JUDGEMENT J.N.Singh, J. 1. The order of dismissal of petitioner issued under the signature of the then Director, Health Services (Respondent No. 3) contained in Memo No. 541 dated 15.6.2001, annexed as Annexure-11, is under challenge in this writ application. The order passed by the appellate authority (Annexure-15) is also under challenge alongwith the said dismissal order. 2. The order (Annexure-11) apparently has been passed by the respondent no. 3 invoking his powers under clause (b) of second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. Mere reference to clause (b) of second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India makes it clear that there was no inquiry and no show cause notice was issued and no opportunity was given to the delinquent prior to the order of his dismissal issued by the respondent Director. Invoking powers under the said clause (b) presupposes that the disciplinary authority was satisfied that recourse to the procedural requirements of said clause (b) was found not reasonably practicable. Recourse to this exceptional clause puts a burden on the authority, invoking the powers, to satisfy a court of law, in case of a challenge (as in this case), that his satisfaction for taking recourse to the said clause was based on objective considerations. Hence, in view of the challenge in this case by the petitioner to the exercise of powers by respondent no. 3 invoking his powers in terms of the said clause (b) for dismissing him, burden lay on the respondents to satisfy this Court that the exercise of powers by the disciplinary authority, namely, respondent no. 3, was within the parameters of the powers of a disciplinary authority under the said clause. Therefore, learned counsel for the respondents was called upon to advance his arguments first, on the question of satisfaction of the disciplinary authority, namely, respondent no. 3, in invoking the said clause (b) of Article 311(2). 3. Opening is arguments, learned counsel for the respondents straightway placed reliance on the celebrated case of Union of India V/s. Tulsiram Patel, reported in (1985)3 S.C.C. 398 to justify the action of respondent Director. He referred to paragraphs 61, 64, 70, 159, 160 and 172 of the judgment in particular. 4. In paragraph 61 of the said judgment, the Apex Court discussed the applicability of clause (b) of second proviso to Article 311(2) in the following words: "61. He referred to paragraphs 61, 64, 70, 159, 160 and 172 of the judgment in particular. 4. In paragraph 61 of the said judgment, the Apex Court discussed the applicability of clause (b) of second proviso to Article 311(2) in the following words: "61. The language of the second proviso is plain and unambiguous. The keywords in the second proviso are "this clause shall not apply". By "this clause" is meant clause (2). As clause (2) requires an inquiry to be held against a Government servant, the only meaning attributable to these words is that this inquiry shall not be held. There is no scope for any ambiguity in these words and there is no reason to give them any meaning different from the plain and ordinary meaning which they bear. The resultant effect of these words is that when a situation envisaged in any of the three clauses of the proviso arises and that clause becomes applicable, the safeguard provided to a Government servant by clause (2) is taken away. As pointed out earlier, this provision is as much in public interest and for public good and a matter of public policy as the pleasure doctrine and the safeguards with respect to security of tenure contained in clauses (1) and (2) of Article 311." 5. In paragraph 64, the Apex Court did not accept the submissions on behalf of the respondents that even the language of clause (b) to the second proviso did not negate every single opportunity to the Government servant for showing his innocence and convincing the disciplinary authority against the proposed penalty. 6. In paragraph 70, the Apex Court laid absolute proposition that in the language of clause (b) to the second proviso no scope for any kind of opportunity was contemplated which was expressed in the following terms: "70. The position which emerges from the above discussion is that the keywords of the second proviso govern each and every clause of that proviso and leave no scope for any kind of opportunity to be given to a Government servant. The phrase "this clause shall not apply" is mandatory and not directory. It is in the nature of a constitution prohibitory injunction restraining the disciplinary authority from holding an inquiry under Article 311(2) or from giving any kind of opportunity to the concerned Government servant. The phrase "this clause shall not apply" is mandatory and not directory. It is in the nature of a constitution prohibitory injunction restraining the disciplinary authority from holding an inquiry under Article 311(2) or from giving any kind of opportunity to the concerned Government servant. There is thus no scope for introducing into the second proviso some kind of inquiry or opportunity by a process of inference or implication....." 7. In paragraph 159 of the said judgment referred to by learned counsel for the respondents, the Apex Court only discussed the provisions of CISF Act which also contained a similar clause like clause (b) of second proviso to Article 311(2). 8. In paragraph 160, the Apex Court has discussed the gravity of the situation arising in the case and found that the act of the respondents virtually amounted to a mutiny as the Army and the members of the Force, to which respondents belonged, were involved in a pitched battle and held that "no person with any reason or sense of responsibility can say that in such a situation the holding of an inquiry was reasonably practicable. 9. In the last paragraph referred to by learned counsel for the respondents i.e. paragraph 172, arguments on behalf of the respondents of the case with respect to quantum and extent of punishment was noticed and it was held that it would depend upon the gravity of the situation at a particular centre and the extent to which the alleged acts, though not serious in themselves, in conjunction with acts committed by others, contributed to the bringing about of the situation. 10. Heavily relying upon the above judgment and particularly, abovementioned paragraphs, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that once the disciplinary authority (respondent no. 3) was satisfied that holding of any inquiry was not reasonably practicable, any sort of opportunity to the petitioner was not required to be given and, only on the basis of materials available with the disciplinary authority, he rightly invoked his jurisdiction and exercised his powers under the said clause (b) of proviso to clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. 11. At this place, it is useful to reproduce provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India, as relevant, for the purposes of this case: "311. 11. At this place, it is useful to reproduce provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India, as relevant, for the purposes of this case: "311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State. (1) No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges: Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed: Provided further that this clause shall not apply (b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or (3) If, in respect of any such person as aforesaid, a question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry as is referred to in clause (2), the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce him in rank shall be final." 12. The provisions of clause (3) of Article 311 of the Constitution of India, as quoted above, makes it clear that the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority with regard to holding of an inquiry as referred to in clause (2) being not reasonably practicable has to be taken as final. However, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that, as laid down long back by the Apex Court, the said satisfaction is not beyond the judicial scrutiny of the courts under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that, as laid down long back by the Apex Court, the said satisfaction is not beyond the judicial scrutiny of the courts under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He also submitted that, in the event of a challenge, the order of the disciplinary authority must show that the said satisfaction was arrived at on materials which were sufficient for any prudent and reasonable man to come to a conclusion that the compliance of Article 311(2) was not practicable. He also submitted that mere fact that the appellate authority affirmed the order passed by the disciplinary authority does not remove the illegality committed by the disciplinary authority in exercise of his jurisdiction and the order of the disciplinary authority, nonetheless, is open to challenge on the grounds of abuse of power or erroneous exercise of jurisdiction or assumption of jurisdictional facts not appearing from the records or satisfaction having been formed mala fide. He relied upon two judgments of the Apex Court in support of his those submissions, namely, one rendered in the case of Jaswant Singh V/s. State of Punjab and Others, reported in (1991)1 S.C.C. 362 and another in the case of Union of India V/s. R. Reddappa and Another, reported in (1993)4 S.C.C. 269 . He has also relied upon paragraph 130 of judgment of Apex Court in the case of Tulsiram Patel (supra). 13. In the case of Jaswant Singh (supra), the ratio of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Tulsiram Patel (supra) fell for consideration. The Court noticed that clause (3) of Article 311 does make satisfaction of the disciplinary authority as final but the said satisfaction was subject to two conditions; (i) that there must exist a situation which renders holding of an inquiry not reasonably practicable, and (ii) the disciplinary authority must record in writing his reasons in support of his satisfaction, challenge to existence of which renders the action open to judicial review by a Court and the Court will be within its jurisdiction to interfere with such an action if it is found to be arbitrary, mala fide, motivated by extraneous consideration or merely by way of ruse to dispense with the inquiry. The observations of the Apex Court in the said case as made in paragraph-4 of the judgment can be usefully quoted herebelow: "4. The observations of the Apex Court in the said case as made in paragraph-4 of the judgment can be usefully quoted herebelow: "4. Article 310 of our Constitution which engrafts the pleasure doctrine of the English common law is, however, qualified by the opening words "except as expressly provided by this Constitution, Article 311 is one such express provision. According to clause (1) thereof, a person who is a member of a civil service cannot be dismissed or removed from service by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. Clause (2) next provides that no such person shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. Then comes the first proviso with which we are not concerned. The second proviso has three clauses but we are concerned with clause (b) only. Clause (b) of that second proviso reads as under: "Provided further that this clause shall not apply (b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry." Thus the English doctrine incorporated in Article 310 which is qualified by the opening words "except as expressly provided by this Constitution" is subject to Articles 311(1) and (2) which contains safeguards against termination from service. However, the second proviso to Article 311(2) is again in the nature of an exception and lays down that in cases catalogued in clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof the requirement of an inquiry can be dispensed with. The scope of Articles 310 and 311 of the Constitution was examined by this Court in Union of India V/s. Tulsiram Patel wherein by majority this Court held that once the requirements of the relevant clause of the second proviso are satisfied, the services of a civil servant can be terminated without following the audi alteram partem rule. It was held that since the requirement of Article 311(2) was expressly excluded by the second proviso, there was no question of introducing the same by the back door. On this line of reasoning, the majority held that Chellappan case was not correctly decided. It was held that since the requirement of Article 311(2) was expressly excluded by the second proviso, there was no question of introducing the same by the back door. On this line of reasoning, the majority held that Chellappan case was not correctly decided. It, therefore, took the view that it is not necessary to offer a hearing to the civil servant even on the limited question of punishment. Insofar as clause (b) is concerned this Court pointed out that two conditions must be satisfied to sustain any action taken thereunder. These are (i) there must exist a situation which renders holding of any inquiry "not reasonably practicable"; and (ii) the disciplinary authority must record in writing its reasons in support of its satisfaction. Of course the question of practicability would depend on the existing fact-situation and other surrounding circumstances, that is to say, that the question of reasonable practicability must be judged in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the date of the passing of the order. Although clause (3) of that article makes the decision of the disciplinary authority in this behalf final such finality can certainly be tested in a court of law and interfered with if the action is found to be arbitrary or mala fide or motivated by extraneous considerations or merely a ruse to dispense with the inquiry." 14. After noticing the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Tulsiram Patel (supra), the Apex Court also considered the scope of subjective satisfaction of the disciplinary authority under clause (b) of Article 311(2) and held that it was incumbent on the respondents to disclose to the Court the materials in existence on the date of passing of the impugned order in support of his subjective satisfaction and also observed that the decision to dispense with the departmental inquiry cannot be rested on the ipse dixit of the concerned authority. The extract from paragraph 5 of the judgment in the case of Jaswant Singh (supra) is quoted herebelow in this regard: "5......This is no more than a mere reproduction of paragraph 3 of the impugned order. The extract from paragraph 5 of the judgment in the case of Jaswant Singh (supra) is quoted herebelow in this regard: "5......This is no more than a mere reproduction of paragraph 3 of the impugned order. Our attention was not drawn to any material existing on the date of the impugned order in support of the allegation contained in paragraph 3 thereof that the appellant had thrown threats that he and his companions will not allow holding of any departmental enquiry against him and that they would not hesitate to cause physical injury to the witnesses as well as the enquiry officer if any such attempt was made. It was incumbent on the respondents to disclose to the court the material in existence at the date of the passing of the impugned order in support of the subjective satisfaction recorded by respondent no. 3 in the impugned order. Clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) can be invoked only when the authority is satisfied from the material placed before him that it is not reasonably practicable to hold a departmental enquiry. This is clear from the following observation at page 270 of Tulsiram Case: (SCC p. 504 para 130) "A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the departments case against the Government servant is weak and must fail." The decision to dispense with the departmental enquiry cannot, therefore, be rested solely on the ipse dixit of the concerned authority. When the satisfaction of the concerned authority is questioned in a court of law, it is incumbent on those who support the order to show that the satisfaction is based on certain objective facts and is not the outcome of the whim or caprice of the concerned officer. In the counter filed by respondent 3 it is contended that the appellant, instead of replying to the show cause notices, instigated his fellow police officials to disobey the superiors. It is also said that he threw threats to beat up the witnesses and the Inquiry Officer if any departmental inquiry was held against him. No particulars are given..........." (Emphasis supplied) 15. It is also said that he threw threats to beat up the witnesses and the Inquiry Officer if any departmental inquiry was held against him. No particulars are given..........." (Emphasis supplied) 15. After the observations as quoted above, the Court examined the materials available on record and found that "subjective satisfaction recorded in paragraph 3 of the impugned order is not fortified by any independent material to justify the dispensing with of the inquiry envisaged by Article 311(2) of the Constitution". Therefore, appeal was allowed by the Apex Court and the impugned order of dismissal was quashed and the impugned order of the High Court dismissing the writ application was set aside. 16. Judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India V/s. R. Reddappa (supra) was relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, and particularly observations of the Apex Court made in paragraph-5, in respect of challenge to the order of the disciplinary authority even in cases in which appeal of the incumbents stands dismissed, the relevant extract of which is quoted herebelow: "5..........If there was no material on which any reasonable person could have come to the conclusion as is envisaged in the rule then the action was vitiated due to erroneous assumption of jurisdictional fact therefore the Tribunal was well within its jurisdiction to set aside the orders on this ground. An illegal order passed by the disciplinary authority does not assume the character of legality only because it has been affirmed in appeal or revision unless the higher authority is found to have applied its mind to the basic infirmities in the order. Mere reiteration or repetition instead of adding strength to the order renders it weaker and more vulnerable as even the higher authority constituted under the Act or the rules for proper appraisal shall be deemed to have failed in discharge of its statutory obligation." 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner also referred to the discussions by the Apex Court in paragraph 130 of Tulsiram Patels case (supra), where the significance of the expression reasonably and practicable was considered in context of the dictionary meaning of the two expressions, and some situation, by way of illustrations, were noticed, which may call for exercise of powers by a disciplinary authority under clause (b) by holding an inquiry as contemplated in clause (2) of Article 311 as not reasonably practicable. However, a word of caution was put by the Apex Court for such exercise of absolute powers by the disciplinary authority and also that the same was open to judicial review in Court, in following words: "...........A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the Departments case against the Government servant is weak and must fail. The finality given to the decision of the disciplinary authority by Article 311(3) is not binding upon the court so far as its power of judicial review is concerned and in such a case the court will strike down the order dispensing with the inquiry as also the order imposing penalty................" 18. Faced with such a situation, emerging from the observations made by the Apex Court in subsequent cases, while noticing the ratio laid down in Tulsiram Patels case (supra), learned counsel for the respondents submitted that there were enough materials available on the record which justified the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority for coming to the conclusion that any inquiry against petitioner was not reasonably practicable. He referred to the pleading made in counter affidavit filed by the respondents in this regard. In the counter affidavit, it has been pleaded that, the Civil Surgeon, Muzaffarpur, through his letter no. 7/A.A. dated 8.6.2001, had reported that on 6.6.2001 "petitioner mischieved the Civil Surgeon, Muzaffarpur in his office chamber and it was found that activities of the petitioner was indisciplined as Annexure- 7 of the writ petition". It is further said that "due to misbehaved activities and indisciplined manners of the petitioner vide letter no. 4/A.A. dated 6.6.2001 issued by the Civil Surgeon, Muzaffarpur an F.I.R. 152/01 has been registered in Sadar P.S. Muzaffarpur". It is also said in the counter affidavit that the District Magistrate, Muzaffarpur also confirmed the misbehaved and indisciplined activities of the petitioner by his letter no. 1600 dated 13.6.2001. It is also said that the charges leveled against petitioner were found very grave and hence under the provisions of schedule (Article) 311(2)(b) of the Indian Constitution, petitioner was dismissed from the Government services. 1600 dated 13.6.2001. It is also said that the charges leveled against petitioner were found very grave and hence under the provisions of schedule (Article) 311(2)(b) of the Indian Constitution, petitioner was dismissed from the Government services. Thereafter, it is said that the respondent Director was the competent authority as post of Director-in- Chief was vacant during that period and the appellate authority considered the matter in full and confirmed the said order of the disciplinary authority. It is also said that the appellate authority had heard and considered the matter in detail before dismissing the appeal. Two representations of the petitioner filed subsequently have been annexed as Annexures-A and B with the counter affidavit. Except for the above pleadings, there. is nothing else in the counter affidavit nor any other pleadings have been filed by the respondents by producing the facts and circumstances, as was available to the disciplinary authority, for coming to the conclusion that an inquiry in the matter by giving opportunity to the petitioner was not reasonably practicable. 19. However, the impugned order is a detailed one and has to be judged on its own merits. In the impugned order the extract of letter no. 7/A.A. dated 8.6.2001 is quoted. The extract shows that on 6.6.2001 at about 1.30 in the afternoon, the Civil Surgeon was sitting in his official Chamber. There, the office clerk of the office of the Regional Deputy Director of Health Services, Tirhut Division and the petitioner, who was office clerk of his office, as well as one reporter of Hindustan Hindi daily were also sitting. All of a sudden, 10-15 persons entered into his office Chamber and started enquiring from the Civil Surgeon as to what problem he had with the petitioner and why he was not acceding to his request. They started applying force and behaving in indisciplined manner and threatened him. The Civil Surgeon asked as to what work petitioner had, upon which petitioner told him that the letter issued by him in respect of one Tiwary should be cancelled. The Civil Surgeon had mentioned in the letter that the situation was such that any untoward incident could happen and therefore he was forced to cancel the order. He informed about the incident to the District Administration and the Police Administration. In the impugned order, thereafter, the contents of letter no. The Civil Surgeon had mentioned in the letter that the situation was such that any untoward incident could happen and therefore he was forced to cancel the order. He informed about the incident to the District Administration and the Police Administration. In the impugned order, thereafter, the contents of letter no. 4/A.A. dated 6.6.2001 of the Civil Surgeon addressed to the Police Station for registering an F.I.R. is also quoted, in which the Civil Surgeon claimed that, in spite of his explanation that he had issued the orders for posting of Ravindra Tiwary in the office as Head Clerk on the orders of the Directorate, he was forced to sign some orders. Thereafter, it is noticed that the Collector, Muzaffarpur, through his letter no. 160 dated 13.6.2001 had confirmed the said fact. It is mentioned that the Civil Surgeon reported further that after institution of the police case he was repeatedly threatened to withdraw the F.I.R. due to which, on account of fear, he asked the officer- in-charge to stop taking further action in the case. The impugned order also mentions that the petitioner is posted in the office of the Civil Surgeon, Muzaffarpur since long and his entire attempt was to create an atmosphere in which the inquiry in respect of forged appointments may get vitiated and the Regional Deputy Director of Health Services, Tirhut Division was also involved in the matter. The disciplinary authority, in the impugned order notices the details of the employees posted in the office of the Civil Surgeon and in the office of the Additional Chief Medical Officer, Muzaffarpur. He finds in the impugned order that petitioner is a local person and has captured the offices of the authorities of the Health Department in the District. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority notices the circumstances in which said Ravindra Tiwary was posted back in the office of Civil Surgeon by the Directorate. The Civil Surgeon implemented the said order due to which he was humiliated, assaulted, threatened etc. Petitioner did not want said Ravindra Tiwary to be posted in the office of the Civil Surgeon again and he wanted one Chandra Bhushan, who was posted in place of Sri Tiwary, to continue in the office of the Civil Surgeon as Head Clerk. The Civil Surgeon implemented the said order due to which he was humiliated, assaulted, threatened etc. Petitioner did not want said Ravindra Tiwary to be posted in the office of the Civil Surgeon again and he wanted one Chandra Bhushan, who was posted in place of Sri Tiwary, to continue in the office of the Civil Surgeon as Head Clerk. The stand of the Collector is also noticed that there was an attempt to interfere with the inquiry going on in the matter of large scale illegal appointments made by the office of the Civil Surgeon, on account of which petitioner was apprehensive, and therefore, he wanted to, directly or indirectly, keep his control in the office. After noticing these facts, it is recorded in the order that the respondent Director was satisfied that there were serious allegations of misconduct against petitioner of various kinds which show that his conduct has been like mafia or as a gang and being a local resident he gets social and political support for his activities. Hence the disciplinary authority observes that, in the light of the facts, it is not possible to get an inquiry held and ask show cause from petitioner, in terms of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India and it is not possible to take action in accordance with law in terms of the Bihar Service Code, 1952, Board Miscellaneous Rules, 1958 and Bihar and Orissa Subordinate Conduct Rules, 1935. Therefore, he relaxes the provisions applicable in the case of major punishment and, in terms of clause (b) of second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, passes the impugned order dismissing petitioner from service. 20. The contents of the impugned order have been noticed in a little detail due to the fact that the solitary counter affidavit filed by the respondents in the case does not contain any details or the materials available on the record at the time when the disciplinary authority passed the impugned order while coming to the conclusion that any inquiry against the petitioner under Article 311(2) or in terms of the Rules was not reasonably practicable. The contents of the impugned order do give some indication about the materials which were considered by the disciplinary authority for coming to such a conclusion. The contents of the impugned order do give some indication about the materials which were considered by the disciplinary authority for coming to such a conclusion. From the impugned order, it appears that on 6.6.2001 there was some untoward incident in the office of the Civil Surgeon. Some 10-15 persons barged into his office in support of petitioner and built a pressure in support of his desire to cancel the posting of said Ravindra Tiwary and allow said Chandra Bhushan to continue as Head Clerk. This solitary grievance was the root cause of the incident. This was reported by the Civil Surgeon to the Department through his letter dated 8.6.2001. He also got an F.I.R. instituted against the petitioner. This incident, as reported by the Civil Surgeon, was also probably found true by the Collector, Muzaffarpur. It is clear that, due to this incident, and in the background of the fact that this petitioner, being a local resident, posted in the office since long, having much social and political support at the local level, was in conspiracy to put all obstacles in some inquiry in respect of large scale illegal appointments made by the office of the Civil Surgeon, for which he had some support from the Regional Deputy Director of Health Services also, the disciplinary authority had come to the conclusion that any inquiry against petitioner in terms of Article 311 (2) or in terms of the Rules was not reasonably practicable and he was fit to be dismissed from service without following the audi alteram partem rule. 21. The incident and the findings and conclusion of the Civil Surgeon, Collector and the respondent Director may be correct, but the question which arises before this Court for consideration is as to whether the materials as noticed in the impugned order were sufficient enough for any reasonable prudent man to come to a conclusion that an inquiry in the circumstances was not reasonably practicable. It may be possible that any inquiry at Muzaffarpur in the office of the Civil Surgeon or in the office of the Regional Deputy Director of Health Services, Muzaffarpur was not reasonably practicable due to influence and support enjoyed by the petitioner at the local level. It may be possible that any inquiry at Muzaffarpur in the office of the Civil Surgeon or in the office of the Regional Deputy Director of Health Services, Muzaffarpur was not reasonably practicable due to influence and support enjoyed by the petitioner at the local level. But there is nothing on the record to show that petitioner was powerful or influential enough to ward off or frustrate any attempt of an inquiry at the departmental level also. Whatever influence petitioner had was apparently at local level only. Therefore, nothing prevented the respondent Director or other higher authorities of the Department to put petitioner under suspension, hold inquiry at Patna at departmental level, give him a show cause, call him at Patna to participate in the inquiry with payment of necessary traveling allowance, hear him and then pass orders in compliance with Principles of Natural Justice. 22. From the facts appearing from the order of the disciplinary authority, it is clear that, in the words of Honble Apex Court, his order suffers from erroneous assumption of jurisdictional facts which were not in existence in this case to justify his subjective satisfaction for coming to the conclusion that an inquiry, in the circumstances of the case, was not reasonably practicable. Apparently, situation was not such in this case that holding of any inquiry was not reasonably practicable even at any other place also apart from Muzaffarpur and the order impugned does not show any such situation to exist making it not reasonably practicable. On the other hand, from the order and the facts noted in the impugned order, it is clear that the act of the disciplinary authority in invoking its powers in terms of clause (b) of second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution was merely a ruse to dispense with the inquiry for his own convenience. 23. In the circumstances, this Court finds that the disciplinary authority has erroneously invoked its jurisdiction without the foundational fact situation available in the case necessitating exercise of his powers in terms of clause (b) of second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. Hence, order impugned, as contained in Annexure-11, is unsustainable in law and is therefore quashed. The order of appellate authority, as contained in Annexure-15, is also, in the circumstances, quashed. 24. Hence, order impugned, as contained in Annexure-11, is unsustainable in law and is therefore quashed. The order of appellate authority, as contained in Annexure-15, is also, in the circumstances, quashed. 24. However, this Court has merely examined the sufficiency of circumstances under which recourse was taken by the disciplinary authority in terms of clause (b) of second proviso to Article 311 (2) and has not gone into the sufficiency of materials for holding disciplinary inquiry against the petitioner. Therefore, while allowing the writ application, this Court gives liberty to the respondent Director, Health Services or any authority of the Department, who may be authorized under the law in respect of Class-Ill employees of the Department like the petitioner, to hold an inquiry in the matter in terms of Article 311(2) and in terms of Government rules in this regard, give due opportunity to the petitioner, consider his show cause and his stand and pass fresh orders in accordance with law. Respondents shall also be at liberty to put petitioner under suspension in accordance with law pending inquiry. The inquiry must be initiated within fifteen days of receipt/production of a copy of this order and must be completed within four months thereafter. During this period, petitioner shall not be entitled to join his services and payment of his salary. However, in case the inquiry does not conclude within the aforesaid period or concludes in favour of petitioner, petitioner will be entitled to join his last place of posting and shall be entitled to his current salary from the date of his joining. So far as arrears salary of the petitioner for the period his writ application remained pending in this Court, the respondents shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner remained out of service throughout the period due to the pendency of the writ application in this Court since 2002. 25. The writ application is accordingly allowed with the aforesaid observations and directions.