JUDGMENT: 1. Appeal admitted. By consent heard finally, forthwith. 2. The Second Appeal has been preferred against the judgement and order of the appellate Court i.e. the additional District Judge, Pune in Civil Appeal No.378 of 1996 by the original plaintiff. The appeal filed by the respondent/defendant was allowed by the district Court and the suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff was dismissed with costs. 3. The undisputed facts are as follows: A shop was let out by the plaintiff to the defendant on a monthly tenancy. It appears that the defendant fell in arrears of rent from 1.5.1991. The plaintiff, therefore, filed a suit for eviction of the defendant on various grounds including (i) arrears of rent (ii) nuisance and (iii) damage to the property. The suit was filed under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. The defendant resisted the suit by filing his written statement denying the contents of the plaint. The trial Court decided the suit on 10.1.1996 and decreed the same. The trial Court held that the defendant was in arrears of rent and that the tenancy had been validly terminated. The trial Court also held that the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act were not applicable to the suit premises. 4. Aggrieved by the decision of the trial Court, the defendant preferred an appeal before the additional District Judge, Pune. While that appeal was pending, a notification was issued on 11.9.1997 by which the limits of the municipal corporation were extended to the area in which the suit premises were situated. The appellate Court, therefore, held that the suit filed by the plaintiff was not tenable as it had not been filed under the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act (for short, `Bombay Rent Act;). The appellate Court observed that in view of a decision of the Supreme Court the appellate Court was bound to take into account the changes in the law and to extend its benefit to the litigant. 5. The plaintiff has preferred the present appeal, being aggrieved by the decision of the appellate Court. 6. The appellate Court observed that in view of a decision of the Supreme Court the appellate Court was bound to take into account the changes in the law and to extend its benefit to the litigant. 5. The plaintiff has preferred the present appeal, being aggrieved by the decision of the appellate Court. 6. The substantial questions of law which arise for consideration in the present appeal are as follows: (a) Whether the lower appellate Court ought to have held that the notification for inclusion of the area, being subsequent to the date of the decree of the trial court, the suit would continue to be governed by the provisions of Transfer of Property Act and the learned lower appellate Court ought to have proceeded to examine the case on merits? (b) Whether in view of the clear proviso to section 50 of Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act and the interpretation thereof by the full bench judgment of this Hon'ble Court as well as by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the lower Appellate Court was justified in holding that the suit ought to governed by the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act even if during the appeal the Act has been made applicable? 7. Before considering the judgments cited at the bar it would be appropriate to set out the relevant provisions of section 50 of the Bombay Rent Act. Section 50 of the Bombay Rent Act reads thus: 50. Repeal. - The Bombay Rent Restriction Act, 1939, and the Bombay Rents, Hotel Rates and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1944, are hereby repealed. Before considering the judgments cited at the bar it would be appropriate to set out the relevant provisions of section 50 of the Bombay Rent Act. Section 50 of the Bombay Rent Act reads thus: 50. Repeal. - The Bombay Rent Restriction Act, 1939, and the Bombay Rents, Hotel Rates and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1944, are hereby repealed. Provided that all suits and proceedings between a landlord and a tenant relating to the recovery of fixing of rent or possession of any premises to which the provisions of Part II apply and all suits and proceedings by a manager of a hotel or an owner of a lodging house against a lodger for the recovery of charges for, or possession of, the accommodation provided in a hotel or loding house situated in an area to which Part III applies, which are pending in any Court, shall be transferred to an continued before the Courts which would have jurisdiction to try such suits or proceedings under this Act or shall be continued in such Courts, as the case may be, and all the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder shall apply to all such suits and proceedings. Nothing in this proviso shall apply to execution proceedings and appeals arising out of decrees or orders passed before the coming into operation of this Act and such execution proceedings and appeals shall be decided and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed: ............... (a) ............. (b) ............. Thus, it is clear that the para which is added below the proviso by the amendment made to the Act by Bombay Act 3 of 1949 specifically provides that the act would not be applicable to appeals against the decrees which were passed prior to the act coming into operation for the area within which the suit premises are situated. In my opinion, the questions raised in the present second appeal are no longer res integra. 8. In my opinion, the questions raised in the present second appeal are no longer res integra. 8. In the case of Motiram Ghelabhai (supra), the Supreme Court posed the same question as the one which arises in the present appeal, namely: "The short question raised in this appeal is whether a pending appeal would be governed by the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (for short the Act) upon the Part II of the Act being made applicable to the area in which the suit premises were situate during its pendency? The Supreme court considered the legislative amendments and the changes brought in by the Bombay Act 3 of 1949 which set at rest the conflict which had arisen after the enactment of the Bombay Rent Act 1947. The Supreme Court then considered section 50 and the proviso thereto including the new paragraph added after the first proviso. In para 10 of the judgment, the Supreme court has held as follows: "10. Having regard to the aforesaid conclusion which we have reached on the true nature and scope of the proviso to s. 50 of the Act it would be clear that the present case, in which an appeal (arising out of a decree passed in a suit filed under the Transfer of Property Act) was pending when Part II of the Act was made applicable to village Kalwada, would be directly covered by the proviso read with the separate paragraph added thereto and the appeal was liable to be decided and disposed of as if the 1947 Act had not been passed, that is to say, had to be disposed of in accordance with the law that was then applicable to it In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the learned Assistant Judge as well as the High Court were right In coming to the conclusion that the appellant-plaintiff was not entitled to any protection of the 1947 Act as claimed by him." 9. The learned advocate for the respondent relied on the decision of the apex Court in the case of Lakshmi Narayan Guin & Ors. v. Niranjan Modak, AIR 1985 SC 111 wherein the Supreme Court considered the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. In this judgment the Supreme Court held that the Court must take into account a change in the law, pending an appeal. v. Niranjan Modak, AIR 1985 SC 111 wherein the Supreme Court considered the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. In this judgment the Supreme Court held that the Court must take into account a change in the law, pending an appeal. The Apex Court further held that if the applicability of the Act was extended to a particular area after the passing of a eviction decree but during the pendency of an appeal, the provisions of the amended Act must be considered by the Court while disposing of the appeal. The learned advocate for the respondent submits that it is this judgment which has been rightly followed by the appellate Court. He further submits that although this judgment in the case of Lakshmi Narayan Guin & Ors. (supra), was delivered earlier than the decision in Motiram Ghelabhai v. Jagan Nagar (supra), unfortunately that judgment in Lakshmi Narayan Guin & Ors. (supra) was not pointed out to the Court while delivering the judgment in Motiram Ghelabhai v. Jagan Nagar (supra). 10. It is true that the judgment in the case of Lakshmi Narayan Guin & Ors. (supra), has not been referred by the Supreme court in the case of Motiram Ghelabhai v. Jagan Nagar (supra). However, in my opinion, the decision in the case of Lakshmi Narayan Guin & Ors. (supra) is not applicable to the present case. This is because that judgment was with respect to the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and the judgment in the case of Motiram Ghelabhai v. Jagan Nagar (supra), is directly related to the facts in the present case as it deals with the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947, and more particularly section 50 of the Act. Apart from this, there is nothing to suggest that the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act has a provision which is similar to the para added after the proviso. This para specifically enjoins that the appeals would be heard in accordance with the earlier law prevalent under which the suit was decided. Therefore, in my opinion, it is the judgment in Motiram Ghelabhai v. Jagan Nagar (supra), which must be followed while dealing with the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act. 11. The appeal is therefore allowed and the decision of the appellate Court is set aside. Therefore, in my opinion, it is the judgment in Motiram Ghelabhai v. Jagan Nagar (supra), which must be followed while dealing with the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act. 11. The appeal is therefore allowed and the decision of the appellate Court is set aside. As the appellate Court had not decided the appeal on merits, Civil Appeal No. 378 of 1996 is remanded to the Appellate Court for a decision on merits. The appeal is of the year 1996. Therefore, the appellate Court is directed to dispose of the appeal within one year from today. Parties to appear before the appellate Court on 3.5.010 for further directions. 12. Second appeal is disposed of accordingly. No costs.