion the representation has to be decided with utmost expedition. In the light of the above decision the question that remains is whether the explanation offered for the delay by the Government was such from which an inference of inaction or callousness on the part of the authorities could be inferred. 12. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the explanation substantially is that the dealing assistant was on leave for about 38 days on medical ground and also that in or about the time, large number of representations had been received which led to accumulation. 13. It brooks no dispute that it was a matter involving the vitally important fundamental right of a citizen. There is a delay of more than forty days. The explanation that the dealing assistant was on long medical leave, hence the delay occurred cannot be said to be plausible and justifiable. All the decided cases discussed above, yield the conclusion that the representation must be decided with utmost expedition. Merely because the dealing assistant was on leave, the representation could not be processed is unacceptable when it involves the vitally important fundamental right of a citizen. Hence, the explanation offered for the delay does not commend for acceptance and on this ground alone, the detention is clearly unsustainable and is liable to be set aside and the petition deserves to be allowed. 14. The other grounds urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner are that no public order was disturbed by the aforesaid incident. The concerned authorities did not apply their mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and the incident was not within the category of cases to invoke provisions of National Security Act. The District Magistrate rejected the representation on hyper-technical ground and not on merits. Since we are allowing the petition on the ground of unjustifiable delay, we do not propose to go into other aspects in detail. 15. In view of the foregoing discussions, the petition is allowed and it is directed that the petitioner shall be set at liberty forthwith unless wanted in any other case. ————