Judgment 1. Appellant is the lessee of the respondent in respect of a shop in Vijayawada town. He established jewellery shop. Mentioning that the appellant committed default in payment of rents, the respondent got issued a quit notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act (for short ‘the T.P. Act’). Stating that his demand was not acceded to, he filed O.S.No.714 of 2005 in the Court of III Additional Junior Civil Judge, Vijayawada, for the relief of, a) eviction of the appellant from the premises, b) recovery of arrears of rent, from 01-11-2004 to 31-03-2005, and c) direction to the appellant to pay the damages for occupation of the premises @ Rs.4,800/- per month, with effect from 01-04-2005, till the date of delivery of premises. The appellant did not dispute the factum of his being the lessee of the premises. However, he pleaded that there are no arrears of rent, and that he is not liable to be evicted. The trial Court dismissed the suit, through its judgment dated 18-09-2006. 2. The respondent filed A.S.No.38 of 2007 in the Court of VIII Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Tract Court), Vijayawada. The appeal was allowed on 06-04-2010. Hence this Second Appeal, under Section 100 of C.P.C. 3. Sri V.V.L.N. Sarma, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the trial Court dismissed the suit on finding that there are no arrears of rent, and that the quit notice marked as Ex.A-3, is defective, and that the lower Appellate Court reversed the decree passed by the trial Court, without there being any proper basis. He contends that the notice was defective and inoperative in law, inasmuch as it did not contain the signature, either of the respondent or his counsel. Learned counsel has also made elaborate arguments, touching on the merits, such as, payment of certain amount to one Sri D. Durga Reddy, the erstwhile tenant. 4. Sri V.S.R. Anjaneyulu, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that the trial Court proceeded as though it was necessary for the respondent herein to prove the existence of arrears of rent, as in the proceedings under the special Rent Control laws. 4. Sri V.S.R. Anjaneyulu, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that the trial Court proceeded as though it was necessary for the respondent herein to prove the existence of arrears of rent, as in the proceedings under the special Rent Control laws. He contends that the findings recorded by the trial Court, on both the issues, framed by it, are perverse and contrary to evidence on record, and the lower Appellate Court has corrected the error committed by the trial Court. He further contends that, except pleading that the copy of the notice received by him did not contain signature of any one, the appellant did not take any steps, to prove it. 5. The respondent filed the suit for eviction of the appellant and for recovery of arrears of rent, as well as damages for use and occupation of the premises. On the basis of the pleadings before it, the trial Court framed two issues, viz., i) whether the plea of default raised by the respondent herein is true and correct ? And ii) Whether the quit notice dated 09-03-2005 (Ex.A-3) issued by the respondent, terminating the tenancy of the appellant is valid and binding on the appellant? 6. The respondent deposed as PW-1 and has spoken about the contents of the plaint. He has filed Exs.A-1 to A-11. Important among them is Ex.A-3, the quit notice, and Ex.A-5, the reply, issued by the appellant. Rest of the documents comprise of postal acknowledgements, copies of accounts, etc. The appellant deposed as DW-1, and one Mr. Durga Reddy was examined as DW-2. Exs.B-1 is the receipt said to have been issued by DW-2; and Exs.B-2 and B-3 are photographs and negatives, receipts, respectively. 7. The trial Court answered both the issues against respondent and dismissed the suit. In the appeal, the lower Appellate Court framed two points, viz., 1) Whether the quit notice, Ex.A-3, is not valid? 2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover the arrears of rent for five months? And 3) Whether the respondent herein is entitled to claim damages, and if so, at what rate? All the points were answered in favour of the respondent. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant has concentrated on the validity of Ex.A-3. The contention advanced in that behalf is that, it did not contain the signature, either of the respondent or his counsel. 9. All the points were answered in favour of the respondent. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant has concentrated on the validity of Ex.A-3. The contention advanced in that behalf is that, it did not contain the signature, either of the respondent or his counsel. 9. It is no doubt true that Section 106 of the T.P. Act mandates that a notice requiring a lessee to vacate the leased premises must be, a) in writing, and b) signed by the lessee, or any person authorized by him. Ex.A-3 is the office copy of the notice, got issued by the respondent. There is no dispute that it contains the signature of the Advocate, who issued it. The plea of the appellant was that the copy received by him did not contain the signature of the person, who issued it. The only way to prove this fact was by filing the copy of the notice, received by the appellant, into the Court. That, however, was not done. This is not a case where the suit was decreed ex parte. Not only the pleadings were complete, but also oral and documentary evidence was adduced by both the parties. 10. The trial Court framed an issue, touching on the validity of the quit notice. However, its discussion on this issue revolved around the contents of notice, than the form. Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the judgment of the trial Court were devoted for discussion on this issue. In paragraph 10, the discussion was about the authenticity of the G.P.A holder of the respondent herein, to get the notice issued, and non-issuance of receipts for the rent. The discussion in that paragraph is summed up with the following observations: “Para-10: …The plaintiff by not issuing the rent receipts for the month’s of November, 2004 to January, 2005 has cleverly made out a plan to get rid of the defendant and got issued then quit notice by the defendant with unclean hands. The plaintiff has not even chosen to prove the Ex.A2 GPA by producing the B. Srinivasa Rao as a witness to the suit proceedings. No reasons have been stated as to why the said Srinivasarao could not be examined...” In paragraph 11, the discussion was about the deposit of Rs.50,000/-, said to have been made by the appellant, with DW-2, a previous tenant. No reasons have been stated as to why the said Srinivasarao could not be examined...” In paragraph 11, the discussion was about the deposit of Rs.50,000/-, said to have been made by the appellant, with DW-2, a previous tenant. The conclusions arrived at by the trial Court reads: “Para-11: …Since the alleged quit notice dated 09-03-2005 does not contain mention about the refund of deposit made by the defendant, it cannot be held to be true, valid and binding on the defendant. Accordingly, I hold that the quit notice dated 09-03-2005 is not true, not valid and not binding on the defendant.” 11. The approach of the trial Court was not at all in consonance with the requirements of law. Strictly speaking, issue No.1, framed by the trial Court, viz., whether the appellant herein committed default in payment of rent, ought to have been considered, only for the limited purpose of ascertaining the liability to pay the arrears, in the event of being evicted. However, the finding recorded by the trial Court to the effect that there are no arrears of rent payable, was treated as a ground for dismissal of suit. The observations on issue No.2, extracted above, clearly indicate that the findings are perverse and totally untenable in law. Even assuming that the contents of quit notice are not correct, they become irrelevant. The reason is that the purpose, which a notice under Section 106 of the Act intended to serve, is, only to put the lessee, of notice, of the intention of the lessor, to terminate the lease. Here itself, it needs to be added that, a lessor is not at all under any obligation to state the reasons, in support of his decision to terminate the lease. In fact, the trial Court itself took note of this fact, at the commencement of paragrapha 11, where it said, “It is true that, as per Section 106 of the T.P. Act, no reasons are necessary to be given in the quit notice, for eviction of the tenant…. However, it proceeded to add, “But the equity demands that, when the tenant is claiming that he had deposited a particular amount with landlord, the landlord is supposed to offer return of the said amount in his quit notice…” Once the relationship between the parties are governed by provisions of law, equity has no role to play. 12. However, it proceeded to add, “But the equity demands that, when the tenant is claiming that he had deposited a particular amount with landlord, the landlord is supposed to offer return of the said amount in his quit notice…” Once the relationship between the parties are governed by provisions of law, equity has no role to play. 12. On dismissal of the suit, respondent carried the matter in appeal, and it was pending before the Appellate Court for three years. At a stage when the appeal was about to be disposed of, the appellant filed I.A.No.47 of 2010, under Rule 27 of Order 21 C.P.C., with a prayer to receive the documents, i.e. the copy of Ex.A-3, said to have been received by him. The lower Appellate Court dismissed the I.A., through order dated 06-04-2010. The appellant pleaded that, as many as three applications were filed before the trial Court viz., for reopening of the evidence; recalling the witnesses; and receiving .the copy of Ex.A-3 on the date on which the judgment in the trial Court was pronounced. The lower Appellate Court observed that the application filed does not fit into the parameters stipulated in Rule 27 of Order 41 C.P.C., and dismissed the I.A. The net result is that there is no evidence adduced by the appellant, to substantiate his contention, that the quit notice was not signed at all. It is a different matter that the appellant has filed C.R.P.no.2022 of 2010, feeling aggrieved by the order in I.A.No.47 of 2009, and this Court has dismissed the same, through a separate order, today itself. 13. The lower Appellate Court has framed three points, covering three different facets of the prayer in the suit. On every point, extensive discussion was undertaken, and specific findings were recorded. It has referred to the relevant precedents, touching on the important point urged by the appellant. Reference was made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in PARWATI BAI v. RADHIKA ( AIR 2003 SC 3995 ). It was held by the Supreme Court that the objection as to invalidity or infirmity of notice under Section 106 of the T.P. Act must be raised “specifically”, and at the earliest, and any failure in this regard would lead to waiver, even if there existed any defect. Other judgments on similar lines were also referred to. It was held by the Supreme Court that the objection as to invalidity or infirmity of notice under Section 106 of the T.P. Act must be raised “specifically”, and at the earliest, and any failure in this regard would lead to waiver, even if there existed any defect. Other judgments on similar lines were also referred to. The plea raised by the appellant in his written-statement, on this aspect, was vague, general and untenable. At any rate, the copy of Ex.A-3 received by the appellant, was not made part of record. 14. One important aspect is that, in case the copy of the quit notice received by the appellant did not contain any signature, the appellant would have pointed out the same, in his reply notice, which was marked as Ex.A-5. A perusal of Ex.A-5 discloses that no such effort was made. The opening sentence of the reply notice, Ex.A-5, on which the edifice of argument is built by the appellant, reads as under: “By perusing the notice, one cannot understand as to who has sent the said notice”. 15. The context in which the observation, “one cannot understand as to who has sent the said notice” appears to be that the notice was issued by an Advocate on the instructions of the General Power of Attorney of the lessor. From this, it cannot be discerned that the notice did not contain any signature, at all. If that were to be so, it would have been pointed out prominently. This Court does not find any basis to entertain the Second Appeal. Hence, the Second Appeal is dismissed. 16. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that his client needs reasonable time to make alternative arrangements. Normally, this Court would not entertain the request for grant of time, in matters arising under the T.P. Act. However, there is no serious opposition from the respondent, on this aspect. 17. Hence, the appellant is granted time, till the end of December, 2010, to vacate the premises, subject to the condition that he shall deposit the amount covered by the decree, within two months from today, and shall continue to pay the damages determined by the lower Appellate Court, on or before 10th of every month, commencing from August, 2010. There shall be no order as to costs.