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2010 DIGILAW 490 (ORI)

Saroj Kumar Mohapatra v. State of Orissa

2010-07-21

B.K.PATEL

body2010
ORDER 21.07.2010 In this revision the petitioner has assailed the legality of that part of the impugned Order dated 28.8.2008 by which the prayer to discharge him was rejected & that part of the conse¬quential Order Dated 18.9.2008 by which charge u/s. 13(2) read with 13(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, ‘the Act’) as well as Sections 420 & 120-B of the I.P.C. was framed against him by the Learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Jeypore in G.R. Case No.29 of 1998. 2. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner & Learned Counsel for the Vigilance Department was heard as length. Also in course of hearing Learned Counsel for the Vigilance Department produced records of the case. 3. Allegations in the case relates to corruption in the matter purchase of PVC Cables by the Superintending Engineer (Electrical Circle), Jeypore (for short, ‘SEE’) between 1995 & 1996. During the period of occurrence the Petitioner was working as Technical Assistant (TA) to the SEE. Two of the co-accused persons were working as Executive Engineer & Assistant Engineer (Finance) respectively. The other co-accused was the supplier of PVC Cables. 4. Berhampur Vigilance P.S. Case No.29 of 1998 correspond¬ing to G.R. Case No.29 of 1998 of the Court of Special Judge (Vigilance), Berhampur was registered on 6.8.1998 on the basis of First Information Report submitted by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance Cell-II, Cuttack against the Petitioner & four others. On completion of investigation charge-sheet was submitted against said five persons & Chief Engineer (RE. & D), Orissa. It is alleged that on 7.5.1996 the SEE purchased 300 meters of 185 mm 2 3.½ Core PVC Armoured Cable & 150 mm 2 3½ Core PVC Armoured Cable from M/s. Maruti Sales, Balasore at the rate of Rs.658 & 604 per meter respectively violating his financial limits without inviting tenders. Similar types of cables had been purchased by the Chief Engineer (R.E. & D.) Orissa, Bhubaeswar from M/s. Cables India, Balasore at price of Rs.251 & Rs.205 per meter respectively excluding 25% excise duties. Gist of the allegations as narrated in the charge-sheet reads as follows : “That Sri Pahallad Pal was working as SEEC, Jeypore up to November, 1996. Similar types of cables had been purchased by the Chief Engineer (R.E. & D.) Orissa, Bhubaeswar from M/s. Cables India, Balasore at price of Rs.251 & Rs.205 per meter respectively excluding 25% excise duties. Gist of the allegations as narrated in the charge-sheet reads as follows : “That Sri Pahallad Pal was working as SEEC, Jeypore up to November, 1996. During his incumbency as such he conspired with proprietor of M/s. Maruti Sales, Balasore & purchased PVC Cables 185 mm 2 3.½ Core & 150 mm 2 3.½ Core Armoured PVC Cables of 300 & 150 meters. from him who is neither a manufacturer on much higher rates than the prevailing market rate also in excess rate causing excess payment of Rs.2,07.650 to the supplier M/s. Maruti Sales, Balasore & corresponding loss to Govt. violating Circular. No. AW/EEC/2/85 No.9339 (12) dt. 25.3.85 of OSEB Regulation, thereby BRM. Vig. PS Case No.29 dt. 6.8.98 u/s. 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) PC Act & Sec. 420/120-B, IPC was registered. During investigation it is established that Sri Prahallad Palo, Ex. SEEC, Jeypore U.C. Mahapatra, Ex-AFM, OLEB, Jeypore, Balakrishna Das, Ex-E.E. Electrical Division, Jeypore, Sri Saroj Kumar Mohapatra, Ex-TA to SEEC, Jeypore & Manoj Kumar Mohanty, Ex. CE (RE & D), Orissa, BBSR connived with Pawan Saraogi, Pro¬prietor M/s. Maruti Sales, Balasore & violating all the rules of Purchase of PVC (Head office Purchase item) decided in purchase committee held on 1.6.95 & 7.6.95 to purchase PVC Cables of 185 mm 2 3.½ Core 150 mm2 3.½ Core amoured of 300 meters each from M/s. Maruti Sales, Balasore, a private firm who is neither a manufacturer nor a roven supplier, on which more higher rates than the rate of manufacturer & placed purchased orders 3104, 3098 dt. 3.1.95 to M/s Maruti Sales, Balasore, as a result of which total a sum of Rs.2,62,380.00 was paid excess to M/s Maruti Sales, Balasore causing the corresponding loss to OSEB due to such pecuniary gain to the party. Thus, the above persons (public servants) have shown undue official favour to M/s. Maruti Sales, Private Ltd. for their pecuniary gain in furtherance of their conspiracy & thus they are liable u/s. 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Act & Sections 420 & 120 B IPC, after obtaining sanction prosecution from government, charge sheet No.12 dt. 13.6.2001 submitted to stand their trial on the Court of law.” (sic). 5. 13.6.2001 submitted to stand their trial on the Court of law.” (sic). 5. It was submitted by the Learned Counsel for the Peti¬tioner that admittedly the Petitioner was posted as TA to the SEE. It was contended that so far as the Petitioner is concerned, his duty was to assist the SEE on technical matters only. Allega¬tions made in the case relate to financial irregularities with regard to purchase of PVC Cables from an unauthorized agency at higher rate without inviting tenders. There is no allegation that Cables procured for the Department did not conform to the re¬quired technical standard of were inferior in quality. It was further argued that the Petitioner was not a part of the decision making process in the matter of purchase of cables. For the purpose, in accordance with the Regulation for procurement of stores by Superintending Engineers & Executive Engineers of OSEB, 1985, a purchase committed consisting of SEE, Senior most Execu¬tive Engineer & Assistant Finance Manager was duly constituted & the Petitioner was required to act as the convener of the commit¬tee. Prior Permission was obtained from the Chief Engineer to Purchase PVC Cables. It was the purchase committee which took decision regarding modalities of purchase. The Petitioner has been maliciously implicated in the case without any rhyme & reasons. 6. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the Vigi¬lance Department that orders of rejecting the petition to dis¬charge an accused & framing of charge-against an accused being interlocutory orders are not amenable to the revisional jurisdic¬tion. Therefore, the revision is not maintainable. Learned Coun¬sel for the Vigilance Department further contended that in his capacity as TA to the SEE, the Petitioner was required to submit his views in the files required to be dealt with by the Commit¬tee. 7. Objection of the Learned Counsel for the Vigilance Department to the maintainability of the revision is based on the bar contained in Section 397 (2) of the Cr.P.C. & Section 19(3)(c) of the P.C. Act to the effect that the powers of revi¬sion shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order. The objection is, therefore, required to be considered upon appreciation of the nature of embargo contained in the above provisions. In this context, it is pertinent to refer to the observations in Bhaskar Industries Lt.d v. Bhiwani Denim & Appar¬els Ltd. & Ors.: 2001 (II) OLR (SC) 613. The objection is, therefore, required to be considered upon appreciation of the nature of embargo contained in the above provisions. In this context, it is pertinent to refer to the observations in Bhaskar Industries Lt.d v. Bhiwani Denim & Appar¬els Ltd. & Ors.: 2001 (II) OLR (SC) 613. It was observed : “8. The interdict contained in Section 397 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short “the Code”) is that the powers of revision shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocu¬tory order. Whether an order is interlocutory or not, cannot be decided by merely looking at the order or merely because the order was passed at the interlocutory stage. The safe test laid down by this Court thought a series of decisions is this; if the contention of the Petitioner who moves the superior Court in revision, as against the order under Challenge is upheld, would the criminal proceeding as a whole culminate ? It they would, then the order is not interlocutory in spite of the fact that it was passed during any interlocutory stage. 9. A Three-Judge Bench of this Court in Madhu Limaya v. State of Maharashtra : (1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 10 : AIR 1978 SC 47 , laid down the following test : “[An order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which, when accepted, will conclude the particular proceeding, will surely be not an interlocutory order with the meaning of Section 397 (2)”. 10. The above position was reiterated in Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v. Uttam : (1999) 3 SCC 134 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 393. Again in KK Patel v. State of Gujarat : (2000) 6 SCC 195 : 2001 (SC) (Cri) 20, this Court stated thus : “It is now well-nigh settled that in deciding whether an order challenged is interlocutory or not as for Section 397 (2) of the Code, the sole test is not whether such order was passed during the interim stage (vide Amar Nath v. State of Haryana : (1977) 4 SCC 137 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 585, Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI & Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v. Uttam). The feasible test is whether by uphold¬ing the objections raised by a party, it would result in culmi¬nating the proceedings, if so any order passed on such objections would not be merely interlocutory in nature as envisaged in Section 397 (2) of the Code. In the present case, if the objec¬tion raised by the Appellants were upheld by the Court the entire prosecution proceedings would have been terminated. Hence, as per the said standard, the order was revisable.” 8. In Kamaljit Singh v. State of Orissa : 55 (1983) C.L.T. 565, a Division Bench of this Court categorically held that an order framing a charge is not an interlocutory order. It was held : “In the case of Khirod alias Khirodra Debata v. State of Orissa, after referring to & relying on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, this Court & other High Courts in a number of reported cases including Mohanlal Maganlal Thakur v. State of Gujrat, Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, Madhu Limaya v. State of Maharashtra, V.C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I., P. Chiranjivi v. Principal, M.K.C.G. Medical College, Berhampur, Mohanlal Devdanb¬hai Chokshi v. J.S. Wogh, Jhaveri v. Sheila Dadlani & Dattatraya Narayan Samant v. State of Maharashtra, this Court held that an order framing a charge under the Code is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397 (2) of the Code & there¬fore, a criminal revision lies against such an order. The present revision against the order framing a charge against the Petition¬er is, therefore competent & maintainable.” 9. In this connection, decision of this Court in Jasobant Narayan Mohapatra & two others v. State of Orissa & two others (2008) 41 OCR 263 may also be referred to. 10. Interlocutory order has been defined neither in the Cr.P.C. nor in the P.C. Act. An order may be final for one pur¬pose & interlocutory for another & final as to part & interlocu¬tory as to part. Any order which substantially affects rights of the accused or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to bar a revision against the order. An order which is an order of moment for an accused does not come within the ambit of interlocutory order so far as that accused is concerned. Any order which substantially affects rights of the accused or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to bar a revision against the order. An order which is an order of moment for an accused does not come within the ambit of interlocutory order so far as that accused is concerned. In the present case, the impugned orders are assailed on the ground that criminal proceedings against the Petitioner is vexatious & without material basis. Such being the nature of challenge made against the impugned order, obviously in case the question raised in the revision is answered in the affirmative, the prosecution against the peti¬tioner is liable to be terminated bringing finality to the pro¬ceeding so far as it relates to him. Therefore, there is no merit in the preliminary objection raised against maintainability of the revision. The impugned order is not an interlocutory order & the embargo contained u/s. 397 (2) of the Cr.P.C. & Section 19(3)(c) of the P.C. Act, not to exercise powers to revision in relation to an interlocutory order, is not applicable to this revision assailing framing of charge against the petitioner. 11. Now adverting to the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner it is observe that petitioner was admittedly TA to the SEE. His duty was to assist the SEE in matters which required technical evaluation. With regard to matters pertaining to fi¬nance, office of the SEE has the services of audit officers & finance officers. Clause 6.1 of the Regulation for procurement of Stores by Superintending Engineers & Executive Engineers of O.S.E.B., 1985 provides :- “A purchase Committee for each Circle is formed under the Chairmanship of the Superintending Engineer of the Circle. The Technical Assistant of the Circle will act as the convener of the Committee. The senior most Executive Engineer & the Internal Audit Officer of the Circle will be the members of the Committee.” In accordance with the Regulation, in the present case, a Purchase Committee of the Circle consisting of the SEE, Assistant Finance Manager & the Senior most Executive Engineer of the Circle was constituted. By virtue of his office as the TA to the SEE the Petitioner was the Convener of the Purchase Committee. Petitioner was not a member thereof. Decision for purchase was taken by the Purchase Committee. By virtue of his office as the TA to the SEE the Petitioner was the Convener of the Purchase Committee. Petitioner was not a member thereof. Decision for purchase was taken by the Purchase Committee. There is no allegation in the case that cables decided to be purchased by the Committee had any technical deficiency. Allegations in the case are confined to purchase at higher rate from an agency which was neither a manu¬facturer nor a regular supplier without inviting tender. Purchase price was determined agency for supply was identified & modali¬ties for purchase were laid down by the Purchase Committee. As the Convener the petitioner had no role to play in arriving at such decisions. Neither the petitioner was competent to offer views or render suggestions in such matters in view of the nature of the office he was holding. As the Convener of the Committee, he was required to convene the sittings of the purchase committee members to meetings & decide. In such circumstances, materials on record do not indicate that the petitioner had any role to play in the alleged irregularities in purchase of cables. Nothing has been placed on record to indicate that the petitioner committed criminal misconduct of the nature as provided u/s. 13(1)(d) of P.C. Act so as to incur liability for punishment u/s. 13(2) of P.C. Act or committed offence of cheating so as to incur liabili¬ty for punishment u/s. 420 of I.P.C. Also no circumstance appears indicating conspiracy on the part of the petitioner to commit such offence in order to be proceeded for commission of offence u/s. 120-B of I.P.C. petitioner has been indiscriminately impli¬cated in the case without any material, direct or circumstantial, to suggest his complicity. Therefore, proceeding against him amounts to abuse of process of Court exposing the petitioner to unwarranted harassment. The impugned orders having been passed without application of mind are liable to be set aside. 12. In view of the above, the revision is allowed. Criminal proceeding as against the petitioner in G.R. Case No.29 of 1998 of the Court of Learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Jeypore is dropped. Revision allowed.