Judgment This order shall govern the disposal of W.P. No. 12882/2009 and W.P. No. 4467/2009 as both the petitioners arise out of the recommendations dated 22-2-2008 by the Madhya Pradesh Human Rights Commission whereby on a complaint by one Genda Rani Yadav and the enquiry in the complaints the Commission found the police personnel offending the human rights of the complainant recommended compensation to the victims and action against the police personnels responsible for the violation of human rights. 2. The Writ Petition No. 12882/09 is at the instance of the Police Officers who were held guilty of violating the human rights. Whereas W.P. No. 4467/2009 is by the victim seeking implementation of the recommendations as early as possible. As well quashing the criminal case registered against the petitioner in W.P. No. 4467/2009. 3. The Commission, on the basis of the enquiry into the complaints of breach of human rights of one Genda Rani Yadav tendered the following recommendations : - xxx    xxx 4. The facts giving rise to the enquiry and the impugned recommendation is the incident which took place on the intervening night of 7/8-12-2006 when a police party under the petitioner who at the relevant point of time was Incharge Police Station, Sarrai Chhatarpur, went to execute a pending warrant of arrest against one Ramshu Yadav @ Ramesh Yadav issued by Judicial Magistrate First Class Navgaon in Case No. 1388/2006. In the process whereof, some altercations took place and the fire shot at in the air by Constable No. 62 Balli Prasad, ricocheted and the pallets hit one Ku. Mendabai, aged about 11 years and Lochan Singh (petitioner in W.P. No. 4467/2009). Ku. Mendabai later on succumbed to the injuries. The incident resulted in lodging of the cases Criminal Case No. 273/2006 was registered against Ramshu Yadav @ Ramesh Yadav under Crime No. 273/2006 for an offence under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 323, 294, 553 and 332, IPC. Criminal Case No. 274/06 under Section 336, IPC was registered, against the petitioner. These cases it is stated at bar still pending adjudication. 5. Criminal Case No. 274/06 under Section 336, IPC was registered, against the petitioner. These cases it is stated at bar still pending adjudication. 5. That an application under Section 12 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 was filed before the Commission by one Smt. Gendabai alleging that on the intervening night of 7/8-12- 2006 the petitioner (in W.P. No. 12882/2009) along with the police party entered her house and started beating her husband and other male members of the house. It was alleged that, the money from Pheran Singh was snatched and the villagers who under the pretext that the house was under siege of dacoits came to rescue were fired at as a result whereof Ku. Mendabai and Lochan Singh sustained injuries. The complainant claimed compensation of Rs. 10 lacs and an appropriate legal action against the offenders of human rights. 6. The Commission, after receiving the complaint, directed for an enquiry by order dated 24-2-2007. On 26-5-2007 the Enquiry Officer Shri O.K. Reddy, Dy. Superintendent of Police submitted his report concluding that the mid-night of 7/8-12-2008 at about 12.30 a.m. the then Incharge K.D. Singh (petitioner No. 1 in W.P. No. 12882/2009) reached Village Ganeshpuri to execute permanent arrest warrant and without taking respectable persons along with him entered into the house of absconder Ramshu Yadav and arrested him. The wife of Ramshu Yadav @ Ramesh Yadav Kusma and cousin brother Faren Singh were present in the house. Seeing the police force suddenly and thinking that some ante-social elements entered their house, they raise commotion. Hearing the commotion, the uncle, viz., Lochan Singh and his two sons, mother Gendrani and father Chandrabhan Yadav armed with axes and other weapons attacked the police force and got Ramshu Yadav released. Because of the sudden attack, the police force, who were present in civil dress, felt threatened and then Balli Patel and other fired some bullets, which hit Lochan Singh and Menda Bai, aged about 11 years. Seeing the situation, K.D. Singh (petitioner No. 1) and his staff absconded from the place of incident. After reaching the Police Station, Garhi Malhar, the petitioner No. 1, registered an offence under Sections 307, 147, 148, 149, 323, 294, 353, 332, 224 and 225 (Kha) of the IPC. 7. Seeing the situation, K.D. Singh (petitioner No. 1) and his staff absconded from the place of incident. After reaching the Police Station, Garhi Malhar, the petitioner No. 1, registered an offence under Sections 307, 147, 148, 149, 323, 294, 353, 332, 224 and 225 (Kha) of the IPC. 7. The Commission of the basis of report prima facie found the violation of human rights and by order dated 26-5-2007 directed issuance of notice under Section 16 of the Act of 1993.The order stipulated that the notices be informed that before filing their reply they are entitled to inspect the record with the Commission and also to have copy of documents after depositing requisite fees. 8. Notices were issued, petitioner (in W.P. No. 12882/2009) entered appearance and on 16-7-2007 demanded the copy of documents. The demand was accepted and the Commission directed to supply the copies after depositing the requisite copying fees. The petitioners were also advised to file, reply, documents, affidavits in support of their contentions. The matter was then posted for 19-11-2007, on the said date the case was adjourned and posted for 3-1-2008. 9. On 3-1-2008 the Commission after affording an opportunity to submit the explanation (joint explanation was also permitted) closed the matter for recommendation. 10. Thereafter, vide recommendation dated 22-2-2008 the Commission besides compensating Lochan Singh tjy awarding compensation of Rs. 50,000/- and Ku. Mendabai, by awarding Rs. 5 lacs, recommended action against the police personnels, petitioners herein. 11. The petitioner against whom action is recommended are before this Court with a sole grievance that as contemplated under Section 16 of the Act 1993, the petitioners were not given the reasonable opportunity of hearing. 12. Relying upon the judgments in State of U.P. and others Vs. Sarjoj Kumar Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC 772 ; Nagarjuna Construction Co. Ltd. Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others, (2008) 16 SCC 276; M.P. Human Rights Commission Vs. State of M.P., AIR 2002 MP 239 and State of Haryana Vs. Som Datt Ex Constable, 1981 (1) SLR 647, it is urged by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that, the reasonable opportunity of hearing as guaranteed under Section 16 of the Act of 1993 is not an empty formality but is an absolute right of the persons against whom the proceedings regarding violation of human rights are initiated. Som Datt Ex Constable, 1981 (1) SLR 647, it is urged by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that, the reasonable opportunity of hearing as guaranteed under Section 16 of the Act of 1993 is not an empty formality but is an absolute right of the persons against whom the proceedings regarding violation of human rights are initiated. It is urged that despite of the demand for the copy of relevant documents the same were not supplied free of cost but was subjected to deposit of requisite copying fees. It is urged that the clog which was put in form of copying fee violated the provisions of Section 16 of the Act, 1993. It is contended that since there was a denial of reasonable opportunity of hearing the recommendations based on such proceedings are liable to be quashed being vitiated. 13. The respondents on their turn, however, support the recommendations. 14. The learned Govt. Advocate appearing for the State of M.P. has to submit that in pursuance to the recommendations by the Commission, the compensation as awarded has been paid and the action against responsible police personnel is also initiated. Learned Government Advocate further submits that the recommendations being based on enquiry and the petitioners having been given the opportunity of hearing are not entitled for any relief. 15. The learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 2, the Commission, also supports the recommendations on the ground that the same has been in a proceedings drawn as per Section 16 of the Act of 1993, and after affording opportunity of hearing. It is urged that since the recommendations are based on finding which in turn is based on cogent materials on record, no interference is warranted. It is accordingly contended that the petitions are liable to be dismissed. 16. Having considered the rival submissions the core question which crops up for determination is whether there is denial of reasonable opportunity of hearing merely because the petitioners who were though given opportunity to inspect of the record were asked to deposit requisite copying fees to have the documents. 17. Undoubtedly, Section 16 guarantees reasonable opportunity of hearing to persons likely to be prejudicially affected. It provides for- "16. 17. Undoubtedly, Section 16 guarantees reasonable opportunity of hearing to persons likely to be prejudicially affected. It provides for- "16. Persons likely to be prejudicially affected to be heard.- If, at any stage of the inquiry, the Commission- (a) considers it necessary to inquire into the conduct of any person; or (b) is of the opinion that the reputation of any person is likely to be prejudicially affected by the inquiry; it shall give to that person a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the inquiry and to produce evidence in his defence: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply where the credit of a witness is being impeached." The provision is based on a basic principle that all actions against a person which involves adverse consequences must be in accordance with the principle of natural justice [See : State of U.P. Vs. Shatrughanlal, (1998) 6 SCC 651 ; M.P. Human Rights Commission Vs. State of M.P., AIR 2002 MP 239 ]. However, as observed by their Lordships in K.I. Tripathi Vs. State Bank of India, AIR 1984 SC 273 , that "the Rules of natural justice are flexible and cannot be put on any rigid formula...... it has to be established that the prejudice has to have been caused to the party concerned by the procedure followed". (Paragraph 41) 18. In the present context as per the provisions under Section 16, having access to the relevant documents on the basis whereof the proceedings are initiated may be an integral part of the procedure, but to have a free copy of such documents would then tantamount to stretching to far the principle of natural justice. 19. None of the judgments relied upon by the petitioner [except State of Haryana Vs. Som Datt Ex. Constable (supra)], deals with the specific issue which has arisen in this petition. Whereas, in Som Datt (supra), the learned Single Judge without adverting to relevant rules which governed the service conditions of the delinquent therein, expressed its opinion which in the considered opinion of this Court has no persuasive value. 20. In this context, this Court is profited by the judgment in Rajpur Ruda Meha and others Vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1980 SC 1707 , wherein Their Lordships were pleased to observe :- "6......... 'pondering over the issue in depth would not be a precedent binding on the Courts........." In Krishena Kumar Vs. 20. In this context, this Court is profited by the judgment in Rajpur Ruda Meha and others Vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1980 SC 1707 , wherein Their Lordships were pleased to observe :- "6......... 'pondering over the issue in depth would not be a precedent binding on the Courts........." In Krishena Kumar Vs. Union of India and others and other connected matters, (1990) 4 SCC 207 , Their Lordships were pleased to observe :- 19. The doctrine of precedent, that is being bound by a previous decision, is limited to the decision itself and as to what is necessarily involved in it. It does not mean that this Court is bound by the various reasons given in support of it, especially when they contain "propositions wider than the case itself required". This was what Lord Selborne said in Caledonian Railway Co. Vs. Walker's Trustees, 1882(7) AC 259 and Lord Hajsbury in Quinn Vs. Leathem, (1901) AC 495 (502). Sir Frederick Pollock has also said : "Judicial Authority belongs not to the exact words used in this or that judgment, nor even to all the reasons given, but only to the principles accepted and applied as necessary grounds of the decision." 20. In other words, the enunciation of the reason or principle upon which a question before a Court has been decided is alone as a precedent. The ratio decidendi is the underlying principle, namely, the general reasons or the general grounds upon which the decision is based on the test or abstract from the specific peculiarities of the particular case which gives rise to the decision. The ratio decidendi has to be ascertained by an analysis of the facts of the case and the process of reasoning involving the major premise consisting of a pre-existing rule of law, either statutory or judge-made, and a minor premise consisting of the material facts of the case under immediate consideration. If it is not clear, it is not the duty of the Court to spell it out with difficulty in order to be bound by it. In the words of Halsbury, 4th Edn., Vol. If it is not clear, it is not the duty of the Court to spell it out with difficulty in order to be bound by it. In the words of Halsbury, 4th Edn., Vol. 26, Para 573 : "The concrete decision alone is binding between the parties Jo it but it is the abstract ratio decidendi, as ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject-matter of the decision, which alone has the force of law and which when it is clear it is not part of a Tribunal's duty to spell out with difficulty a ratio decidendi in order to be bound by it, and it is always dangerous to take one or two observations out of a long judgment and treat them as if they gave the ratio decidendi of the case. If more reason than one are given by a Tribunal for its judgment, all are taken as forming the ratio decidendi." 33. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. To adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things which are settled. But it applies to litigated facts and necessarily decided questions. Apart from Art. 14 of the Constitution of India, the policy of Courts is to stand by precedent and not to disturb settled point. When Court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable adhere to certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases where facts are substantially the same. A deliberate and solemn decision of Court made after argument on question of law fairly arising in the case, and necessary to its determination, is an authority, or binding precedent in the same Court, of in other Courts of equal or lower rank in subsequent cases where the very point is again in controversy unless there are occasions when departure is rendered necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice. It should be invariably applied and should not ordinarily be departed from where decision is of long standing and rights have been acquired under it, unless considerations of public policy demand it. But in Nakara it was never required to be decided that all the retirees formed a class and no further classification was permissible." In State of U.P. Vs. Harendra Arora and another, AIR 2001 SC 2319 , it was observed by Their Lordships:- "13. But in Nakara it was never required to be decided that all the retirees formed a class and no further classification was permissible." In State of U.P. Vs. Harendra Arora and another, AIR 2001 SC 2319 , it was observed by Their Lordships:- "13. The matter may be examined from another view point. There may be cases where there are infractions of statutory provisions, rules and regulations. Can it be said that every such infraction would make the consequent action void and/or invalid ? The statute may contain certain substantive provisions, e.g., who is the Competent Authority to impose a particular punishment on a particular employee. Such provision must be strictly complied with as in these cases the theory of substantial compliance may not be available. For example, where a rule specifically provides that the delinquent officer shall be given an opportunity to produce evidence in support of his case after the close of the evidence of the other side and if not such opportunity is given, it would not be possible to say that the inquiry was not vitiated. But in respect of many procedural provisions, it would be possible to apply to theory of substantial compliance or the test of prejudice, as the case, may be. Even amongst procedural provisions, there may be some provisions of a fundamental nature which have to be complied with and in whose case the theory of substantial compliance may not be available, but the question of prejudice may be material. In respect of procedural provisions other than of a fundamental nature, the theory of substantial compliance would be available and in such cases objections on this score have to be judged on the touchstone of prejudice. The test would be, whether the delinquent officer had or did not have a fair hearing. In the case of Russel Vs. Duke of Norfolk,. (1949) 1 All ER 109, it was laid down by the Court of Appeal that the principle of natural justice cannot be reduced to any hard and fast formulae and the same cannot be put in a straitjacket as its applicability depends upon the context and the facts and circumstances of each case. " In H.C. Sarin Vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1976 SC 1686 , Their Lordships were pleased to observe :- "25. " In H.C. Sarin Vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1976 SC 1686 , Their Lordships were pleased to observe :- "25. In the entire background of this case we find a passage occurring at Page 803 in the judgment of Lord Denning, Master of the Rolls in the case of R Vs. Secy. of State for the Home Department exparte Mughal, (1973) 3 All ER 796, quite apposite to be quoted. The passage runs thus :- "The rules of natural justice must not be stretched too far. Only too often the people who have done wrong seek to invoke 'the rules of natural justice' so as to avoid the consequences." In The Chairman, Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines and another Vs. Ramjee, AIR 1977 SC 965 , Their Lordships were pleased to observe:- "13.......Natural justice is no unruly horse, no lurking land mine, nor a judicial cure-all. If fairness is shown by the decision-maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features and the fundamentals of such essential processual propriety being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of. Unnatural expansion of natural justice without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case, can be exasperating. We can neither be financial nor fanatical but should be flexible yet firm in this jurisdiction. No man shall be hit below the belt - that is the conscience of the matter should be flexible yet firm in this jurisdiction. No man shall be hit below the belt - that is the conscience of the matter. 14. Shri Gambhir, who appeared as amicus curiae and industriously helped the Court by citing several decisions bearing on natural justice, could not convince us to reach a contrary conclusion. It is true that in the context of Article 311 of the Constitution this Court has interpreted the quality and amplitude of the opportunity to be extended to an affected public servant. Certainly we agree with the principles expounded therein. But then we cannot look at law in the abstract or natural justice as a mere artifact. Nor can we fit into a rigid mould the concept of reasonable opportunity, Shri Gambhir cited before us the decisions State of Gujarat Vs. Teredesai, (1970) 1 SCR 251 = AIR 1969 SC 1294 ; Management of DTI] Vs. But then we cannot look at law in the abstract or natural justice as a mere artifact. Nor can we fit into a rigid mould the concept of reasonable opportunity, Shri Gambhir cited before us the decisions State of Gujarat Vs. Teredesai, (1970) 1 SCR 251 = AIR 1969 SC 1294 ; Management of DTI] Vs. B.B.L. Majelay, (1973) 2 SCR 114 = ( AIR 1972 SC 2452 ) and K.C. Tandon Vs. Union of India, (1974) 4 SCC 374 = AIR 1974 SC 1589 , and one or two other rulings. The ratio therein hardly militates against the realism which must inform "reasonable opportunity" or the rule against bias. If the authority which takes the final decision acts mechanically and without applying its own mind, the order may be bad, but if the decision-making body after fair and independent consideration, reaches a conclusion which tallies with the recommendations of the Subordinate Authority which held the preliminary enquiry, there is no error in law. Recommendations are not binding but are merely raw material for consideration. Where there is no surrender of judgment by the Board to the recommending Regional Inspector, there is no contravention of the canons of natural justice. We agree with Shri Gambhir that the adjudicating agency must indicate in the order, at least briefly, why it takes the decision it does, unless the circumstances are so clear that the concluding or decretal part of the order speaks for itself even regarding the reasons which have led to it. It is desirable also to communicate the report of the Inquiry Officer, including that part which relates to the recommendation in the matter of punishment, so that the representation of the delinquent may be pointed and meaningful." 21. In the case at hand the documents on record reveals that the inspection of relevant documents to the petitioners were never denied, nor was there any denial to supply the documents, but the supply was subjected to depositing requisite copying fee. That petitioners have failed to establish as to how the demand of copying fee caused prejudiced. In the considered opinion of this Court since the petitioners were afforded the reasonable opportunity of hearing by the Commission before recommending an action; no interference is warranted and the petition W.P. No. 12882/2009 is hereby dismissed. 22. That petitioners have failed to establish as to how the demand of copying fee caused prejudiced. In the considered opinion of this Court since the petitioners were afforded the reasonable opportunity of hearing by the Commission before recommending an action; no interference is warranted and the petition W.P. No. 12882/2009 is hereby dismissed. 22. Regarding W.P. No. 4467/2009, since as per the contentions of the respondent State of M.P. the recommendation by the Commission since have been implemented no further order to that effect is warranted. Regarding the quashment of proceedings forming subject matter of S.T. No. 24/2008, no case is made out by the petitioner; therefore, the prayer for quashment of S.T. No. 24/2008 is declined. 23. In view of above W.P. No. 4467/2009 is disposed of; whereas W.P. No. 12882/2009 dismissed. However, no costs.