ORDER : M.M. Das, J. A consent memo has been filed in favour of Mr. B. Routray, learned senior counsel to appear on behalf of the petitioner in Court today. The same be kept on record. Mr. S. Mishra, learned counsel has entered as a Caveator on behalf of the contesting Opp. Parties. 2. The petitioner in this writ petition has challenged the order dated 20-7-2010 passed in I.A. No. 84 of 2010 arising out of C.S. No. 278 of 2010 by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Angul. The opp. party No. 1 - institution is a technical educational institution, which has been formed by virtue of a registered deed of trust of 1989. Due to dissension amongst the parties, earlier C.S. No. 69 of 2002 was filed before the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Angul, which was ultimately disposed of by judgment dated 21-3-2006. The learned Civil Judge in the said suit refused to grant permanent injunction against the defendants therein and declared that there were only three new trustees, namely, Bansidhar Pradhan, the petitioner herein, and the opp. parties 2 and 3 to this writ petition. Against the aforesaid judgment, RFA No. 5 of 2006 was filed before the learned Additional District Judge, Angul, which was disposed of by judgment dated 10-1-2007. The learned Additional District Judge by the aforesaid judgment confirmed the judgment of the learned trial Court which respect to the trusteeship of the present petitioner and the present opp. party No. 3, whereas the trusteeship of opp. party No. 2 as declared by the learned trial Court was set aside. Against the aforesaid judgment in appeal, RSA No. 47 of 2007 has been filed by one Lambodhar Pradhan, wherein the present petitioner as well as the opp. parties and others have been made respondents. Similarly, the present opp. parties 2 and 3 along with proforma opp. party No. 4 have jointly filed RSA No. 152 of 2007 before this Court. Both the appeals are pending and the question of trusteeship of the present opp. party No. 2 is yet to be decided. Another writ petition, being W.P.(C) No. 3881 of 2007 was filed by the present opp. party No. 3 challenging the order dated 25-2-2007 passed by the Commissioner-cum-D.T.E. & T., Orissa holding that certain documents alleged to have been created by the opp. party No. 3 in connivance with one Kishore Ch. party No. 2 is yet to be decided. Another writ petition, being W.P.(C) No. 3881 of 2007 was filed by the present opp. party No. 3 challenging the order dated 25-2-2007 passed by the Commissioner-cum-D.T.E. & T., Orissa holding that certain documents alleged to have been created by the opp. party No. 3 in connivance with one Kishore Ch. Nath, who was not a trustee are illegal and null and void. A Division Bench of this Court by order dated 11-4-2007 observing that the Court wanted to pass a detailed order on merit holding that the impugned letter under Annexure-4 (order of the Commissioner-cum-D.T.E. & T.) dated 2-3-2007 is perfectly right, allowed the petitioners therein to withdraw the writ petition (W.P.(C) No. 3881 of 2007) by recording that the writ petition is dismissed as withdrawn. Several other litigations are also pending and in Criminal Revision No. 1483 of 2007 filed by one Bira Kishore Patel claiming himself to be the Principal wherein the present petitioner is an intervenor - opp. party, this Court in the order dated 13-12-2007 has passed an order to maintain status quo in respect of the possession of the institution. 3. It appears that thereafter, the opp. parties 2 and 3 have filed the present suit being C.S. No. 278 of 2010 praying for a decree of permanent injunction and an interim application being I.A. No. 84 of 2010 was filed praying for interim injunction against the petitioner, who is the defendant No. 1 in the suit, from interfering with the affairs of the institution. 4. Mr. Routray learned senior counsel submits that the suit itself has been filed by the opp. parties 2 and 3 relying upon the self-same fabricated documents which were dealt with by this Court in the aforesaid W.P.(C) No. 3881 of 2007 and, as such, the entire suit is vexatious amounting to abuse of the process of law. The petitioner filed applications under the provision of Section 10 read with Section 151 C.P.C. for stay of further proceedings in the suit as well as in the interim application. The learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Angul on considering the pleadings allowed the petition filed by the petitioner and stayed further proceedings of the Civil Suit since the previous suit being C.S. No. 69 of 2010 is now pending before this Court in the aforesaid two Second Appeals. The learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Angul on considering the pleadings allowed the petition filed by the petitioner and stayed further proceedings of the Civil Suit since the previous suit being C.S. No. 69 of 2010 is now pending before this Court in the aforesaid two Second Appeals. However, the learned trial Court did not stay the hearing of the interim application filed by the plaintiffs for grant of interim injunction. 5. Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the opp. parties strenuously urges that it is well settled in law that stay of a suit under Section 10 of the C.P.C. does not mean that interim application for injunction, receiver or any other appropriate order like attachment before judgment, cannot be entertained by the Court in which the suit is pending. 6. Mr. Routray, on the contrary, submits that the decision relied upon by the learned Court below do not apply to the facts of the present case. 7. The moot question, therefore, which arises in this writ petition is, as to whether, there can be a general principle of law that when further proceeding in a suit is stayed by exercise of jurisdiction under Section 10 C.P.C., the same would not amount to stay of interim application wherein prayer for interim injunction or appointment of receiver or for attachment before judgment is made. 8. Mr. Mishra, relied upon the decision in the case of Indian Bank v. Maharashtra State Co-operative Marketing Federation Ltd., AIR 1998 SC 1952 and the decision of this Court in the case of Bijay Kumar Agarwalla and another v. Ramakanta Das, (1987) 64 CLT 540, in support of his contention that further proceedings in the interim application, where a prayer for interim injunction has been made as in the present case, should not be stayed. It should be noted at this juncture that further proceeding in C.S. No. 278 of 2010 has been stayed by the learned Court below on the application made by the petitioner under Section 10 of the C.P.C. and that, the said suit has been filed with a prayer for passing a decree of permanent injunction restraining the present petitioner who is defendant No. 1 in the suit and his henchman, from entering into the institution and interfering with any matter relating to the institution. The prayer in the interim application is also to injunct the petitioner from interfering with the affairs of the institution till disposal of the suit. It may be further noted that since further proceedings in the suit has been stayed under Section 10 of the C.P.C. by the learned trial Court, passing an interim injunction in favour of the plaintiffs would practically amount to passing a permanent order of injunction as the said suit, which has been stayed, cannot be proceeded with and further proceeding of which depends on the result of the Second Appeals pending before this Court. It, therefore, would mean that if an order of interim injunction is passed on the interim application, by the learned trial Court, in favour of the plaintiffs, the said order will continue and will not come to an end even if the plaintiffs might be having no merit in the suit. 9. The Supreme Court in the case of Indian Bank (supra) was considering the question as to whether the bar to proceed with the trial of a subsequently instituted suit contained in Section 10 of the C.P.C. is applicable to summary suit filed under Order 37 of the Code. While dealing with the aforesaid question, the Supreme Court held that the word "trial" in Section 10 of the C.P.C. will have to be interpreted and construed keeping in mind the object and nature of that provision and the prohibition to proceed with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit. The Supreme Court observed that the object of the prohibition contained in Section 10 of the C.P.C. is to prevent the Courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel suits and also to avoid inconsistent findings on the matters in issue. While holding thus, the Supreme Court has made an observation in the said decision that it has been construed by the Court as not a bar of the passing of interlocutory orders such as an order for consolidation of the later suit with the earlier suit or appointment of receiver or an injunction or attachment before judgment. 10. While holding thus, the Supreme Court has made an observation in the said decision that it has been construed by the Court as not a bar of the passing of interlocutory orders such as an order for consolidation of the later suit with the earlier suit or appointment of receiver or an injunction or attachment before judgment. 10. The Supreme Court laid down that the course of action, which the Court has to follow according to Section 10 is not to proceed with the 'trial' of the suit but that does not mean that it cannot deal with the subsequent suit any more or for any other purpose. In view of the object and nature of the provision and the fairly settled legal position with respect to passing of interlocutory orders it has to be stated that the word 'trial' in Section 10 is not used in its widest sense. 11. In the case of Bijay Kumar Agrawalla and another (supra), this Court was dealing with an order of stay passed by this Court in a revision petition and during subsistence of order of stay, whether the trial Court had jurisdiction to entertain an application under Order 38, Rule 5 C.P.C. for attachment before the judgment. The matter arose out of a money claim. While considering the aforesaid question, this Court interpreting the meaning and import of an order of stay of further proceedings in the suit passed by the revisional Court, referring to decisions of various High Courts held that when the trial of the suit is stayed, the trial Court retains its jurisdiction to pass interlocutory order for the purpose of keeping the proceeding alive or for preserving the subject-matter in dispute for protecting the interest of the parties to the suit during pendency of the stay order passed by the appellate Court or revisional Court. Agreeing with the view of the Madras, Mysore, Madhya Pradesh and Bombay High Courts, this Court held that the lower Court retains its jurisdiction to consider and pass interlocutory orders in matters which are collateral or which may be protective or which be for the purpose of keeping the lis alive even during subsistence of the order of the superior Court directing stay of further proceedings in the suit. However, this Court in the said case categorically held that the Court should take care to ascertain that the subject-matter in the petition does not touch the trial of the suit which has been stayed by the superior Court and to hold otherwise may in many cases work out injustice inasmuch as for every collateral matter, the parties will be compelled to approach the appellate or revisional Court though such a matter may not be within the ambit and scope of appeal or revision pending before the superior Court. (Emphasis supplied) 12. It, therefore, transpires that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Indian Bank (supra) is squarely distinguishable on facts from the present case. More so, even applying the principles laid down therein, interpreting the word "trial" in Section 10 of the C. P. C. keeping in mind the object and nature of that provision, it would be seen that since both the prayers made in the suit as well as the interim application are to injunct the present petitioner from interfering with the affairs of the institution and at this juncture, applying the ratio of the decision in the case of Bijay Kumar Agarwalla (supra) as it would be seen that if the interim application is taken up for hearing, it would touch the merit of the suit, further proceeding of which has been stayed under Section 10 of the C. P. C., this Court is of the view that in the present case, the learned trial Court is required to stay its hands from deciding the interim application wherein a similar prayer as that made in the suit has been made for grant of injunction against the present petitioner. 13. Answering the question framed in paragraph-7 above, this Court, therefore, finds that it cannot, as a general principle of law, be laid down that wherever further proceeding of a suit has been stayed under Section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, the trial Court can proceed with any interim application filed by any of the parties in spite of such stay order. It is to be examined in the facts of each case as to whether proceeding with any interim application, where interim prayer is made by any of the parties to the suit, would touch the merit of the suit/the issue raised in the suit in any manner. It is to be examined in the facts of each case as to whether proceeding with any interim application, where interim prayer is made by any of the parties to the suit, would touch the merit of the suit/the issue raised in the suit in any manner. If that be so, the trial Court should not proceed with such interim application. 14. Therefore, the order impugned in this writ petition passed on 20-7-2010 refusing to stay further proceedings in the interim application No. 84 of 2010 at Annexure-9 is quashed and the learned trial Court is directed not to proceed with the said interim application No. 84 of 2010 till disposal of the Second Appeals pending before this Court. 15. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.