JUDGMENT 1. By this common order I shall dispose of the interlocutory applications (in short „IAs?) filed both by the plaintiffs as well as the defendants. IA No. 150/2010 has been filed by the plaintiffs under the provisions of Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short the CPC?) while IA No.290/2010 has been filed by defendant Nos.1 and 2. 2. The defendant nos 1 and 2 have moved this application to seek vacation of ad interim ex-parte order passed by me on 001.2010 on the above referred IA being: IA No. 150/2010 moved by the plaintiffs. In the operative part of the order dated 001.2010 I had directed as follows:- “…….In the circumstances, the defendant no.3 while being permitted to continue with the election process shall refrain from declaring the results till the next date of hearing…….” 3. The circumstances in which the plaintiffs have instituted the present action require to be noted in order to dispose of the captioned applications. 3.1 The plaintiffs herein who are officers of the State Bank of India (in short „SBI?) claim that they have been continuously working with various branches of SBI, in the Delhi circle. The plaintiffs also assert that they are members of the State Bank of India Officers? Association, Delhi Circle i.e., defendant no.1. Defendant no.1, which is (as indicated hereinabove) an association of officers of the State Bank of India, Delhi circle; is a trade union registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926 (in short the „Trade Unions Act?). 3.2 Defendant no.1, it appears, in a meeting convened by its Central Committee on 29.11.2009, amongst various other issues took several decisions including those with regard to the holding of elections for various posts for the period 2009-2012, constitution of an Election Committee and Election Tribunal. Consequent thereto, the Election Committee (pursuant to the decision of the Central Committee dated 29.11.2009 and the circular no.39 of even date i.e., 29.11.2009 issued by defendant no.2 i.e., General Secretary of defendant no.1) invited nominations for the post of Circle Office Bearers and Module Committee and Districts vide their notification dated 01.12.2009. The said notification inter alia detailed out the posts for which elections were to be held, the election schedule and the rules for elections. The said notification inter alia detailed out the posts for which elections were to be held, the election schedule and the rules for elections. 3.3 The plaintiffs have impugned before me the actions of the defendants in calling for elections, constituting the Election Committee as also the Election Tribunal. At this point it would be relevant to extract the prayers made in the suit because there has been some amount of argument on the scope of the prayers:- “(i) grant the permanent injunction thereby restraining the Defendant No.1 and the Defendant No.3 to count the votes cast; (ii) grant the permanent injunction thereby restraining the Defendant No.1 and the Defendant No.3 from releasing the result of the election malafidely conducted by the Defendant No.3 in violation of all principles of law; (iii) grant the mandatory injunction that the Defendant No.1 be directed to conduct fresh and fair elections by appointing an Election Committee constituted by the General Council or under the supervision of an independent body; (iv) declare that all acts done by the Defendant No.2 in capacity of General Secretary of Defendant No.1 for and on behalf of the Defendant No.1 after 5.11.2009 to be null and void; (v) declare that the nomination of Defendants No.5, 6 and 7 accepted by the Defendant No.3 to be null and void; and/or (vi) pass such further order(s) and/or give direction(s) as deemed fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 3.4 It would be important to note at this juncture that both parties have confined themselves to what is primarily a legal issue as to whether the Central Committee of defendant no.1could have taken a decision that it took on 29.11.2009 to call for elections, constitute an Election Committee and the Election Tribunal. Counsels both for the plaintiffs as well as the defendants addressed arguments before me on this aspect of the matter. This is so because the only objection principally taken before me by defendant no.2 in the captioned IA was with regard to the maintainability of the suit in view of the constitution of an Election Tribunal. Counsels both for the plaintiffs as well as the defendants addressed arguments before me on this aspect of the matter. This is so because the only objection principally taken before me by defendant no.2 in the captioned IA was with regard to the maintainability of the suit in view of the constitution of an Election Tribunal. Apart from this, the defendants have also alluded to the fact that the plaintiffs are not entitled to an ad interim relief on the ground that they have failed to disclose that out of 140 posts for which elections were held results with respect to 101 posts have been declared and that results are awaited only with respect to 39 posts. In addition it has also been averred that 99 candidates who support the defendants have been elected unopposed. The fact that plaintiffs have themselves participated in the elections in as much as they have filed their nominations, and that elections of defendant Nos. 6 and 7 have been challenged by the plaintiffs in a Civil Court in Agra where injunction was declined, which again, is not disclosed in the instant proceedings —ought to disentitle the plaintiffs from claiming an equitable relief from this Court. 4. On behalf of the plaintiffs Mr. V K Rao, Senior advocate in the background of these facts has submitted that the objection taken by the defendants as regards the maintainability of suit is misconceived. He submitted that the present suit has been filed inter alia for a declaration that the Central Committee which evidently convened on 29.11.2009 to take the decisions, which it took, with regard to various issues including those connected with the elections was void abinitio. He contended that the reason for the same was that under Section 6 (hh) of the Trade Unions Act a Trade Union (defendant no.1 being one such trade union) is entitled to frame rules, which are required to provide that the term of the members of its Executive Committee and other office bearers does not extend beyond a period of three years. It was, thus, submitted by Mr. Rao that there can be no dispute that the term of members of the Executive Committee and other office bearers cannot exceed three years. It was, thus, submitted by Mr. Rao that there can be no dispute that the term of members of the Executive Committee and other office bearers cannot exceed three years. It was also contended that it can also not be disputed that the office bearers which includes the Central Committee members, were elected to various posts on 05.11.2005 and that their tenure came to an end in November, 200 The Central Committee therefore, according to Mr. Rao was denuded of power to take any decision whatsoever in November, 2009. He further contended that even if this Court were to give the Central Committee, a little leeway, in accordance with the provisions of Bye-law 45(a) as framed by defendant no.1 which enables extension of term of office bearers for a period of one year in times of exigencies— even then the decision taken on 29.11.2009 was a nullity as the extended period of one year came to an end on 05.11.2009. Mr. Rao has of course made the said submission without prejudice to his contention that Bye-law 45(a) was beyond the provisions of Section 6(hh) of the Trade Unions Act. In these circumstances, it was the contention of Mr. Rao that the subsequent notification dated 01.12.2009 issued by the Election Committee inviting nominations for various posts was also bad in law. Therefore, it was the submission of Mr. Rao that the challenge to the aforesaid actions of the Central Committee which in a sense is a progenitor of both the Election Committee and the Election Tribunal; are actions on which the Election Tribunal cannot adjudicate. The suit, therefore, in his submission was plainly maintainable. Mr. Rao further contented the fact that the plaintiffs had filed their nominations had been disclosed in the plaint. He also submitted that the other fact, which was that plaintiff Nos 1 and 2, had approached this Court by instituting CS(OS) No. 2337/2009 and obtained order dated 09.12.2009 permitting them to file their nominations and contest elections, has also been disclosed in the plaint. These actions, according to Mr. Rao, were triggered because of the misgivings which the plaintiffs have qua the actions of defendant no.2, who is the General Secretary of defendant no.1. In this connection, Mr. These actions, according to Mr. Rao, were triggered because of the misgivings which the plaintiffs have qua the actions of defendant no.2, who is the General Secretary of defendant no.1. In this connection, Mr. Rao contended that in the General Council?s meeting held on 16.11.2008, the members while approving the new set of Bye-laws of defendant no 1 proposed by the then Central Committee, had in no uncertain terms indicated that the elections will be held soon after the new set of Bye-laws were approved by the Registrar of Trade Unions, New Delhi (in short „Registrar of Trade Unions?). He stressed that the defendants had deliberately allowed time to lapse, and called for elections beyond the maximum time granted under Bye-law 45(a). In support of his submission, the learned counsel relied upon the judgment of this Court in Surender Pal Singh Chauhan & Anr. vs Bar Council of India & Ors. : 158(2009) DLT 697 at Page 711 (para 21) for the proposition that where a statute provides that a particular act has to be done in a particular manner it can be done only in that manner or not at all. 5. As against this Mr. Sandeep Sethi, learned Senior counsel appearing for defendant nos 1 and 2 and Mr. N K Kaul, learned Senior counsel appearing for defendant Nos. 3 to 7 supported their case for vacating the interim order on the grounds primarily articulated in their application preferred under Order 39 Rule 4 of CPC. They highlighted the fact that the disputes raised in the present suit could only be adjudicated upon by the duly constituted Election Tribunal. For this proposition they cited the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of N P Ponnuswami vs Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency , Namakkal, Salem Dist. & four Ors.: 1952 SCR 21 It was thus submitted that the jurisdiction of a Civil Court (including this Court) in these circumstances was completely ousted. The suit in their submission was not maintainable. The learned counsel in support of their submission stated that the election process had started in February, 2009 when, the amended Bye-laws were approved by the Registrar of Trade Unions. The suit in their submission was not maintainable. The learned counsel in support of their submission stated that the election process had started in February, 2009 when, the amended Bye-laws were approved by the Registrar of Trade Unions. Therefore, under Bye-law 57 which provides for constitution of an Election Tribunal, (in regard to which there being no substantial change both under the unamended and amended Bye-laws) disputes; if any, could be agitated by the plaintiffs before the Election Tribunal. It was submitted that the delay in holding elections was caused on account of various factors, which included the approval of the amended Bye-laws, the restructuring in the bank, and lastly because of large number of nominations which had been received from persons interested in participating, in the elections. On the issue of expiry of the term of the Central Committee, it was the submission of the learned counsel that the resolution of the General Council passed on 16.11.2008 whereby, amended Bye-laws were approved; ipso facto extended the term of the Central Committee. Therefore, the acts of the Central Committee were perfectly within the realm of law. In any event, they submitted that the law would not permit a vacuum to arise; meaning thereby that the Central Committee would not dissolve immediately upon completion of its term. It was submitted that the members elected to various committees including the Central Committee would continue to function as office bearers till such time fresh elections were held, and charge was handed over to the newly elected members. 5.1 Emphasis was laid on the conduct of the plaintiffs. It was submitted that not only had the plaintiffs participated in the elections by filing their nominations but had also approached this court, in regard to their right to participate, and obtained necessary interim orders in that regard. It was also contended that the plaintiffs were guilty of concealment in as much as, they had not disclosed facts pertaining to proceedings instituted by plaintiffs against the election of defendant nos 6 and 7. It was further contended that it had not been disclosed by the plaintiffs that amongst 140 posts results of 101 posts have been declared, out of which 99 candidates belonging to the defendants group had been elected unopposed. It was further contended that it had not been disclosed by the plaintiffs that amongst 140 posts results of 101 posts have been declared, out of which 99 candidates belonging to the defendants group had been elected unopposed. It was also contended that since Section 6(hh) of the Trade Unions Act does not provide for consequences of failure to hold elections, within the period of three years, the action of the Central Committee, if at all, was a mere irregularity, and therefore the elections held could not be set at naught only on this ground. Reliance in this regard was placed for this purpose on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Administrator, Municipal Committee, Charkhi Dadri & Anr vs Ramji Lal Bagla & Ors: AIR 1995 SC 2329 . It was also contended that the declaration of results could not be interdicted by this Court. Reliance was placed on the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Boddula Krishnaiah vs State Election Commissioner, A.P.” AIR 1996 SC 1595 . It was submitted that the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in the Ponnuswami’s case (supra) as well as in Boddula Krishnaiah’s case (supra) is applicable even to association such as defendant no.1. For this purpose, reliance was placed on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Narender Kumar Jain vs Govt. of NCT of Delhi : 2008 X AD(Delhi) 105. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. At an interlocutory stage defendants have raised an issue in an application under Order 39 Rule 4 of CPC with regard to the maintainability of the suit, this ground is premised on the Election Tribunal being validly constituted. It is not in dispute that in the context of the facts of this case and the peculiarity of the Bye-laws which govern defendant no.1 that the Election Tribunal is the progeny of the Central Committee if the old unamended Bye-laws were to apply, and that of the Executive Committee if the amended Bye-laws were to apply. It is not in dispute that in the context of the facts of this case and the peculiarity of the Bye-laws which govern defendant no.1 that the Election Tribunal is the progeny of the Central Committee if the old unamended Bye-laws were to apply, and that of the Executive Committee if the amended Bye-laws were to apply. For the purposes of a decision on this issue, it would really make no difference if recourse is taken to the amended or unamended Bye-laws, if I were to hold that on the expiry of term (including the extended term) of the office bearers their actions lacked legal sanctity or, in other words, were denuded of legal force. As indicated above, the Election Tribunal in the facts of this case takes its life and breath from the Central Committee or the Executive Committee. It is not a permanent body created by a statute or otherwise, to adjudicate upon the disputes pertaining to the “election process” of defendant no.1. 6.1 It is not in dispute that the decision to constitute an Election Tribunal was taken at the meeting of the Central Committee held on 29.11.2009. It is also not in dispute that the three years term expired on 05.11.2008 and the extended term expired on 05.11.2009. In these circumstances, the question which arises is; can the tribunal determine the validity of its own constitution. In my view, the answer has to be in the negative. It is well settled that a body cannot determine the validity of the very statute/instrument of which it is a creature. In this regard the observations of seven Judges of the Supreme Court in the case of L Chandra Kumar Versus. Union of India & Ors: (1997) 3 SCC 261 made in connection with the Tribunals constituted under Article 323 A and 323-B of the Constitution, at Page 309 being relevant, are extracted hereinbelow:- “….Before moving on to other aspects, we may summarise our conclusions on the jurisdictional powers of these Tribunals. The Tribunals are competent to hear matters where the vires of statutory provisions are questioned. However, in discharging this duty, they cannot act as substitutes for the High Courts and the Supreme Court which have, under our constitutional set-up, been specifically entrusted with such an obligation. The Tribunals are competent to hear matters where the vires of statutory provisions are questioned. However, in discharging this duty, they cannot act as substitutes for the High Courts and the Supreme Court which have, under our constitutional set-up, been specifically entrusted with such an obligation. Their function in this respect is only supplementary and all such decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the respective High Courts. The Tribunals will consequently also have the power to test the vires of subordinate legislations and rules. However, this power of the Tribunals will be subject to one important exception. The Tribunals shall not entertain any question regarding the vires of their parent statutes following the settled principle that a Tribunal which is a creature of an Act cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional. In such cases alone, the High Court concerned may be approached directly….” 6.1.1 In similar vein are the observations of Supreme Court in an earlier judgment of the court in the case of K. S. Venkataraman vs State of Madras AIR 1966 SC 1089 at page 1100 para 24 which being apposite, are extracted herein below: “24 ………..But an authority created by a statute cannot question the vires of that statute or any of the provisions thereof whereunder it functions. It must act under the Act and not outside it. If it acts on the basis of a provision of the statute, which is ultra vires, to that extent it would be acting outside the Act. In that event, a suit to question the validity of such an order made outside the Act would certainly lie in a civil court.” 6.1.1.2 Thus the issue of the validity of the resolution passed by the Central Committee on 29.11.2009 which pertains to the very constitution of the Election Tribunal, in my opinion, cannot be adjudicated upon by the Election Tribunal. 6.2 In this connection a submission was raised by the learned counsel for the defendants that the resolution passed at the meeting of the Central Committee on 29.11.2009 has not been challenged by the plaintiffs. In my opinion, this objection of the defendant misses the wood from the trees. 6.2 In this connection a submission was raised by the learned counsel for the defendants that the resolution passed at the meeting of the Central Committee on 29.11.2009 has not been challenged by the plaintiffs. In my opinion, this objection of the defendant misses the wood from the trees. A perusal of the prayers would show that they have a far greater amplitude, which certainly would bring within its fold, the challenge to both the resolution of the Central Committee dated 29.11.2009, as also the notification issued by the Election Committee on 01.12.2009. A “meaningful” reading of the averments in plaint and prayers would show that the core challenge is to the decisions of the Central Committee taken on 29.11.2009, and the notification issued by the Central Committee on 01.12.2009. By way of an example, averments made in Paragraphs 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, 19 and 20 of the plaint read with relief sought in prayer clause (iv) which has been extracted in the earlier part of my judgment, bring to fore the challenge to the decisions of both the Central Committee and Election Committee, quite emphatically. In the said prayer clause relief of declaration has been sought against acts carried out by defendant no.2 in his capacity as General Secretary of defendant no.1 after 05.11.2009. A perusal of the minutes of the meeting dated 29.11.2009, would show that it has been issued under the signatures of defendant no.2 i.e., Mr T N Goel. Therefore, in my view, the objection raised with regard to the reliefs sought is without merit. 6.2.1 There is another aspect of the matter. The Civil Court?s jurisdiction is governed by Section 9 of the CPC. Section 9 mandates that the Civil Courts will have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except those suits whose cognizance is either expressly or implicidly barred. The nine Judges of the Supreme Court in the case of Dhulabhai etc. vs State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr: AIR 1969 SC 78 have stated in paragraph 32 at Pages 89-90 that an exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions enunciated apply. The nine Judges of the Supreme Court in the case of Dhulabhai etc. vs State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr: AIR 1969 SC 78 have stated in paragraph 32 at Pages 89-90 that an exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions enunciated apply. While articulating various conditions, one of the conditions which the Supreme Court set down was that the jurisdiction of Civil Court was not excluded where there was challenge to the provisions of a particular act on the ground of it being ultra vires, which could not be brought before the tribunal constituted under the act. Therefore, in my opinion, the challenge to the resolution passed at the meeting the Central Committee on of 29.11.2009; which in a sense is an act, which gives birth to the Election Tribunal, could be maintained before a Civil Court. Therefore, the submission of the learned counsels for the defendants that the suit is not maintainable, in my view, deserves to be rejected. 6..3 Based on the undisputed facts there can be no doubt in my opinion; that both the original term as well as the extended term of the office bearer including that of the Central Committee came to an end on 05.11.2009. In a manner of speaking the Central Committee lost its soul on 05.11.2009. Can it then be countenanced that, it could, on 29.11.2009 take any decision — what to speak of decisions with regard to constitution of an Election Committee and an Election Tribunal, I think not. Acceptance of a submission to the contrary will be in the teeth of Section 6 (hh) of the Trade Unions Act and defendant no. 1?s own Bye-law 45(a). If the resolution dated 29.11.2009 falls, then the resolution of the Election Committee dated 01.12.2009 will meet the same fate. 6.4 The submission of the learned counsel for the defendants that the statute does not contemplate a vacuum or that the actions of the defendants are, if at all, a mere irregularity in as much as the statute or the Bye-laws did not provide for any consequences, in not holding elections within the original term of three years, or within the extended term; is an argument, in my view, which is misconceived in law. Under the scheme of the Bye-laws which govern defendant no.1, the organizational set up is provided in Bye-law 13 both under the amended and unamended Bye-laws. For the purposes of disposal of the present applications, it is only to be noted that the General Council which comprises of all ordinary & honorary members of defendant no.1 is the supreme body. Only to be noted that while unamended Bye-law - 13 provides for a Central Committee, the amended Bye-laws exclude the constitution of a Central Committee. Therefore, by its very nature the only permanent body is the General Council. Thus, the submission of the learned counsel for the defendants that a vacuum would be created as to who would govern the affairs of defendant no.1 is, in my view, untenable. In the absence of duly constituted committees which have been tasked to perform various functions under the Bye-laws, the decision with regard to the affairs of defendant no. 1 can always be taken at a meeting of the General Council convened by the requisite members provided under the Bye-law 17. There is, therefore, in my view, no vacuum in the organizational set up of defendant no.1. The judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Administrator, Municipal Committee, Charkhi Dadri & Anr (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the defendants for the proposition that since no consequences had been provided under Section 6(hh) of the Trade Unions Act with regard to what would happen if the three year term of office bearers were to expire and therefore in that sense, the actions taken beyond the tenure prescribed are mere irregularities is, in my view, not the ratio of the said case. 6.4.1 The facts in the Administrator, Municipal Committee, Charkhi Dadri & Anr (supra) were as follows: A notification under Section 42 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 was issued to acquire a piece of land within the boundary of Charkhi Dadri Municipality for implementing a scheme prepared by Charkhi Dadri Improvement Trust (in short „Trust?). The scheme was duly notified. Pursuant to the notification of the scheme, steps were initiated for acquiring the requisite parcel of land. Awards were passed, and compensation was also paid to persons interested in the land acquired. The possession of the land was also taken over by the Trust. The scheme was duly notified. Pursuant to the notification of the scheme, steps were initiated for acquiring the requisite parcel of land. Awards were passed, and compensation was also paid to persons interested in the land acquired. The possession of the land was also taken over by the Trust. In the context of these facts an issue arose whether given the provisions of Section 44-A of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922, the failure to execute the scheme notified by the Trust, within the stipulated period of five years from the date of notification would result in reversal of acquisition. Section 44-A of the said Act also contained a proviso which empowered the State Government to extend the said period if it was satisfied that, for reasons beyond the control of the Trust, the scheme could not be executed within the stipulated period. The Supreme Court in this context held that the main part of the provisions of Section 44-A which contained the word „shall? for the purposes of execution of the scheme within the prescribed period had to be read as "directory” and the acquisition could not be nullified which had become final, and thereby resulting in a situation whereby, the Trust was divested of its title. In coming to the conclusion that „shall? used in the context of the said provision was directory, the Court took notice of the proviso to Section 44-A which enabled the Government to extend the time According to me, observations made therein turned on the provisions of that particular statute. There is no such power conferred on any authority under the Act to extend time. As noticed hereinabove, Bye-law 45(a) provides for an extension by a period of one year after the expiry of the term of the elected members. Admittedly in the instant case even the extended period came to an end. I am not commenting for the moment on the submission made before me that the provisions of Bye-law 45(a) are ultra vires the provisions of the Trade Unions Act, in as much as, it is not presently necessary to do so for the purposes of deciding the captioned applications and the issues raised before me. I am not commenting for the moment on the submission made before me that the provisions of Bye-law 45(a) are ultra vires the provisions of the Trade Unions Act, in as much as, it is not presently necessary to do so for the purposes of deciding the captioned applications and the issues raised before me. 6.5 The submissions of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs based on the principles enunciated in the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of N.P Ponnuswami (supra) and Boddula Krishnaiah (supra) and those in the judgment of the Division Bench argued that the election process could not be interdicted. In my view, the said judgments are distinguishable for the reason that they were rendered in the context of bodies which stood created under the provisions of the Constitution or a Statute. Being mindful of the general principles enunciated in these cases, at the ex-parte stage, elections were not interdicted by me. The only protection which the plaintiffs were given was with regard to declaration of results as otherwise the entire suit would have been rendered infructuous. In my view, therefore, the judgments cited by the defendants will not help in finding a solution to the particular problem which has arisen in the facts of this case. It is equally well settled that judgment is binding for what it decides and not what logically follows from it. [See Bhavnagar University vs Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd (2003) 2 SCC 111 at page 130 paragraph 59] 6.6 I shall now deal with the aspect of relief, if any, which ought to be given to the plaintiffs. This also brings me to the submission of the learned counsels for the defendants that looking at the conduct of the plaintiffs the interim order granted by me on 001.2010 ought not to be continued. It cannot be disputed that the plaintiffs have disclosed the fact that they had filed their nominations for participation in the elections. The plaintiffs have also disclosed the fact that they have instituted a suit in this Court for that very purpose and obtained orders in that regard from a Single Judge of this Court. It cannot be disputed that the plaintiffs have disclosed the fact that they had filed their nominations for participation in the elections. The plaintiffs have also disclosed the fact that they have instituted a suit in this Court for that very purpose and obtained orders in that regard from a Single Judge of this Court. However, the issue as to whether non-disclosure of the fact that, out of 140 posts elections had been declared for 101 posts, and that 99 persons of the defendants group had been elected unopposed; or that plaintiffs had filed suits against defendant nos. 6 & 7 in the city civil court at Agra, ought to disentitle plaintiffs to protection of this court, is pivoted on both knowledge and materiality. 6.7 I find that this very issue has been articulated in the written statement filed by defendant nos 1 and 2. In response, in paragraph 8 of the replication, the plaintiffs have stated as follows:- “….The averments made in para 4 and 5 of the preliminary objections and the instant para clearly demonstrate the extent of manipulations in the election process as out of 140 posts, 101 posts have been elected unopposed. The contention of the answering defendants that results for 101 posts were declared on 26.12.2009 is totally false and frivolous and the documents supporting the same produced by the defendants no.1 and 2 is totally false and frivolous and fabricated as the same document was never brought to the knowledge of the plaintiffs nor the defendants no.3 and 4 to whom the said documents pertained to, mentioned about the same in their written statement. The extent of rigging and the mala fides behind the elections are further borne out from the fact that all the posts of (1) Regional Secretary, Special units Delhi; (2) Meerut Module; (3) Majority of Agra Module; (4) District Conveners and District Secretaries have been declared elected unopposed clearly showing that there was negligible participation of the members in the election process, whose very initiation was illegal and mala fide.,…” 6.8 A perusal of the aforesaid paragraph clearly shows that the plaintiffs have claimed that they have no knowledge of declaration of results on 26.12.2009 with regard to 101 posts. If this issue has been raised it could only be determined at the trial as to whether stand taken by the plaintiffs is factually correct. If this issue has been raised it could only be determined at the trial as to whether stand taken by the plaintiffs is factually correct. Similarly, with regard to institution of suit against defendant nos. 6 and 7, a perusal of the written statement would show that the allegation is qua the colleagues and not the plaintiffs. In paragraph 11 of the replication on the other hand it has been further clarified that apart from lack of knowledge the challenge is to the nominations of defendant nos. 6 and 7 and not elections. In any event, in my view, if the core issue raised by the plaintiffs is to be accepted, which is, that on the completion of the term of the Central Committee, the Central Committee ipso facto stood dissolved and any actions taken thereafter could have no legal effect, this aspect of the matter even if it is considered for the sake of argument was deliberately withheld, in my view would not be material and hence, lead to a situation that I would disentitle them to a relief which they would be otherwise entitled to. The observation of the Supreme Court in the case of SJS Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. vs State of Bihar & Ors: (2004) 7 SCC 166 at page 173 para 13 on what constitutes material information, being apposite, are extracted herein below. “13. As a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a litigant disqualifies such litigant from obtaining any relief. This rule has been evolved out of the need of the courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. But the suppressed fact must be a material one in the sense that it had not been suppressed it would have had an effect on the merits of the case. It must be a matter which was material for the consideration of the court, whatever view the court may have taken.” 7. In the context of the present case there is no doubt that the original tenure as well as the extended tenure of the officer bearers came to an end on 05.11.2009; would it then make a difference as to whether results of elections to posts, pursuant to a non-est election were disclosed or not. As to the number of candidates elected unopposed or otherwise, would have no impact on the issue raised before me. As to the number of candidates elected unopposed or otherwise, would have no impact on the issue raised before me. Mr Rao in his submissions, as a matter of fact, referred to the averments by the defendants in their application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC in CS(OS) No. 2337/2009 wherein it is stated that the unamended Bye-laws governed defendant no.1 and its members only till November, 2008, and thereafter it was governed by the amended Bye-laws. Based on this, it was argued that the unamended Bye-laws provided for a Central Committee, whereas after the amendment of the Bye-laws defendant no.1 had done away with the very existence of a Central Committee. Therefore, any which ways, according to Mr Rao, there was no Central Committee in existence on the date when evidently, a decision was taken to hold elections In my view, as indicated above, it would suffice for the purposes of disposal of the application if the submission of the plaintiffs that after 05.11.2009 the Central Committee stood ipso facto dissolved, is accepted. 8. The argument of the learned counsel for the defendants that by virtue of the resolution of the General Council dated 16.11.2008 the term of the Central Committee stood extended is also untenable, in my view. A bare reading of the resolution no.12 passed by the General Council on 16.11.2008 would show that the General Council by an unanimous resolution adopted the amended Bye-laws as proposed by the then Central Committee. The General Council further resolved that the new Bye-laws shall take effect from the next general election of the defendant no. 1 which, according to the resolution were to be held soon after the approval of the amended Bye-laws by the Registrar, Trade Unions. The defendants have accepted the fact that the amended Bye-laws were approved by the Registrar Trade Unions, in February, 2009; therefore, even if the argument of the defendants is to be accepted and the extended term of the Central Committee under Bye-law 45(a) is made applicable then, the elections necessarily had to be held before 05.11.2009. The argument of the defendants that the Central Committee?s tenure would extend beyond 05.11.2009, is without merit. The argument of the defendants that the Central Committee?s tenure would extend beyond 05.11.2009, is without merit. If I may add a general foot note to my judgment, which is that this precise argument of the defendants, unintendedly reflects the malaise which afflicts bodies, such as defendant no.1, which misuse such like provisions to perpetuate control by causing delay in holding elections on one pretext or the other. Such a submission is fraught with inherent danger of turning, what are essentially structured as democratic institutions, into a fiefdom of a few who control such associations and organizations. 8.1 My discussion hereinabove, would show that the plaintiffs not only have a strong prima facie case but the balance of convenience is also in their favour. 9. This brings me to the last part of the judgment as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case it would enure to the benefit of either party if the injunction order is confirmed. There are a few options available with the court: First, confirm the ad interim order. Second, vacate the interim order and tell the litigant (in particular, involving challenge to elections) even though you have a good chance of success at the final stage, at the interlocutory stage no relief can be granted since the suit and thereafter the parties involved would have to go through the grind of a trial. The third, is a surgical option which would be to cut the gordion knot and provide immediate relief to warring parties by enabling the General Council to call for fresh elections. Issuing mandatory order at an interim stage is rare but not without precedent. (See Dorab Cawasji Warden vs Coomi Sorab Warden & Ors (1990) 2 SCC 117 ) An order such as this always results in a loss of face for those already elected— but this is all for a good cause which is strengthening of the institution. Apart from the other aspects articulated above, what has also weighed with me is the fact that out of 140 posts, 101 posts have been won without opposition. If the defendants are truly as popular as the statistics suggest, then a re-election would not affect them and if they are not as invincible as they seem, a wrong would be righted. Either way, the institution, i.e., would stand to gain. 10. If the defendants are truly as popular as the statistics suggest, then a re-election would not affect them and if they are not as invincible as they seem, a wrong would be righted. Either way, the institution, i.e., would stand to gain. 10. In view of the discussions above, I am of the opinion that the interim order passed on 01.2010 will have to supplanted by calling for fresh elections. It is not doubted that the General Council of defendant no.1?s association is in position. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case it would, in my opinion, be appropriate if the Registrar of Trade Unions is directed to convene a meeting of the General Council to enable the General Council to decide as to the date, mode and manner in which elections be held to the posts provided under the extant Bye-laws. The Registrar of Trade Unions shall convene a meeting of the General Council of defendant no. 1 within the shortest possible time keeping in mind the provisions of the Trade Unions Act and the Bye-laws of defendant no. 1. Both at the convened meeting of the General Council and the elections held pursuant to it, the Registrar, Trade Union shall act as the observer. Within one week of the conclusion of the meeting of the General Council, and similarly within two weeks of the declaration of the results of election; a report shall be filed by the Registrar, Trade Union. The applications are disposed of accordingly.