Order The petitioner company entered into a contract with the railways for carrying out certain 'civil work' in the year 2005. On 1.2.2008 the said agreement was terminated by the Railways. There were mutual allegations of default. Arbitration was sought by a letter of the petitioner dated 29.2.2008. A panel of three arbitrators entered upon reference on 25.7.2008. The arbitration is still pending. 2. In the meantime, the petitioner entered into four other contracts with the Railways which are dated 3.4.2008, 16.6.2008, 26.6.2008 and 12.11.2008 respectively. On 3.11.2009 Railways issued a notice directing withholding payment of Rs. 4,42,35,921/- from the running bills of the petitioner in respect of the aforesaid other four contracts. Apparently, this amount represents the claim of the Railways in respect of the contract of 2005. 3. It is common ground that the amount has been withheld from the running bills of other contracts by way of lien permissible under Clauses 52 and 52A of the General Conditions of the Contract (GCC for short) which were part of the 2005 agreement. 4. The petitioner relies upon a letter of the Railways dated 4.10.1990, a copy of which has been enclosed as Annexure to the writ petition. In that letter it has been stated that the implementation of the aforesaid Clause 52 of GCC causes problems because a contractor who had defaulted in respect of one contract, slows down the work of other undisputed contracts on the apprehension that his running bills of the other contracts would be withheld. The circular therefore requests incorporation of necessary amendment to Clause 52 of GCC. 5. However, it is not disputed that this request was not implemented because despite this circular of 1990, in the petitioner's agreement of 2005 Clause 52 of GCC remained as before. 6. Therefore, the circular at best represents a line of thinking or an idea which was not in fact implemented. Therefore, the Court has to go by the conditions of the Clause 52 as it stands, and not by the un implemented ideas. 7. 6. Therefore, the circular at best represents a line of thinking or an idea which was not in fact implemented. Therefore, the Court has to go by the conditions of the Clause 52 as it stands, and not by the un implemented ideas. 7. The petitioner has relied upon another circular dated 12/16.5.2006 enclosed as annexure to the supplementary affidavit which indicates that subsequent to the petitioner's agreement, the Railways decided to incorporate in future agreements a clause requiring the contractors to furnish a "performance guarantee" to the extent of 5% of the contract value in the form of a bank guarantee which was enforceable in the event of default. This is a subsequent event and may be relevant for other future• agreements in which such a clause has been actually incorporated, but is not relevant for the agreement of 2005 which does not contain any such provision .for performance guarantee. 8. At this point, it may also be mentioned that despite the requirement of incorporating the condition regarding performance guarantee, the Railways have retained Clause 52 of the GCC in its original shape and form. 9. Before 'proceeding further with regard to the other submissions of the petitioner it may be clarified at this point that there are two distinct although consequential issues involved. 10. The first question involved is whether the Railways are or are not entitled to recover the amount of Rs. 4,42,35,921/- in respect of 2005 contract. 11. The second question is that if the Railways are entitled to recover the aforesaid amount whether the lien in respect of the said amount can be so exercised as to withhold payment of running bills of other independent agreements between the Railways and the petitioner. 12. So far the first question is concerned, that is directly covered by the arbitration proceedings and therefore, if the contention of the petitioner is that the said amount is not recoverable in respect of 2005 contract, the remedy of the petitioner lies in seeking injunction in the pending arbitral proceedings against such recovery. Therefore, I do not consider it proper for this Court to pre-empt the injunction jurisdiction of the arbitral proceeding for examining this issue. 13. So far as the second issue about the permissibility of withholding running bills of other agreements as lien is concerned, the same has been done in terms of the aforesaid Clause 52. 14. Therefore, I do not consider it proper for this Court to pre-empt the injunction jurisdiction of the arbitral proceeding for examining this issue. 13. So far as the second issue about the permissibility of withholding running bills of other agreements as lien is concerned, the same has been done in terms of the aforesaid Clause 52. 14. The petitioner assails such action basically on two grounds: (i) That Clause 52 of the• GCC is liable to be struck down as being unconscionable, and the petitioner was made to sign on the pre-printed conditions of contract and the petitioner and the Railways were unequal in bargaining power. (ii) The other ground is that from 1.2.2008 when the contract of 2005 was terminated till 3.11.2009 when the notice for withholding payment from running bills of other agreements was given by the Railways, no such recovery was indicated to the petitioner by the Railways and on that basis the petitioner was induced to enter into the four fresh contracts on 3.4.2008, 16.6.2008, 26.6.2008 and 12.11.2008. 15. So far as the first ground aforesaid is concerned, the petitioner has placed reliance upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in. the case of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly reported in (1986) 3 SCC 156 and in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Boghara Polyfab Pvt. Ltd. reported in (2009) 1 SCC 267 . 16. Both the above cases were such where the oppressed party was under distress, having no option except to sign on the dotted line. In the case of Central Inland Water Transport .Corporation (supra) the choice was between signing on the dotted line or losing the fob, whereas in the second case of National Insurance Company Ltd. (supra), the insured had suffered major losses to the business by virtue of heavy rains and flooding and was therefore desperate to salvage the loss. 17 .In the present case the petitioner company does not appear to have been under any such or similar distress when it entered into the agreement of 2005. Despite repeated requests, learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to show any decision where this principle of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation has been applied to a cause of free tendering and award of contracts. Despite repeated requests, learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to show any decision where this principle of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation has been applied to a cause of free tendering and award of contracts. In fact the Supreme Court itself says in para 89 of (1986) 3SCC 156 as follows:- "This principle, however; will not apply where the paramount power of the contracting parties is equal or almost equal. This principle may not apply where both the parties are businessmen and the contract is a commercial transaction." 18. Accordingly, I am unable to come to a conclusion as a fact, on the facts and circumstances of the present case, that when the petitioner entered into the contract of 2005 there was such distress because of which the petitioner had no choice except to sign on the dotted line. 19. Moreover, whether the decision of the Railways to incorporate a condition like Clause 52 of GCC in its agreement with the contractors is or is not likely to be in the ultimate long term public interest is largely a question of policy to be decided by the Railways. The isolated idea in the circular of 1990 was not implemented by suitably modifying Clause 52. May be further thinking and experience persuaded the Railways to keep the Clause 52 intact. 20. In policy matters it is not for this Court under Article 226 of the• Constitution of India to modify agreements of .a commercial nature upon a mere view that another policy would have been a better policy. 21. Therefore, I am of the view that Clause 52 cannot be discarded by this Court on the ground that it is unconscionable or opposed to public policy. 22. So far as the second submission is concerned, it is based on some kind of principle of estoppel. In substance, the petitioner's contention is that by delaying the notice of recovery the Railways induced the petitioner to enter into the four subsequent agreements. I do not find any pleading in the writ petition that if the petitioner had known that Clause 52 of the GCC was likely to be enforced, the petitioner would not have entered into the subsequent four agreements with the Railways. I do not find any pleading in the writ petition that if the petitioner had known that Clause 52 of the GCC was likely to be enforced, the petitioner would not have entered into the subsequent four agreements with the Railways. Thus, for want of pleadings on this issue no findings can be recorded about whether the railways are estopped from exercising the lien under Clause 52 because of the delay in the action on the part of the railways. 23. The remaining contention about the action of exercising of lien being mala fide or arbitrary is concerned, it has already been indicated above that if the petitioner wants to contend that recovery of the amount was not permissible on such grounds, that would be a matter to be raised in the prayer for injunction in the arbitral proceedings. 24. Accordingly, the petitioner's contentions fail and the writ petition is dismissed.