Judgment :- (Per Nooty Ramamohana Rao, J.) 1. This writ petition has been instituted by Smt. Chalamala Rajyalakshmi, W/o Sri C. Nagendra Rao, R/o Tiruvuru Village & Mandal, Krishna District, soliciting a writ of Habeas Corpus, for production and setting free her husband Sri Chalamala Nagendra Rao, S/o Sri Uddandu, R/o Tiruvuru Village & Mandal, Krishna District, who has been detained by the 4th respondent - District Collector and Magistrate, Krishna District, in exercise of the power available to him under Subsection (2) of Section 3 r/w Section 2 (a) & (b) of the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 ( henceforth referred to as 'the Act') - Act No.1 of 1986. 2. The detaining authority passed orders on 31-03-2009 recording his satisfaction based upon the grounds set out therein. The orders were, in fact, confirmed by the State Government after considering the report submitted by the Advisory Board. The State Government, while confirming the orders of the detaining authority, ordered for detention for a period of 12 months, commencing from the date of detention, namely, 31-03-2009. These orders were passed by the State Government in their G.O.Rt.No.2101, General Administration (Law & Order.II) Department, dated 05-05-2009. 3. The learned counsel for the writ petitioner would submit that the Order of detention passed by the District Collector was illegal, as there was no valid material for recording his satisfaction. He would further submit that the order for detention for a period of 12 months, passed by the State Government while confirming the orders of preventive detention passed by the 4th respondent - District Collector and Magistrate, Krishna District, is vitiated, for the reason that the period, which has not been, in fact, specified by the District Magistrate, has now been specified by the State Government and that too without any application of mind, the State Government has straightaway proceeded to order for detention for the maximum period of detention, i.e., for 12 months. The learned counsel contends that in terms of Section 3 of the Act, before passing any order for the detention for the maximum period of 12 months, the State Government was required to consider the necessity of detaining the detenu for period of 3 months, initially, and only thereafter, they must examine the necessity of detaining the detenu any further and then pass a further Order, at any rate, for a total period not exceeding 12 months. Instead, it has straightaway passed an order for detaining the detenu for 12 months from the date of the order of detention passed by the District Collector and Magistrate, Krishna District. Per contra, the learned Assistant Government Pleader would submit that the Proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act, has got to be understood, in its operation, in the context of Subsection (2), which enables the State Government to delegate the powers exercisable by it under Subsection (1), on to the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police, as the case may be. Therefore, it is the period of delegation, which is sought to be regulated by the proviso and hence, the proviso shall not be read in an isolated manner. She, therefore, submits that an Order of detention at the first instance can be passed for the maximum period allowed in the Statute. The learned Assistant Government Pleader has also relied upon the Judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in MRS. HARPREET KAUR HARVINDER SINGH BEDI v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER AIR 1992 SC 979 , wherein a similar provision of a statute made by the Maharashtra Legislature has fallen for consideration. 4. It will be important to notice that the Collector and District Magistrate, Krishna at Machilipatnam, while passing the Order of detention has rested his satisfaction upon the material forming part of Crime No.225 of 2008-09, on the file of the Prohibition and Excise Police Station, Tiruvuru, Crime No.471 of 2008-09, booked by the Prohibition and Excise Sub Inspector, Enforcement Wing, Vijayawada and Crime No.588 of 200809, booked by the Prohibition and Excise Sub Inspector, Vijayawada. The detune was found in possession of illicitly distilled liquor of 40 liters in the first case and 60 liters in the second and third cases. When the samples taken therefrom are analyzed by the Government Chemical Examiner, they are tested positive for ethyl alcohol and fusel oil. The detune was found in possession of illicitly distilled liquor of 40 liters in the first case and 60 liters in the second and third cases. When the samples taken therefrom are analyzed by the Government Chemical Examiner, they are tested positive for ethyl alcohol and fusel oil. The chemical analyst was of the opinion that the samples are illicitly distilled liquor, unfit for human consumption and injurious to health. In this context it is worth noticing that Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot Leggers, Dacoits, Drug-offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 (henceforth referred to as 'the Boot Leggers Act), has been ushered in for preventive detention of Boot Leggers, Dacoits, Drug-offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers, and for preventing their dangerous activities, which are considered as prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The expression "Boot Legger" has been defined in the following terms in Section 2 (b) of the Boot Leggers Act: "boot-legger" means a person, who distills manufactures, stores transports, imports, exports, sells or distributes any liquor, intoxicating drug or other intoxicant in contravention of any of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968 and the rules, notifications and orders made thereunder, or in contravention of any other law for the time being in force, or who knowingly expends or applied any money or supplies any animal, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance or any receptacle or any other material whatsoever in furtherance or support of the doing of any of the above mentioned things by himself or through any other person, or who abets in any other manner the doing of any such thing." It is, therefore, manifestly clear that any person, who distills, manufactures, stores or transports or sells or distributes any liquor in contravention of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968, answers the description of 'Boot Legger'. Sub-section (1) of Section 3, empowers the State Government, if satisfied with respect to any Boot Legger, order for his detention with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. In terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 3, similar functions can also be exercised by the District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police, as the case may be. In terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 3, similar functions can also be exercised by the District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police, as the case may be. Section 9, required constitution of an Advisory Board and after considering the report of the said Advisory Board, the Government is required in terms of Section 12, either to confirm the detention order or vary the same. Section 13 prescribed the maximum period for which any person may be detained; to be 12 months from the date of detention. 5. The question relating to the distinction between "law and order" and "public order", has fallen for consideration of the Supreme Court in RAM MANOHAR LOHIA v. STATE OF BIHAR 1966 CRL.L.J 608, and it is held as under: "......... Law and order represents the largest circle within which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents security of State.........." In ARM GHOSH v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL 1970 CRL.L.J. 1136, it was set out as under: "Take the case of assault on girls. A guest at a hotel may kiss or make advances to half a dozen chambermaids. He may annoy them and also the mangement but he does not cause disturbance of public order. He may even have a fracas with the friends of one of the girls but even then it would be a case of breach of law and order only. Take another case of a man who molests women in lonely places. As a result of his activities girls going to colleges and schools are in constant danger and fear. Women going for their ordinary business are afraid of being waylaid and assaulted. The activity of this man in its essential quality is not different from the act of the other man but in its potentiality and in its effect upon the public tranquillity there is a vast difference. The act of the man who molests the girls in lonely places causes a disturbance in the even tempo of living which is the first requirement of public order. He disturbs the society and the community....." Again in KANU BISWAS v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL 1972 CRL.L.J. 1006, it is held as follows: "The question whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order........ He disturbs the society and the community....." Again in KANU BISWAS v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL 1972 CRL.L.J. 1006, it is held as follows: "The question whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order........ is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society. Public order is what the French call "order publique" and is something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order. The test to be adopted in determining whether an act affects law and order or public order, as laid down in the above case is: Does it lead to disturbance of the current of life of the community so as to amount to a distrubance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquillity of society undisturbed?" In SUBHASH BHANDARI v. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, LUCKNOW 1982 CRL.L.J. 1191, it is stated thus : "A solitary act of omission or commission can be taken into consideration for being subjectively satisfied, by the detaining authority to pass an order of detention if the reach, effect and potentiality of the act is such that it disturbs public tranquillity by creating terror and panic iii the society or a considerable number of the people in a specified Locality where the act is alleged to have been committed. Thus it is the degree and extent of the reach of the act upon the society which is vital for considering the question whether a man has committed only a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause disturbance to public order." From the above decisions, it clearly emerges that the potentiality of the acts indulged in by individual and their likely impact upon the tranquility of the society that marks out such men as possible offenders of public order. Going by the definition of the expression "boot legger", in the Act and the material behind the grounds of detention, clearly mark out the detenue to be a boot legger. The Supreme Court while considering an identically worded Proviso to an identically worded Subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Maharashtra Act, has concluded the issue in the following manner in MRS. HARPREET KAUR HARVINDER SINGH BEDI's case cited (1 supra): "14. The Supreme Court while considering an identically worded Proviso to an identically worded Subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Maharashtra Act, has concluded the issue in the following manner in MRS. HARPREET KAUR HARVINDER SINGH BEDI's case cited (1 supra): "14. From the law laid by this Court, as noticed above, it follows that it is the degree and extent of the reach of the objectionable activity upon the society which is vital for considering the question whether a man has committed only a breach of 'law and order' or has acted in a manner likely to cause disturbance to'public order'. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of 'public order'. Whenever an order of detention is questioned, the courts apply these tests to find out whether the objectionable activities upon which the order of detention is grounded fall under the classification of being prejudicial to 'public order' or belong to the category of being prejudicial only to 'law and order'. An order of detention under the Act would be valid if the activities of a detenu affect 'public order' but would not be so where the same affect only the maintenance of 'law and order'................................................. A plain reading of the Section shows that the State Government under Section 3(1), if satisfied, with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of "public order", it is necessary so to do, make an order of detention against the person concerned. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 deals with the delegation of powers by the State Government and provides that if the State Government is satisfied, having regard to the circumstances prevailing in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police, as the case may be to exercise the powers of the State Government to order detention of a person as provided by sub-section (1), then the State Government may, by an order in writing direct that during such period as may be specified in the order, the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police may also if satisfied as provided in sub-section (1), exercise the powers of the State Government as conferred by subsection (1). The proviso to subsection (2), only lays down that the period of delegation of powers, specified in the order to be made by the State Government under sub-sec. (2), delegating to the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police the powers under sub-section (1) shall not in the first instance exceed three months." The above principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in MRS. HARPREET KAUR HARVINDER SINGH BEDI's case cited (1 supra), is a complete answer to the contention canvassed by the writ petitioner with regard to the scope of the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act. The Proviso, in its operation, must be understood as limiting the periods for which the State Government can consider delegating its powers on to the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police as the case may be. The power available to the State Government under Subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Act, to order for detention of any person, who, in their assessment and satisfaction, was carrying on activities, which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, has got to be read with Section 13, which provided for the maximum period for which the detenu can be detained. When so read, it makes the position this much clear that, the State Government, while exercising its power under Subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Act, can order for detention, but however, in no case, it shall exceed 12 months period. Since, the same powers can also be delegated under sub-section (2) of Section 3, it follows that even the delegate can order for detention for a period of 12 months. For these reasons, we do not find any justification to entertain the writ petition any further and it is liable to be dismissed. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed, but however, without costs.