JUDGMENT 1. - This writ petition is directed against order dated 17.2.10 passed by the Rent Tribunal, Chittorgarh in execution case no. 2/10, whereby the objections raised by the petitioner against the execution of certificate for recovery of possession dated 20.4.05 issued by the Rent Tribunal in pursuance of an order passed in terms of the compromise arrived at between the parties, stand rejected. 2. The respondent no.2, a society registered under the Societies Registration Act preferred a petition u/s 9 of the Rent Control Act, 2001 (in short the Act") against the petitioner for eviction from the premises i.e. a shop, on the ground of reasonable & bona fide necessity. The petitioner filed a reply thereto. Both the parties filed affidavits of their witnesses. However, before the trial could proceed further, both the parties arrived at a compromise, wherein inter alia it was agreed upon that the petitioner/tenant shall vacate the premises and hand over the vacant possession thereof to the respondent/landlord on 31.12.09. It was further agreed upon that the petitioner shall deposit a sum of Rs. 75,000/- as security which shall remain with the respondent/landlord upto 30.12.09 and thereafter, the same shall be deposited back in the bank account of the petitioner or with the Tribunal while claiming possession in execution of the certificate. The Tribunal in presence of the parties and their counsels, passed the final order in terms of the compromise arrived at and accordingly, certificate for recovery of possession was ordered to be issued. 3. Since as per the terms of the compromise arrived at, the premises was not vacated by the petitioner, the respondent applied for execution of the certificate for recovery of possession before the Tribunal. The petitioner filed objections thereto stating therein that the order in terms of the compromise has been obtained by committing fraud. It was stated that respondent no.2, a society registered under the Societies Registration Act is a body corporate and, therefore, by virtue of clause (v) of Section 3 of the Act, Chapters II and III of the Act are not applicable to the premises belonging to or let out to it and, therefore, no order of eviction could have been passed by the Rent Tribunal in terms of the provisions of Section 9 of the Act. That apart, an objection was raised that the provisions contained in Section 9 of the Act setting out the grounds for eviction of the tenant from the premises is a non obstante clause and, therefore, unless, the Tribunal is satisfied that any of the grounds enumerated in Section 9 is satisfied, no order directing the eviction of the tenant could be passed. The petitioner submitted that in absence of existence of any of the grounds enumerated in Section 9 of the Act and the satisfaction in this regard of the Tribunal being recorded in the order, the certificate for recovery of possession issued in pursuance thereof is nullity in the eye of law and, therefore, the same is not executable. 4. After due consideration of the objections raised on behalf of the petitioner, the Tribunal arrived at the finding that by virtue of clause (v) of Section 3 of the Act, Chapter II and III of the Act do not apply to any premises belonging to or let out by any body corporate constituted by a Central Act or a Rajasthan Act, but the respondent no.2 is only a society, registered under the Rajasthan Societies Registration Act and cannot be treated to be a body corporate constituted by any Central or Rajasthan Act. 5. Considering the objection of the petitioner that the certificate for recovery of possession issued in terms of the order passed on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties is nullity inasmuch as, no satisfaction has been recorded by the Tribunal regarding he existence of any of the grounds for eviction set out in Section 9 of the Act, the Tribunal observed that in the compromise arrived at the existence of the ground for eviction need not be admitted or denied specifically. The Tribunal observed that the compromise arrived at has been made order of the Tribunal keeping in view the material on record and, therefore, the satisfaction of the Tribunal regarding the existence of ground for eviction is implied. The Tribunal further observed that in original file, the affidavits of the witnesses filed /by the parties are available and before the matter could proceed for cross examination of the witnesses, the compromise arrived at between the parties was filed before the Tribunal and, therefore, it can be presumed that the Tribunal was satisfied with regard to existence of the ground for eviction. In support of the findings arrived at, the Tribunal has relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Roshan Lal v. Madan Lal, AIR 1975 SC 2130 . Accordingly, while rejecting the objections filed by the petitioner, by the order impugned, the Tribunal has directed the respondent/landlord to deposit the security amount of Rs. 75,000/- with the Tribunal, if not already deposited. 6. Reiterating the aforesaid objections raised on behalf of the petitioner before the Tribunal, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that a society, registered under the Societies Registration Act has to be treated as a body corporate constituted under the Rajasthan Act and, therefore, Chapter II and III of the Act are not applicable to the premises belonging to respondent/landlord, let out to the petitioner. It is next contended by the learned counsel that Section 9 being a non obstante clause, before passing a decree for eviction, the satisfaction of the court regarding existence of any of the grounds enumerated in the said Section is condition precedent even if the decree is passed on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties. The learned counsel submitted that even with the consent of the parties, the Tribunal was not competent to pass an order for eviction in absence of the existence of any of the grounds for eviction specified under section 9 of the Act. Accordingly, it is submitted by the learned counsel that the certificate of possession issued by the Rent Tribunal in terms of the order dated 20.4.05 is nullity in the eye of law. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel has relied upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matters of Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal & Anr., AIR 1970 SC 794 , Smt. Kaushalya Devi & Ors. v. K.L. Bansal, AIR 1970 SC 838 , Nagin Das Ram Das v. Dalpat Ram Ichcha Ram, AIR 1974 SC 471 and the decisions of this court in the matters of Prem Lal v. Jadav Chand & Anr., 1977 WLN (Raj.), 332 and Mahaveer Uchchya Prathmik Vidyalaya, Sardar Shahar, 1996 DNJ (Raj.) 335 . 7. I have given thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel and gone through the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court relied upon. 8. 7. I have given thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel and gone through the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court relied upon. 8. Coming to the first contention of the learned counsel that Chapter II and III of the Act does not apply to the respondent society, which is registered under the Societies Registration Act, it is to be noticed that by virtue of clause (v) of Section 3, anything contained in Chapter II and III shall not apply to any premises belonging to or let out by any body corporate constituted by the Central Act or Rajasthan Act. It is not the case of the petitioner that respondent society has come into existence/constituted by any Central or Rajasthan Act. Merely because, the respondent society is compulsorily registered under the relevant statute i.e. Rajasthan Societies Registration Act, 1958, by no stretch of imagination, it can be treated to be a body corporate constituted by a Rajasthan Act. Thus, to say the least, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is absolutely devoid of any merit. 9. Before considering the next contention of the learned counsel that the certificate of possession issued by the Rent Tribunal in terms of the compromise arrived at between the parties is nullity in the eye of law and cannot he executed, it will be appreciate to consider the position of law settled by various decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this court. 10. In Smt. Kaushalya Devi's case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with a matter under Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, relying upon its earlier decision in Bahadur Singh v. Muni Subrat Dass, (1969) 1 SCWR 51 , held that a decree passed in ejectment suit by the court on the basis of compromise arrived at without satisfying itself that the ground of eviction existed was a nullity and could not be executed. 11. In Ferozi Lai Jain's case(supra), again considering the provisions of Section 13(1) of Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act, specifying the grounds for eviction, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that a decree of eviction can be passed by any court only, if that court is satisfied that one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 13(1) are established. 11. In Ferozi Lai Jain's case(supra), again considering the provisions of Section 13(1) of Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act, specifying the grounds for eviction, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that a decree of eviction can be passed by any court only, if that court is satisfied that one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 13(1) are established. It was held that without such a satisfaction, the court is incompetent to pass a decree for possession of any premises. 12. In K.K. Chari v. R.M. Shaishadri, AIR 1973 SC 1311 the Hon'ble Apex Court while considering the ratio of the decisions in Bhadur Singh, Smt. Kaushalya Devi and Ferozi Lai Jain, cases (supra) observed that "It is no doubt true that before making an order for possession, the court is under a duty to satisfy itself as to truth of the landlord's claim if there is a dispute between the landlord and the tenant, but if the tenant in fact admits that the landlord is entitled to possession on one or other of the statutory grounds mentioned in the Act, it is open to the court to act on that admission and make an order for possession in favour of the landlord without further inquiry. It is no doubt true that each case will have to be decided on its own facts to find out whether there is material to justify an inference that an admission, expressed or implied, has been made by the tenant about the existence of one or other of the statutory grounds." (emphases added). 13. In Nagin Das Ram Das's case(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court after due consideration of its previous decisions cited at the bar observed that "From a conspectus of the cases cited at the bar, the principle that emerges is, that if at the time of the passing of the decree, there was some material before the Court, on the basis of which, the Court could be prima facie satisfied, about the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it will be presumed that the Court was so satisfied and the decree for eviction apparently passed on the basis of a compromise, would be valid." (emphasis added). 14. 14. in Prem Lal's case(supra), this court while considering the matter with regard to amendment of the pleadings in the eviction proceedings under the provisions of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, wherein the grounds for eviction from the premises let out were specified in Section 13, observed as under: "9. The opening words of section 13(1),"Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract no Court shall pass any decree, or make any order in favour of a landlord whether in execution of a decree or otherwise" create a fetter on the powers of the Court. The broad policy and purposes as indicated in the preamble are to protect tenants against their landlord in respect of the rents, evictions etc. The Act by section 13(1) expressly forbids the Court from passing a decree or order of eviction on a ground which is de hors the Act. The entire scheme and structure of the Act leads to the irresistible conclusion that section 13(1) places a bar on the Court. The Court is not competent to pass a decree for possession either in invitum or with consent of the parties or on a ground which is de hors the Act. The existence of one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 13(1) is a sine qua non to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court." 15. In Mahaveer Uchchya Prathmik Vidyalaya's case (supra), this court after due consideration of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decisions referred supra and yet another decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Roshan Lal & Anr. v. Madan Lal, AIR 1975 SC 2130 , observed as under: "23. However, if the plaintiff and defendant choose to. enter into a compromise due to some reasons best known to them, It Is open to them to do so. In such a situation only thing to be seen is that whether compromise is in violation of the requirement of the law contemplated u/s 13 of the said Act. The compromise must indicate either on its face or in the back-ground of other materials in the case that the tenant expressly or impliedly is agreeing to suffer a decree for eviction because the landlord in the circumstances is entitled to have such a decree under the law. The compromise must indicate either on its face or in the back-ground of other materials in the case that the tenant expressly or impliedly is agreeing to suffer a decree for eviction because the landlord in the circumstances is entitled to have such a decree under the law. In such cases of compromise, the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 CPC apply to eviction suits governed by Act No.17 of 1950. If the compromise for the eviction of the tenant is found in the facts of a particular case to be in violation of Section 13 of the said Act, the Court would refuse to record the compromise as it will not be a lawful compromise. If on the other hand, a Court is satisfied on consideration of the terms of the compromise and if necessary by considering them in the context of the pleadings of the parties and other materials in the case to the effect that agreement is lawful then in such a situation, the Court of law has no option except to pass a decree for eviction on the basis of compromise entered into between the landlord and tenant." 16. Thus, the settled position of law which emerges from the various decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court and this court that the satisfaction of the court regarding the existence of any of the ground for eviction set out in the relevant statute for the order of eviction based on compromise need not borne out by a judicial finding and it can even be presumed on the basis of the material on record that the court was satisfied about the existence of the ground on which the order of eviction based on compromise arrived at between the parties was passed. 17. Adverting to the facts of the present case, admittedly, the petition for eviction u/s 9 of the Act was filed by the respondent/landlord against the petitioner/tenant on the sole ground that it required the house for its bona fide and reasonable necessity. The petitioner by filing a reply thereto denied the claim of the respondent and both the parties had filed the affidavits of their witnesses in terms of the provisions of Section 15 of the Act. The petitioner by filing a reply thereto denied the claim of the respondent and both the parties had filed the affidavits of their witnesses in terms of the provisions of Section 15 of the Act. The petitioner did not ask for cross examination of the witness whose affidavits i were filed on behalf of the respondent/landlord and in the meantime, entered into a compromise with the respondent wherein instead of contesting the petition, he agreed to vacate the premises in question on a stipulated date unconditionally and agreed to hand over the possession. It was also specifically agreed open that the certificate for recovery of possession to be issued by the Tribunal shall be executable. The terms of the compromise arrived at have been made the order of the Tribunal. Thus, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, noticed above, it can be safely presumed that the Tribunal has passed the order on the basis of the implied admission of the petitioner regarding reasonable and bona fide necessity of the respondent/landlord of the premises in question. Thus, the contention of the petitioner that the order in terms of the compromise was passed by the Tribunal without its satisfaction regarding the existence of any of the grounds enumerated in Section 9 of the Act is also devoid of any merit. 18. In view of the discussion above, in considered opinion of this court, the Tribunal has not erred in holding that on the given facts and circumstances of the case, it can be presumed that the order in terms of the compromise directing eviction of the petitioner from the suit premises was passed by the Tribunal after being satisfied that the ground for eviction set out in Section 9 of the Act exists. Thus, the order impugned passed by the Tribunal rejecting the objections raised by the petitioner against the execution of certificate for recovery of possession does not suffer from any infirmity, illegality or jurisdictional error warranting interference by this court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 19. No other point has been pressed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 20. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed in limine.Writ Petition Dismissed. *******