JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner has challenged the judgment dated 11.01.2008 passed by the Rent Control Tribunal Jaipur City, Jaipur and the judgment dated 05.02.2010 passed by the Rent Control Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur. 2. Briefly stated, the petitioner happens to be a tenant of Sarojani Sharma, respondent No. 1 for the last thirty-five years. The petitioner is engaged in manufacturing of welding electrode holders and air pressure equipments. The said manufacturing is being carried out at House No. 150, Shiv Nagar, Dadi Ka Phatak. Respondent No. 1 filed a suit for eviction against the petitioner on the ground of bona fide necessity. In the suit, she claimed that she is an elderly person who is residing on the first floor of the house. But because of her old age, she finds it extremely difficult to climb the steps in order to reach her part of the house. She further claimed that she is residing with her daughter, Seema Sharma, respondent No.3. She further alleged that she and her daughter require the ground floor for their personal usage. The petitioner filed his reply and denied the averments. After going through the oral and documentary evidence, vide judgment dated 11.01.2008, the learned Rent Tribunal directed the petitioner to vacate the said premises. Since the petitioner was aggrieved by the said judgment, he filed an appeal before the learned Appellate Tribunal. However, vide judgment dated 05.02.2010, the learned Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal. Hence, this petition before this Court. 3. Mr. Shyam Arya has raised a single contention before this Court. According to him, since respondent No. 3, Seema Sharma, was already married, therefore, she could not be considered as a member of Sarojani Sharma's family. Therefore, the bona fide necessity of Seema Sharma could not be considered as a basis for evicting the petitioner. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the impugned judgments. 5. The word "family" has not been defined in the Rent Control Act, 2001. Thus, there is nothing in the Act to exclude a married daughter from being considered as a part of the family. According to respondent No. 1, despite the fact that her daughter was married, she was staying with her. Hence, the learned Tribunal and the learned Appellate Tribunal were justified in considering the bona fide necessity of respondent Nos. 1 & 3 simultaneously. 6. According to respondent No. 1, despite the fact that her daughter was married, she was staying with her. Hence, the learned Tribunal and the learned Appellate Tribunal were justified in considering the bona fide necessity of respondent Nos. 1 & 3 simultaneously. 6. A bare perusal of both the impugned orders clearly reveal that the learned Tribunal and the learned Appellate Tribunal have meticulously discussed the evidence which was produced before them. Thus, there is neither any perversity, nor any illegality in the impugned judgments. In the case of Shamshad Ahmad & Ors., (2008) 9 SCC 1 , while dealing with the powers of this Court under Article 227, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- "Through powers of a High Court under Articles 226 and 227 are very wide extensive over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, such powers must be exercised within the limits of law. The power is supervisory in nature. The High Court does not act as a court of appeal or a court of error. It can neither review nor re-appreciate, nor reweigh the evidence upon which determination of a subordinate court or inferior tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of fact or even of law and to substitute its own decision for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The powers are required to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts and inferior tribunals within the limits of law." 7. Therefore, this Court does not find any case for interfering with the impugned orders. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has requested that a reasonable time be given to the petitioner to vacate the premises. Since the request is a reasonable one, this Court directs the petitioner to vacate the premises within a period of three months from today i.e., 03.03.2010. 9. For the reasons stated above, this writ petition is devoid of any merit; it is, hereby, dismissed. However, the petitioner is granted three months' time to vacate the premises and to hand over the possession of the premises to respondent Nos. 1 and 3 immediately after completion of three months.Writ petition dismissed. *******