JUDGMENT : Chitra Venkataraman, J. The Petitioners herein seek the quashing of the common order of the Labour Court rejecting the petitions u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 2. The grievance of the Petitioner herein is that when the total number of persons who had made a petition before the Labour Court were 163 persons, the Tribunal considered the evidence of only one representative on behalf of the Petitioners, and Ors. have not let in any evidence; consequently, the order passed rejecting the petitions based on the evidence of only one witness is illegal and contrary to law. Quite apart, relying on Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, learned Counsel for the Petitioners contended that even though the Petitioners had come out of the company under a Voluntary Retirement Scheme and received the settlement, yet, some of the employees who had opted to go under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, continued to remain in service even after 1996 and that under a settlement reached in the year 1997, they had the advantage of a better settlement. Consequently, the Petitioners also merited to have the same benefit of settlement of the year 1997. Since the Respondent Management did not apply the settlement thus reached in the year 1997 in respect of the Petitioners herein, the Petitioners moved the Labour Court u/s 33-C(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 3. A perusal of the order of the Labour Court shows that the Petitioners had not established any right to file a petition u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. On the contrary, the Labour Court pointed out that the evidence of the Petitioners was in favour of the Respondent Management herein. Having regard to the fact that some of the Petitioners had already retired on attaining superannuation and some of the Petitioners had gone on Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) settlement u/s 18(1) of the Act on March 15, 1997, the Petitioners not being workmen during the relevant period, the question of extending the benefit of the settlement reached u/s 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act in the year 1997 did not arise. 4. The main grievance of the Petitioners herein is that instead of examining each one of the Petitioners in the course of proceeding before the Tribunal, only one Petitioner was examined. 4. The main grievance of the Petitioners herein is that instead of examining each one of the Petitioners in the course of proceeding before the Tribunal, only one Petitioner was examined. When there is a duty cast on the Labour Court to examine each one of the Petitioners, the failure on the part of the Petitioners to examine themselves, by itself, would not enable the Tribunal to merely accept the case, of the Respondents. Consequently, the order of the Labour Court has to be set aside. 5. I do not agree with the said submission of the learned Counsel for the Petitioners herein for the following reasons. When the documents filed in this case by the Petitioners did not establish any subsisting rights of the Petitioners as on the date of entering into the Section 18(1) settlement, rightly, the Labour Court held that the Petitioners had No. locus standi at all to claim the benefit of settlement. The Petitioners do not deny, as a matter of fact, that on the date of the Section 18(1) settlement, they were not the employees of the Respondent. 6. Considering Exhibit P-1, I do not find, any amount of oral evidence would be of any assistance to the Petitioners. Thus the Petitioners not establishing any right to be part of the settlement of the year 1991 rightly the Labour Court dismissed the petition u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 7. It is seen from the petition filed before the Labour Court and from the order passed by the Labour Court that as on the date of Section 18(1) settlement on March 15, 1997 there were only 169 employees in the Union and the Petitioners were not members of the union. None of the Petitioners numbering 174 signed in the requisitions, as like Exhibit P-1. There were No. dispute raised by any of them. The evidence of Kathirvel P.W.1 clearly pointed out that from 1988 to 1997, there were No. settlement between the Management and the Workers' Union. 46 persons retired before the date of Section 18(1) settlement. With the; number of persons who had gone in for Voluntary Retirement Scheme numbering 174, the contention of the Petitioners herein in the petition filed before the Labour Court shows that the workers who had gone in for V.R.S. had; admittedly signed a settlement with the Management. 46 persons retired before the date of Section 18(1) settlement. With the; number of persons who had gone in for Voluntary Retirement Scheme numbering 174, the contention of the Petitioners herein in the petition filed before the Labour Court shows that the workers who had gone in for V.R.S. had; admittedly signed a settlement with the Management. It is also admitted in the petition that they had received the money due and payable under the V.R.S. for 128 workers and further 28 workers went in for V.R.S. between: June 1995 and March 1996. The averments in the petition filed, in paragraph 6, show that they had gone on retirement and that they had received the benefits due and payable under the Scheme. In the background of the said fact, the order of the Labour Court needs to be seen. 8. The Labour Court referred to Section 18(1) and Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and pointed out that any, settlement reached u/s 18(1) of the Act will have relevance and have a binding force only in respect of those who were signatories to the settlement. A perusal of the settlement marked as Exhibit P-1 shows that the Petitioners were members of the Union and were signatories to the settlement. Hence, going by Exhibit P-l, the Labour Court held that none of the conditions or Clauses therein would be relevant to the Petitioners' case. The Labour Court referred to the evidence of the one and only witness who deposed on behalf of the Petitioners. 9. It is relevant to note herein that, to a specific question raised, P.W. 1 stated that there was No. agreement, between the Management and the Petitioners to insist on payment of amount as per Exhibit P-1. It is also admitted therein that all the Petitioners had either retired on attaining superannuation or "Had gone in for V.R.S. settlement. In the background of the admitted case of the Petitioners that they are not parties to the Section 18(1) settlement and that they were not in service as on the date of the settlement reached, rightly, the Labour Court came to the conclusion that the Petitioners are not entitled to any relief. Quite apart from that, in the absence of any pre-existing right to invoke Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the petition is not maintainable. 10. Quite apart from that, in the absence of any pre-existing right to invoke Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the petition is not maintainable. 10. To a specific question raised by this Court to the Petitioners' counsel as to why rest of the Petitioners had not deposed,- there is No. immediate answer. The only submission made by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners is that, it is the responsibility of the Tribunal to see that, the Petitioners should let in evidence. I fail to understand the said line of reasoning, particularly when even by the documentary evidence Exhibit P-l, the Petitioners could not establish that the same applied to their case too. The fact that none of the other Petitioners had been examined is not of any consequence to this case, since the dispute herein does not look upon any oral evidence for the purposes of the decision making process. Given the fact that none of the workers were signatories to Exhibit P-1 and that the company itself was closed after March 14, 1997 and further a settlement had already taken place, I fail to understand the contention of the Petitioners herein that they are entitled to have the benefit u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 11. Learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent Management placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court Vijay Kumar and Others Vs. Whirlpool of India Ltd. and Others, (2008) 1 SCC 119 , both as regards the scope of Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the entitlement of a worker seeking the benefit of a settlement that had happened long after his opting for a golden hand shake. The Apex Court referred to the decision A.K. Bindal and Another Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (2003) 5 SCC 163 , wherein, it was pointed out that once an amount is paid to an employee under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, he ceased to be under the employment of the Company or the Undertaking. He leaves all his rights and there is No. question of his again agitating any claim whatsoever with his erstwhile employer. He leaves all his rights and there is No. question of his again agitating any claim whatsoever with his erstwhile employer. If the employee is still permitted to raise any grievance regarding enhancement of any pay scale from a retrospective date even after he had opted for Voluntary Retirement Scheme and had accepted the amount paid to him, the whole purpose of introducing the scheme would be, totally frustrated. The Apex Court further referred to the decision State Bank of India Vs. Ram Chandra Dubey and Others, (2001) 1 SCC 73 , particularly with reference to Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and held that the benefit sought to be enforced u/s 33-C(2) of the Act is necessarily dependent on a pre-existing right. When a worker is entitled to receive any money or benefit from his employer which is capable of being computed in terms of money and the same is denied to the workman, then alone he can approach the Labour Court u/s 33-C(2) of the Act. In the absence of any such preexisting right, the question of invoking Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act does not arise. 12. Similar is the law declared by this Court in Management of Binny Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Principal Labour Court, (2009) 5 MLJ 1489 (Mad-NOC) wherein, after analysing the decision of the Apex Court as to the scope of Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court held as follows; 6. An analysis of the above law laid down by the Supreme Court would lead to the following settled positions of law, viz: (1) there must be a pre-existing right on the workman to file an application u/s 33-C(2) of the Act; (2)while dealing with an application u/s 33-C(2) of the Act, the Labour Court is in position of an executing Court; (3) the Labour Court, is called upon to compute and calculate the monetary benefit only on the basis of pre-existing right of the workman? (4) the Labour Court cannot entertain and adjudicate upon a petition u/s 33-C(2) when the entitlement itself is in dispute; and (5) an application u/s 33-C(2) is not maintainable, if the petition is filed on disputed facts which require adjudication by the Labour Court. 13. (4) the Labour Court cannot entertain and adjudicate upon a petition u/s 33-C(2) when the entitlement itself is in dispute; and (5) an application u/s 33-C(2) is not maintainable, if the petition is filed on disputed facts which require adjudication by the Labour Court. 13. In the light of the decisions of the Apex Court and this Court when we look at the admitted fact position herein, it is evident that as on the date of Section 18(1) Settlement on March 15, 1997, as under Exhibit P-1, none of the Petitioners were there as workmen to have the benefit of the settlement. In the absence of any pre-existing right to claim the benefit under Exhibit P-1, or for that matter, even to maintain an application u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, I fail to understand the contention of the Petitioners that on the basis of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Petitioners are entitled to the relief as sought for. Quite apart from this, as pointed out by the learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent -Management, the Memorandum of Settlement under Rule 25 of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958, entered into between the Petitioners and the Management, shows that the retiring employees agreed that on receipt of the compensation, they would have No. other claim whatsoever against, the Management. Thus, the employees accepted the payment as full and final settlement of all dues. Having signed the said agreement for Voluntary Retirement Scheme Settlement, I do not find any justification in the contention of the Petitioners herein that over and above what had been agreed and received by the Petitioners, they would also be entitled for the settlement under Exhibit P-1. 14. Going by the provisions of Section 33-C(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act on the finding of the Tribunal that there is No. pre-existing right for the Petitioners, a fact which has not been disproved by the Petitioners herein, I do not find any justification to accept the contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners. They are bound by the individual settlement reached by them with the Management. Consequently, the Petitioners not being parties to the Section 18(1) of the settlement, they are not entitled to any relief. 15. In the above circumstances, the writ petition has to be dismissed. They are bound by the individual settlement reached by them with the Management. Consequently, the Petitioners not being parties to the Section 18(1) of the settlement, they are not entitled to any relief. 15. In the above circumstances, the writ petition has to be dismissed. As regards the non-examination of other witnesses, the Petitioners having not chosen to examine themselves as witnesses in respect of their respective claims and further, when the documentary evidence were good enough to reject the contention of the Petitioners that the scope of the oral evidence to be let in is almost nil, I do not find any justification in the plea of the Petitioners that the award suffers a patent illegality for this Court to interfere. 16. Consequently, the writ petition stands dismissed. No. costs.